Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Noland and Clayborne (plaintiffs) are former members of the General Assembly who voted for laws that reduced legislators’ salaries. After leaving office, plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the reductions violated article IV, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution (Legislative Salary Clause) and sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Illinois Comptroller to pay them and all affected legislators their disputed salaries. The Cook County circuit court found that the affirmative defenses of laches and waiver failed as a matter of law and that the statute of limitations defense lacked merit. The court also found that, although plaintiffs were entitled to relief for themselves, they could not obtain relief on behalf of nonparty legislators. The court found that the laws at issue were facially unconstitutional and that the plaintiffs were entitled to mandamus relief.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs, suing in their individual and not in their official capacity, have “slept on their rights” and are estopped from bringing their claims. The "public was misled by these plaintiffs," who waited to file their action until eight years elapsed following the enactment of the fiscal 2010 Salary Reduction Laws and all subsequent enactments. The court vacated findings that the Salary Clause prohibits mid-term changes in legislators’ salaries and awards of $71,507.43 for Noland and $104,412.93 for Clayborne. View "Noland v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

A public body has five-10 business days to respond to a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/3(d), (e)). In 2014, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) received FOIA requests from local newspapers for information relating to citizen complaints filed against Chicago police officers since 1967. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) sought to enjoin the release of files that were more than four years old; its collective bargaining agreement required the destruction of records of alleged police misconduct at that age. The court granted the FOP an injunction prohibiting the release of files that were more than four years old as of the date of the newspapers’ FOIA request. . Meanwhile, Green, who was convicted in 1986 of offenses arising from a quadruple homicide, became aware that files he wants could be destroyed. He hopes to prove his innocence by exposing police misconduct. Green sent CPD a FOIA request. CPD did not respond.The Illinois Supreme Court held that unless the FOIA exemption states otherwise, the circuit court should review the withholding of information under the circumstances that existed when the public body made its decision. If the information becomes releasable later, a requester may refile his request. When CPD constructively denied Green’s request, an injunction barred CPD from releasing responsive files that were more than four years old. The subsequent invalidation of the injunction was immaterial. View "Green v. Chicago Police Department" on Justia Law

The building at 1572 North Milwaukee Avenue in Chicago is owned by the Corporation. Strauss was the Corporation’s president. Double Door Liquors, a music venue, was a tenant in the building. Numerous difficulties arose with Double Door, including lease violations, excessive noise levels, illegal drug use, alcohol abuse, and property damage. The Corporation terminated Double Door’s lease and filed an eviction action, which led to Double Door’s eviction. Subsequently, Chicago enacted a zoning ordinance that changed the types of establishments that were allowed in the building.Strauss challenged the zoning ordinance and certain conduct of alderman Moreno and the city that occurred before the zoning ordinance was enacted. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing despite a misnomer in the complaint and that not all of the claims were moot, despite the sale of the building. Because Moreno is not liable for injuries resulting from his conduct due to discretionary immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-10, Chicago is likewise not liable. The court declined to address the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance that applies to one piece of property that the Corporation has sold. View "Strauss v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1999, Riley was shot and killed in Chicago. Coleman made a statement to police that she saw Blalock, whom she knew from grammar school, with his hand out a car window, shooting in Riley’s direction. Coleman stated that no threats or promises had been made to her and that she had been allowed to make corrections to her statement. Blalock gave a handwritten statement confessing to the shooting. Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress, alleging that Blalock's statement was the result of physical coercion by detectives, who slapped and yelled at him, threatened him, and cut or sliced his fingernails. At trial, Coleman recanted her statement, claiming that police had struck her with pens and her statement had not been freely given.Convicted of first-degree murder, Blalock was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. In 2016, Blalock sought leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, claiming that newly discovered evidence showed that the officers who interrogated him had engaged in a pattern and practice of police brutality. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of that petition. Blalock failed to establish prejudice by showing that the claim not raised during the initial proceeding so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process, 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f). Blalock’s trial testimony indicated that he fabricated his statement to appease the detectives and assistant state’s attorney, not because of physical abuse, which contradicts the abuse allegations contained in the post-conviction petition. View "People v. Blalock" on Justia Law

