Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1993, Kastman was charged with misdemeanor offenses based on acts of public indecency involving children and disorderly conduct. The state’s attorney initiated a civil commitment proceeding against Kastman under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01). Evidence indicated that Kastman suffered from pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, exhibitionism, and alcohol dependency. Kastman was found to be a sexually dangerous person, and the circuit court granted the petition. In 2016, Kastman was granted conditional release from institutional care.In 2020, he sought financial assistance. Kastman asserted that he was unemployed, disabled, and could not afford his $300 monthly treatment costs and the $1800 monthly rent for housing that complied with the Sex Offender Registration Act. The circuit court of Lake County ordered the Department of Corrections to pay a portion of Kastman’s monthly expenses. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The statutes indicate that a sex offender’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding who should bear the expense of treatment costs; without a clear statutory directive, the legislature is not presumed to have intended that only financially stable individuals are eligible for conditional release. Financial instability and the need for supervision to protect the public are not the same things. View "People v. Kastman" on Justia Law

Quiroz was inside the underground subway tunnel connecting CTA stations when he fell from a recessed catwalk authorized for CTA personnel and injured himself. The area near the tracks where he fell was lit. At least two trains passed without incident. He was allegedly visible on security cameras. Another train struck Quiroz in the tunnel, causing his fatal injuries.Quiroz’s estate filed a wrongful death action, asserting that, having discovered Quiroz in a position of peril, the CTA owed him a duty of care and violated that duty by failing to notify train operators of his presence and by failing to stop train service, or, alternatively, that failure to keep a lookout for persons in the tunnel and to monitor the security cameras in real-time was willful and wanton. The CTA argued that, because Quiroz was a trespasser, it owed no duty to protect him from the open and obvious danger of a moving train.The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed, finding the allegations that Quiroz was a discovered trespasser in a position of peril sufficient to establish a legally recognized duty under section 337 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Section 337 does not apply to an open and obvious danger and no further duty was owed under the circumstances. The CTA is not an insurer of a trespasser’s safety; its focus must be on ensuring mass transit. View "Quiroz v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Crane filed a complaint for retaliatory discharge, alleging that his employment with Midwest was terminated after he reported numerous health and safety violations to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. Crane was awarded $160,000 in compensatory damages and $625,000 in punitive damages. The appellate court affirmed. After losing the underlying action and paying damages to its former employee, Midwest filed a legal malpractice complaint against its attorneys and the Sandberg law firm, alleging that the attorneys failed to list all witnesses intended to be called at trial in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f), resulting in six defense witnesses being barred from testifying, and several other errors.The circuit court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss but certified a question for immediate appeal: Does Illinois’ public policy on punitive damages and/or the statutory prohibition on punitive damages [in legal malpractice actions, 735 ILCS 5/2-1115] bar recovery of incurred punitive damages in a legal malpractice case where the client alleges that, but for the attorney's negligence in the underlying case, the jury in the underlying case would have returned a verdict awarding either no punitive damages or punitive damages in a lesser sum?” The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court answered the question in the negative and affirmed the judgment. View "Midwest Sanitary Service, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C." on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery. After the jury returned its signed verdict forms in open court, Jackson’s attorney asked the court to poll the jury. The circuit court then asked 11 of the 12 jurors whether the verdicts reflected on the verdict forms were their verdicts. All of the 11 jurors who were questioned confirmed that the signed verdict forms accurately reflected their verdicts. The circuit court dismissed the jury without polling the twelfth juror. Jackson’s attorney failed to object to the error and did not include the error in a posttrial motion.Jackson raised the error for the first time on direct appeal. The appellate court held that the error in polling the jury constituted structural error that called into question the integrity of the judicial process, excused the forfeiture under the second prong of Illinois’s plain error rule, and reversed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. A procedure that is not required in every criminal jury trial cannot be logically categorized as an essential element of every criminal jury trial on par with the jury trial oath; no U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggests that a criminal defendant is denied the fundamental right to juror unanimity when jury polling does not take place or when there is an error in the jury polling process. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Noland and Clayborne (plaintiffs) are former members of the General Assembly who voted for laws that reduced legislators’ salaries. After leaving office, plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the reductions violated article IV, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution (Legislative Salary Clause) and sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Illinois Comptroller to pay them and all affected legislators their disputed salaries. The Cook County circuit court found that the affirmative defenses of laches and waiver failed as a matter of law and that the statute of limitations defense lacked merit. The court also found that, although plaintiffs were entitled to relief for themselves, they could not obtain relief on behalf of nonparty legislators. The court found that the laws at issue were facially unconstitutional and that the plaintiffs were entitled to mandamus relief.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs, suing in their individual and not in their official capacity, have “slept on their rights” and are estopped from bringing their claims. The "public was misled by these plaintiffs," who waited to file their action until eight years elapsed following the enactment of the fiscal 2010 Salary Reduction Laws and all subsequent enactments. The court vacated findings that the Salary Clause prohibits mid-term changes in legislators’ salaries and awards of $71,507.43 for Noland and $104,412.93 for Clayborne. View "Noland v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

