Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2014, Eighner filed a personal injury complaint (14-L-11428) concerning a November 2012 collision. Eighner paid the filing fee and caused summons to be issued. As the trial approached, Eighner decided to undergo surgery. In May 2017, the court granted a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under 735 ILCS 5/2- 1009(a), with leave to reinstate within one year. In April 2018, Eighner ’s counsel electronically filed a document under the number, 14-L11428, titled “Eighner ’s Notice of Refiling Complaint Being Reinstated.” Eighner paid no filing fee and no summons issued. Eighner ’s counsel received file-stamped copies of the documents, and a “Notice of Electronic Filing,” from the clerk. Defense counsel informed Eighner ’s counsel that he was unable to find the reinstated case on the court website. In October 2018, Eighner’s counsel notified defense counsel that he had tried to file the matter under a different number and had been advised by the clerk’s office to keep the same number. Eighner ’s counsel, unsuccessful in filing a motion under that number, filed a new complaint, number 18-L-11146, and paid a filing fee; a new summons was issued.The defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the new lawsuit as untimely having been filed five months after the expiration of the one-year period. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court concluded that section 13-217 did not permit Eighner to file the previously dismissed action under its original case number, citing the phrase “may commence a new action.” Case 18-L-11146 was untimely and Eighner ’s April 2018 filing was not a new action. View "Eighner v. Tiernan" on Justia Law

In each of two automobile personal injury actions, plaintiffs moved for entry of a qualified protective order (QPO) pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 110 Stat. 1936, and its implementing regulations (45 C.F.R. 160, 164) (Privacy Rule). Plaintiffs’ proposed QPOs would allow protected health information (PHI) to be released, subject to restrictions that nonlitigation use or disclosure of PHI is prohibited and PHI must be returned or destroyed at the conclusion of the litigation. State Farm, the liability insurer for the named defendants, intervened in each lawsuit and sought entry of its own protective order, which expressly allowed insurance companies to use, disclose, and maintain PHI for purposes beyond the litigation and expressly exempted insurers from the “return or destroy” requirement.In both cases the circuit court granted the plaintiffs’ motions. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting State Farm’s argument that property and casualty insurers fall outside HIPAA. Rejecting arguments concerning the requirements of the Illinois Insurance Code, the court stated that no Illinois law requires State Farm to use or disclose plaintiffs’ PHI after the conclusion of the litigation. The Cook County standard protective order is preempted by the Privacy Rule and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011, does not apply to shield that order from traditional preemption. View "Haage v. Zavala" on Justia Law

Sproull filed a putative class action against State Farm, alleging breach of contract. State Farm allegedly depreciated labor costs in determining “actual cash value” (ACV) of a covered loss and concealed this practice from its policyholders. The policy does not define ACV. State Farm agreed to certify a question for interlocutory review: “Where Illinois’ insurance regulations provide that the ‘actual cash value’ or ‘ACV’ of an insured, damaged structure is determined as ‘replacement cost of property at time of loss less depreciation if any,’ and the policy does not itself define actual cash value, may the insurer depreciate all components of replacement cost (including labor) in calculating ACV?”The Appellate Court reformulated the question to address solely labor costs, rather than all components of replacement cost and answered the question in the negative. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding the policy ambiguous and construing it against the insurer. Illinois’s insurance regulations provide that the ACV of an insured, damaged structure is determined as the replacement cost of the property at time of loss less depreciation if any; only the property structure and materials are subject to a reasonable deduction for depreciation, and depreciation may not be applied to the intangible labor component. View "Sproull v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In 1994, Evans was convicted of Class 2 felony manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance and Class X felony manufacture or delivery of more than 15 grams of cocaine. In 2018, Evans applied to the Illinois State Police for a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card. The Police denied the request, explaining that in Illinois, felons are prohibited from owning firearms under section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code. The circuit court rejected Evans’s petition to have his firearm rights restored under section 10(c) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, reasoning that federal law, the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), barred Evans from obtaining a FOID card and that Evans had not established that issuing him a FOID card would not be contrary to the public interest. The Appellate Court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. If a convicted felon can establish the requirements of section 10(c)(1)-(3), he has his civil rights restored and may be granted relief that is not contrary to federal law, which includes a “civil rights restored” exception. Evans failed to meet his burden of establishing that granting him relief would not be contrary to the public interest. The court noted that nothing in the statute precludes Evans from filing another petition to remove his firearm disability. Evans now knows why his previous submissions were found lacking and can bolster his submissions. View "Evans v. Cook County State's Attorney" on Justia Law

