Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Betsy filed a petition for the dissolution of marriage from Stephen. The parties married in 2000 and had no children. In 2016, the circuit court entered judgment for dissolution of marriage, which incorporated a marital settlement agreement, stating that Betsy would receive monthly of $5,000.00 for 48 months and thereafter would receive 48 months of payments in decreasing amounts. “Said maintenance payments shall be nonmodifiable pursuant to Section 502(f) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.” In 2018, Stephen filed a petition to modify the judgment to terminate or modify his maintenance obligation. Stephen asserted that the maintenance obligation was not truly nonmodifiable because it did not specifically provide, as required by the Marriage Act, “that the non-modifiability applies to amount, duration, or both.” He asserted that a change in circumstances necessitated the modification.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate and the circuit court in holding that section 502(f) allows parties to make maintenance entirely nonmodifiable or to select a single aspect of the obligation, amount, or duration, to make nonmodifiable and that the settlement agreement showed the parties intended to make the maintenance obligation nonmodifiable in both amount and duration. Stephen cannot now avoid that obligation based on changed circumstances. View "In re Marriage of Dynako" on Justia Law

Sandra and Mark were married in 1992. In 2014, Sandra filed for divorce. The couple had five children; three were then minors. While the divorce was pending, Mark’s mother died; he inherited approximately $615,000. The inheritance included checking accounts and investment accounts, the majority being held in two individual retirement accounts (IRAs).In the divorce judgment, the circuit court excluded Mark’s inheritance in calculating his child support and maintenance obligations under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/504, 505. The circuit court subsequently certified a question for interlocutory review: “Whether inherited mandatory retirement distributions are income for purposes of child support and maintenance calculations.” The appellate court reframed the question and held that mandatory distributions or withdrawals taken from an inherited IRA containing money that has never been imputed against the recipient for the purposes of maintenance and child support calculations constitute “income.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Classifying the distributions and withdrawals as income does not constitute impermissible double counting because the inherited IRAs had not been previously imputed to Mark as income for support purposes. Mark’s nonmarital mandatory distributions and withdrawals received and reinvested in his own retirement accounts are not excluded from the statutory definition of “income.” View "In re Marriage of Dahm-Schell" on Justia Law

Jill, age 42, died two days after seeking treatment at Mercy’s emergency department. A postmortem examination by the medical examiner indicated that Jill died from myocarditis resulting from sepsis; Jill’s blood cultures showed that MRSA bacteria was present in Jill’s blood. At the request of Jill’s family, Bryant performed a second autopsy and concluded that Jill’s cause of death was acute and chronic congestive heart failure due to dilated cardiomyopathy. Bryant’s report did not indicate that Jill had myocarditis or sepsis. Her estate sued for wrongful death and medical negligence, arguing that Jill died of toxic shock syndrome and sepsis caused by a retained tampon, which could have been treated by antibiotics if timely diagnosed. A jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the circuit court abused its discretion and denied the plaintiff a fair trial by refusing to issue a nonpattern jury instruction on the loss of chance doctrine and a pattern jury instruction on informed consent. When a jury is instructed on proximate cause through a pattern jury instruction, the lost chance doctrine, as a form of proximate cause, is encompassed within that instruction. The plaintiff never alleged that Jill consented to medical treatment without being adequately informed and that the treatment injured her. The plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction did not identify any treatment Jill received or any injury she received from that treatment. View "Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center" on Justia Law

Doe sued Parillo based on physical and sexual assaults and the violation of an order of protection. The following 30 months involved multiple delays and disputes. Parillo was sanctioned several times for failing to answer the complaint, failing to cooperate in discovery, and for his (and his attorney’s) failure to appear for scheduled hearings. In 2019, following a trial that Parillo and his attorney did not attend, a jury awarded Doe $200,000 for “Loss of Normal Life,” $200,000 for “Pain and Suffering,” $200,000 for “Emotional Distress,” $200,000 for “Future Loss of Normal Life,” and $200,000 for “Future Pain and Suffering,” totaling $1 million in compensatory damages, plus $8 million in punitive damages.In ruling on a post-trial motion, the court stated “[T]he defendant lied in an affidavit to seek a trial continuance, the defense attorneys failed to follow a well-known and well-understood circuit court rule ... and the defense attorneys and defendant abandoned the trial ... defendant’s attempt should read, ‘A Conspiracy to Undermine the Integrity of the Judicial Process—or— How Not to Get a Trial Continuance in the Law Division.’ First, lie; second, don’t follow rules; and third, if the first and second don’t work, don’t show up for trial.” The appellate court reduced Doe’s punitive damages to $1 million. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgments. The punitive damages award was not unconstitutionally excessive. View "Doe v. Parrillo" on Justia Law

