Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/1), states that “an important State interest” requires that an employer “who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who ... suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child.” The Act does not define “catastrophic injury,” which the Illinois Supreme Court has found “synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4-110 of the [Illinois Pension] Code”Peoria’s ordinance was amended to define “catastrophic injury” as “[a]n injury, the direct and proximate consequences of which permanently prevent an individual from performing any gainful work.” The term “gainful work,” which does not appear in the Act, is defined as “[f]ull- or part-time activity that actually is compensated or commonly is compensated.”The Union sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment violates the Act. The circuit court granted the Union summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The ordinance’s definitions are inconsistent with the requirements of the Act and are therefore preempted; the ordinance is not a valid exercise of Peoria’s home rule authority. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 50 v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Munoz sued general contractor, Bulley & Andrews, for injuries he sustained while an employee of its subcontractor, Bulley Concrete. Bulley & Andrews had paid workers’ compensation insurance premiums and benefits for the subcontractor and its employees. Each company has its own distinct federal tax identification number and files separate federal and state income tax returns. The companies have different presidents and employ different workers.The circuit court dismissed, finding that the genderal contractor was immune from the lawsuit under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a). The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The exclusive remedy provisions do not extend to a general contractor who is not the employee’s immediate employer. Immunity does not hinge on the payment of benefits. Bulley & Andrews had no legal obligation to provide workers’ compensation insurance for Bulley Concrete employees. The fact that Bulley Concrete was a subsidiary of Bulley & Andrews is of no import. If a parent company and its subsidiary are operated as separate entities, only the entity that was the immediate employer of the injured worker is entitled to immunity. The Act bars an employee from bringing a civil suit directly against his employer but does not limit the employee’s recovery from a third-party general contractor. View "Munoz v. Bulley & Andrews, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, Suburban, owned by Barus, and ROC formed ROC/Suburban LLC, which acted as a vendor to Suburban. In 2010, Barus retained attorney Carlson for legal advice in unwinding that relationship. ROC sued Suburban, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The Gaspero Law Firm defended Suburban in the ROC litigation. In June 2015, the court entered judgment for ROC and ordered Suburban to pay 50% of the fair value of the assets that Barus had improperly transferred out of ROC/Suburban.In May 2016, Barus and Suburban filed a legal malpractice action against Carlson, who allegedly recommended or approved the self-help actions that resulted in the breach of fiduciary duties. The circuit court held that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13- 214.3(b)) because the injury began when the plaintiffs retained new counsel and that the plaintiffs knew they were injured in 2013 at the latest when the judge stated that Carlson had committed malpractice.The appellate court reversed; the Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The plaintiffs did not suffer a realized injury until the court found a breach of fiduciary duty and entered a judgment against them. Although plaintiffs may have been alerted in 2013 that counsel misadvised them, the possibility of damages was not actionable until the ROC litigation ended and plaintiffs became obligated to pay damages as a result of Carlson’s advice. View "Suburban Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

In 2011, PNC filed a foreclosure complaint against Kusmierz. PNC retained Metro to serve the summons. Magida, a Metro employee, attempted to serve Kusmierz at the subject Lombard address but the property was a vacant lot. Magida served Kusmierz in Palatine. Days later, PNC obtained the appointment of Metro as a special process server. PNC then filed affidavits of service. Kusmierz failed to appear. On February 28, 2012, the court entered an order of default and a judgment of foreclosure and sale. PNC complied with all statutory notice requirements, and the property was sold at a judicial sale back to PNC. The court confirmed the judicial sale. Notices of the proceedings were mailed to the Palatine address. In 2013, third parties purchased the property from PNC for $24,000 and constructed a home on the property with mortgage loans totaling $292,650.In 2018, more than seven years after being served with the foreclosure complaint and summons, Kusmierz sought relief from void judgments under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f), alleging improper service because the process server was not appointed by the court at the time of service, in violation of section 2-202(a). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, applying both laches and the bona fide purchaser protections in section 2-1401(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure. View "PNC Bank, National Association v. Kusmierz" on Justia Law

After being convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), Mudd argued on appeal that comments made in the prosecution’s rebuttal closing argument constituted reversible error because they misrepresented the evidence and shifted the burden of proof to him. Alternatively, he contended that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to those rebuttal comments. The defense had emphasized the lack of evidence supporting the testimony by police officers; the prosecutor had responded that jurors should use their “common sense”; no one else was near the van when Mudd knelt beside the tire, so he was the only person who reasonably could have left the gun there, making forensic testing of the weapon unnecessary.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court upheld his conviction. To establish plain error, Mudd had to prove that the prosecutor’s comments were “clear or obvious” reversible error that shifted the burden of proof to him. Mudd had equal access to the weapon for purposes of testing. It is difficult to imagine how an accurate portrayal of the parties’ ability to request forensic testing, as required by Illinois law, can be deemed to be unduly prejudicial to a defendant. View "People v. Mudd" on Justia Law

