Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Palos sued, alleging Humana underpaid for medical services that Palos provided to members of Humana health insurance plans. For two years, the parties filed numerous motions to compel and other “emergency” discovery motions. Judge Tailor appointed retired judge Sullivan to serve as a discovery master. In 2017, Judge Sullivan sent a letter with certain recommendations to Judge Tailor and counsel. At a hearing the next day, Judge Shelley began presiding over the case. Palos contended that the court lacked the authority to appoint a special master or mediator to oversee discovery. Judge Shelley saw no “need to deviate from the procedure” that Judge Tailor had established. Palos filed a memorandum in support of its motion to strike the discovery master and an objection to Judge Sullivan’s report.Palos subsequently moved for substitution of judge as a matter of right, 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2)(i), noting that the trial court had not made any substantial ruling. The court denied the motion, citing the “testing the waters” exception; ” such a motion “is considered untimely when the party moving for a substitution of judge has discussed issues with the judge, who has indicated a position on a particular point.” Discovery proceeded, with discovery sanctions and spoliation. A jury found in favor of Humana. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rulings.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The “test the waters” doctrine is not a valid basis on which to deny a party’s motion for substitution of judge as of right; the doctrine conflicts with the plain language of the statute. View "Palos Community Hospital v. Humana Insurance Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, 12 tree planters who allegedly worked for Moore Landscapes under contracts that Moore executed with the Chicago Park District, sought unpaid wages, statutory damages, prejudgment interest on back-pay, and reasonable attorney fees and costs under the Illinois Prevailing Wage Act, 820 ILCS 130/11. They alleged that Moore improperly paid them an hourly rate of $18 instead of the prevailing hourly wage rate of $41.20.The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal order. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The Park District and Moore did not stipulate rates for work done under the contracts. The Act provides that, when the public body does not include a sufficient stipulation in a contract, the potential liabilities of the contractor are narrower than those provided under section 11, when a contractor disregards a clear contractual stipulation to pay prevailing wage rates, and “shall be limited to the difference between the actual amount paid and the prevailing rate of wages required to be paid for the project. View "Valerio v. Moore Landscapes, LLC" on Justia Law

Sekura purchased a membership from Krishna that gave her access to L.A. Tan’s salons. Her membership required Sekura to provide Krishna with her fingerprints. Sekura filed a class-action lawsuit against Krishna, alleging that Krishna violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act: because it “systematically and automatically collected, used, stored, and disclosed their [customers’] biometric identifiers or biometric information without first obtaining the written release required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3) … systematically disclosed ... biometric identifiers and biometric information to SunLync, an out-of-state … vendor and … does not provide a publicly available retention schedule or guidelines for permanently destroying its customers’ biometric identifiers and biometric information as specified by the [Act].” The complaint also alleged negligence and unjust enrichment. Krishna tendered Sekura’s lawsuit to West Bend, its insurer.West Bend sought a declaratory judgment that it did not owe a duty to defend Krishna against Sekura’s lawsuit. The trial court entered a judgment for Krishna. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed after construing the policy terms “personal injury or advertising injury,” “publication” of material, and violation of Sekura’s “right of privacy” to conclude that the allegations in Sekura’s complaint fall within or potentially within West Bend’s policies’ coverage for personal injury or advertising injury. A “violation of statutes” exclusion in the policies does not apply to the Act. View "West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc." on Justia Law

Hatter was charged with nine counts of criminal sexual assault based on three acts involving F.T., his live-in girlfriend’s 13-year-old daughter. In return for the recommendation of four-year consecutive sentences and an agreement to nol-pros the remaining charges, he pled guilty to counts alleging that he knowingly made contact between his penis and F.T.’s vagina and inserted his finger into F.T.’s vagina while she was a minor and Hatter was her “family member,” as the live-in boyfriend of her mother. The court stated that each charge was punishable by a sentence of four-15 years’ imprisonment, with the potential for an additional 30 years if there were aggravating factors. The court found that he understood the nature of the charges, the possible penalties, and his rights; he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and his guilty plea was supported by a factual basis. The court imposed two consecutive four-year prison terms. Hatter did not appeal. Because of an error with respect to supervised release, at a later hearing, Hatter had an opportunity to vacate his guilty plea. He instead agreed to an amendment of the sentence to provide for the correct mandatory supervised release term.A year later, Hatter filed the pro se post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not argue that F.T. was not a family member. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as patently without merit. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hatter’s factual allegations do not establish an arguably reasonable probability that he would have decided to plead not guilty, absent counsel’s alleged errors in failing to discover and present the defense to three of the nine alternative charges. View "People v. Hatter" on Justia Law

The Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act took effect in 2014, 410 ILCS 130/999, “to protect patients with debilitating medical conditions, as well as their physicians and providers, from arrest and prosecution, criminal and other penalties, and property forfeiture if patients engage in the medical use of cannabis.” The Department of Agriculture (DOA), charged with enforcing the provisions of the Act related to registering and overseeing medical cannabis cultivation centers, adopted Administrative Rules.Medponics petitioned for administrative review of a DOA decision, awarding a permit to Curative, to operate a medical cannabis cultivation center in Aurora. Medponics alleged that the location of Curative’s proposed facility violated the Act because it was located within 2500 feet of the R-1 and R-5 districts in Aurora, both of which Medponics alleged were zoned exclusively for residential use. DOA found Curative’s proposed location satisfied the location requirement because multiple nonresidential uses were authorized in Aurora’s R-1 and R-5 districts. The circuit court reversed the DOA’s decision.The appellate court ordered the permit reinstated to Curative. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. DOA’s interpretation of the location requirement is not erroneous, unreasonable, or in conflict with the Act; the definition is reasonable and harmonizes with the purpose of the Act. View "Medponics Illinois LLC v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Bochenek was convicted of identity theft for the knowingly unauthorized use of another person’s credit card information to purchase cigarettes. Before trial, Bochenek argued that the venue provision pertaining to identity theft, 720 ILCS 5/1-6(t)(3), which allows for proper venue in the county in which the victim resides, was unconstitutional. Bochenek maintained that the acts constituting the offenses occurred at a gas station in Lake County and not where the victim resides, in Du Page County.The circuit and appellate courts and the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision. Based on the nature of the crime, the constitutional mandate that criminal trials occur in the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed is satisfied. The offense of identity theft may be deemed to have been committed where the physical acts occurred as well as where the intangible identifying information is “located,” namely the victim’s residence. View "People v. Bochenek" on Justia Law

