Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Agpawa pleaded guilty to federal felony mail fraud. In 2002, he completed his sentence. Agpawa ran for mayor of the City of Markham in 2017. There were no preelection challenges to Agpawa’s nominating petitions, but Cook County State’s Attorney Foxx sent Agpawa a letter stating that he was ineligible to serve as mayor because of his felony conviction. Agpawa won the election. Foxx filed a complaint, alleging that Agpawa had been convicted of an “infamous crime” and was prohibited from holding municipal office unless he received a presidential pardon under the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/29-15. The appellate court affirmed judgment for Foxx.Agpawa sought relief from then-Governor Rauner, who issued a document that purported to be a “RESTORATION OF RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP ROGER AGPAWA.” Agpawa took the oath of office as Markham's mayor. The court vacated its earlier order. No appeal was taken. In 2020, Agpawa sought reelection. Opponents objected. The Markham Municipal Officers Electoral Board ruled in favor of Agpawa. The appellate court reversed. A subsequent amendment to the Election Code specifically refers to a restoration of rights by the governor.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the Board ruling. While the governor has no constitutional authority to pardon a federal conviction, the governor has statutory authority to mitigate the collateral electoral consequences of such a conviction by issuing a restoration of rights. Governor Rauner’s untitled document restored Agpawa’s Illinois rights of citizenship, including the right to hold municipal office. The court rejected arguments that the Illinois legislature had no authority to alter the effect of a federal conviction and that the statutory amendment violated the special legislation clause, was “void for vagueness,” should not be applied retroactively, and violated first amendment rights, the equal protection clause, and separation of powers principles. View "Walker v. Agpawa" on Justia Law

In 1995, Beaman was convicted of the murder of his former girlfriend, a college student, and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment. After Beaman had served more than 13 years in prison, this court overturned his conviction because the trial was tainted by a Brady violation. The undisclosed evidence concerned, Murray, a drug dealer who had a sporadic sexual relationship with the victim, who failed to complete a polygraph examination, was charged with domestic battery and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver prior to Beaman’s trial, physically abused his girlfriend on numerous occasions, and used steroids, which caused him to act erratically. The state declined to retry Beaman and dismissed the murder charge against him. Beaman subsequently sued Freesmeyer, Warner, and Zayas, former detectives of the Normal Police Department, asserting malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. Beaman also requested damages from the municipality, under theories of respondeat superior and indemnification.On remand, the appellate court again affirmed the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment for defendants. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. While no court has ever deemed the evidence against Beaman insufficient to sustain his conviction, Beaman is entitled to have a jury determine whether the detectives acted with malice. Material issues of fact exist with respect to whether the defendants intentionally ignored, shaped, interpreted, or created evidence to support their conclusion that Beaman was guilty. View "Beaman v. Freesmeyer" on Justia Law

In 1996, Dorsey (age 14) kicked open a door to a Chicago takeout restaurant and began firing a gun at customers, killing a 16-year-old and severely injuring 13-year-old Williams and 16-year-old Sims. At the hospital, Williams told police that Dorsey, whom she knew from school, was the shooter. The juvenile court allowed Dorsey’s prosecution to proceed in adult criminal court. Dorsey was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. A presentence report detailed Dorsey’s troubled home life, gang involvement, and previous encounters with the law. While awaiting trial, Dorsey obtained an eleventh-grade education with “very good grades.” The court heard extensive evidence in aggravation and in mitigation then sentenced Dorsey to consecutive terms, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 76 years’ imprisonment.In 2014, Dorsey sought leave to file a successive petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his aggregate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Miller v. Alabama holding, which forbids “a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” He argued that, although his sentence is not technically a natural life sentence, such a lengthy sentence imposed on a juvenile is sufficient to trigger Miller-type protections.The Illinois Supreme Court held that good-conduct credit is relevant and that a sentence imposed pursuant to a statutory scheme that affords a juvenile an opportunity to be released from prison after serving 40 years or less of the term imposed does not constitute a de facto life sentence. View "People v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

