Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

McDonald sought letters of administration for the estate of his deceased brother, John. An affidavit averred that John’s only heirs were his parents and his siblings. McDonald had been appointed plenary guardian over John’s person and estate; thereafter, without the prior knowledge of his guardian or the court, John participated in a purported wedding ceremony with Ellizzette. The circuit court entered orders appointing Shawn as administrator and declaring John’s heirs to be John’s parents and siblings. McDonald filed but then withdrew a petition for declaration of invalidity of marriage, and filed a petition to recover assets. The court allowed Ellizzette to file a petition seeking letters of administration based on her assertion that she is John’s surviving spouse, then held that Ellizzette failed to present a prima facie case establishing the validity of the marriage. The Appellate Court remanded, finding the circuit court erred in barring Ellizzette from testifying based on the Dead Man’s Act. 735 ILCS 5/8-201.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. Under the Probate Act, a ward who wishes to enter into a marriage may do so only with the consent of his guardian. Ellizzette was aware at the time of the marriage that John was under guardianship, so the marriage might not be valid. No best interest finding was ever sought or made. Ellizzette could not have provided any testimony that would have been sufficient to prove the validity of the marriage and could not have been prejudiced by her inability to testify regarding the marriage. View "In re Estate of McDonald" on Justia Law

Schultz filed a wrongful death and survival action, alleging that the defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct by refusing to dispatch 911 services, which resulted in the decedent’s (his wife) death. Schultz had called 911, asking that police stop his wife from driving because she was intoxicated. The defendants allegedly first dispatched police to the wrong location and then refused to contact police after Schultz called back. The circuit court dismissed, finding that the defendants had absolute immunity from civil liability under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act and that the decedent's negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injuries and death. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Emergency Telephone System Act (ETS), 50 ILCS 750/15.1(a), did not apply to situations in which a 911 dispatcher allegedly failed or refused to dispatch emergency services but is limited to “provid[ing] an immunity for failures within that infrastructure and technology itself” and “was not designed to supersede the immunities set forth in the Tort Immunity Act.”The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The limited immunity of section 15.1(a) of the ETS Act governs this claim, but dismissal was appropriate because the decedent’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of her death. View "Schultz v. St. Clair County" on Justia Law

In 2004, Grant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault. The trial court merged the counts and sentenced him to 14 years in prison. In 2013, Grant sought forensic testing of a hair that was discovered during a post-assault examination of the victim. It was subsequently discovered that all the forensic evidence in Grant’s case was destroyed in 2007, pursuant to Peoria Police Department policy.Defense counsel moved for a new trial or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, citing PPD’s failure to fulfill its duty to preserve the forensic evidence as required by 725 ILCS 5/116-4. The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court vacated Grant’s conviction, remanded for further proceedings, and ordered a jury instruction at any retrial that the state failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence as required and that the jury may construe that fact against the state. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the judgment of the circuit court. Section 116-4 contains nothing to indicate that the legislature intended for the failure to comply with the statute to result in vacatur of a defendant’s conviction; the legislative intent is further confirmed by the criminal liability set forth for intentional non-compliance with section 116-4. View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law

Dent and RLD (Petitioners) had several supply and marketing contracts with energy companies (Respondents). Respondents terminated the Petitioners' at-will consulting agreements. Petitioners filed an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 petition seeking disclosure from Respondents of the names and addresses of three unidentified individuals who might be responsible in damages to Petitioners, alleging that those individuals publicized false and defamatory statements about Dent that caused respondents to terminate their contractual relationships. Petitioners alleged that the unnamed individuals accused Dent of drunken conduct and of sexual misconduct. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the petition, stating that the circuit court abused its discretion when it sua sponte dismissed the petition based upon its determination that Petitioners knew the identity of Respondents and their attorneys; Respondents and their attorneys were not potential defendants responsible in damages for defamation or breach of contract.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The appellate court erred in holding that a section 2-615 motion to dismiss cannot consider affirmative defenses apparent on the face of the petition, such as the existence of qualified privilege. The existence of qualified privilege on the part of the unidentified individuals was apparent from the face of the petition. Respondents, having raised nothing more than a conclusory denial, failed to sufficiently allege abuse of that privilege. View "Dent v. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc." on Justia Law

