Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a night of drinking, Deroo drove his car off the road, flipped several times, and crashed into a ditch. He was taken to the hospital by ambulance. Deroo was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) and aggravated driving while his license was revoked and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of nine and three years, respectively. At trial, the results of a blood test establishing his blood alcohol content were admitted into evidence under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a)), which allows the admission of chemical tests of blood conducted in the course of emergency medical treatment “as a business record exception to the hearsay rule.” Deroo argued that section 11-501.4(a) conflicted with Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6), which excluded “medical records in criminal cases” from the business records hearsay exception.The appellate court found no conflict and affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Rule 803(6)'s medical records exclusion for criminal cases is not logically defensible. The court amended that Rule, striking the exception and stating that ordinary rules of evidence do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because by simply permitting evidence to be admitted at trial, they do not at all subvert the presumption of innocence. View "People v. Deroo" on Justia Law

On February 15, 2018, GAN filed a petition for a tax deed to acquire property it purchased at Cook County’s 2016 annual tax sale for the tax year 2014. On April 24, 2018, GAN assigned its interest in the property to Blossom63. On May 6, 2018, Longmeadow, the owner of the property, transferred its interest in the property to Devonshire. On May 17, Devonshire sought to intervene in the tax deed proceedings and moved to vacate Blossom63’s tax deed on the ground Blossom63 failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of the Property Tax Code, 35 ILCS 200/22-5.On May 18, the circuit court granted the petition for a tax deed. The county clerk issued Blossom63 a tax deed. On June 19, 2019, the circuit court granted Devonshire’s motion to vacate the order issuing a tax deed to Blossom63. The appellate court reversed, finding Blossom63’s notice strictly complied with the Tax Code. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Blossom63 strictly complied with section 22-5 by listing the delinquent tax year for which the sale was held without listing the additional delinquent tax years for which it paid taxes to complete the sale. View "In re Application of the County Collector" on Justia Law

McDonald filed a putative class action, alleging that her former employer, Bronzeville, collected, used, and stored sensitive biometric data from employees in a fingerprint timekeeping system, violating the Biometric Information Privacy Act,740 ILCS 14/1. McDonald alleged that she was never provided with nor signed a release and had never been informed of the purposes or length of time for which her biometric information was stored. Bronzeville argued that the claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries transpiring in the workplace, and that an employee has no common-law or statutory right to recover civil damages from an employer for injuries incurred in the course of her employment.The circuit court rejected Bronzeville’s argument, reasoning that privacy rights are neither a psychological nor physical injury and not compensable under the Compensation Act. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court concluded that an employee's claim against an employer for liquidated damages under the Privacy Act, available without further compensable actual damages being alleged or sustained and intended to have a preventative and deterrent effect, is not the type of injury that categorically fits within the purview of the Compensation Act, a remedial statute designed to provide financial protection for workers that have sustained an actual injury. View "McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Johnathan was adjudicated a delinquent minor under 705 ILCS 405/5-701 after he was found guilty of 10 counts of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a seven-year-old victim. During his sex offender evaluation, Johnathan stated that his lawyer did not return calls, that they “didn’t talk” and that he was never prepared for the stand. On appeal, Jonathan argued that the circuit court erred because it did not conduct a “Krankel” preliminary inquiry regarding his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in not conducting a “Krankel” hearing. The Krankel procedure applies in juvenile proceedings and is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A pro se defendant only has to bring his claim to the trial court’s attention and is not required to file a written motion. The procedure applies even though the defendant has retained counsel. Johnathan clearly stated that his attorney was not doing something that he should have been doing. A juvenile in a juvenile delinquency proceeding need do nothing more than bring his pro se claim to the attention of the court. View "In re Johnathan T." on Justia Law

The Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/1), states that “an important State interest” requires that an employer “who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who ... suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child.” The Act does not define “catastrophic injury,” which the Illinois Supreme Court has found “synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4-110 of the [Illinois Pension] Code”Peoria’s ordinance was amended to define “catastrophic injury” as “[a]n injury, the direct and proximate consequences of which permanently prevent an individual from performing any gainful work.” The term “gainful work,” which does not appear in the Act, is defined as “[f]ull- or part-time activity that actually is compensated or commonly is compensated.”The Union sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment violates the Act. The circuit court granted the Union summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The ordinance’s definitions are inconsistent with the requirements of the Act and are therefore preempted; the ordinance is not a valid exercise of Peoria’s home rule authority. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 50 v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Munoz sued general contractor, Bulley & Andrews, for injuries he sustained while an employee of its subcontractor, Bulley Concrete. Bulley & Andrews had paid workers’ compensation insurance premiums and benefits for the subcontractor and its employees. Each company has its own distinct federal tax identification number and files separate federal and state income tax returns. The companies have different presidents and employ different workers.The circuit court dismissed, finding that the genderal contractor was immune from the lawsuit under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a). The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The exclusive remedy provisions do not extend to a general contractor who is not the employee’s immediate employer. Immunity does not hinge on the payment of benefits. Bulley & Andrews had no legal obligation to provide workers’ compensation insurance for Bulley Concrete employees. The fact that Bulley Concrete was a subsidiary of Bulley & Andrews is of no import. If a parent company and its subsidiary are operated as separate entities, only the entity that was the immediate employer of the injured worker is entitled to immunity. The Act bars an employee from bringing a civil suit directly against his employer but does not limit the employee’s recovery from a third-party general contractor. View "Munoz v. Bulley & Andrews, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, Suburban, owned by Barus, and ROC formed ROC/Suburban LLC, which acted as a vendor to Suburban. In 2010, Barus retained attorney Carlson for legal advice in unwinding that relationship. ROC sued Suburban, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The Gaspero Law Firm defended Suburban in the ROC litigation. In June 2015, the court entered judgment for ROC and ordered Suburban to pay 50% of the fair value of the assets that Barus had improperly transferred out of ROC/Suburban.In May 2016, Barus and Suburban filed a legal malpractice action against Carlson, who allegedly recommended or approved the self-help actions that resulted in the breach of fiduciary duties. The circuit court held that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13- 214.3(b)) because the injury began when the plaintiffs retained new counsel and that the plaintiffs knew they were injured in 2013 at the latest when the judge stated that Carlson had committed malpractice.The appellate court reversed; the Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The plaintiffs did not suffer a realized injury until the court found a breach of fiduciary duty and entered a judgment against them. Although plaintiffs may have been alerted in 2013 that counsel misadvised them, the possibility of damages was not actionable until the ROC litigation ended and plaintiffs became obligated to pay damages as a result of Carlson’s advice. View "Suburban Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

In 2011, PNC filed a foreclosure complaint against Kusmierz. PNC retained Metro to serve the summons. Magida, a Metro employee, attempted to serve Kusmierz at the subject Lombard address but the property was a vacant lot. Magida served Kusmierz in Palatine. Days later, PNC obtained the appointment of Metro as a special process server. PNC then filed affidavits of service. Kusmierz failed to appear. On February 28, 2012, the court entered an order of default and a judgment of foreclosure and sale. PNC complied with all statutory notice requirements, and the property was sold at a judicial sale back to PNC. The court confirmed the judicial sale. Notices of the proceedings were mailed to the Palatine address. In 2013, third parties purchased the property from PNC for $24,000 and constructed a home on the property with mortgage loans totaling $292,650.In 2018, more than seven years after being served with the foreclosure complaint and summons, Kusmierz sought relief from void judgments under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f), alleging improper service because the process server was not appointed by the court at the time of service, in violation of section 2-202(a). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, applying both laches and the bona fide purchaser protections in section 2-1401(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure. View "PNC Bank, National Association v. Kusmierz" on Justia Law

After being convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), Mudd argued on appeal that comments made in the prosecution’s rebuttal closing argument constituted reversible error because they misrepresented the evidence and shifted the burden of proof to him. Alternatively, he contended that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to those rebuttal comments. The defense had emphasized the lack of evidence supporting the testimony by police officers; the prosecutor had responded that jurors should use their “common sense”; no one else was near the van when Mudd knelt beside the tire, so he was the only person who reasonably could have left the gun there, making forensic testing of the weapon unnecessary.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court upheld his conviction. To establish plain error, Mudd had to prove that the prosecutor’s comments were “clear or obvious” reversible error that shifted the burden of proof to him. Mudd had equal access to the weapon for purposes of testing. It is difficult to imagine how an accurate portrayal of the parties’ ability to request forensic testing, as required by Illinois law, can be deemed to be unduly prejudicial to a defendant. View "People v. Mudd" on Justia Law

The appellate court reversed Cline’s conviction for residential burglary because the only evidence tying him to the burglary was a fingerprint found on a portable headphone case inside the residence and there was no evidence that the state’s fingerprint expert, Dennewitz, verified his results with another examiner.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Cline did not dispute that the resident’s testimony was sufficient to show that someone knowingly entered his apartment without authority and with the intent to commit theft there. Cline also did not challenge the admissibility of Dennewitz’s expert testimony. The court rejected Cline’s argument that, without proof that Dennewitz’s conclusion was verified by another examiner, the state “failed to prove” Dennewitz followed the “accepted” ACE-V analytical method for fingerprint identification. Dennewitz was found qualified by the trial court to testify as an expert in forensic fingerprint identification. The evidence was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of Cline’s guilt of residential burglary. View "People v. Cline" on Justia Law