Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Knapp and Rodriguez were charged with attempted first-degree murder, mob action, and aggravated battery in connection with the stabbing of Avitia, who survived the attack and identified the assailants. At a McHenry County jury trial, the prosecution argued that the defendants were members of the Norteños street gang and that they attacked Avitia based on his alleged association with a rival street gang. At the state’s request, the court admonished Knapp concerning his right to testify. Knapp acknowledged that he had discussed the issue with his attorney and made a choice not to testify.On appeal, Knapp unsuccessfully argued that his counsel was ineffective because counsel “elicited inadmissible other crimes evidence that was similar to the charged offense and also false” and failed to “pursue a ruling on the State’s motion to introduce gang evidence or renew his objection to the admission of such evidence.” Knapp then filed a pro se post-conviction petition, raising claims of actual innocence, involuntary waiver of his right to testify, and ineffective assistance.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the summary dismissal of the petition. While a pro se petitioner is not required to use precise legal language alleging a “contemporaneous assertion of the right to testify” to survive first-stage summary dismissal, summary dismissal is warranted when the record positively rebuts the allegations. The record contains nothing to suggest that Knapp ever alerted the court of his desire to testify, that he had any questions about that right, or that he otherwise was unsure about waiving his right to testify. View "People v. Knapp" on Justia Law

Reents obtained a tax deed to 10 locked and gated acres in Rockford. In 2017, the Attorney General, at the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, filed a civil enforcement action for violations of 415 ILCS 5/1, against Reents and Stateline Recycling, including allegations of open dumping of waste without a permit; disposal, storage, and abandonment of waste at an unpermitted facility; open dumping of waste resulting in litter and the deposition of construction and demolition debris; and failure to pay clean construction and demolition debris fill operation fees. Reents refused to permit an inspection of the property during pretrial discovery. The Winnebago County circuit court granted a motion to compel her to comply with the Rule 214(a) inspection request. After Reents asserted a good-faith objection and respectfully refused to comply, the court held her in contempt so that she could file an appeal. The appellate court reversed, citing Fourth Amendment principles.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated. The appellate court erred in deciding the appeal on constitutional grounds; the issue presented involves a civil discovery order that the appellate court should have reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Reents did not raise any constitutional issues and has forfeited any such challenge. Courts should not find discovery rules unconstitutional when a particular case does not require it. The circuit court applied the plain language of Rule 214(a) as written. View "Madigan v. Stateline Recycling, LLC" on Justia Law

Fox Lake patrol officer Zander was charged with misconduct arising from multiple job-related incidents. The chief recommended termination. Zander's union, FOP, assigned Attorney Carlson, an FOP employee. Zander had no input into the choice of an attorney, had no retainer agreement with Carlson, and was not charged for Carlson’s services. Under the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-1-1), police officers who face removal or discharge are entitled to a hearing before the local board of fire and police commissioners unless a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provides for arbitration. The CBA between Fox Lake and FOP gave officers the option of pursuing either avenue. On Carlson’s advice, Zander chose arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the termination. Zander sued, alleging legal malpractice and that FOP has no right to employ attorneys to furnish legal services under its direction to FOP members, and cannot control what attorneys assigned to help FOP members may do and “should be vicariously liable.”The circuit court dismissed, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s "Atkinson" holding, which immunizes union members and officers against personal liability for actions taken while acting as a union representative in the context of the collective bargaining process. The court noted the parallels between federal labor law and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. But for the collective bargaining agreement. FOP would have owed Zander no duty. Zander’s claim against the union fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Labor Relations Board. View "Zander v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Sparta instituted a policy for evaluating the performance of full-time police officers. Day-shift officers must accumulate at least 82 points, while the standard for night-shift officers is 65 points. Points are awarded for traffic citations, drug task force duties, investigations that take more than one shift, shooting range training; training outside the department, court time, and extra duty shifts. Awards for Officer of the Month and of the Year will be based on the most points earned over the Officer’s monthly minimum standard. Failure to reach the minimum monthly points will result in discipline that is corrective and progressive in nature. The Union alleged the policy establishes an unlawful ticket quota in violation of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-1-12). The circuit court granted Sparta summary judgment.The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute prohibits consideration of the number of citations issued when evaluating a police officer’s performance based on points of contact. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 11-1-12 first provides a general statement prohibiting citation quotas, defined as “requir[ing] a police officer to issue a specific number of citations within a designated period of time.” The second paragraph, applicable here, does not prohibit evaluating police officers with points-of-contact system and defines a “point of contact” as “any quantifiable contact made in the furtherance of the police officer’s duties,” with the sole exception being “the issuance of citations or the number of citations issued.” View "Policemen's Benevolent Labor Committee v. City of Sparta" on Justia Law

