Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A Pan-Oceanic supervisor, Singh, asked Green to pick up a skid steer from Patten. Green saw that the equipment was not loaded properly, and asked that it be reloaded. Patten employees refused. Singh told Green to return with the equipment. In heavy expressway traffic, Green saw that the trailer was bouncing and stepped on the brakes. The trailer swung into McQueen's car, injuring him. Pan-Oceanic acknowledged that Green was its agent, acting within the scope of his agency. A jury ruled for McQueen against PanOceanic, but not against Green, and assessed damages of $163,227.45, finding that Pan-Oceanic had acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. The jury subsequently awarded $1 million in punitive damages.On appeal, the court held that, when a plaintiff is injured by a company’s employee in a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for direct negligence against the employer where the employer admits responsibility for the employee’s conduct under respondeat superior, concluding that the jury’s findings—that Green was not negligent but Pan-Oceanic acted with aggravated negligence—were legally inconsistent, The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the award. The trial court properly instructed the jury that Green claimed Pan-Oceanic was negligent for ordering Green to take the load on the highway after it knew or should have known, that it was unsafe and for failing to reject the load to prevent it from traveling on the highway. This liability did not depend on Green’s actions. The verdicts were not legally inconsistent. View "McQueen v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant fired a gun at four police officers and was convicted of armed robbery and four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The appellate court reversed in part after finding no speedy trial or public trial violation and no reversible error on a jury instruction issue. The appellate court vacated three of the aggravated discharge convictions, finding that the state had effectively prosecuted the defendant based on his firing a single shot at four officers.The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, agreeing with the appellate court. As to the speedy trial claim, the defendant did not demand trial in the statutorily directed manner and is considered to have agreed to the first continuance. There was no abuse of discretion in granting the state’s first motion for continuance. Counsel was not ineffective on that issue. The erroneous and contradictory jury instructions, however, require reversal and retrial. On retrial, the unit of prosecution issue is likely to recur. Where the legislature can, but does not, define the unit of prosecution, the doctrine of lenity applies. The offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm does not clearly define the unit of prosecution, so a single discharge in the direction of multiple police officers can sustain only one conviction. View "People v. Hartfield" on Justia Law

Responding to a burglary at a Chicago bar in 2009, police found the bar owner in the parking lot with multiple injuries. The man died hours later. Salamon was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and burglary and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 33 years.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. While an inculpatory statement Salamon made to police about two years after the burglary was involuntary and should have been suppressed, the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated that a prolonged incommunicado detention disguised as “normal police procedure” cannot be condoned; an unwarranted delay in providing the simple expedient of a telephone call takes on significant importance in evaluating the voluntariness of an inculpatory statement made after an extended period of incommunicado detention. However, the substance of Salaman’s video-recorded confession was cumulative and duplicated other evidence that was properly admitted at trial, so the result of the trial would have been the same if the confession had been excluded. View "People v.Salamon" on Justia Law

Moon was charged with domestic battery for causing bodily harm to a minor. Before jury selection, the court typically administers a voir dire oath to prospective jurors but the record does not establish whether the court administered a voir dire oath before or during jury selection. The circuit court asked each potential juror several questions. All the prospective jurors indicated that they would follow the court's instructions. After jury selection, the court asked the circuit clerk to swear the jury in. There is no verbatim record of the oath but the parties stipulated that the clerk incorrectly asked the already-selected jurors: “[D]o you solemnly swear or affirm you’ll truthfully answer all questions asked concerning your qualifications as jurors?” Before his conviction, Moon did not object to the unsworn status of the jury. Denying a post-trial motion, the circuit court concluded that the error was harmless. The appellate court concluded that Moon had forfeited and was not prejudiced by this “clear error.”The Illinois Supreme Court held that reversal of Moon’s conviction is required, regardless of the strength of the evidence or any showing of prejudice. Swearing the jury with a trial oath was essential to the common-law system of trial by jury; deprivation of this constitutional right amounts to structural error. A jury must be sworn with an oath that substantially incorporates specific elements. Because jeopardy never attached, the state is not precluded from retrying the defendant on remand. View "People v. Moon" on Justia Law

In the March 2020 primary election, McHenry Township voters rejected a proposition to dissolve the township. Months later, the township’s board of trustees adopted a resolution to place a nearly identical proposition on the November 2020 general election ballot. The McHenry County Clerk refused to place the proposition on the ballot, notifying the township that the proposition violated the statutory prohibition against “the same proposition” appearing on the ballot more than once within 23 months, 10 ILCS 5/28-7.The circuit court dismissed a mandamus petition. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that, regardless of whether the proposition was prohibited from appearing on the November 2020 ballot, the clerk lacked the statutory authority to make that determination and was obligated to perform the ministerial act of placing the proposition on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the township is no longer pursuing dissolution.Section 28-5 provides that a county clerk is authorized to give notice that the public question may not be placed on the ballot only when the question is prohibited by “the limitations of section 28-1.” The prohibition against placing the same proposition on the ballot more than once in 23 months is set forth in section 28- 7, not section 28-1. The court did not consider whether the proposition actually violated section 28-7. View "McHenry Township v. County of McHenry" on Justia Law

