Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Davidson was charged with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i)), for pushing Correctional Officer Stitt in the chest. Stitt was on duty at the Montgomery County Jail when he heard loud banging, investigated, and noticed that a dry-erase board had been knocked off the wall. Stitt then saw Davidson screaming and swearing. Stitt explained that any yelling at the jail needed to be stopped immediately to reduce the likelihood of escalation among the inmates. Davidson refused to comply. Stitt informed him that he would be placed on lockdown. Davidson stated Stitt “would have to make [him] go on lockdown.” As Stitt attempted to block Davidson from running. Davidson shoved Stitt in the chest. Stitt, who was not injured, subdued Davidson. Stitt did not testify that he felt insulted or provoked by Davidson’s push. Davidson admitted to yelling and running away from Stitt. He denied hitting Stitt.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Davidson's conviction. The trier of fact must consider the context of the conduct when determining whether the contact was insulting or provoking. The physical contact was precipitated by Davidson’s intentional disregard of Stitt’s commands and taunting of Stitt; it would be reasonable for the jury to infer that Davidson’s act was insulting or was provoking a physical altercation. The state is not required to prove that a battery victim subjectively felt insulted or provoked by the contact but need only prove that a reasonable person would have felt insulted or provoked by the physical contact. View "People v. Davidson" on Justia Law

In 2011, police officers stopped Villareal while he was driving a car the officers believed had been involved in a neighborhood shooting. During the traffic stop, officers searched the car and recovered a fully loaded handgun. Villareal was charged with several offenses related to the firearm. Villareal pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a gang member (720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1). The circuit court sentenced Villareal to four years in prison. Villareal subsequently filed a petition, arguing his sentence was improperly increased by mandatory supervised release.The circuit court dismissed the petition. On appeal, Villareal challenged section 24-1.8(a)(1) as facially unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because it impermissibly criminalized his status as a gang member. He also argued that it violated substantive due process. The appellate court rejected Villareal’s Eighth Amendment challenge and declined to address the due process claim, as it was raised for the first time in Villareal’s supplemental brief.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in curbing gang violence in public places and is not unconstitutionally vague. The court noted plain language explaining when a person is an active gang member. Villareal did not allege or show all gang membership is involuntary. View "People v. Villareal" on Justia Law

In July 2017, Cross was charged with murder. He remained in custody through trial. At a preliminary hearing, the court ordered Cross to respond to the state’s motion for pretrial discovery within 30 days, with written notice of any defenses. The court granted Cross six continuances, attributing each delay to Cross for purposes of the 120-day statutory speedy-trial term. On July 16, 2018, the defense indicated "ready for trial" and demanded a speedy trial. Trial was set for September 24, 2018; the 70-day period after July 16 would be attributable to the state. On August 21, Cross first raised an alibi defense. The state argued that the alibi would have been known to Cross for a year, that the late disclosure would require further investigation, and that the time from July 16 to September 24 should be attributable to Cross The court attributed the 36-day period before August 21 to the state but attributed the subsequent 34-day period to Cross. The court set a new trial date of November 6; the delay after September 24 was attributed to the state. Defense counsel did not object to a statement that the speedy-trial term would run on November 29.On appeal following his conviction, Cross first argued that his statutory speedy-trial rights were violated. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court rejected his argument that there is no delay unless a trial date is postponed. Cross received effective assistance of counsel. View "People v. Cross" on Justia Law

The Chicago Sun-Times sent Cook County Health and Hospitals System a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1) for information about gunshot wound patients who arrive at the defendant’s emergency rooms unaccompanied by law enforcement. The newspaper was investigating whether the defendant was meeting a requirement to notify local law enforcement when so-called “walk-in” gunshot wound patients are treated, 20 ILCS 2630/3, and asked for the “time/date” of each relevant hospital admission and the corresponding “time/date” of law enforcement notification. Cook County asserted two FOIA exemptions and withheld the records, claiming they contained personal health information prohibited from disclosure by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (110 Stat. 1936) and private information barred from disclosure under FOIA. The newspaper argued that the year listed on each record was discoverable, even if the time of day, day of the month, and month were not.The Cook County circuit court granted the defendant summary judgment. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed, holding that HIPAA and FOIA permitted the release of the year elements of the records as long as the individual identifying information was redacted, or “deidentified” to maintain patient confidentiality. View "Chicago Sun-Times v. Cook County Health and Hospital System" on Justia Law

The Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging (NIAAA), sought mandamus relief against the Department on Aging. The Department had designated NIAAA as a regional administrative agency (RAA) for administering programs created by the Adult Protective Services Act. NIAAA had filed petitions for administrative hearings; the Department rejected both petitions, finding that neither presented a “contested case” for which an administrative hearing is required. The first petition requested a recall of a new Protective Act Program Services Manual. NIAAA claims that the Department retaliated by terminating its grant and its position as RAA. NIAAA requested the Department to adopt administrative rules for “contested case” hearings and to compensate NIAAA for the lost funding. In its second petition, NIAAA requested a hearing on the Department’s rejection of NIAAA’s designation of Protective Act providers.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal of the mandamus complaint. The Department has adopted the requested administrative rules, so those allegations are moot. The Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 5 ILCS 100/1-1 does not require hearings on the other allegations. Nothing in the relevant statutes and regulations provides that the Department's decision regarding funding and service provider designations are to be made only after an opportunity for a hearing. Under the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions, procedural due process protections are triggered only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is implicated. NIAAA does not have a constitutionally protected interest in the funding or its service provider designation. View "Nyhammer v. Basta" on Justia Law

The Condominium Property Act requires condominium unit sellers to obtain specific disclosure documents from the Association or its agent before a sale and to provide them to potential buyers on request. After entering into a standard sales contract with a potential buyer who requested those disclosures, Channon obtained them from Westward, a management agent hired by the Association’s board of managers. Westward charged $245 for the documents. Channon filed a class-action lawsuit, alleging that Westward violated section 22.1 of the Act by charging unreasonable fees for the statutorily required documents and violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.In response to a certified question, the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 22.1 does not provide an implied cause of action in favor of a condominium unit seller against a property manager, as an agent of an association or board of directors, based on allegations that the manager charged excessive fees for the production of information required to be disclosed under that statute. The standard for a court to imply a private right of action in a statute is quite high. That extraordinary step should be taken only when it is clearly needed to advance the statutory purpose and when the statute would “be ineffective, as a practical matter, unless a private right of action were implied.” View "Channon v. Westward Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Sheckler rented residential property from McIntosh. The lease provided McIntosh “shall maintain fire and other hazard insurance on the premises only” and that Sheckler was responsible for insurance on possessions contained in the premises. The lease's indemnification clause exculpated McIntosh from any damages or injury occurring on the premises. McIntosh obtained insurance from Auto-Owners; first-party dwelling coverage provided coverage for fire damage and third-party landlord liability coverage provided coverage for claims brought by third parties that the insured “becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of or arising out of bodily injury or property damage.” The third-party coverage provided a duty to defend any claim covered by the policy, excluding “property damage to property occupied or used by an insured or rented to or in the care of, any insured.” The policy listed McIntosh as the only named insured. McIntosh claims no money received from Sheckler was used to pay the annual premium.Sheckler notified McIntosh that the gas stove was not working. McIntosh placed a service call. The technician’s efforts resulted in a fire that caused substantial property damage. Auto-Owners paid McIntosh for damages incurred due to the fire and lost rental income and filed a subrogation action against the technician (Workman), who filed a third-party contribution complaint against Sheckler. Sheckler tendered the defense to Auto-Owners, which rejected the claim. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the rejection of Sheckler’s claim. An insurer’s duty to defend or indemnify does not extend to the tenant of an insured property against a third-party negligence contribution claim when the tenant is not identified as a person insured under the policy. View "Sheckler v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Under the Counties Code, 55 ILCS 5/art. 2, county governments may take the township form, the commission form, or the county executive form. In the township form, the county is governed by an elected board, headed by a chair who is either selected by the board from among its members or elected directly by the voters. The board has legislative and administrative duties and its chair functions as both a legislative and executive leader. Until 2016, Champaign County operated under a township form; a board chair selected by the board from among its members, appointed individuals to fill vacancies in elected and nonelected positions.In 2016, the voters approved a referendum, changing to the county executive form, under which an executive, elected by the citizens, serves as the “chief executive officer,” entirely separate from the county board, which acts as “the legislative body.” Kloeppel was elected as Champaign County executive. The board continued to select one of its members as its chair. When vacancies arose in elected county offices, they were filled by the chair, as they had been before the change in the form of government. Vacancies in nonelected county positions were filled by Kloepel, who alleged that the board had usurped her authority by filling vacancies in the county treasurer and county board positions. The Election Code (10 ILCS 5/25-11) states that vacancies in elected county offices “shall be filled … by the chairman of the county board.” Kloepel argued that the position of county board chair does not exist in a county executive form of government and cited 55 ILCS 5/2-5009(d), which states that a county executive has the power to “appoint … persons to serve on the various boards and commissions to which appointments are provided by law to be made by the board.”The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Kloepel’s arguments. In an Illinois county with a county executive form of government, the power to appoint a person to fill a vacancy in an elected county office resides with the chair of the county board. View "Kloeppel v. Champaign County Board" on Justia Law