Rock Island police responded to a report of shots fired. Rush and Childs were found in a bullet-ridden car. Rush died of his gunshot wounds. Officers spoke to witnesses who had observed a dark Lincoln Town Car at the scene at the time of the shooting. An off-duty police officer had heard the gunshots and had observed a dark Lincoln Town Car fleeing. The Lincoln and its occupants—Phelps and Reed—were stopped. Both implicated Eubanks as the shooter. Police located Eubanks weeks later. He agreed to be interviewed. Eubanks denied any involvement but admitted to being with Phelps and Reed that day. He later stated that Reed had “set it up.” Under a subsequent plea agreement, the parties agreed to a 35-year sentence. Eubanks gave a detailed videotaped statement confessing to the crimes.The court granted a subsequent motion to vacate the plea. At his stipulated bench trial, Eubanks's statement was admitted into evidence. Eubanks was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. He filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress his statement under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. The videotaped statement was not part of the negotiation process and, therefore, inadmissible under Rule 402(f). A plea deal was in place when Eubanks gave his statement. Giving that statement was not a condition precedent of the deal but, rather, was a fulfillment of the deal. View "People v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Ittersagen brought a medical malpractice action against Advocate Medical and Dr. Thakadiyil, alleging that the defendants negligently failed to diagnose him with sepsis and treat him appropriately. A jury was sworn. More than halfway through the trial, the court received a note from a juror, who reported that he had a business relationship with “the Advocate Health Care System Endowment.” The juror, a partner in a company that handles investments, said he believed the endowment was affiliated with but separate from Advocate Medical. He explained that his connection to Advocate Medical was so attenuated that he forgot to mention it during jury selection. The juror insisted that the outcome of the trial would not affect him financially and that he could remain fair and impartial. The trial court denied Ittersagen’s request to remove the juror for actual bias or implied bias and to replace him with an alternate juror. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the juror’s business relationship with the endowment created a presumption of bias that cannot be rebutted by claims of impartiality. The court noted the lack of evidence of the affiliation between the endowment and Advocate. The juror did not owe Advocate a fiduciary duty and did not have any other direct relationship with the defendants that would create a presumption of juror bias as a matter of law. View "Ittersagen v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp." on Justia Law

The Illinois State Police (ISP) revoked Brown’s Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card due to Brown's 2001 California conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV). On his application, Brown had answered “no” to the question of whether he had ever been convicted of domestic battery or a substantially similar offense. A domestic violence conviction precludes possession of firearms under federal law, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9).The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated an order granting Brown’s petition and ordering ISP to issue Brown a FOID card. Under section 10(c) of the FOID Card Act, a circuit court may grant relief to a petitioner whose FOID card has been revoked if the petitioner has not been convicted of a forcible felony under the laws of any jurisdiction within 20 years of the application or at least 20 years have passed since the end of any period of imprisonment imposed in relation to that conviction; the circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, the applicant’s criminal history, and his reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety; granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest; and granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.Brown satisfied the federal law test for the “civil rights restored” exception because he lost his right to possess firearms under California law and those rights were subsequently automatically restored by virtue of California law 10 years after his conviction. View "Brown v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, in committing a respondent under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), the circuit court must make an explicit finding that the respondent is substantially probable to commit sex offenses in the future if not confined. The Act was subsequently amended to include the required element of a substantial probability to reoffend within the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person.In 1973, Snapp pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent liberties with a child. In 1992, he pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In 1997, after Snappwas again charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the state filed a petition and obtained his commitment under the Act. In 2004 and 2007, Snapp filed applications for recovery, seeking release from his civil commitment. Both of those applications were denied. In 2010, Snapp filed another application for recovery. A bench trial was held in 2018, The court denied Snapp’s petition, finding he was “still a sexually dangerous person and in need of confinement.” The appellate court vacated, finding that precedent required an express finding of a substantial probability to reoffend.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The General Assembly eliminated the requirement of a separate explicit finding by the circuit court that the respondent is substantially probable to reoffend if not confined. View "In re Commitment of Snapp" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery, home invasion, and possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle. At trial, the victim (defendant’s former girlfriend) testified to having received threatening Facebook Messenger communications that used a nickname, “Masetti Meech” that defendant had used while they were dating. A message under that name led the victim to her car, days after defendant took it. The messages included personal information only defendant would have known. Police found defendant in possession of the victim’s car keys, near her brother’s workplace.The appellate court affirmed, finding that proof of intent to permanently deprive the victim of her car was not required because defendant was charged with conversion or theft. It was sufficient that the victim testified that defendant broke into her residence, committed assault, stole her keys, and took her car. Because the trial court failed to hold a “Krankel" hearing on defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the State agreed a hearing was necessary, and the appellate court remanded the cause for a preliminary Krankel hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding the contents of Facebook messages allegedly sent by defendant and that the state failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle. The prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence properly authenticating the Facebook Messenger messages. View "People v. Brand" on Justia Law

House was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on his participation in 1993 abductions and shooting deaths of two teenagers. House was 19 at the time of the crimes. He claimed that he had no idea of the larger plan when the victims were driven to the deserted location and that the victims were killed after he left. The circuit court sentenced him to a mandatory natural life term for the murder convictions and 60 years for each aggravated kidnapping conviction, to run consecutively.In 2001, House’s sentence for the kidnappings was reduced to consecutive 30-year terms. House filed a post-conviction petition, asserting actual innocence based on a witness’s recantation of her trial testimony; newly discovered evidence of police misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; and that his mandatory sentence of natural life violated the Eighth Amendment and the Illinois constitution's proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court vacated House’s sentence, finding that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the Illinois proportionate penalties provision as applied because it precluded consideration of mitigating factors, specifically House’s age, level of culpability, and criminal history.The Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and to reconsider the effect of its 2018 Harris opinion. On remand, the appellate court denied an agreed motion seeking remand and again vacated House’s sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The appellate court erroneously held that House’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the as-applied constitutional challenge. The court vacated the dismissal of the actual innocence claim. View "People v. House" on Justia Law