After Dameron underwent a robotic-assisted hysterectomy at Mercy Hospital, she brought a medical malpractice action. During discovery, Dameron disclosed Dr. Preston as a controlled expert witness under Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 213(f)(3). Dameron stated that Preston would testify concerning "the comparison electromyogram and/or nerve conduction studies he will be performing" and would also testify that he reviewed the results of Dameron’s November 2013 EMG and NCV tests performed at Mercy. In June 2017, Preston performed the EMG study and prepared a report. In July 2017, Dameron e-mailed the defendants, stating that she was withdrawing Preston as a Rule 213(f)(3) controlled expert witness and considering him to be a Rule 201(b)(3) non-testifying expert consultant and that she would not produce any documents from Preston’s review of the case or his examination. Dameron moved to change Preston’s designation and sought to preclude discovery of facts and opinions known by Preston absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, stating that Preston was not one of her treating physicians.The appellate court reversed the denial of Dameron’s motion. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Defendants are not entitled to Preston’s report and EMG study on the basis that Preston served as Dameron’s treating physician; Preston was consulted for the purpose of providing testimony. A party is permitted to redesignate an expert from a Rule 213(f) controlled expert witness to a Rule 201(b)(3) consultant in a reasonable amount of time before trial, where a report has not yet been disclosed. Rule 201(b)(3) protects both conceptual data and factual information. Defendants did not show exceptional circumstances. View "Dameron v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center" on Justia Law

Brown was charged with armed robbery and aggravated robbery. At a pretrial conference, defense counsel stated that Brown had told counsel that “a mental problem that he has had in the past has resurfaced. He’s under medication.... He tells me that he is again starting to hear the voices and said that he was having some difficulty in communicating with me … and that it may have factored into the events ... it may be necessary to do an evaluation to determine whether or not he’s fit to stand trial.” Judge Kouri ordered an evaluation, continuing the case for 30 days. The attorneys indicated the “evaluation would just be for fitness.” The fitness report indicated that Brown met the DSM-5 criteria for schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; PTSD; and mild intellectual disability but had the ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense. At the next court date, a written order set the matter for trial and included handwritten notations, “fitness report received, parties stipulate to contents” and “by agreement—Brown is fit to stand trial.” Brown was convicted.The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court failed to affirmatively exercise its judicial discretion to determine Brown’s fitness for trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the verdict and sentence. Neither the parties nor the trial court indicated a bona fide doubt of Brown’s fitness, either when Judge Kouri ordered the examination or 30 days later. No party ever requested a fitness hearing. Absent a bona fide doubt concerning his fitness to stand trial, Brown was not entitled to a fitness hearing. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit concerning flood damage to their Maine Township property after heavy rains in September 2008, alleging that public entities breached duties owed to them with respect to a stormwater drainage system located near their properties. Plaintiffs claimed that certain actions by the defendants increased water flow to the area and that there has been major flooding in the past. After a 2002 event, the Illinois Department of Natural Resources discovered “numerous bottlenecks and obstructions to flow as the causes of the invasive flooding” in the community. The trial court dismissed, finding that the defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs under the public duty rule and plaintiffs had not alleged any special duty. In the meantime, the Illinois Supreme Court (Coleman) abolished the public duty rule, which provided that a local governmental entity does not owe any duty to individual members of the public to provide adequate governmental services. The trial court found that the new law set forth in Coleman should not be retroactively applied.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Coleman clearly established a new principle of law, overturning decades of existing precedent. Given these circumstances and the two rationales for abolishing the public duty rule, the new law announced in Coleman would not be thwarted by its prospective application. Prospective application avoids substantial inequitable results for defendants who have relied upon the public duty rule throughout the long course of this litigation. View "Tzakis v. Maine Township" on Justia Law