Walls pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. He was sentenced to three consecutive 15-year prison terms. The court denied Walls’s motion to reconsider in October 2005. In November, Walls filed a “Motion for Rehearing,” arguing that his attorney had failed to comply with Rule 604(d) because he did not review the transcript of the plea hearing or file a Rule 604(d) certificate of compliance. The case was then delayed until 2010 when Walls sought relief under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401. After the state moved to dismiss the petition, the case was again delayed. In 2019, Walls filed “Amended Petition[s] to Vacate or Redress a Void Sentence.”The court concluded that the case was “still at the motion to reconsider sentencing stage because a [Rule 604(d)] certificate was never filed” and directed Walls’s attorney to comply. The attorney filed a Rule 604(d) certificate. The court denied Walls’s amended motion. The appellate court held that Walls’s direct appeal from the denial of his amended motion to reconsider was untimely. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b), Walls had 30 days from the 2005 date to file a notice of appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court erred in finding the proceedings on Walls’s original motion to reconsider remained “pending” due to his attorney’s noncompliance with Rule 604(d), which is not jurisdictional. Despite the absence of a Rule 604(d) certificate, the post-plea proceedings concluded when the trial court denied Walls’s motion to reconsider his sentence in 2005. View "People v. Walls" on Justia Law

Smith was charged with residential burglary alleging he knowingly and without authority entered Whittington’s Carbondale apartment with the intent to commit theft, In a pretrial motion, Smith sought to bar admission of two short video clips recorded by the building’s landlord, who had pointed an iPhone’s video camera at a screen as the recording of surveillance footage played. Smith argued admitting the cell phone video clips would violate the best evidence rule (Ill. Rs. Evid. 1001-1004.The Jackson County circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Smith's conviction. The cell phone video clips constitute duplicates under Rule 1001(4), as required for admissibility under Rule 1003. Interpreting Rule 1001(4) to require any duplicate to include the entirety of an original would not follow its plain language. While the entire original recording was not duplicated, there is no question as to the accuracy of the recording, which shows Smith approach and stand close outside Whittington’s doorway for a few moments before walking away and—after a gap of 20 minutes—Smith leave Whittington’s apartment through the door, carrying a plastic bag. The landlord, a neutral observer, testified the hallway was “just empty” on the original surveillance footage captured between the two cell phone video clips. Admitting the duplicates was fair because the jury heard both sides. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law