A Pan-Oceanic supervisor, Singh, asked Green to pick up a skid steer from Patten. Green saw that the equipment was not loaded properly, and asked that it be reloaded. Patten employees refused. Singh told Green to return with the equipment. In heavy expressway traffic, Green saw that the trailer was bouncing and stepped on the brakes. The trailer swung into McQueen's car, injuring him. Pan-Oceanic acknowledged that Green was its agent, acting within the scope of his agency. A jury ruled for McQueen against PanOceanic, but not against Green, and assessed damages of $163,227.45, finding that Pan-Oceanic had acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. The jury subsequently awarded $1 million in punitive damages.On appeal, the court held that, when a plaintiff is injured by a company’s employee in a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for direct negligence against the employer where the employer admits responsibility for the employee’s conduct under respondeat superior, concluding that the jury’s findings—that Green was not negligent but Pan-Oceanic acted with aggravated negligence—were legally inconsistent, The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the award. The trial court properly instructed the jury that Green claimed Pan-Oceanic was negligent for ordering Green to take the load on the highway after it knew or should have known, that it was unsafe and for failing to reject the load to prevent it from traveling on the highway. This liability did not depend on Green’s actions. The verdicts were not legally inconsistent. View "McQueen v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant fired a gun at four police officers and was convicted of armed robbery and four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The appellate court reversed in part after finding no speedy trial or public trial violation and no reversible error on a jury instruction issue. The appellate court vacated three of the aggravated discharge convictions, finding that the state had effectively prosecuted the defendant based on his firing a single shot at four officers.The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, agreeing with the appellate court. As to the speedy trial claim, the defendant did not demand trial in the statutorily directed manner and is considered to have agreed to the first continuance. There was no abuse of discretion in granting the state’s first motion for continuance. Counsel was not ineffective on that issue. The erroneous and contradictory jury instructions, however, require reversal and retrial. On retrial, the unit of prosecution issue is likely to recur. Where the legislature can, but does not, define the unit of prosecution, the doctrine of lenity applies. The offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm does not clearly define the unit of prosecution, so a single discharge in the direction of multiple police officers can sustain only one conviction. View "People v. Hartfield" on Justia Law

Responding to a burglary at a Chicago bar in 2009, police found the bar owner in the parking lot with multiple injuries. The man died hours later. Salamon was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and burglary and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 33 years.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. While an inculpatory statement Salamon made to police about two years after the burglary was involuntary and should have been suppressed, the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated that a prolonged incommunicado detention disguised as “normal police procedure” cannot be condoned; an unwarranted delay in providing the simple expedient of a telephone call takes on significant importance in evaluating the voluntariness of an inculpatory statement made after an extended period of incommunicado detention. However, the substance of Salaman’s video-recorded confession was cumulative and duplicated other evidence that was properly admitted at trial, so the result of the trial would have been the same if the confession had been excluded. View "People v.Salamon" on Justia Law

Moon was charged with domestic battery for causing bodily harm to a minor. Before jury selection, the court typically administers a voir dire oath to prospective jurors but the record does not establish whether the court administered a voir dire oath before or during jury selection. The circuit court asked each potential juror several questions. All the prospective jurors indicated that they would follow the court's instructions. After jury selection, the court asked the circuit clerk to swear the jury in. There is no verbatim record of the oath but the parties stipulated that the clerk incorrectly asked the already-selected jurors: “[D]o you solemnly swear or affirm you’ll truthfully answer all questions asked concerning your qualifications as jurors?” Before his conviction, Moon did not object to the unsworn status of the jury. Denying a post-trial motion, the circuit court concluded that the error was harmless. The appellate court concluded that Moon had forfeited and was not prejudiced by this “clear error.”The Illinois Supreme Court held that reversal of Moon’s conviction is required, regardless of the strength of the evidence or any showing of prejudice. Swearing the jury with a trial oath was essential to the common-law system of trial by jury; deprivation of this constitutional right amounts to structural error. A jury must be sworn with an oath that substantially incorporates specific elements. Because jeopardy never attached, the state is not precluded from retrying the defendant on remand. View "People v. Moon" on Justia Law

In the March 2020 primary election, McHenry Township voters rejected a proposition to dissolve the township. Months later, the township’s board of trustees adopted a resolution to place a nearly identical proposition on the November 2020 general election ballot. The McHenry County Clerk refused to place the proposition on the ballot, notifying the township that the proposition violated the statutory prohibition against “the same proposition” appearing on the ballot more than once within 23 months, 10 ILCS 5/28-7.The circuit court dismissed a mandamus petition. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that, regardless of whether the proposition was prohibited from appearing on the November 2020 ballot, the clerk lacked the statutory authority to make that determination and was obligated to perform the ministerial act of placing the proposition on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the township is no longer pursuing dissolution.Section 28-5 provides that a county clerk is authorized to give notice that the public question may not be placed on the ballot only when the question is prohibited by “the limitations of section 28-1.” The prohibition against placing the same proposition on the ballot more than once in 23 months is set forth in section 28- 7, not section 28-1. The court did not consider whether the proposition actually violated section 28-7. View "McHenry Township v. County of McHenry" on Justia Law

Sigcho-Lopez, the alderman for Chicago’s 25th Ward, filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections, alleging that his predecessor’s (Solis) campaign committee unlawfully paid Solis's personal legal fees from campaign funds. The Board dismissed Sigcho-Lopez’s complaint. On administrative review, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Legal fees incurred to pay for a public official’s criminal defense against investigations or charges of public corruption do not amount to a per se prohibited personal debt under the plain language and spirit of Election Code section 9-8.10(a)(3); whether legal defense fees amount to a personal debt that does not defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Solis was not indicted but worked with federal investigators using his official capacity to expose public corruption. Considering the evidence before the Board, its conclusion that Solis’s legal fees amounted to a proper expenditure not prohibited as “satisfaction or repayment” of personal debt but incurred “to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” was not clearly erroneous. View "Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law