Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gorss pled guilty to aggravated driving under the influence arising from a 2016 accident that resulted in a death. He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. Gorss, through counsel, moved to reconsider his sentence. Counsel filed a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) The circuit court denied the motion. Gorss argued that his counsel failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d) by failing to state, in the certificate, that he consulted with Gorss to ascertain his contentions of error with the entry of the guilty plea. The appellate court affirmed Gorss’s conviction and sentence, finding that the Rule 604(d) certificate did not violate the rule.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Counsel must strictly comply with each provision of Rule 604(d); failure to do so requires a remand for the filing of a new motion to withdraw a guilty plea or to reconsider a sentence. The rule is clear: counsel must certify that consultation to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error as to both the sentence and entry of the guilty plea took place. Here, counsel’s certificate as written leaves unclear whether he consulted with Gorss as to his contentions of error in the entry of his guilty plea. View "People v. Gorss" on Justia Law

In a March 6, 2015, vehicular collision at a Minooka truck terminal, Armstead, a semi-truck driver with Pennsylvania-based Manfredi Mushroom, was allegedly struck and injured by the semi-truck operated by Roberts, employed by NFI. Armstead filed a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim against Manfredi Mushroom, which led to the execution of a “Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation” settling the claim. Armstead then filed a negligence suit against NFI in Illinois. The circuit court determined that the Agreement included a judicial admission that prohibited Armstead from claiming injuries other than a right knee strain. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated and remanded for dismissal. The circuit court’s order limiting Armstead’s injury allegations resolved an issue that was ancillary to the negligence claims. Permitting an appeal from that order would promote precisely the type of piecemeal appeals Rule 304(a) was designed to discourage. After the circuit court’s improper Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of its order, Armstead dismissed his action in the circuit court, where jurisdiction remained due to the improper Rule 304(a) finding. He failed to refile the action within one year or within the statute of limitations period, so his action remains dismissed. View "Armstead v. National Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

Freeport Police Sergeant Weichel identified McGee as having fled the scene of a home invasion. Fane, apprehended with McGee, was charged with residential burglary, aggravated battery of a victim over 60, home invasion, and resisting or obstructing a peace officer. McGee pled guilty to residential burglary and home invasion and testified on Fane’s behalf, naming Beales as the other burglar. McGee claimed that as he fled, he encountered Fane and advised him to run because he had just conducted a drug deal and had been set up. McGee testified that he and Fane had been friends for 15 years.Fane objected to the use of jury instruction IPI Criminal 3.17 (Testimony Of An Accomplice): “When a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.” Some appellate courts had deemed 3.17 inappropriate when the accomplice witness’s testimony completely exonerated the defendant.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction. A trial court need not find that the testimony implicates the defendant before giving the accomplice witness instruction. The instruction was an accurate, impartial, and nonargumentative summation of the law. View "People v. Fane" on Justia Law

Jones was a juvenile in 2000 when he pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. After unsuccessfully petitioning for postconviction relief, Jones sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging his sentence violated the eighth amendment protections in the Supreme Court’s “Miller v. Alabama” decision.The appellate court affirmed the denial of his motion, finding that Jones’ claims did not invoke the protections provided to juveniles in Miller. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply only when a trial court lacks or refuses to use discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to life, or to a de facto life, sentence. The mandatory sentencing scheme that applied in Illinois at the time he was sentenced was never applied to Jones. By entering a plea agreement, a defendant forecloses any claim of error. A voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones. Jones has not claimed that the state engaged in any misrepresentation or committed any misconduct. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Mancini Law Group sent a commercial Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (5 ILCS 140/1) to the Schaumburg Police Department seeking disclosure of all traffic accident reports for all motor vehicle accidents that occurred within the Village between June 30, 2017, and July 13, 2017. The Department provided redacted accident reports, asserting that FOIA section 7(1)(b) exempted driver’s license numbers, personal telephone numbers, home addresses, and personal license plates; the Department relied upon section 7(1)(c) in redacting dates of birth and policy account numbers. The names of drivers and witnesses were unredacted.The circuit court held that the Department had established that the information at issue was exempt and rejected Mancini’s argument that the Department was precluded from asserting that the information was exempt because it voluntarily provided unredacted traffic accident reports to LexisNexis, a third-party vendor approved by the state for assisting the Department with its Illinois Vehicle Code mandatory reporting obligations.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Department is not precluded from asserting that the redacted information is exempt under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c). An Illinois public body does not have the ability to waive an individual’s interest in his personal or private information that is contained in a document subject to a FOIA request. it is irrelevant whether the Department could have chosen to fulfill its mandatory reporting obligations in a different way. View "Mancini Law Group, P.C. v. Schaumburg Police Department" on Justia Law