In 1999, Agpawa pleaded guilty to federal felony mail fraud. In 2002, he completed his sentence. Agpawa ran for mayor of the City of Markham in 2017. There were no preelection challenges to Agpawa’s nominating petitions, but Cook County State’s Attorney Foxx sent Agpawa a letter stating that he was ineligible to serve as mayor because of his felony conviction. Agpawa won the election. Foxx filed a complaint, alleging that Agpawa had been convicted of an “infamous crime” and was prohibited from holding municipal office unless he received a presidential pardon under the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/29-15. The appellate court affirmed judgment for Foxx.Agpawa sought relief from then-Governor Rauner, who issued a document that purported to be a “RESTORATION OF RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP ROGER AGPAWA.” Agpawa took the oath of office as Markham's mayor. The court vacated its earlier order. No appeal was taken. In 2020, Agpawa sought reelection. Opponents objected. The Markham Municipal Officers Electoral Board ruled in favor of Agpawa. The appellate court reversed. A subsequent amendment to the Election Code specifically refers to a restoration of rights by the governor.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the Board ruling. While the governor has no constitutional authority to pardon a federal conviction, the governor has statutory authority to mitigate the collateral electoral consequences of such a conviction by issuing a restoration of rights. Governor Rauner’s untitled document restored Agpawa’s Illinois rights of citizenship, including the right to hold municipal office. The court rejected arguments that the Illinois legislature had no authority to alter the effect of a federal conviction and that the statutory amendment violated the special legislation clause, was “void for vagueness,” should not be applied retroactively, and violated first amendment rights, the equal protection clause, and separation of powers principles. View "Walker v. Agpawa" on Justia Law

In 1995, Beaman was convicted of the murder of his former girlfriend, a college student, and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment. After Beaman had served more than 13 years in prison, this court overturned his conviction because the trial was tainted by a Brady violation. The undisclosed evidence concerned, Murray, a drug dealer who had a sporadic sexual relationship with the victim, who failed to complete a polygraph examination, was charged with domestic battery and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver prior to Beaman’s trial, physically abused his girlfriend on numerous occasions, and used steroids, which caused him to act erratically. The state declined to retry Beaman and dismissed the murder charge against him. Beaman subsequently sued Freesmeyer, Warner, and Zayas, former detectives of the Normal Police Department, asserting malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. Beaman also requested damages from the municipality, under theories of respondeat superior and indemnification.On remand, the appellate court again affirmed the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment for defendants. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. While no court has ever deemed the evidence against Beaman insufficient to sustain his conviction, Beaman is entitled to have a jury determine whether the detectives acted with malice. Material issues of fact exist with respect to whether the defendants intentionally ignored, shaped, interpreted, or created evidence to support their conclusion that Beaman was guilty. View "Beaman v. Freesmeyer" on Justia Law

In 1996, Dorsey (age 14) kicked open a door to a Chicago takeout restaurant and began firing a gun at customers, killing a 16-year-old and severely injuring 13-year-old Williams and 16-year-old Sims. At the hospital, Williams told police that Dorsey, whom she knew from school, was the shooter. The juvenile court allowed Dorsey’s prosecution to proceed in adult criminal court. Dorsey was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. A presentence report detailed Dorsey’s troubled home life, gang involvement, and previous encounters with the law. While awaiting trial, Dorsey obtained an eleventh-grade education with “very good grades.” The court heard extensive evidence in aggravation and in mitigation then sentenced Dorsey to consecutive terms, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 76 years’ imprisonment.In 2014, Dorsey sought leave to file a successive petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his aggregate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Miller v. Alabama holding, which forbids “a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” He argued that, although his sentence is not technically a natural life sentence, such a lengthy sentence imposed on a juvenile is sufficient to trigger Miller-type protections.The Illinois Supreme Court held that good-conduct credit is relevant and that a sentence imposed pursuant to a statutory scheme that affords a juvenile an opportunity to be released from prison after serving 40 years or less of the term imposed does not constitute a de facto life sentence. View "People v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

