Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sroga was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4-104(a)(4)) for displaying an unauthorized license plate on a vehicle. He later filed a petition under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, asserting that his conviction violated the Illinois proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 11). He argued that section 3-703 of the Vehicle Code created a Class C misdemeanor covering the same conduct for which he was convicted but imposed a lesser penalty. Neither provision contained an express mental state requirement.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The court inferred a requisite mental state of knowledge for Sroga’s section 4-104(a)(4) conviction and concluded that the parallel provision in section 3-703 imposes absolute liability. Although the two offenses criminalize the same physical act, they possess different mental state requirements. Because section 4-104(a)(4) has an inferred mental state of knowledge and section 3-703 imposes absolute liability, the imposition of harsher punishment for a conviction under section 4-104(a)(4) than under section 3-703 is constitutionally sound. View "People v. Sroga" on Justia Law

Smith was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder; two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm; and one count each of home invasion, armed robbery, and aggravated battery of a child. Because the trial court failed to rule on his pro se post-conviction petition within 90 days, the petition automatically advanced to the second stage of proceedings. Assistant Public Defender Avant was appointed to represent Smith and filed a Rule 651(c) certificate. The Rule provides: “The record filed in that court shall contain a showing, which may be made by the certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that [(1)] the attorney has consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in-person to ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, [(2)] has examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and [(3)] has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Avant left the public defender’s office; Underwood was subsequently appointed and represented Smith at a hearing on the state's motion to dismiss.The trial court dismissed his petition. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Smith’s argument that Underwood’s representation did not comply with Rule 651(c). Underwood was not required to independently demonstrate compliance with Rule 651(c) when all that remained for her to do upon assuming the role of second-stage postconviction counsel was orally argue against the motion to dismiss. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault against his daughter and his stepdaughter. During rebuttal closing arguments the prosecutor, in response to the defense’s remarks about “uncorroborated” testimony, that the defense also had subpoena power. Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment.The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the judgment. While the defense has no burden to produce evidence, the statement was an accurate and reasonable response to defense counsel’s claim that the prosecution should have called certain witnesses. The comment was not substantially prejudicial. It was brief, constituting three lines in nearly 17 pages of the trial transcript. The prosecutor and the jury instructions subsequently reminded the jury that the state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is not required to prove his innocence, and that closing arguments are not evidence. The prosecutor’s statement that hearsay is “something that’s said outside of court” and “[i]t’s a rule we can’t bring in hearsay” and that defense counsel was aware of that rule did not constitute a clear and obvious error. The evidence against the defendant was not closely balanced, so the comment was not prejudicial. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2016, nearly 80% of Illinois voters voted to amend the Illinois Constitution; section 11, titled “Transportation funds,” was added to the state revenue article and provides that money generated from taxes, fees, excises, and license taxes on transportation infrastructure or operations shall only be spent on transportation purposes. Plaintiffs, contracting firms in the public transportation construction and design industry, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Cook County, a home-rule unit, was violating the Amendment by diverting “revenue from transportation-related taxes and fees to the County’s Public Safety Fund” and impermissibly spending the revenue on non-transportation related purposes.The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the complaint failed to state a violation of the Amendment. The appellate court reversed on the issue of standing but affirmed that no violation of the Amendment had been stated. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. The plaintiffs have associational standing and the money derived from the Cook County Transportation Taxes is subject to the Amendment. The Amendment did not create an exemption for home-rule units, home-rule taxes, or home-rule expenditures. The court found no issue with the manner in which home-rule units have had their power limited in the transportation context. View "Illinois Road and Transportation Builders Association v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was injured after a high-speed chase, during which officers were following a car that had been reported stolen; officers had gotten within 10 feet of the car in a parking lot and had ordered the driver out of the car at gunpoint. The driver sped off and hit the plaintiff. The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b), provides local public entities and public employees with absolute immunity from liability for “[a]ny injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner.”The appellate court held that the defendants, several police officers and their government employers, did not have immunity under section 4-106(b) for the plaintiff's injuries because the person the police officers were chasing was not “an escaped or escaping prisoner” within the meaning of the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A mere show of authority by police officers is not sufficient to establish physical custody. The driver’s freedom of movement was directly controlled or limited to a particular place; he was not “held in custody” in the parking lot within the plain and ordinary meaning of that phrase, and was not an “escaped or escaping prisoner” when he subsequently hit the plaintiff. View "Robinson v. Village of Sauk Village" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILCS 150/1, the state initiated forfeiture proceedings against currency totaling $223,743 that was seized from a van driven by Tyler, but owned by Salaam, following a traffic stop. The forfeiture complaint alleged that there was probable cause to believe that the currency was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance. The state unsuccessfully attempted to serve Tyler with notice of the forfeiture proceedings by mail, before serving notice by publication. No one filed a claim to the currency. The circuit court entered a default judgment of forfeiture. More than two years later, Salaam moved to vacate, arguing that the judgment was void because he was not served with notice. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that it had in rem jurisdiction over the currency; that notice was properly given to the driver, as the “owner or interest holder” of the currency; and that Salaam was not entitled to notice because he was not an “owner or interest holder.” The appellate court affirmed,The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction of the case under the Forfeiture Act and had in rem jurisdiction over the seized currency, so any failure to comply with statutory notice rendered its judgment voidable, not void. Any challenge to that order had to be filed within two years of its entry. Salaam’s motion was not timely. View "Alvarez v. $59,914 United States Currency" on Justia Law

