Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision, affirming the trial court's decision to allow the postconviction counsel to withdraw and to dismiss the postconviction petition. The defendant, Russell A. Frey, was convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 50 years in prison. Frey filed a pro se postconviction petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and a proportionate penalties claim. The trial court appointed counsel for Frey, who later moved to withdraw, arguing that Frey had no meritorious claims. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the appellate court vacated and remanded the case, holding that postconviction counsel did not provide reasonable assistance when he failed to address one of Frey's claims. However, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that Frey failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance arising from counsel's Rule 651(c) certificate, and therefore, the motion to withdraw was not deficient. As such, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed the trial court's orders allowing postconviction counsel to withdraw and dismissing Frey's postconviction petition. View "People v. Frey" on Justia Law

During a bench trial, the defendant Santana Grayer was found guilty of attempted vehicular hijacking. On appeal, Grayer argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because he was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the incident. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that evidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer relevant to the issue of intent, as the legislature had removed voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense. However, it also noted that even if voluntary intoxication remained relevant, the evidence failed to establish that Grayer’s state of intoxication was so extreme that he was unable to form the requisite intent.On review, the Supreme Court of Illinois also affirmed Grayer’s conviction, but for different reasons. The court clarified that while voluntary intoxication is no longer recognized as an affirmative defense in Illinois, it can still be considered relevant evidence at trials for specific-intent offenses like attempted vehicular hijacking. This is because a defendant's state of voluntary intoxication might affect their mental state, which is a crucial element in specific-intent crimes. However, in this case, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Grayer had the specific intent to commit the offense of attempted vehicular hijacking, despite his state of voluntary intoxication. The court particularly relied on the defendant's behavior during the incident, including his threats to the victim, his refusal to leave the scene, and his actions suggestive of an attempt to take control of the victim's vehicle. View "People v. Grayer" on Justia Law

The defendant, Justin Devine, was convicted in the circuit court of Kane County of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. He appealed to the appellate court arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court agreed with Devine and reduced his conviction to disorderly conduct. The State appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Illinois.The key issues before the Supreme Court of Illinois included whether Devine "disseminated" the images when he sent them to himself and whether the victim was identifiable from the images. The court held that Devine did disseminate the images when he texted them from the victim's phone to his own, rejecting the reasoning of the appellate court that Devine did not make the images "more widely known" because he already had knowledge of them. The court reasoned that the statute prohibits dissemination of images, not knowledge of images, and that Devine's act of sending the images to himself was an act of dissemination.However, the Supreme Court of Illinois agreed with the appellate court that the victim was not identifiable from the images. The images were close-ups of female genitalia and did not contain any distinctive identifiers. The court concluded that the fact the victim was wearing red nail polish on the day she went to the store or that the images were on her phone did not make her identifiable from the images.Thus, the court affirmed the appellate court's judgment in reducing Devine's conviction to disorderly conduct. View "People v. Devine" on Justia Law

In the case of Clark Alave v. The City of Chicago, the plaintiff, Clark Alave, filed a complaint against the City of Chicago after he was injured when his bicycle struck a pothole. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the city did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care under section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act. The court based this decision on the lack of any affirmative physical manifestations, such as signs or pavement markings, that the city intended for the roadway to be used for bicycling. The court also considered the Divvy bicycle rental station located nearby, but found that this station only indicated that the city permitted, not intended, bicycling on the roadway. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff was not both a permitted and intended user of the roadway, and thus the city owed him no duty of care. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. View "Alave v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The attorneys represented Doe in a medical malpractice action against a hospital and other medical staff. During that litigation, the evidence established that, after Doe was admitted to the emergency room of the hospital, he attempted suicide by stabbing himself multiple times. The hospital sought a qualified protective order under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. 1320d) to gain access to Doe’s protected health information and requested a subpoena pursuant to HIPAA. At trial, Doe testified in detail about his suicide attempt, his injuries therefrom, and his diagnosis., Doe was awarded $4.2 million. Subsequently, the attorneys issued a press release related to the medical malpractice trial describing Doe’s suicide attempt, the resulting injuries, and his diagnoses and commented on the medical malpractice case and Doe’s history for an article published in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin.Doe alleged that the attorneys violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1). The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal of his case. Doe waived his claims of confidentiality under the Act by voluntarily and publicly disclosing his private health information in a public trial; the qualified protective order under HIPAA did not preclude such waiver. The evidence and testimony divulged during Doe’s medical malpractice trial were not records or communications made in the course of mental health services; therefore, the Act does not apply. View "Doe v. Burke Wise Morrissey & Kaveny, LLC" on Justia Law

