Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Aljohani was indicted on five counts of first-degree murder in connection with the stabbing death of Talal and one count of armed robbery. The circuit court denied a motion to suppress evidence. The court concluded that the officers’ entry into an apartment fell “squarely within the community caretaking function.” In 2018, Aljohani was convicted and sentenced to 23 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed, citing the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The police officers had reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed, having responded to a 911 call about a suspected battery in progress and spoken to a witness, who was “adamant” that someone was seriously hurt. The officers saw an apartment door “wide open,” received no response, and found the victim unresponsive on a bed. The totality of the circumstances at the time of entry provided an objective, reasonable basis for believing someone was injured inside the apartment. View "People v. Aljohani" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs own property on the non-navigable Mazon River in Grundy County and want to kayak on the River through the defendants' neighboring properties. They sought a declaration that they had the right as riparian owners to kayak along the entire length of the Mazon River, including through property owned by the defendants, “f[r]ee and clear from any claim of trespass.” The Mazon River is 28 miles long and is a tributary of the Illinois River.The circuit court, appellate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendants. Neither precedent nor Illinois common law grants a riparian owner on a non-navigable river or stream the right to use that waterway to cross the property of another riparian owner without that owner’s permission. The distinction between property boundaries on a lake versus a river or stream has been recognized in Illinois law for over a century. The Illinois common law “reasonable use” doctrine of water by riparian owners applies to direct consumptive or diversionary uses of the water, not the use of the surface water to enter the property of another riparian owner. View "Holm v. Kodat" on Justia Law

In 2017, Brown was charged with violating section 2(a)(1) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1)), which requires a person who possesses a firearm in Illinois to have a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card issued by the State Police. Brown challenged section 2(a)(1) as unconstitutional as applied under the Second Amendment. The circuit court dismissed the charge, finding that the legislature did not intend for the FOID Act to apply in a person’s home because “such an interpretation would lead to absurd and unworkable results.”The Illinois Supreme Court stated: “The circuit court’s ruling that section 2(a)(1) … is unconstitutional as applied was not necessary to the resolution of this case. Therefore, we remand this cause … direct that the order … be vacated." When the cause was remanded, the matter proceeded before a new judge, who adopted the reasoning of an Illinois Supreme Court dissent and again found the section unconstitutional as applied.The Illinois Supreme Court again vacated and remanded. The circuit court had no authority to set aside the directions on remand and enter a different order. The mandate was “precise and unambiguous.” On remand, “the circuit court shall not entertain any motion from any party, nor take any action other than entering the modified order.” View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged that his wife, Dollett, was rendered a disabled person with permanent and irreparable brain damage as a proximate result of Fitness’s willful and wanton misconduct in failing to use an automated external defibrillator (AED) on Dollett in a timely fashion after she suffered cardiac arrest while exercising at one of their facilities. There was an AED and an employee trained to use it on the premises at the time of the incident. The circuit court of Will County dismissed the case with prejudice.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Fitness facility where Dollett’s injuries occurred was covered by the Physical Fitness Facility Medical Emergency Preparedness Act (210 ILCS 74/1), which creates a private right of action based on willful and wanton misconduct in the non-use of an AED. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff could conceivably introduce evidence establishing that Fitness’s employees’ failure to provide AED treatment to Dollett in a timely manner after she collapsed rose to the level of willful and wanton misconduct that breached the duty that Fitness owed to Dollett, thereby proximately causing her injuries. View "Dawkins v. Fitness International, LLC" on Justia Law

Prate, a construction contractor, sought coverage through the Illinois Assigned Risk Plan, which provides workers’ compensation insurance coverage through a risk pool administered by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI). Liberty was assigned as Prate’s carrier. After determining that Prate’s subcontractor, ARW, did not have workers’ compensation insurance, Liberty assessed Prate an additional premium of $127,305. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, which provides dispute resolution services for NCCI, declined to rule on the dispute, citing insufficient information. Prate appealed to the Department of Insurance (DOI) under Insurance Code section 462. One of Prate’s arguments was that ARW had no employees and that all work on Prate projects was performed by RTS, which had workers’ compensation insurance. The DOI’s hearing officer agreed with Liberty on all issues. The circuit court affirmed. While an appeal was pending, the appellate court issued its ruling in a dispute between Liberty and a trucking company, finding that DOI did not have the authority to resolve a dispute concerning employment status.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The DOI had the authority to resolve the dispute under 215 ILCS 5/462. While section 462 does not apply to all insurance premium disputes but only to those involving the application of a rating system to a party’s insurance, the existence of a single factual dispute does not preclude review under section 462. View "Prate Roofing and Installations, LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