A public body has five-10 business days to respond to a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/3(d), (e)). In 2014, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) received FOIA requests from local newspapers for information relating to citizen complaints filed against Chicago police officers since 1967. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) sought to enjoin the release of files that were more than four years old; its collective bargaining agreement required the destruction of records of alleged police misconduct at that age. The court granted the FOP an injunction prohibiting the release of files that were more than four years old as of the date of the newspapers’ FOIA request. . Meanwhile, Green, who was convicted in 1986 of offenses arising from a quadruple homicide, became aware that files he wants could be destroyed. He hopes to prove his innocence by exposing police misconduct. Green sent CPD a FOIA request. CPD did not respond.The Illinois Supreme Court held that unless the FOIA exemption states otherwise, the circuit court should review the withholding of information under the circumstances that existed when the public body made its decision. If the information becomes releasable later, a requester may refile his request. When CPD constructively denied Green’s request, an injunction barred CPD from releasing responsive files that were more than four years old. The subsequent invalidation of the injunction was immaterial. View "Green v. Chicago Police Department" on Justia Law

The building at 1572 North Milwaukee Avenue in Chicago is owned by the Corporation. Strauss was the Corporation’s president. Double Door Liquors, a music venue, was a tenant in the building. Numerous difficulties arose with Double Door, including lease violations, excessive noise levels, illegal drug use, alcohol abuse, and property damage. The Corporation terminated Double Door’s lease and filed an eviction action, which led to Double Door’s eviction. Subsequently, Chicago enacted a zoning ordinance that changed the types of establishments that were allowed in the building.Strauss challenged the zoning ordinance and certain conduct of alderman Moreno and the city that occurred before the zoning ordinance was enacted. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing despite a misnomer in the complaint and that not all of the claims were moot, despite the sale of the building. Because Moreno is not liable for injuries resulting from his conduct due to discretionary immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-10, Chicago is likewise not liable. The court declined to address the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance that applies to one piece of property that the Corporation has sold. View "Strauss v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1999, Riley was shot and killed in Chicago. Coleman made a statement to police that she saw Blalock, whom she knew from grammar school, with his hand out a car window, shooting in Riley’s direction. Coleman stated that no threats or promises had been made to her and that she had been allowed to make corrections to her statement. Blalock gave a handwritten statement confessing to the shooting. Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress, alleging that Blalock's statement was the result of physical coercion by detectives, who slapped and yelled at him, threatened him, and cut or sliced his fingernails. At trial, Coleman recanted her statement, claiming that police had struck her with pens and her statement had not been freely given.Convicted of first-degree murder, Blalock was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. In 2016, Blalock sought leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, claiming that newly discovered evidence showed that the officers who interrogated him had engaged in a pattern and practice of police brutality. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of that petition. Blalock failed to establish prejudice by showing that the claim not raised during the initial proceeding so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process, 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f). Blalock’s trial testimony indicated that he fabricated his statement to appease the detectives and assistant state’s attorney, not because of physical abuse, which contradicts the abuse allegations contained in the post-conviction petition. View "People v. Blalock" on Justia Law

In 2013, Craig (age 49) executed an Illinois statutory short-form health care power of attorney, appointing his mother as his agent. In 2016, Craig was hospitalized at McFarland after being charged with burglary and found unfit to stand trial. In 2018, a McFarland psychiatrist sought to involuntarily administer psychotropic medications to Craig under the Mental Health Code, 405 ILCS 5/2-107. Craig alleged that decisions on his medical treatment rested with his agent. A psychiatrist testified that Craig was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, when he was 25 years old and had been experiencing hallucinations with symptoms of paranoia, inability to sleep, poor impulse control, hypersexuality, physical aggression, and psychomotor agitation; Craig had no understanding of his mental illness and lacked the capacity to make rational treatment decisions. She opined that the benefits of the medications outweighed the potential risks. Without treatment, Craig was unable to live outside a hospital. Craig’s 82-year-old mother declined to consent, believing that the medications caused brain damage, made Craig “like a zombie,” and made him look “like a man without a head.”The trial court granted the petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for a period not to exceed 90 days. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Mental Health Code, which includes strict standards for an order permitting involuntary administration of psychotropic medications, provides a narrow exception to an agent’s authority to make a principal’s health care decisions. View "In re Craig H." on Justia Law

Lewis was charged with involuntary sexual servitude of a minor (720 ILCS 5/10-9(c)(2)), traveling to meet a minor (11- 26(a)), and grooming (i11-25(a)). He asserted the defense of entrapment. Convicted, he was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. The appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that defense counsel’s cumulative errors rendered the proceeding unreliable under Strickland v. Washington.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the remand for a new trial. Defense counsel was ineffective in presenting his entrapment defense where he failed to object to the circuit court’s responses to two jury notes regarding the legal definition of “predisposed,” object to the prosecutor’s closing argument mischaracterizing the entrapment defense and the parties’ relevant burdens of proof, and present defendant’s lack of a criminal record to the jury. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law