Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cook County Sheriff Dart instituted disciplinary proceedings against several Sheriff’s officers (plaintiffs) by filing charges with the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board under Counties Code, 55 ILCS 5/3-7011. The plaintiffs filed motions with the Board to dismiss the charges. While the administrative proceedings were pending, the plaintiffs filed suit, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the Sheriff, Cook County, the Board, and the Cook County Board of Commissioners, asserting that the Board was not legally constituted because several of its members were appointed to or served terms that did not comply with the Code section 3-7002 requirements.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because the plaintiffs challenged the authority of the Board to address the charges, the “authority” exception to the exhaustion requirement applied. The circuit court can adjudicate the requests for back pay and other claims, which do not fall within the particular expertise of the Board. The plaintiffs raised the issue before the Board, which refused to hear them until after the disciplinary proceedings were complete. Given that the Board had not taken any substantive action regarding the disciplinary charges before the filing of the lawsuit, the “de facto officer doctrine” does not apply. View "Goral v. Dart" on Justia Law

Tabirta was driving a truck in Ohio, when another truck, driven by Cummings, collided with his vehicle. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries, including the amputation of both legs. Cummings’s vehicle was owned by his employer, GML. Tabirta filed a negligence action in Cook County. The defendants moved to transfer venue. Under 735 ILCS 5/2-101, venue is proper either in the county of residence of any defendant or in the county where the transaction occurred. Tabirta cited the Cook County home office of GML employee Bolton (a part-time account representative) and argued that GML was “doing business” in the county. Cummings is not a resident of Cook County. GML is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business and registered agent located in Randolph County.The Illinois Supreme Court held that Cook County is not the proper venue for the suit. Bolton's work for GML from his home office, standing alone, does not establish that the home was an “other office.” GML did not “purposely select” a location in Cook County to carry on its business but selected Bolton, a person with extensive experience in the food industry. Even if Bolton’s proximity to customers played a role in his hiring, GML did not own, lease, or pay any expenses associated with Bolton’s residence. GML did not hold out to customers or the public that Bolton’s residence was a GML office. GML had no office or other facility in Cook County. Bolton did not sell products from his home office. The work he conducted from his residence was merely incidental to GML’s usual and customary business of food product manufacturing. View "Tabirta v. Cummings" on Justia Law

In 2002, Lusby was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and home invasion and sentenced to 130 years’ imprisonment. Though he was 23 years old at the time of the trial, he was only 16 years old at the time of the offenses. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings, he sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, asserting that his sentencing hearing was constitutionally inadequate under the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Miller v. Alabama. The Will County Circuit Court denied that motion. The appellate court reversed.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s decision, denying relief. Lusby failed to show cause and prejudice such that the trial court should have granted leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. Lusby had every opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to offer any. The trial court considered his youth and its attendant characteristics before concluding that his future should be spent in prison. The de facto discretionary life sentence passes constitutional muster under Miller; Lusby has not shown prejudice under 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1). Miller does not require a court to use “magic words” before sentencing a juvenile defendant to life imprisonment but only requires consideration of “youth-related factors.” View "People v. Lusby" on Justia Law

Glispie has four Illinois convictions for residential burglary, having pled guilty to knowingly and without authority entering into other people’s dwelling places to commit thefts. He subsequently pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)), reserving the right to challenge his designation as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Burglary is included in the definition of a violent felony. The Supreme Court has ruled that burglary “contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The district court determined that Illinois’s residential burglary statute was no broader than generic burglary and that Glispie’s convictions qualified as violent felonies, increasing his sentencing range from a maximum of 10 years to a minimum of 15 years' imprisonment (and a maximum of life). The court imposed a 15-year sentence.The Seventh Circuit agreed with Glispie that, if the limited authority doctrine applied to the Illinois statute, his convictions would not constitute aggravating offenses. That doctrine provides that the “authority to enter a building for a specific lawful purpose is vitiated when the wrongdoer departs from that purpose and commits a felony or theft.” Answering a question certified by the Seventh Circuit, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the doctrine does apply. Over the course of multiple statutory amendments, the legislature was aware that the term “without authority” in both the burglary and home invasion statutes incorporates the limited authority doctrine. View "United States v. Glispie" on Justia Law

After a dispute at his parents’ house, Gaines was charged with criminal damage to property, criminal trespass to a residence, misdemeanor criminal damage to property, misdemeanor domestic battery, and misdemeanor aggravated assault. At a hearing, the judge initially accepted a negotiated plea to two counts, but subsequently rejected the plea and reinstated the charges. At trial, Gaines was convicted of felony criminal trespass to a residence and misdemeanor domestic battery. Gaines did not raise a double jeopardy argument in post-trial motions. The appellate court ordered his release.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the misdemeanor battery conviction. In the context of a guilty plea proceeding, jeopardy attaches when the court unconditionally accepts the guilty plea. A formal finding of guilt is not required, nor is imposition of a sentence. The court unconditionally accepted Gaines’s guilty plea; jeopardy attached. Jeopardy did not, however, terminate improperly, where the court sua sponte vacated the guilty plea. The court did not abuse its discretion because it had “good reason to doubt the truth of the plea.” Because jeopardy did not terminate improperly, (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)), Gaines’s subsequent trial on the same offense did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Gaines cannot demonstrate prejudice, so his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. View "People v. Gaines" on Justia Law

