Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During a pat-down search of Brown, Chicago officers recovered a loaded handgun from his pocket and packets of a suspected narcotic from the driver’s seat of his car. Brown was charged with being an armed habitual criminal and possessing a controlled substance. Two attorneys appeared on Brown’s behalf. The court questioned the venire members in panels and conferred with the attorneys at a sidebar to discuss objections. The court held eight sidebars off the record before announcing that a jury had been selected. The judge then went back on the record, outside the presence of the jury, and explained the challenges for cause and for peremptory challenges. The jury found Brown guilty of being an armed habitual criminal. In his motion for a new trial, Brown did not challenge the sidebars. On appeal, Brown argued that he was deprived of his constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the proceeding and asserted that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the process where jurors were challenged at sidebars without Brown himself being present.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Brown did not establish prejudice; he failed to show that he was not tried by an impartial jury. Brown was present in the courtroom for all the questioning of the venire members; the record is silent as to whether Brown talked with counsel about venire members before the sidebars. Without any evidence that counsel failed to represent Brown’s interests at the sidebars, there is no basis to conclude that counsell rendered deficient performance by failing to object to the procedure. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Cothron. employed by a White Castle restaurant in Illinois since 2004, filed a class action on behalf of all Illinois White Castle employees. White Castle required its employees to scan their fingerprints to access their pay stubs and computers. A third-party vendor verified each scan and authorized the employee’s access. The complaint alleged that White Castle implemented this biometric-collection system in violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d), which became effective in 2008 and provides that a private entity may not “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain” a person’s biometric data without first providing notice to and receiving consent from the person; a private entity may not “disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate” biometric data without consent. White Castle did not seek her consent to acquire her fingerprint biometric data until 2018.White Castle argued that the action was untimely because her claim accrued in 2008 when White Castle first obtained her biometric data after the Act’s effective date. The district court agreed with Cothron. The Seventh Circuit certified an interlocutory appeal, then certified a question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that a separate claim accrues under the Act each time a private entity scans or transmits an individual’s biometric identifier or information in violation of section 15(b) or 15(d). View "Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law

Tims filed a class-action lawsuit against Black Horse, his former employer, alleging violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(a)), concerning the retention and deletion of biometric information, and sections 15(b) and 15(d), concerning the consensual collection and disclosure of biometric identifiers and biometric information. The Cook County circuit court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely, reasoning that it was timely filed because the five-year limitations period (Code of Civil Procedure section 13-205) applied to the Act, which does not contain a limitations period. Tims subsequently amended his complaint to name an additional class representative. Black Horse moved to reconsider its motion to dismiss and to certify, for immediate appeal, the question of which limitations period controlled. The circuit court certified the question. The appellate court allowed the interlocutory appeal and held that the one-year limitations period (section 13-201) governs actions under section 15(c) and 15(d) of the Act and that the five-year limitations period governs actions under section 15(a), 15(b), and 15(e) of the Act.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the five-year default limitations period governs claims under the Act, noting the need to ensure certainty, predictability, and uniformity as to when the limitations period expires in each subsection. View "Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc." on Justia Law

After a 2016 single-car collision, Galarza was found guilty of DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1)), failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident (11-601(a)), and operating an uninsured motor vehicle (3-707). The appellate court affirmed his conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. The prosecution conceded error on the conviction for operating an uninsured motor vehicle, which was reversed. The court further determined the trial court had not been required to admonish Galarza under Rule 402(a), as his stipulated bench trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Viewing the stipulated evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found Galarza guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. A stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea if the state’s entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the defendant does not present or preserve a defense or the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant.” If a stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea, the court must give the defendant Rule 402(a) guilty plea admonishments. Galarza did more than deny stipulated facts, he presented a defense. View "People v. Galarza" on Justia Law

In 1993, Clark entered Catlin's Galesburg apartment to commit robbery. Clark was 24 years old; Catlin was 89. Clark killed Catlin by cutting her throat, then robbed the apartment. Clark pled guilty but mentally ill to first-degree murder and robbery. Clark suffered from antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and fetal alcohol syndrome. He had an IQ of 79 and the intellectual ability of a 13-14-year-old; he had been severely abused as a child and had an extensive criminal history. Clark was sentenced to 90 years of imprisonment for the murder, with a consecutive 15-year prison sentence for the robbery. The appellate court affirmed. In 2001 and 2012 Clark filed unsuccessful post-conviction petitions.In a 2018 motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, Clark challenged the constitutionality of his sentence as inconsistent with the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause. Clark argued that his sentence was the functional equivalent of a life sentence and that the circuit court failed to give sufficient weight to the characteristics of his intellectual disabilities and his young age as mitigation factors. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief.The proportionate penalties clause requires penalties to be determined with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship and provides a limitation on penalties beyond those afforded by the eighth amendment. Precedent does not establish “cause” for relaxing the res judicata doctrine with respect to the issues Clark raised, which were decided on direct appeal. Clark also cannot establish prejudice under the cause-and-prejudice test by advancing a challenge to his sentence as it relates to his intellectual disabilities. “Neurological development was not a prospect for” Clark. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