The appellate court reversed Cline’s conviction for residential burglary because the only evidence tying him to the burglary was a fingerprint found on a portable headphone case inside the residence and there was no evidence that the state’s fingerprint expert, Dennewitz, verified his results with another examiner.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Cline did not dispute that the resident’s testimony was sufficient to show that someone knowingly entered his apartment without authority and with the intent to commit theft there. Cline also did not challenge the admissibility of Dennewitz’s expert testimony. The court rejected Cline’s argument that, without proof that Dennewitz’s conclusion was verified by another examiner, the state “failed to prove” Dennewitz followed the “accepted” ACE-V analytical method for fingerprint identification. Dennewitz was found qualified by the trial court to testify as an expert in forensic fingerprint identification. The evidence was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of Cline’s guilt of residential burglary. View "People v. Cline" on Justia Law

Gorss pled guilty to aggravated driving under the influence arising from a 2016 accident that resulted in a death. He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. Gorss, through counsel, moved to reconsider his sentence. Counsel filed a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) The circuit court denied the motion. Gorss argued that his counsel failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d) by failing to state, in the certificate, that he consulted with Gorss to ascertain his contentions of error with the entry of the guilty plea. The appellate court affirmed Gorss’s conviction and sentence, finding that the Rule 604(d) certificate did not violate the rule.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Counsel must strictly comply with each provision of Rule 604(d); failure to do so requires a remand for the filing of a new motion to withdraw a guilty plea or to reconsider a sentence. The rule is clear: counsel must certify that consultation to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error as to both the sentence and entry of the guilty plea took place. Here, counsel’s certificate as written leaves unclear whether he consulted with Gorss as to his contentions of error in the entry of his guilty plea. View "People v. Gorss" on Justia Law

In a March 6, 2015, vehicular collision at a Minooka truck terminal, Armstead, a semi-truck driver with Pennsylvania-based Manfredi Mushroom, was allegedly struck and injured by the semi-truck operated by Roberts, employed by NFI. Armstead filed a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim against Manfredi Mushroom, which led to the execution of a “Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation” settling the claim. Armstead then filed a negligence suit against NFI in Illinois. The circuit court determined that the Agreement included a judicial admission that prohibited Armstead from claiming injuries other than a right knee strain. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated and remanded for dismissal. The circuit court’s order limiting Armstead’s injury allegations resolved an issue that was ancillary to the negligence claims. Permitting an appeal from that order would promote precisely the type of piecemeal appeals Rule 304(a) was designed to discourage. After the circuit court’s improper Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of its order, Armstead dismissed his action in the circuit court, where jurisdiction remained due to the improper Rule 304(a) finding. He failed to refile the action within one year or within the statute of limitations period, so his action remains dismissed. View "Armstead v. National Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

Freeport Police Sergeant Weichel identified McGee as having fled the scene of a home invasion. Fane, apprehended with McGee, was charged with residential burglary, aggravated battery of a victim over 60, home invasion, and resisting or obstructing a peace officer. McGee pled guilty to residential burglary and home invasion and testified on Fane’s behalf, naming Beales as the other burglar. McGee claimed that as he fled, he encountered Fane and advised him to run because he had just conducted a drug deal and had been set up. McGee testified that he and Fane had been friends for 15 years.Fane objected to the use of jury instruction IPI Criminal 3.17 (Testimony Of An Accomplice): “When a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.” Some appellate courts had deemed 3.17 inappropriate when the accomplice witness’s testimony completely exonerated the defendant.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction. A trial court need not find that the testimony implicates the defendant before giving the accomplice witness instruction. The instruction was an accurate, impartial, and nonargumentative summation of the law. View "People v. Fane" on Justia Law

Jones was a juvenile in 2000 when he pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. After unsuccessfully petitioning for postconviction relief, Jones sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging his sentence violated the eighth amendment protections in the Supreme Court’s “Miller v. Alabama” decision.The appellate court affirmed the denial of his motion, finding that Jones’ claims did not invoke the protections provided to juveniles in Miller. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply only when a trial court lacks or refuses to use discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to life, or to a de facto life, sentence. The mandatory sentencing scheme that applied in Illinois at the time he was sentenced was never applied to Jones. By entering a plea agreement, a defendant forecloses any claim of error. A voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones. Jones has not claimed that the state engaged in any misrepresentation or committed any misconduct. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law