The Homeowners Association alleged that M/I’s subcontractors caused construction defects in a Hanover Park development by using defective materials, conducting faulty workmanship, and failing to comply with building codes. The Association alleged that it would be required to repair the defects and “damage to other property caused by the [d]efects.” M/I demanded a defense from Acuity as the additional insured on a commercial general liability policy that Acuity issued to one of its subcontractors on which M/I was an additional insured. Acuity sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that the complaint failed to allege any “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” as those terms are defined by the policy and interpreted by Illinois law. The circuit court granted Acuity summary judgment.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the allegations sufficiently fall within the initial grant of coverage requirement that there be “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” The court remanded for further consideration of whether policy exclusion bar coverage. To hold that all construction defects that result in property damage to the completed project are always excluded would mean that the exclusions in the policy related to business risk become meaningless. The business risk exclusions contemplate that some construction defects that result in property damage are covered and some are not, depending on various factors. View "Acuity v. M/I Homes of Chicago, LLC" on Justia Law

Mosby, an RN, filed a class-action suit, alleging that she used a medication dispensing system and its finger-scan device, distributed and marketed by BD, to provide patient care, i.e., to authenticate her identity and access controlled and restricted material. Mosby alleged that BD violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b), (d)) by using the scanning device to collect, use, and/or store her finger scan data without complying with the Act’s notice and consent provisions and by disclosing her purported biometric data to third parties without first obtaining her written consent. BD argued that the finger scan data restricted access to protected health information and medication and was used for health care treatment and operations under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. 164.501, specifically excluded from the scope of the Act.On interlocutory appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Act’s exclusion of ‘information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under” HIPAA applies to biometric information of health care workers (as opposed to patients) collected, used or stored for health care treatment, payment or operations under HIPAA. Finger-scan information collected by a health care provider from its employees falls within that exclusion when the employee’s finger-scan information is used for purposes related to ‘health care,’ ‘treatment,’ ‘payment,’ or ‘operations’ as defined by HIPAA. View "Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Guiracocha and his son, Cristopher, filed an uninsured motorist (UM) claim against Direct Auto, stemming from a hit-and-run incident where 14-year-old Cristopher was struck by a vehicle while riding his bicycle. They asserted Fredy was the named insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Direct Auto and that UM coverage applied to Cristopher based on his status as a “relative” under the policy. Direct Auto denied coverage because Cristopher was not an occupant of a covered vehicle at the time of the accident and sought a declaratory judgment. The circuit court granted Direct Auto summary judgment.The appellate court reversed, holding that a provision in an automobile insurance policy that limits UM coverage to insureds occupying an insured automobile violates the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 143a states that an insurance policy cannot be “renewed, delivered, or issued for delivery” in Illinois unless it provides coverage to “any person” for injuries “arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” A bicyclist injured by an uninsured motorist vehicle is a “person” who suffered injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of “a motor vehicle.” The injured person’s status as an occupant of a vehicle is irrelevant. View "Galarza v. Direct Auto Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Sergeant Albee saw a truck pulling a partially loaded car hauler semitrailer with no driver’s side markings indicating the company name or the DOT number required by federal regulations. The hauler was only partially loaded, which Albee found unusual; no registration was displayed on the trailer. During the subsequent traffic stop, Webb displayed “a state of panic” and had no organized documentation. He volunteered that he had been stopped several times and that the vehicle had been checked for drugs. Albee found that statement “bizarre.” Webb gave Albee a cab card that was Illinois apportioned, but the displayed license plate was from California. Albee performed a free air sniff test with his canine partner. After a positive alert on the trailer, a search revealed an unlicensed firearm and 2736 grams of cannabis–street value $40,000.Webb was convicted of cannabis trafficking, possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and possession of cannabis. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Webb’s argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the cannabis on the basis that the positive canine alert, without more, was not sufficient to establish probable cause following changes to Illinois cannabis legislation. Albee relied on more than the dog sniff. The totality of the facts and circumstances justified a reasonable person in believing that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of criminal activity. View "People v. Webb" on Justia Law

Mark executed powers of attorney appointing his spouse, Dorothy, as his agent for health care and property. He also executed a will. Mark revoked the will and executed a new one as he was dying from cancer 17 years later. Mark’s sisters contested the new will because it changed Mark’s disposition of his interests in certain family businesses to their detriment and to the benefit of Dorothy. They allege that Dorothy, as the primary beneficiary, exerted undue influence over Mark to procure the preparation of the new will. Mark's wealth had come from a family business, founded by their father; Mark and Dorothy were married 24 years and had no children.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed judgment for Dorothy. What constitutes undue influence depends on the circumstances of each case, and the fiduciary-relationship presumption must be applied with caution in the context of marital relationships. Although Mark’s power of attorney for property created a fiduciary relationship with Dorothy as a matter of law, the circuit court’s directed finding that Dorothy did not procure the preparation of the will was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court reiterated its repudiation of the debilitated-testator theory of presumptive undue influence. View "In re Estate of Coffman" on Justia Law