Duniver, lost his leg during a 2017 workplace accident. In 2019, Duniver filed a personal injury lawsuit seeking recovery from multiple defendants. Weeks later, Duniver filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection and failed to disclose the personal injury lawsuit, answering “no” when asked whether he was suing anyone. He then checked “[y]es” in response to a question asking if he had “Other contingent or unliquidated claims of every nature, including counterclaims of the debtor and rights to set off claims.” Duniver listed: Workman’s Comp. On another form, he checked “[y]es” in response to: “Within 1 year before you filed for bankruptcy, were you a party in any lawsuit, court action, or administrative proceeding,” A collections action filed against Duniver was listed, but the personal injury case was not included.The defendants argued judicial estoppel prohibited Duniver from pursuing his personal injury lawsuit and that Duniver lacked standing to sue them where the injury claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Duniver then filed amended bankruptcy schedules disclosing his personal injury case. The bankruptcy case was dismissed. The circuit court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding Duniver “blatantly deceived” the bankruptcy trustee and that any claim would have to be pursued on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Duniver had standing and the evidence failed to show an intent to deceive or mislead. View "Duniver v. Clark Material Handling Co." on Justia Law

Heineman was the driver in a single-vehicle accident that resulted in the death of his passenger. Fisher— an officer who investigated the case—testified that he was familiar with the law and had received training on a mathematical formula for converting blood serum alcohol concentration into a whole blood equivalent. Fisher testified— over objection—that he learned of Heineman’s blood serum alcohol concentration test results and could apply the formula. He explained, “[y]ou would divide the blood serum level, which in this case is .155, by 1.18 to get a [whole blood alcohol concentration of] [.]131,” which exceeds the legal limit for DUI in Illinois. Heineman was convicted of two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (2), (d)(1)(F)).The Illinois Supreme Court reversed as to count I; the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting Fisher’s testimony regarding the conversion factor, such that the state failed to prove Heineman’s whole blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 or greater when he drove. The court affirmed on count II, in which the state was required to prove he was under the influence of alcohol when he drove. Heineman conceded that, besides his whole blood alcohol concentration, the state presented other evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he was driving while under the influence and that evidence could sustain his conviction on count II despite any failure to prove his whole blood alcohol concentration. View "People v. Heineman" on Justia Law

Jones was arrested following a traffic stop and was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a). Officer Wakeland testified that he searched the car and found two rounds of .40-caliber ammunition in the glove compartment. Jones stated that the ammunition belonged to her husband; she acknowledged that she had a 2002 felony conviction for identity theft. Jones explained that she and her husband shared a vehicle; her husband had guns and a FOID card. Her husband, Brown, testified that although the vehicle was registered in Jone's name only, he also used the vehicle and sometimes took his firearm with him. Brown identified his FOID card and the.40-caliber cartridges as his. Jones knew that Brown transported a firearm in her car. The jury was instructed that the state must prove: “That the defendant knowingly possessed firearm ammunition; and Second Proposition: That the defendant had previously been convicted of the offense of Identity Theft.” The jury asked for the definition of “knowingly.” The court responded that the word should be given its plain meaning "within the jury’s common understanding.”The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Jones’s conviction, rejecting a challenge to the jury instructions. Defense counsel’s strategy with respect to the jury’s question was reasonable. A rational trier of fact could have found Jones had control over the premises where the ammunition was located and could find that she knowingly possessed the ammunition. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Chaudhary arrived in the U.S. from Pakistan in 2007-2008. She married Ramzan while in Pakistan. They have three children together. Ramzan also has a daughter from a different marriage. In 2012, Chaudhary divorced Ramzan. She moved to West Chicago (White Oak address). Chaudhary received Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits for herself and her three children. He separately received benefits for himself and his daughter. Under separate accounts, Chaudhary and Ramzan received SNAP benefits from May 2015-December 2017, both listing the White Oak address as their SNAP benefits mailing address. In 2019, the Department of Human Services investigated Chaudhary under the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/12-4.4) and determined that she received overpayments totaling $21,821. The Department began an overpayment collection process. Chaudhary filed an agency appeal. The ALJ and the Secretary of Human Services upheld the determination.The circuit court reversed. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Chaudhary, as a SNAP recipient, having been previously approved and awarded SNAP benefits, was not required to prove the absence of an overpayment. The Department’s evidence was not sufficiently authenticated and does not support the determination that Ramzan resided at White Oak during the overpayment period. The Secretary’s credibility determination was unreasonable and not supported by the record. View "Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

A 1998 Chicago ordinance includes procedures, penalties, and fees that apply to vehicle owners when a vehicle has been impounded because of its use in certain municipal code offenses. Within 15 days of the impoundment, an owner may request a preliminary hearing, at which an administrative law officer determines whether there is probable cause to believe the vehicle was used in an enumerated offense. If the officer finds probable cause, the owner may regain possession of the vehicle by paying the administrative penalty applicable to the municipal code offense, plus towing and storage fees. If probable cause is lacking, the vehicle is returned to the owner; no penalty or fees are owed. An administrative penalty constitutes a debt that may be enforced as a judgment.Illinois Vehicle Code, section 11-207 provides that while local authorities can adopt additional traffic regulations, “no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter unless expressly authorized herein.” Home rule units, such as Chicago, cannot adopt inconsistent local police regulations. In 2012, the Vehicle Code was amended to authorize municipalities to “provide by ordinance procedures for the release of properly impounded vehicles” and to impose “a reasonable administrative fee related to … administrative and processing costs.”The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a purported class action challenging the ordinance. A home rule unit’s imposition of penalties does not interfere with and is not inconsistent with state efforts to allow municipalities to recoup the remedial costs incurred by an impoundment. The imposition of the penalty is a valid exercise of Chicago’s home rule authority and does not constitute a criminal penalty for purposes of double jeopardy. View "Lintzeris v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law