Indeck develops, owns, and operates conventional and alternative fuel power plants. DePodesta, Indeck's vice president of business development, had overall responsibility for Indeck’s electrical generation project development efforts. Dahlstrom was director of business development. DePodesta and Dahlstrom had signed confidentiality agreements.In 2010, Dahlstrom founded HEV, a consulting firm that develops electrical power generation projects. DePodesta later became a member of HEV. In 2013, DePodesta, Dahlstrom, and HEV formed an LLC to develop natural-gas-fired, simple cycle power plants in Texas. The two subsequently copied and removed from Indeck’s premises thousands of documents and files. DePodesta resigned from Indeck on November 1, 2013, and Dahlstrom on November 4. They did not tell anyone at Indeck that they intended to pursue an opportunity with a new LLC. In 2014, Indeck filed suit, alleging breach of the confidentiality agreements and fiduciary duties,” seeking injunctive relief and disgorgement.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Indeck’s confidentiality agreement was unenforceable as overbroad and Indeck failed to prove it had sustained injury based on any breach. Any profits from breaches of fiduciary duty after the defendants were speculative; there was no identifiable fund traceable to those breaches, so a constructive trust was not available. However, defendants breached their fiduciary duties during their employment and were required to disgorge their salaries. Indeck failed to prove the injury necessary for its claim of usurpation of a corporate opportunity. View "Indeck Energy Services, Inc. v. DePodesta" on Justia Law

Roberts was driving a truck through a construction zone when he saw a flagger holding a sign that said “SLOW.” Roberts slowed down. The flagger suddenly turned the traffic sign to “STOP.” Roberts abruptly slammed on his brakes. Solomakha, driving a tractor-trailer behind Roberts, was not able to stop his tractor-trailer in time and rear-ended Roberts’s truck. Roberts’s injuries resulted in medical bills totaling more than $500,000. In Roberts’s suit for negligence, Alex (Solomakha’s employers) sought contribution against third-parties for their role in failing to maintain the safety of the construction site. E-K, the general contractor, settled with Roberts and was dismissed from the suit. Alex settled with Roberts for $1.85 million. Before trial on the contribution claim, the district court determined that Alex, Safety (E-K's subcontractor), and E-K must appear on the verdict form so that the jury could adequately apportion fault among every tortfeasor.The Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act provides that “[t]he pro-rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability” and that “no person shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share,” with an exception where “the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro-rata liability.”The district court concluded that any share of liability that the jury assigned to E-K should not be reallocated between Alex and Safety and ordered that Alex would remain liable for E-K’s entire share along with its own. The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which responded that the obligation of a settling party is not “uncollectable” under 740 ILCS 100/3. View "Roberts v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

The real estate taxes on Brown’s mineral rights were not paid. In 2013, the Hamilton County collector sold the delinquent taxes. Castleman extended the taxes’ redemption date to October 10, 2015, and filed a petition for a tax deed on June 22, 2015. An October 2015 order under Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/22-40(a)) directed the clerk to issue a tax deed to Castleman. Castleman assigned the tax sale certificate to Groome. Brown sold the mineral rights to SI by quitclaim deed. In November 2015, SI moved to vacate the section 22-40(a) order. The trial court dismissed for lack of standing. Meanwhile, Groome recorded a tax deed in February 2016. In June 2017, SI sought a writ of mandamus against the Hamilton County clerk who conceded that the 2016 Groome deed did not comport with the underlying section 22-40(a) order, which directed the deed to be issued to Castleman. The court granted SI’s requests. Castleman and Groome were not parties in the mandamus proceedings.The appellate court found the motion to vacate the section 22-40(a) order "a nullity.” The Hamilton County clerk issued Castleman a “Corrective Tax Deed” in October 2017, in compliance with the original section 22-40(a) order. SI filed a “Section 22-85 Motion to Void Tax Deed” and a “[Section] 2-1401/22-45 Petition to Vacate the October 2015 Order Directing Issuance of Tax Deed.” The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of both counts.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A tax deed issued and was recorded within the mandatory time limit. The deed’s failure to name the proper party created a conflict between the deed and the section 22-40(a) order. While timely filing may result in the tax deed becoming “absolutely void,” 35 ILCS 200/22-85, the conflict with the order does not. The court’s mandamus order is properly viewed as reforming and correcting the 2016 tax deed to comport with the section 22-40(a) order. View "In re Application for a Tax Deed" on Justia Law