J.B. and Cordova had purchased a Romeoville home together and had three children. In January 2010, Cordova moved from the home. J.B. was granted an order of protection, prohibiting Cordova from having any contact with J.B. or the children and from entering the home. J.B. testified that, on November 20, 2010, as she was getting ready for a date, Cordova kicked in her locked bedroom door and entered the room, “going crazy.” He made threats, damaged property, and raped J.B. He then began choking her. Cordova only let go when J.B.'s cell phone rang; he stated he was going to return and then left. J.B. went to her neighbor’s house and called the police. J.B. was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. Cordova testified that he and J.B. had arranged to meet that day so he could retrieve some of his mother’s items. He denied any violence and testified they had consensual sexual relations. Cordova was convicted of criminal sexual assault, 720 ILCS 5/12- 13(a)(1), and home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault, section 12-11(a)(6).The trial and appellate courts rejected Cordova’s argument that under the one-act, one-crime doctrine he could be sentenced only on the home invasion conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Proof of criminal sexual assault is a necessary element of proof of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault. All the elements of criminal sexual assault are included in the offense of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault contains no element not included in home invasion. View "People v. Reveles-Cordova" on Justia Law

Cahill was the office administrator for the Family Vision optometry practice and handled insurance billings. She left her employment and filed for bankruptcy protection. About 90% of Family’s revenue came from claims submitted to VSP, which covers claims from optometrists only if they have “majority ownership and complete control” of their medical practices. VSP disburses payments after the provider signs an agreement certifying itself as “fully controlled and majority-owned” by an optometrist. At the time Cahill was submitting Family’s claims, the practice was actually owned by a practice management company with more than 150 surgery centers and other medical practices.About a year after Cahill left Family, the trustee of Cahill’s bankruptcy estate sued under the Insurance Claims Fraud Prevention Act, 740 ILCS 92/1, which added civil penalties to existing criminal remedies for fraud against private insurance companies and allows a claim to be raised on the state’s behalf by a private person (relator), in a qui tam action. The relator becomes entitled to remuneration if the lawsuit succeeds. A relator must be an “interested person” but the Act does not define that term.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reinstatement of the case. A former employee-whistleblower with personal, nonpublic information of possible wrongdoing qualifies as an “interested person” under the Act and need not allege a personal claim, status, or right related to the proceeding. The state need not suffer money damages to partially assign its claim to a relator. The Act is intended to remedy fraud against private insurers, where the only injury to the state is to its sovereignty, based on a violation of criminal law. View "Leibowitz v. Family Vision Care, LLC" on Justia Law

From behind a closed hotel bathroom door, Casler told Sgt. Draper that his name was Jakuta King Williams, that he had no identification, and that he was from Virginia. Draper recognized Casler when he emerged and remembered having previously arrested him. Draper asked whether he was Rasheed Casler. Casler did not respond. The dispatcher indicated that Casler had an outstanding warrant. Draper arrested Casler. Casler did not attempt to resist or flee. There was no indication that Casler had disposed of evidence in the bathroom. The officers discovered Casler’s Illinois identification card.Casler was charged with possessing less than 15 grams of cocaine and less than five grams of methamphetamine and with obstructing justice by providing false information. Casler testified that, while in the bathroom, he thought that his friends were joking around, so he answered Jakuta King Williams; he did not know there were officers outside the bathroom and was not attempting to avoid arrest. Casler was acquitted of the drug possession charges and convicted of obstructing justice. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; 720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1), which criminalizes obstructing justice by furnishing false information, includes as an element of the offense that the false information materially impeded the administration of justice. In this case, the charge and the jury instructions did not identify that element of the offense. Retrial is not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "People v. Casler" on Justia Law