In 2016, Cooke filed a complaint against the Committee for Frank J. Mautino with the Illinois State Board of Elections, alleging that the Committee had filed inadequate expenditure reports, Elections Code, 10 ILCS 5/9-7, and made expenditures that did not comply with section 9-8.10. The Board held that the Committee willfully violated its order to amend its expenditure reports and imposed a $5000 fine. Cooke appealed because the Board did not reach the merits of his complaint. On remand, the Board deadlocked on both issues and found that Cooke had not met his burden in establishing violations of either section. The appellate court reversed the Board’s findings that Cooke had not met his burden in establishing violations.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. Section 9-8.10(a)(9) does not permit committees to make expenditures for gas and repairs to vehicles that are not owned or leased by the committee. For such vehicles, a committee may only make expenditures for actual mileage reimbursement. Because the Committee made expenditures for gas and repairs for vehicles it neither owned nor leased, the Committee violated section 9- 8.10(a)(9). Section 9-8.10(a)(2) regulates only the amount or price of expenditures. Cooke did not demonstrate that the Committee violated that section. View "Cooke v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Jackson and Pope each filed a statement as an independent candidate for village president. Jackson's petition had 50 voter signatures. Pope's had 32 signatures. An objection alleged that the number of signatures was insufficient under 10 ILCS 5/10-3. At an Electoral Board hearing, Schmidt, the Glendale Heights clerk and election official, testified that the Du Page County Clerk’s Office sent an e-mail indicating that “due to COVID, we are reducing the points of contact, here is a list of forms.” Schmidt stated that she read the State Board of Elections 2021 Candidate’s Guide, and, relying on the numbers “for non-partisan” elections, concluded that 24 signatures were required. Schmidt admitted that she did not understand the distinction between independent and nonpartisan. She acknowledged that she was never notified that the statutorily required number of signatures had been reduced because of the pandemic. Both candidates testified that they relied on Schmidt's representations.The Board overruled the objection, finding that both candidates justifiably relied on Schmidt’s statements and excusing their statutory violations. The trial and appellate courts affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, noting that the lowest possible correctly calculated number of signatures would be 118. While ballot access is a substantial right, the best safeguard of that right is fidelity to the Election Code and not unrestrained discretion by a local election official inexplicably confused about the statutory distinction between partisan and nonpartisan elections. A precise mathematical formula, clear and certain in its application, prevents impermissible political bias. View "Corbin v. Schroeder" on Justia Law

Elam, seeking election to the office of Riverdale village trustee at the consolidated general election occurring on April 6, 2021, filed nomination papers to be included on the ballot as an independent candidate on December 21, 2020. Attached to Elam’s nomination papers were 26 pages of signatures collected and certified by multiple petition circulators. Days later, objectors challenged Elam’s nomination papers, arguing that three individuals who circulated Elam’s nomination papers for signatures as an independent candidate in the 2021 consolidated general election violated statutory law by previously circulating nomination papers on behalf of a Democratic candidate in the 2021 consolidated primary election.The Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the Village of Riverdale determined that Election Code section 10-4, 10 ILCS 5/10-4 prohibits such a circumstance of “dual-circulation." The circuit court, appellate court, and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The policy reasons for the “dual-circulator” prohibition are evident in situations where a circulator solicits signatures for a party candidate in the primary (independent candidates do not appear on the primary ballot) and an independent candidate in the general election, both of whom will challenge one another for the same office in the general election. Section 10-4 prohibits situations such as this, which would undoubtedly cause voter confusion. View "Elam v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the Village of Riverdale" on Justia Law

In 2012, Wendy was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and arranged for her boyfriend, Mirenda, to care for her six-year-old daughter, Br. Br. came to the attention of DCFS in 2013 based on pending allegations that Mirenda sexually abused a previous partner’s daughters. The court conducted a hearing. Wendy and Assistant State’s Attorney Filipiak were present. Assistant Public Defender Bembnister was appointed as counsel for Wendy, and Assistant Public Defender Drell was appointed as guardian ad litem (GAL) for Br. Proceedings concerning Br. continued for several years.At a 2018 status hearing, Wendy appeared with a new, privately retained attorney, Drell. Drell’s appearance as Br.’s GAL at three hearings on the 2013 neglect petition before the same judge was not mentioned. In 2019, Drell withdrew and the public defender represented Wendy. The trial court terminated Wendy’s parental rights. The appellate court reversed, holding that a per se conflict existed because Drell served as Br.’s GAL before she served as Wendy’s attorney. Wendy had not raised the conflict-of-interest issue.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A “ ‘realistic appraisal’ ” of Drell’s professional relationship with Br. indicates that Drell was not associated with the victim for purposes of the per se conflict rule when she acted as Br.’s GAL. An allegedly neglected minor is not a victim but “the subject of the proceeding” under the Juvenile Court Act; such proceedings are not adversarial. Drell was never associated with the prosecution. Drell acted at the behest of the court, not the state. View "In re Br. M. & Bo. M." on Justia Law