Indeck develops, owns, and operates conventional and alternative fuel power plants. DePodesta, Indeck's vice president of business development, had overall responsibility for Indeck’s electrical generation project development efforts. Dahlstrom was director of business development. DePodesta and Dahlstrom had signed confidentiality agreements.In 2010, Dahlstrom founded HEV, a consulting firm that develops electrical power generation projects. DePodesta later became a member of HEV. In 2013, DePodesta, Dahlstrom, and HEV formed an LLC to develop natural-gas-fired, simple cycle power plants in Texas. The two subsequently copied and removed from Indeck’s premises thousands of documents and files. DePodesta resigned from Indeck on November 1, 2013, and Dahlstrom on November 4. They did not tell anyone at Indeck that they intended to pursue an opportunity with a new LLC. In 2014, Indeck filed suit, alleging breach of the confidentiality agreements and fiduciary duties,” seeking injunctive relief and disgorgement.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Indeck’s confidentiality agreement was unenforceable as overbroad and Indeck failed to prove it had sustained injury based on any breach. Any profits from breaches of fiduciary duty after the defendants were speculative; there was no identifiable fund traceable to those breaches, so a constructive trust was not available. However, defendants breached their fiduciary duties during their employment and were required to disgorge their salaries. Indeck failed to prove the injury necessary for its claim of usurpation of a corporate opportunity. View "Indeck Energy Services, Inc. v. DePodesta" on Justia Law

Roberts was driving a truck through a construction zone when he saw a flagger holding a sign that said “SLOW.” Roberts slowed down. The flagger suddenly turned the traffic sign to “STOP.” Roberts abruptly slammed on his brakes. Solomakha, driving a tractor-trailer behind Roberts, was not able to stop his tractor-trailer in time and rear-ended Roberts’s truck. Roberts’s injuries resulted in medical bills totaling more than $500,000. In Roberts’s suit for negligence, Alex (Solomakha’s employers) sought contribution against third-parties for their role in failing to maintain the safety of the construction site. E-K, the general contractor, settled with Roberts and was dismissed from the suit. Alex settled with Roberts for $1.85 million. Before trial on the contribution claim, the district court determined that Alex, Safety (E-K's subcontractor), and E-K must appear on the verdict form so that the jury could adequately apportion fault among every tortfeasor.The Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act provides that “[t]he pro-rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability” and that “no person shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share,” with an exception where “the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro-rata liability.”The district court concluded that any share of liability that the jury assigned to E-K should not be reallocated between Alex and Safety and ordered that Alex would remain liable for E-K’s entire share along with its own. The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which responded that the obligation of a settling party is not “uncollectable” under 740 ILCS 100/3. View "Roberts v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

The real estate taxes on Brown’s mineral rights were not paid. In 2013, the Hamilton County collector sold the delinquent taxes. Castleman extended the taxes’ redemption date to October 10, 2015, and filed a petition for a tax deed on June 22, 2015. An October 2015 order under Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/22-40(a)) directed the clerk to issue a tax deed to Castleman. Castleman assigned the tax sale certificate to Groome. Brown sold the mineral rights to SI by quitclaim deed. In November 2015, SI moved to vacate the section 22-40(a) order. The trial court dismissed for lack of standing. Meanwhile, Groome recorded a tax deed in February 2016. In June 2017, SI sought a writ of mandamus against the Hamilton County clerk who conceded that the 2016 Groome deed did not comport with the underlying section 22-40(a) order, which directed the deed to be issued to Castleman. The court granted SI’s requests. Castleman and Groome were not parties in the mandamus proceedings.The appellate court found the motion to vacate the section 22-40(a) order "a nullity.” The Hamilton County clerk issued Castleman a “Corrective Tax Deed” in October 2017, in compliance with the original section 22-40(a) order. SI filed a “Section 22-85 Motion to Void Tax Deed” and a “[Section] 2-1401/22-45 Petition to Vacate the October 2015 Order Directing Issuance of Tax Deed.” The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of both counts.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A tax deed issued and was recorded within the mandatory time limit. The deed’s failure to name the proper party created a conflict between the deed and the section 22-40(a) order. While timely filing may result in the tax deed becoming “absolutely void,” 35 ILCS 200/22-85, the conflict with the order does not. The court’s mandamus order is properly viewed as reforming and correcting the 2016 tax deed to comport with the section 22-40(a) order. View "In re Application for a Tax Deed" on Justia Law