O’Connell began working for the County in 1999 and became a participant in the Benefit Fund, with the County transferring a portion of his salary to the Fund as his employee contribution (40 ILCS 5/9-108). In 2001, O’Connell was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. In 2017, after exhausting his paid leave, O’Connell obtained an ordinary disability benefit (50% of his salary). The Board stated that based on his years of service, the benefit would expire in August 2021. The County separated him from the position effective July 1, 2019. The Board ceased paying the ordinary disability benefit to O’Connell; the County ceased making contributions to the Fund on O’Connell’s behalf.O’Connell filed suit, alleging that the Illinois Pension Code and the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, 5) entitled him to continued ordinary disability benefit payments even though the County had terminated his employment. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of his complaint. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. O’Connell maintained standing to seek relief for reinstatement of his ordinary disability benefit by the Board and of contributions by the County and stated a sufficient cause of action for declaratory judgment and for mandamus. Once the Board grants the employee the ordinary disability benefit, Pension Code section 9-157 then enumerates triggering events, which do not include termination of employment, that halt the benefit. View "O'Connell v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

Sroga was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4-104(a)(4)) for displaying an unauthorized license plate on a vehicle. He later filed a petition under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, asserting that his conviction violated the Illinois proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 11). He argued that section 3-703 of the Vehicle Code created a Class C misdemeanor covering the same conduct for which he was convicted but imposed a lesser penalty. Neither provision contained an express mental state requirement.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The court inferred a requisite mental state of knowledge for Sroga’s section 4-104(a)(4) conviction and concluded that the parallel provision in section 3-703 imposes absolute liability. Although the two offenses criminalize the same physical act, they possess different mental state requirements. Because section 4-104(a)(4) has an inferred mental state of knowledge and section 3-703 imposes absolute liability, the imposition of harsher punishment for a conviction under section 4-104(a)(4) than under section 3-703 is constitutionally sound. View "People v. Sroga" on Justia Law

Smith was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder; two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm; and one count each of home invasion, armed robbery, and aggravated battery of a child. Because the trial court failed to rule on his pro se post-conviction petition within 90 days, the petition automatically advanced to the second stage of proceedings. Assistant Public Defender Avant was appointed to represent Smith and filed a Rule 651(c) certificate. The Rule provides: “The record filed in that court shall contain a showing, which may be made by the certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that [(1)] the attorney has consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in-person to ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, [(2)] has examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and [(3)] has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Avant left the public defender’s office; Underwood was subsequently appointed and represented Smith at a hearing on the state's motion to dismiss.The trial court dismissed his petition. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Smith’s argument that Underwood’s representation did not comply with Rule 651(c). Underwood was not required to independently demonstrate compliance with Rule 651(c) when all that remained for her to do upon assuming the role of second-stage postconviction counsel was orally argue against the motion to dismiss. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault against his daughter and his stepdaughter. During rebuttal closing arguments the prosecutor, in response to the defense’s remarks about “uncorroborated” testimony, that the defense also had subpoena power. Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment.The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the judgment. While the defense has no burden to produce evidence, the statement was an accurate and reasonable response to defense counsel’s claim that the prosecution should have called certain witnesses. The comment was not substantially prejudicial. It was brief, constituting three lines in nearly 17 pages of the trial transcript. The prosecutor and the jury instructions subsequently reminded the jury that the state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is not required to prove his innocence, and that closing arguments are not evidence. The prosecutor’s statement that hearsay is “something that’s said outside of court” and “[i]t’s a rule we can’t bring in hearsay” and that defense counsel was aware of that rule did not constitute a clear and obvious error. The evidence against the defendant was not closely balanced, so the comment was not prejudicial. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2016, nearly 80% of Illinois voters voted to amend the Illinois Constitution; section 11, titled “Transportation funds,” was added to the state revenue article and provides that money generated from taxes, fees, excises, and license taxes on transportation infrastructure or operations shall only be spent on transportation purposes. Plaintiffs, contracting firms in the public transportation construction and design industry, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Cook County, a home-rule unit, was violating the Amendment by diverting “revenue from transportation-related taxes and fees to the County’s Public Safety Fund” and impermissibly spending the revenue on non-transportation related purposes.The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the complaint failed to state a violation of the Amendment. The appellate court reversed on the issue of standing but affirmed that no violation of the Amendment had been stated. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. The plaintiffs have associational standing and the money derived from the Cook County Transportation Taxes is subject to the Amendment. The Amendment did not create an exemption for home-rule units, home-rule taxes, or home-rule expenditures. The court found no issue with the manner in which home-rule units have had their power limited in the transportation context. View "Illinois Road and Transportation Builders Association v. County of Cook" on Justia Law