Sigcho-Lopez, the alderman for Chicago’s 25th Ward, filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections, alleging that his predecessor’s (Solis) campaign committee unlawfully paid Solis's personal legal fees from campaign funds. The Board dismissed Sigcho-Lopez’s complaint. On administrative review, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Legal fees incurred to pay for a public official’s criminal defense against investigations or charges of public corruption do not amount to a per se prohibited personal debt under the plain language and spirit of Election Code section 9-8.10(a)(3); whether legal defense fees amount to a personal debt that does not defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Solis was not indicted but worked with federal investigators using his official capacity to expose public corruption. Considering the evidence before the Board, its conclusion that Solis’s legal fees amounted to a proper expenditure not prohibited as “satisfaction or repayment” of personal debt but incurred “to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” was not clearly erroneous. View "Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

After a night of drinking, Deroo drove his car off the road, flipped several times, and crashed into a ditch. He was taken to the hospital by ambulance. Deroo was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) and aggravated driving while his license was revoked and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of nine and three years, respectively. At trial, the results of a blood test establishing his blood alcohol content were admitted into evidence under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a)), which allows the admission of chemical tests of blood conducted in the course of emergency medical treatment “as a business record exception to the hearsay rule.” Deroo argued that section 11-501.4(a) conflicted with Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6), which excluded “medical records in criminal cases” from the business records hearsay exception.The appellate court found no conflict and affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Rule 803(6)'s medical records exclusion for criminal cases is not logically defensible. The court amended that Rule, striking the exception and stating that ordinary rules of evidence do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because by simply permitting evidence to be admitted at trial, they do not at all subvert the presumption of innocence. View "People v. Deroo" on Justia Law

On February 15, 2018, GAN filed a petition for a tax deed to acquire property it purchased at Cook County’s 2016 annual tax sale for the tax year 2014. On April 24, 2018, GAN assigned its interest in the property to Blossom63. On May 6, 2018, Longmeadow, the owner of the property, transferred its interest in the property to Devonshire. On May 17, Devonshire sought to intervene in the tax deed proceedings and moved to vacate Blossom63’s tax deed on the ground Blossom63 failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of the Property Tax Code, 35 ILCS 200/22-5.On May 18, the circuit court granted the petition for a tax deed. The county clerk issued Blossom63 a tax deed. On June 19, 2019, the circuit court granted Devonshire’s motion to vacate the order issuing a tax deed to Blossom63. The appellate court reversed, finding Blossom63’s notice strictly complied with the Tax Code. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Blossom63 strictly complied with section 22-5 by listing the delinquent tax year for which the sale was held without listing the additional delinquent tax years for which it paid taxes to complete the sale. View "In re Application of the County Collector" on Justia Law

McDonald filed a putative class action, alleging that her former employer, Bronzeville, collected, used, and stored sensitive biometric data from employees in a fingerprint timekeeping system, violating the Biometric Information Privacy Act,740 ILCS 14/1. McDonald alleged that she was never provided with nor signed a release and had never been informed of the purposes or length of time for which her biometric information was stored. Bronzeville argued that the claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries transpiring in the workplace, and that an employee has no common-law or statutory right to recover civil damages from an employer for injuries incurred in the course of her employment.The circuit court rejected Bronzeville’s argument, reasoning that privacy rights are neither a psychological nor physical injury and not compensable under the Compensation Act. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court concluded that an employee's claim against an employer for liquidated damages under the Privacy Act, available without further compensable actual damages being alleged or sustained and intended to have a preventative and deterrent effect, is not the type of injury that categorically fits within the purview of the Compensation Act, a remedial statute designed to provide financial protection for workers that have sustained an actual injury. View "McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Johnathan was adjudicated a delinquent minor under 705 ILCS 405/5-701 after he was found guilty of 10 counts of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a seven-year-old victim. During his sex offender evaluation, Johnathan stated that his lawyer did not return calls, that they “didn’t talk” and that he was never prepared for the stand. On appeal, Jonathan argued that the circuit court erred because it did not conduct a “Krankel” preliminary inquiry regarding his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in not conducting a “Krankel” hearing. The Krankel procedure applies in juvenile proceedings and is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A pro se defendant only has to bring his claim to the trial court’s attention and is not required to file a written motion. The procedure applies even though the defendant has retained counsel. Johnathan clearly stated that his attorney was not doing something that he should have been doing. A juvenile in a juvenile delinquency proceeding need do nothing more than bring his pro se claim to the attention of the court. View "In re Johnathan T." on Justia Law