Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Moore, a tenured teacher since 1994, was advised by her students that another student had ingested some pills. Other school personnel immediately became involved in responding to the incident. Chicago Public Schools later approved dismissal charges against Moore, (105 ILCS 5/34-85), alleging failure to appropriately respond, failure to supervise, failure to perform certain duties, and failure to comply with Board policies and the state ethical and professional standards. Moore was suspended without pay pending the outcome of the dismissal hearing.On September 7, 2018, the hearing officer issued findings that Moore had alerted the administration to the student’s overdose and that she had not lied during the investigation and concluded that the Board’s evidence failed to establish cause for Moore’s dismissal. The Board found that Moore failed to act in a prudent and responsible manner, failed to check on the well-being of the student, and failed to notify her colleagues in a timely fashion. The Board determined that Moore’s negligent behavior did not warrant her dismissal but issued a warning resolution, required her to attend training, and imposed a 90-day reduction in her back pay.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the Board’s decision. The appellate court erred when it held that section 34-85 precluded the Board from suspending a teacher without pay following a dismissal hearing; a 2011 amendment did not diminish the Board’s implied authority to issue a suspension once a determination is made that the conduct does not warrant dismissal. Sections 34- 18 and 34-85 govern different disciplinary sanctions (dismissals and suspensions) and are not in conflict. The Board articulated its findings and analysis supporting the sanctions. View "Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. Moore" on Justia Law

On January 29, 2009, Glenn suffered a partial tear of his Achilles tendon. On February 17, Glenn sought treatment from Dr. Treacy at Rezin Orthopedics. Glenn was 42 years old and borderline obese. Dr. Treacy’s treatment plan included placing Glenn’s lower right leg in a plantar flexion position, set in a plaster cast for six weeks. Dr. Treacy memorialized his recommendation for Glenn to return for a follow-up appointment in two weeks in an invoice. Glenn required an appointment within a day or two for cast placement because he had driven himself to the appointment. Dr. Treacy directed the receptionist (Decker) to schedule a two-week follow-up appointment. Decker scheduled Glenn’s casting appointment for February 19 at another office. After Glenn’s leg was casted, the receptionist, Hare, scheduled Glenn’s follow-up appointment for March 13, more than three weeks after his initial appointment. On February 25, Glenn telephoned Rezin. The receptionist, Popplewell, rescheduled Glenn’s follow-up visit for March 12. On March 8, Glenn died of a pulmonary embolism.In a wrongful death and survival action, a jury returned a defense verdict. Glenn’s administrator appealed only the verdict in favor of Rezin. The appellate court reversed with directions to enter judgment n.o.v. in favor of the estate. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the verdict. The evidence supported a conclusion that Rezin’s failures did not proximately cause Glenn’s death. Glenn’s death was not a reasonably foreseeable result of Rezin's failure to schedule his follow-up appointment within two weeks of his initial appointment. View "Steed v. Rezin Orthopedics and Sports Medicine, S.C." on Justia Law

The John A. Logan Community College Board of Trustees voted to reduce the number of full-time faculty members for the 2016-17 school year; 27 tenured faculty members (including the plaintiffs) received layoff notices under the Public Community College Act, 110 ILCS 805/3B. The Board and the union entered into a settlement agreement regarding various matters related to the decision.In 2017, the plaintiffs filed suit, citing section 3B-5 of the Act, which provides: “For the period of 24 months from the beginning of the school year for which the faculty member was dismissed, any faculty member shall have the preferred right to reappointment to a position entailing services he is competent to render prior to the appointment of any new faculty member; provided that no nontenure faculty member or other employee with less seniority shall be employed to render a service which a tenured faculty member is competent to render.” During the 2016-17 school year, adjunct instructors taught courses that plaintiffs had previously taught; they alleged that enough work existed to employ them full-time.The appellate court ruled that adjunct instructors were other “employee[s] with less seniority” under the “bumping rights” provision. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The rights conferred by section 3B-5 apply to individual courses, rather than to positions as faculty members; section 3B-5 prohibits the Board from laying off tenured faculty members and hiring adjunct instructors to teach courses that the tenured faculty formerly taught. View "Barrall v. Board of Trustees of John A. Logan Community College" on Justia Law