Chicago police officer Luzadder and his partner were on patrol at 11:36 p.m. when they received a dispatch stating that an anonymous person reported that two white females were walking with a white male wearing a black hoodie, who “was swinging at the females” and “has a gun” near a particular intersection. A second call reported that the group had moved north. Minutes later, at the second location, Luzadder saw Carter, a white male, wearing the described clothing, holding his waistband. Luzadder did not see two women nor did he see Carter violate any laws. Luzadder believed that Carter was attempting to conceal a firearm. Luzadder, with a hand on his service weapon, ordered Carter to raise his hands, patted down Carter over his clothes, and felt what he thought was the handle of a handgun. He lifted Carter’s shirt and recovered a revolver from Carter’s waistband. Luzadder arrested Carter, who was charged with being an armed habitual criminal, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon.The circuit court denied his motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed the denial of Carter’s motion and his nine-year sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part. The officers had the necessary reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. The court otherwise vacated. The state failed to prove Carter guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed habitual criminal; the other convictions were merged into that conviction. View "People v. Carter" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the doctors negligently failed to recognize that Thomas was pregnant before performing elective surgery on her and administering anesthesia, pain medication, and antibiotics, resulting in irreversible injury to the fetus. Thomas was subsequently informed by another physician that the fetus would not survive to term and the pregnancy should be terminated. Thomas had a lawful, consensual abortion. Because the abortion would not have occurred but for the doctors’ negligent conduct and the injuries suffered by the fetus, plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ negligence “ultimately caused the death of” the fetus.Responding to a question certified by the trial court, the appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court held that the Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/2.2, does not bar a cause of action against a defendant for fetal death if the defendant knew or had a medical reason to know of the pregnancy and the alleged malpractice resulted in a non-viable fetus that died as a result of a lawful abortion with requisite consent. Section 2.2 addresses only the liability of the doctor who performs the abortion, not the liability of other physicians, and does not state that abortion is a superseding cause, as a matter of law, where a physician tortiously injures a fetus in a separate medical procedure. View "Thomas v. Khoury" on Justia Law

Julie arrived at Carle Hospital on September 14, 2018, after swallowing batteries in an apparent suicide attempt. Carlefiled a petition for Julie’s emergency admission by certification to a mental health facility, Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/1-100) on October 5. Julie argued the petition was untimely filed, claiming that she had been medically cleared on September 28 yet remained “detained involuntarily” and that sections 3-604 and 3-610 require that a petition or certificate, be executed within 24 hours of involuntary detention. The Champaign County circuit court ordered her involuntarily committed for no more than 90 days.The appellate court found that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine applied and affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The section 3-610 24-hour deadline starts upon admission of a respondent under article VI and ends with the proper execution of a second examination and certificate. Admission under article VI occurs no sooner than when the petition and first certificate are properly executed. The 24-hour deadline starts upon detention based on a petition alone and ends when a certificate is furnished to or by the facility. Carle never purported to detain Julie on the basis of a petition alone nor did Julie allege that she was detained on the basis of a petition alone. Section 3-604 does not apply to this case. View "In re Julie M." on Justia Law

Schoonover was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault against his niece, M.L. The prosecution alleged Schoonover, who was over the age of 17, committed “act[s] of contact” with the victim, M.L., who was under the age of 13. Before M.L.’s testimony, the trial court indicated its intention to have the courtroom cleared except for M.L.’s family members and the media during M.L.’s testimony, barring Schoonover’s family members (Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/115-11).The appellate court majority reversed Schoonover’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court committed second-prong plain error for failing to inquire as to whether the spectators removed from the courtroom during the minor’s testimony had a direct interest in the case.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding no clear or obvious error under section 115-11 or the sixth amendment. The plain language of section 115-11 is clear: the trial court need only formulate an opinion as to whether the spectators being excluded have a direct interest in the case. The determination as to whether a direct interest exists is left to the discretion of the court. Section 115-11 is constitutional and the trial court comported with its requirements and limitations. View "People v. Schoonover" on Justia Law

The circuit court of Cook County adjudicated Z.L. and Z.L.’s siblings abused and neglected minors under the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3) and made the minors wards of the court. The appellate court reversed the findings of abuse and neglect and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1912(a).The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, rejecting arguments that the state failed to prove Z.L. was a victim of abusive head trauma and that the court’s finding that Z.L. was physically abused was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court’s conclusion that the mother was unable, at that time, to parent the children was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court remanded for a determination of whether there was compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act. Although the record disclosed that the state sent notification to the Bureau of Indian Affairs on December 20, 2019, there is no evidence as to what has transpired in connection with this notice since that time. View "In re Z.L." on Justia Law