Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sheckler rented residential property from McIntosh. The lease provided McIntosh “shall maintain fire and other hazard insurance on the premises only” and that Sheckler was responsible for insurance on possessions contained in the premises. The lease's indemnification clause exculpated McIntosh from any damages or injury occurring on the premises. McIntosh obtained insurance from Auto-Owners; first-party dwelling coverage provided coverage for fire damage and third-party landlord liability coverage provided coverage for claims brought by third parties that the insured “becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of or arising out of bodily injury or property damage.” The third-party coverage provided a duty to defend any claim covered by the policy, excluding “property damage to property occupied or used by an insured or rented to or in the care of, any insured.” The policy listed McIntosh as the only named insured. McIntosh claims no money received from Sheckler was used to pay the annual premium.Sheckler notified McIntosh that the gas stove was not working. McIntosh placed a service call. The technician’s efforts resulted in a fire that caused substantial property damage. Auto-Owners paid McIntosh for damages incurred due to the fire and lost rental income and filed a subrogation action against the technician (Workman), who filed a third-party contribution complaint against Sheckler. Sheckler tendered the defense to Auto-Owners, which rejected the claim. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the rejection of Sheckler’s claim. An insurer’s duty to defend or indemnify does not extend to the tenant of an insured property against a third-party negligence contribution claim when the tenant is not identified as a person insured under the policy. View "Sheckler v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Under the Counties Code, 55 ILCS 5/art. 2, county governments may take the township form, the commission form, or the county executive form. In the township form, the county is governed by an elected board, headed by a chair who is either selected by the board from among its members or elected directly by the voters. The board has legislative and administrative duties and its chair functions as both a legislative and executive leader. Until 2016, Champaign County operated under a township form; a board chair selected by the board from among its members, appointed individuals to fill vacancies in elected and nonelected positions.In 2016, the voters approved a referendum, changing to the county executive form, under which an executive, elected by the citizens, serves as the “chief executive officer,” entirely separate from the county board, which acts as “the legislative body.” Kloeppel was elected as Champaign County executive. The board continued to select one of its members as its chair. When vacancies arose in elected county offices, they were filled by the chair, as they had been before the change in the form of government. Vacancies in nonelected county positions were filled by Kloepel, who alleged that the board had usurped her authority by filling vacancies in the county treasurer and county board positions. The Election Code (10 ILCS 5/25-11) states that vacancies in elected county offices “shall be filled … by the chairman of the county board.” Kloepel argued that the position of county board chair does not exist in a county executive form of government and cited 55 ILCS 5/2-5009(d), which states that a county executive has the power to “appoint … persons to serve on the various boards and commissions to which appointments are provided by law to be made by the board.”The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Kloepel’s arguments. In an Illinois county with a county executive form of government, the power to appoint a person to fill a vacancy in an elected county office resides with the chair of the county board. View "Kloeppel v. Champaign County Board" on Justia Law

Walls pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. He was sentenced to three consecutive 15-year prison terms. The court denied Walls’s motion to reconsider in October 2005. In November, Walls filed a “Motion for Rehearing,” arguing that his attorney had failed to comply with Rule 604(d) because he did not review the transcript of the plea hearing or file a Rule 604(d) certificate of compliance. The case was then delayed until 2010 when Walls sought relief under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401. After the state moved to dismiss the petition, the case was again delayed. In 2019, Walls filed “Amended Petition[s] to Vacate or Redress a Void Sentence.”The court concluded that the case was “still at the motion to reconsider sentencing stage because a [Rule 604(d)] certificate was never filed” and directed Walls’s attorney to comply. The attorney filed a Rule 604(d) certificate. The court denied Walls’s amended motion. The appellate court held that Walls’s direct appeal from the denial of his amended motion to reconsider was untimely. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b), Walls had 30 days from the 2005 date to file a notice of appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court erred in finding the proceedings on Walls’s original motion to reconsider remained “pending” due to his attorney’s noncompliance with Rule 604(d), which is not jurisdictional. Despite the absence of a Rule 604(d) certificate, the post-plea proceedings concluded when the trial court denied Walls’s motion to reconsider his sentence in 2005. View "People v. Walls" on Justia Law

Smith was charged with residential burglary alleging he knowingly and without authority entered Whittington’s Carbondale apartment with the intent to commit theft, In a pretrial motion, Smith sought to bar admission of two short video clips recorded by the building’s landlord, who had pointed an iPhone’s video camera at a screen as the recording of surveillance footage played. Smith argued admitting the cell phone video clips would violate the best evidence rule (Ill. Rs. Evid. 1001-1004.The Jackson County circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Smith's conviction. The cell phone video clips constitute duplicates under Rule 1001(4), as required for admissibility under Rule 1003. Interpreting Rule 1001(4) to require any duplicate to include the entirety of an original would not follow its plain language. While the entire original recording was not duplicated, there is no question as to the accuracy of the recording, which shows Smith approach and stand close outside Whittington’s doorway for a few moments before walking away and—after a gap of 20 minutes—Smith leave Whittington’s apartment through the door, carrying a plastic bag. The landlord, a neutral observer, testified the hallway was “just empty” on the original surveillance footage captured between the two cell phone video clips. Admitting the duplicates was fair because the jury heard both sides. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Kidd was convicted on two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)). The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The indictment does not set forth all the elements of the charged offenses; the court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment.In both counts, the grand jury alleged Kidd, "who was over the age of 17, committed an act of sexual contact, however slight, with T.F., in that said defendant placed his penis in contact with the mouth of T.F. and T.F. was under the age of 13 years old.” The counts alleged separate dates. A predatory criminal sexual assault indictment alleging contact requires an allegation that the purpose of the contact was for sexual gratification. The prosecutor and the court told Kidd the state could prove predatory criminal sexual assault by proving contact without also proving the purpose of the contact. Immediately before trial, the prosecutor told Kidd that he intended to prove Kidd acted for the purpose of sexual gratification. While the court did not allow the state to amend the indictment, the court permitted the change by including the statutory language of purpose in the jury instructions. View "People v. Kidd" on Justia Law