In 2013, Craig (age 49) executed an Illinois statutory short-form health care power of attorney, appointing his mother as his agent. In 2016, Craig was hospitalized at McFarland after being charged with burglary and found unfit to stand trial. In 2018, a McFarland psychiatrist sought to involuntarily administer psychotropic medications to Craig under the Mental Health Code, 405 ILCS 5/2-107. Craig alleged that decisions on his medical treatment rested with his agent. A psychiatrist testified that Craig was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, when he was 25 years old and had been experiencing hallucinations with symptoms of paranoia, inability to sleep, poor impulse control, hypersexuality, physical aggression, and psychomotor agitation; Craig had no understanding of his mental illness and lacked the capacity to make rational treatment decisions. She opined that the benefits of the medications outweighed the potential risks. Without treatment, Craig was unable to live outside a hospital. Craig’s 82-year-old mother declined to consent, believing that the medications caused brain damage, made Craig “like a zombie,” and made him look “like a man without a head.”The trial court granted the petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for a period not to exceed 90 days. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Mental Health Code, which includes strict standards for an order permitting involuntary administration of psychotropic medications, provides a narrow exception to an agent’s authority to make a principal’s health care decisions. View "In re Craig H." on Justia Law

Lewis was charged with involuntary sexual servitude of a minor (720 ILCS 5/10-9(c)(2)), traveling to meet a minor (11- 26(a)), and grooming (i11-25(a)). He asserted the defense of entrapment. Convicted, he was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. The appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that defense counsel’s cumulative errors rendered the proceeding unreliable under Strickland v. Washington.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the remand for a new trial. Defense counsel was ineffective in presenting his entrapment defense where he failed to object to the circuit court’s responses to two jury notes regarding the legal definition of “predisposed,” object to the prosecutor’s closing argument mischaracterizing the entrapment defense and the parties’ relevant burdens of proof, and present defendant’s lack of a criminal record to the jury. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Johnson suffers from severe, permanent nerve damage, which he alleges was caused by a negligently performed hip replacement surgery. He sued his surgeon, Dr. Armstrong, citing specific negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. He also brought a res ipsa loquitur claim against a surgical technician who participated in the surgery. Johnson provided one expert witness, also a surgeon, to establish the elements of res ipsa loquitur. The court granted the technician summary judgment, stating that Johnson failed to present an expert witness to establish the standard of care for a technician, that the control element of res ipsa loquitur was not met, and that there was no evidence of negligence on the technician’s part. The court subsequently granted Armstrong summary judgment on the res ipsa loquitur count, leaving the count of specific negligence remaining. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed and vacated in part. The effect of the summary judgment in favor of Armstrong is to preclude Johnson from proving that Armstrong was negligent under the unique proofs of res ipsa loquitur, but the claim for negligence remains outstanding. The summary judgment order with respect to Armstrong was not a final judgment; the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. With respect to the other defendants, the elements of res ipsa loquitur were met at the time of the decision; no further expert testimony on the standard of care was required. Given that the Armstrong summary judgment was pronounced after the technician was orally dismissed from the res ipsa loquitur count, the circuit court was directed to reconsider that order in light of this opinion. View "Johnson v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Leib was convicted of being a child sex offender in a school zone when persons under the age of 18 were present in the building or on the grounds, 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a), and was sentenced to one year in prison. He argued that the prosecution failed to establish that he was on “real property comprising any school” and that, even if the property at issue was properly considered “real property comprising any school,” the state failed to establish that Leib knew he was on such property. Leib had been present at a festival in a parking lot for a church and school.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. There is evidence that the parking lot is used for school purposes and is owned by the parish, which owned the church and school, and that the church and school were connected to each other and considered to be synonymous. The layout of the festival itself indicates Leib was aware of a substantial probability that the parking lot is located on school grounds. View "People v. Leib" on Justia Law

In 2015, Aljohani was indicted on five counts of first-degree murder in connection with the stabbing death of Talal and one count of armed robbery. The circuit court denied a motion to suppress evidence. The court concluded that the officers’ entry into an apartment fell “squarely within the community caretaking function.” In 2018, Aljohani was convicted and sentenced to 23 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed, citing the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The police officers had reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed, having responded to a 911 call about a suspected battery in progress and spoken to a witness, who was “adamant” that someone was seriously hurt. The officers saw an apartment door “wide open,” received no response, and found the victim unresponsive on a bed. The totality of the circumstances at the time of entry provided an objective, reasonable basis for believing someone was injured inside the apartment. View "People v. Aljohani" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs own property on the non-navigable Mazon River in Grundy County and want to kayak on the River through the defendants' neighboring properties. They sought a declaration that they had the right as riparian owners to kayak along the entire length of the Mazon River, including through property owned by the defendants, “f[r]ee and clear from any claim of trespass.” The Mazon River is 28 miles long and is a tributary of the Illinois River.The circuit court, appellate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendants. Neither precedent nor Illinois common law grants a riparian owner on a non-navigable river or stream the right to use that waterway to cross the property of another riparian owner without that owner’s permission. The distinction between property boundaries on a lake versus a river or stream has been recognized in Illinois law for over a century. The Illinois common law “reasonable use” doctrine of water by riparian owners applies to direct consumptive or diversionary uses of the water, not the use of the surface water to enter the property of another riparian owner. View "Holm v. Kodat" on Justia Law