Hollahan was charged with aggravated DUI. His initial jury trial ended in a mistrial when a video recording of the traffic stop was inadvertently played beyond the point of admissible evidence. During a second jury trial, a redacted video of the traffic stop was played for the jury. Following the presentation of evidence, closing arguments, and instruction as to the applicable law, the jury retired to deliberate. Shortly thereafter, the jury asked to watch the video again. The judge granted that request. The video was shown to the jury in the courtroom because the court did not have the “arrangement” necessary to allow the jury to view the video in the jury deliberation room. The court allowed Hollahan, the attorneys, and two alternate jurors to remain in the courtroom while the jury watched the video. Defense counsel did not object. Before the jury was returned to the courtroom, the court admonished that the jury would be watching the video and that “[n]o one will have any conversation.” The judge told the jurors, “we will not be talking to you other than to get the video, period.” After watching the video, the jury returned to the jury room and found Hollahan guilty.The Illinois Supreme Court found no reversible error. Deliberations were not taking place while the jurors were watching the video in the presence of non-jurors and there was no communication with non-jurors. Even if there were error, Hollahan has not shown that he was prejudiced by the procedure employed by the circuit court. View "People v. Hollahan" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs filed a two-count class-action complaint on behalf of “all residents of the City of Chicago who have resided in an area where the City has replaced water mains or meters between January 1, 2008, and the present.” The complaint raises claims of negligence and inverse condemnation in relation to the replacement of water meters and water main pipes, as well as the partial replacement of lead service lines that run between the water mains and residences throughout Chicago. The complaint claimed the city’s actions created an increased risk that lead will be dislodged or leach from the residents’ individual service lines. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the complaint.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The complaint did not allege that anyone is suffering from any physical impairment, dysfunction, or physically disabling consequence caused by the city's actions. An increased risk of harm is not, itself, an injury consistent with the traditional understanding of tort law. The plaintiffs have alleged only that the replacement of water mains and meters has made the proposed class members’ property “more dangerous.” The concept of “dangerousness” is not susceptible to objective measurement and, thus, cannot by itself constitute damage under the Illinois takings clause. View "Berry v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Sharpe and Westmoreland were married and had a child, A.S. The marriage was dissolved in 2013. Sharpe and Westmoreland agreed to a joint parenting agreement. The parents shared equal parenting time. A.S.’s legal residence was with Sharpe. Sharpe entered into a civil union with Fulkerson. A.S. continued to reside with Sharpe, Fulkerson, and Fulkerson’s children. Sharpe died in 2017. After Sharpe’s death, Westmoreland no longer let A.S. live with or visit Fulkerson and Fulkerson’s children. Fulkerson sought visitation and an allocation of parental responsibilities. The appellate court responded to certified questions, finding that a party to a civil union lacks “step-parent” standing as defined by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/101, to request visitation with her deceased partner’s child or to request parental responsibilities.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. in enacting the Civil Union Act, the General Assembly intended to create an alternative to marriage that was equal in all respects. That intent was not limited to partners’ rights as to each other. When a child’s parent enters into a civil union with an individual who is not the child’s other parent, that individual becomes the child’s stepparent as defined by the Dissolution Act and meets that aspect of the standing requirement to petition the court for visitation, allocation of parental responsibilities, or both. View "Sharpe v. Westmoreland" on Justia Law

McAllister injured his knee while working as a sous chef for a restaurant. The injury occurred as he stood up from a kneeling position while attempting to retrieve food that had been misplaced in the cooler. He had previously had surgery on the knee and had received workers’ compensation benefits at that time. An arbitrator awarded him workers’ compensation benefits but the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed, finding that the injury did not “arise out of” his employment. The circuit court and the Appellate Court, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division, affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The injury arose out of an employment-related risk; the acts that caused the injury were risks incident to his employment because these were acts his employer might reasonably expect him to perform in fulfilling his assigned job duties. McAllister was responsible for arranging the walk-in cooler and had a duty to find misplaced food. The court overruled certain cases to the extent that they held that injuries attributable to common bodily movements or routine everyday activities, such as bending, twisting, reaching, or standing up from a kneeling position, are not compensable unless a claimant can prove that he was exposed to a risk of injury from these common bodily movements or routine everyday activities to a greater extent than the general public. View "McAllister v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission" on Justia Law

In 1998, a jury convicted Stoecker of first-degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. Stoecker filed numerous unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief. In 2005 Stoecker filed a petition for relief from judgment, arguing that the procedures in imposing his life sentence for murder violated the Supreme Court’s 2000 “Apprendi” holding that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Appointed defense counsel acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court had held that Apprendi did not apply retroactively to cases whose direct appeals had been exhausted. The petition was dismissed. Although Stoecker filed subsequent petitions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, he did not appeal the Apprendi ruling.Seven years later, Stoecker again sought relief from judgment, raising the Apprendi issue. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the petition as untimely. Four years later, Stoecker again sought relief from judgment, arguing that under recent Supreme Court decisions, Apprendi applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The state moved to dismiss the petition. Four days later, the circuit court dismissed the petition. The state was present but made no argument. Appointed counsel was apparently not notified of the proceeding. The court ruled that the state was correct as a matter of law. Stoecker filed an unsuccessful pro se motion to reconsider.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Any violation of Stoecker’s due process rights was harmless because the deficiencies in the petition could not be cured. The petition was untimely, barred by res judicata, and meritless. Any deficient performance by appointed counsel did not warrant remand. View "People v. Stoecker" on Justia Law