TURSS provided background and credit screening services to property management professionals and landlords through its online platforms and undertook to build an online platform to sell customizable electronic lease forms. TURSS sent Helix a letter of intent that the platform would be completed in 2009. The companies entered into a five-year marketing agreement that required TURSS to provide the platform and Helix to provide the product. TURSS would receive 35% of the revenue generated from sales and Helix would receive 65%. The agreement was not exclusive. Helix provided electronic forms and supporting materials to TURSS but the platform was still not completed in 2015.Helix sued TURSS for“willful and intentional” breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel. The court ultimately granted TURSS summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that Helix failed to present proof of its damages with reasonable certainty. Helix did not present evidence of revenues of a similar product or a similar business in a similar market. Where a plaintiff seeks lost profits for a new company, "without a track record of profit, attempting to sell a new and untested product to a new market,” the specter of impermissible speculation arises. View "Ivey v. Transunion Rental Screening Solutions Inc." on Justia Law

Castillo, an inmate, was charged with aggravated battery against an employee of the Department of Corrections (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i)). Count II charged him with aggravated battery, “knowing Pontiac Correctional Center to be public property,” (section 12-3.05(c)). Castillo argued that a cellblock in a maximum-security prison that is inaccessible to the public is not “public property” for purposes of the aggravated battery statute and that the state failed to prove ownership of Pontiac Correctional Center.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. The plain and ordinary meaning of “public property” in the aggravated battery statute is simply property owned by the government. While the state presented uncontested evidence that the incident took place at Pontiac, it did not present evidence concerning the ownership of Pontiac, which is necessary to establish that Pontiac was public property. The fact that a battery occurred on public property is an element of the offense. However, there was no abuse of discretion in the appellate court’s decision to take judicial notice of the state’s ownership of Pontiac. View "People v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Epstein, charged with aggravated DUI, moved to exclude her blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) test result obtained from blood drawn four hours after the traffic stop. Epstein argued that the prejudicial effect of admitting that result would substantially outweigh any probative value because retrograde extrapolation could not be performed to establish her BAC at the time of driving. She offered the expert testimony of Dr. O’Donnell, who had interviewed Epstein and reviewed the traffic stop video, video of the field sobriety tests, and video of Epstein sitting in the squad car and testified that retrograde extrapolation could not be performed to determine BAC at the time of driving because the time when alcohol absorption peaked, and elimination began, could not be determined. Retrograde extrapolation could be performed only if Epstein’s alcohol absorption had peaked before the traffic stop; “drinking occurred during the hour before the traffic stop” and alcohol was “being absorbed at the time of the traffic stop.” The circuit court held that the test was inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 403.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. The admission of the BAC test would not create a mandatory presumption. The state still has the burden of proving the elements of the offenses. Epstein may submit evidence, including O’Donnell’s testimony, to show that the test result is unreliable to establish her BAC at the time of driving. The admission of the test result does not violate due process. View "People v. Epstein" on Justia Law

In 2015, Libricz was charged with committing sex offenses against his daughters, D.L. and K.L., in 1987-2006, when the victims were minors. Counts VI and VIII charged Libricz with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. This offense was created by Public Act 89-428, with an effective date of December 13, 1995. Public Act 89-428 was later held unconstitutional, as violating the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution.. The General Assembly later reenacted the offense, with an effective date of May 29, 1996, with the effect of creating an entirely new criminal statute.”Libricz argued the indictment was fatally defective and asserted his convictions should be reversed because the alleged period in which the acts took place included 14 months before the effective date of the statute creating the offense. The Appellate Court found the two counts in the indictment defective but affirmed Libricz’s convictions and sentences. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Libricz was not prejudiced by the defect in the indictment. The indictment apprised him of the nature, cause, and elements of the charges. Defense counsel had ample opportunity to raise the argument of the statute’s effective date prior to trial and even during trial. View "People v. Libricz" on Justia Law

Based on allegations that he sexually abused his grandson, J.M., McKown was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)), three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (11-1.60(c)(1)(i)), and one count of child pornography (11- 20.1(a)(1)(ii)). There were inconsistencies in J.M.’s testimony. An officer testified that McKown had consented to a search of his basement, where the officer saw “multiple cutout pictures of young female children’s faces that had slits cut into the mouths and cutout images of male penises inserted into those slits.”The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed McKown’s convictions. The pictures of young children that McKown modified to depict sexual conduct constitute child pornography under section 11-20.1 and section 11-20.1 is consistent with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. McKown possessed images of actual, identifiable children that he altered to depict sexual conduct. Sufficient corroboration existed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule as to McKown’s convictions for various sexual offenses. View "People v. McKown" on Justia Law