McDonald sought letters of administration for the estate of his deceased brother, John. An affidavit averred that John’s only heirs were his parents and his siblings. McDonald had been appointed plenary guardian over John’s person and estate; thereafter, without the prior knowledge of his guardian or the court, John participated in a purported wedding ceremony with Ellizzette. The circuit court entered orders appointing Shawn as administrator and declaring John’s heirs to be John’s parents and siblings. McDonald filed but then withdrew a petition for declaration of invalidity of marriage, and filed a petition to recover assets. The court allowed Ellizzette to file a petition seeking letters of administration based on her assertion that she is John’s surviving spouse, then held that Ellizzette failed to present a prima facie case establishing the validity of the marriage. The Appellate Court remanded, finding the circuit court erred in barring Ellizzette from testifying based on the Dead Man’s Act. 735 ILCS 5/8-201.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. Under the Probate Act, a ward who wishes to enter into a marriage may do so only with the consent of his guardian. Ellizzette was aware at the time of the marriage that John was under guardianship, so the marriage might not be valid. No best interest finding was ever sought or made. Ellizzette could not have provided any testimony that would have been sufficient to prove the validity of the marriage and could not have been prejudiced by her inability to testify regarding the marriage. View "In re Estate of McDonald" on Justia Law

Schultz filed a wrongful death and survival action, alleging that the defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct by refusing to dispatch 911 services, which resulted in the decedent’s (his wife) death. Schultz had called 911, asking that police stop his wife from driving because she was intoxicated. The defendants allegedly first dispatched police to the wrong location and then refused to contact police after Schultz called back. The circuit court dismissed, finding that the defendants had absolute immunity from civil liability under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act and that the decedent's negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injuries and death. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Emergency Telephone System Act (ETS), 50 ILCS 750/15.1(a), did not apply to situations in which a 911 dispatcher allegedly failed or refused to dispatch emergency services but is limited to “provid[ing] an immunity for failures within that infrastructure and technology itself” and “was not designed to supersede the immunities set forth in the Tort Immunity Act.”The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The limited immunity of section 15.1(a) of the ETS Act governs this claim, but dismissal was appropriate because the decedent’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of her death. View "Schultz v. St. Clair County" on Justia Law

In 2004, Grant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault. The trial court merged the counts and sentenced him to 14 years in prison. In 2013, Grant sought forensic testing of a hair that was discovered during a post-assault examination of the victim. It was subsequently discovered that all the forensic evidence in Grant’s case was destroyed in 2007, pursuant to Peoria Police Department policy.Defense counsel moved for a new trial or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, citing PPD’s failure to fulfill its duty to preserve the forensic evidence as required by 725 ILCS 5/116-4. The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court vacated Grant’s conviction, remanded for further proceedings, and ordered a jury instruction at any retrial that the state failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence as required and that the jury may construe that fact against the state. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the judgment of the circuit court. Section 116-4 contains nothing to indicate that the legislature intended for the failure to comply with the statute to result in vacatur of a defendant’s conviction; the legislative intent is further confirmed by the criminal liability set forth for intentional non-compliance with section 116-4. View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law

Dent and RLD (Petitioners) had several supply and marketing contracts with energy companies (Respondents). Respondents terminated the Petitioners' at-will consulting agreements. Petitioners filed an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 petition seeking disclosure from Respondents of the names and addresses of three unidentified individuals who might be responsible in damages to Petitioners, alleging that those individuals publicized false and defamatory statements about Dent that caused respondents to terminate their contractual relationships. Petitioners alleged that the unnamed individuals accused Dent of drunken conduct and of sexual misconduct. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the petition, stating that the circuit court abused its discretion when it sua sponte dismissed the petition based upon its determination that Petitioners knew the identity of Respondents and their attorneys; Respondents and their attorneys were not potential defendants responsible in damages for defamation or breach of contract.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The appellate court erred in holding that a section 2-615 motion to dismiss cannot consider affirmative defenses apparent on the face of the petition, such as the existence of qualified privilege. The existence of qualified privilege on the part of the unidentified individuals was apparent from the face of the petition. Respondents, having raised nothing more than a conclusory denial, failed to sufficiently allege abuse of that privilege. View "Dent v. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc." on Justia Law