In filing mortgage foreclosure cases, the plaintiffs each paid a $50 “add on” filing fee under section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of section 15-1504.1 and of sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Illinois Housing Development Act, 20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31, which created foreclosure prevention and property rehabilitation programs funded by the fee.The trial court, following a remand, held that the fee violated the equal protection, due process, and uniformity clauses of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the fee violates the constitutional right to obtain justice freely. The $50 filing charge established under section 15-1504.1, although called a “fee,” is, in fact, a litigation tax; it has no direct relation to expenses of a petitioner’s litigation and no relation to the services rendered. The court determined that the plaintiffs paid the fee under duress; the voluntary payment doctrine did not apply. View "Walker v. Chasteen" on Justia Law

Municipal filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint against Moriarty in Kankakee County and had a summons issued. Leggott, a registered detective, served Moriarty at Rush Hospital in Chicago. Municipal had not moved for the appointment of a process server. Moriarty never filed an answer. The circuit court entered a judgment for foreclosure and sale, finding that Moriarty was personally served with process and was in default and that service of process was properly made. Municipal, the successful bidder at a sheriff’s sale, moved for confirmation of the foreclosure sale. Moriarty filed his appearance pro se, stating that he had not been aware of the sale. He had been in a nursing home and did not receive notice. The circuit court stated that Municipal had no obligation to give him notice of the sale and granted the motion for confirmation. Moriarty artued that the circuit court was without personal jurisdiction to enter the default judgment.The circuit court found and the appellate court affirmed that Leggott was not required to be specially appointed. Code of Civil Procedure section 202 provides: Process shall be served by a sheriff, or … by a coroner. ... In counties with a population of less than 2,000,000, process may be served, without special appointment, by a person who is licensed or registered as a private detective.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Section 2-202 is concerned with where process is served, not about where the complaint is filed. In counties with a population of less than 2 million--all Illinois counties other than Cook County--process may be served, without special appointment, by a private detective. For a private detective to serve process on a defendant in Cook County, he must be specially appointed by the court. View "Municipal Trust and Savings Bank v. Moriarty" on Justia Law

Diana initiated divorce proceedings from Gregory in 2007. A final judgment dissolving the marriage and allocating marital property was entered in 2009 and was affirmed in 2012. Both parties filed post-decree petitions. Diana appealed a series of orders, arguing as a threshold issue that the court erred in denying her motion for substitution of judge as of right. The appellate court (Crecos II) agreed that the trial court erred in denying Diana’s motion and that subsequent orders were “void.” In 2016, Diana filed petitions under 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3) for attorney fees and costs incurred in both appeals. In 2018, the trial court ordered Gregory to pay Diana’s attorney fees: $32,952.50 for the Crecos I appeal and $89,465.50 for the Crecos II appeal.The appellate court found that the 2018 order was not final and appealable; the order awarded interim attorney fees under section 501(c-1), which are temporary in nature and subject to adjustment and inextricably intertwined with the property issues that remained partially unresolved. The claim for attorney fees was not a separable claim for purposes of appeal.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The 2018 fee award was a final order on a post-dissolution petition. In entering the order, the trial court included Rule 304(a) language. The appellate court had jurisdiction over Gregory’s appeal of that order. View "In re Marriage of Crecos" on Justia Law

Tillman filed a petition for leave to file a taxpayer action under 735 ILCS 5/11-303, to enjoin the disbursement of public funds, alleging that certain general obligation bonds issued by the state in 2003 and 2017 were unconstitutional. He claimed the bonds violated article IX, section 9(b), of the Illinois Constitution on the ground that they were not issued for qualifying “specific purposes,” which, he argued, refers exclusively to “specific projects in the nature of capital improvements, such as roads, buildings, and bridges.” The 2003 “State pension funding” law authorized $10 billion in bonds to be issued “for the purpose of making contributions to the designated retirement systems.” The 2017 law authorized “Income Tax Proceed Bonds,” ($6 billion) “for the purpose of paying vouchers incurred by the State prior to July 1, 2017.”The circuit court denied the petition. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the circuit court. the necessary elements for laches have been met in this case: “lack of due diligence by the party asserting the claim” and “prejudice to the opposing party.” There is no reasonable ground under section 11-303 of the Code for filing the petitioner’s proposed complaint View "Tillman v. Pritzker" on Justia Law