Kent backed up a grain truck that was owned by his father, Sheldon, to an auger that was being used to move grain to a transport truck. A tractor powered the auger by means of a power take-off shaft. Kent, attempting to open the truck’s gate, wanted to get extra leverage and stepped onto the auger. The auger’s protective shield had been removed. Kent’s foot was exposed to the turning shaft. In the ensuing accident, Kent lost his leg below the knee. Kent settled a negligence action against Sheldon and received $1.9 million from insurers.Kent reserved his right to pursue additional coverage under the auto policy that covered the truck. State Farm sought a declaratory judgment that no coverage was provided because an auger is neither a “car” nor a “trailer,” as defined in the policy but fell under the policy’s “mechanical device” exclusion for damages resulting from "THE MOVEMENT OF PROPERTY BY MEANS OF A MECHANICAL DEVICE, OTHER THAN A HAND TRUCK, THAT IS NOT ATTACHED TO THE VEHICLE.” The circuit court granted State Farm summary judgment. The appellate court construed the exclusion against State Farm.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The exclusion was not ambiguous. The auger is a machine or tool designed to move grain from one place to another and is a device that was “operated by a machine or tool” (a tractor) that is not a small hand-propelled truck or wheelbarrow, and was not attached to the insured vehicle. Exclusions are permissible if they do not differentiate between named insureds and permissive users. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Gillespie was working on a dump trailer manufactured and sold by East and leased by his employer. It was loaded with mulch. Using the front cast iron side steps, Gillespie climbed on top of the trailer and lowered himself inside. After leveling the mulch, Gillespie crawled to the front, positioned his right knee on the aluminum cap, placed his left foot on the first step, and attempted to place his right foot on the second step. His hands slid off the top of the trailer, and his left foot slipped, causing him to fall off the stairs. He landed on his feet and felt a sharp pain in his back. He reported his injury before returning to work.Gillespie alleged that East is strictly liable for, and acted negligently in, designing, manufacturing, and selling a defective and unreasonably dangerous product that lacked adequate safety features; that East failed to warn consumers about foreseeable dangers from unsafe modifications; and that the product did not undergo product testing for safety. In a deposition, Gillespie's expert, Hutter, opined that the steps were defective and unreasonably dangerous; the spacing and width of the steps and the lack of side rails did not comply with the recommended practices of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the American National Standards Institute, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, and the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association.The circuit court granted the defendant summary judgment, ruling that OSHA does not apply to trailers, that industry standards are not mandatory, and that third-party modifications demonstrated that the trailer was not unreasonably dangerous when it left East’s control. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hutter’s deposition testimony was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the trailer was unreasonably dangerous. View "Gillespie v. Edmier" on Justia Law

Reed was charged with armed violence, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Reed agreed to plead guilty to armed violence in exchange for a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. As its factual basis, the prosecution averred that Officer Daniels would testify that Reed fled and entered a house; Daniels followed, locating a shotgun and cocaine. The shotgun had Reed’s DNA on it. The court confirmed the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily and accepted the plea.Reed’s initial post-conviction petition, asserting actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel, was summarily dismissed. Reed sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, alleging that he did not reside at the residence in which the gun and drugs were found and did not know what was within that residence. No DNA links Reed to the drugs. The gun was found not on his person but under the bed in a different room. Reed attached an affidavit in which Callaway averred that he owned the cocaine and that Reed had no knowledge of its presence. Callaway wrote the affidavit after he was imprisoned with Reed. The court denied Reed’s petition, finding Callaway’s testimony new but not credible. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, first holding that a plea agreement does not preclude a subsequent claim of actual innocence. Pleas are no more foolproof than trials. The factual basis to support a plea requires only a basis from which the court could reasonably conclude that defendant actually committed the acts constituting the offense. Reed, however, did not provide new, material, noncumulative evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a trial would probably result in acquittal. View "People v. Reed" on Justia Law

Knapp and Rodriguez were charged with attempted first-degree murder, mob action, and aggravated battery in connection with the stabbing of Avitia, who survived the attack and identified the assailants. At a McHenry County jury trial, the prosecution argued that the defendants were members of the Norteños street gang and that they attacked Avitia based on his alleged association with a rival street gang. At the state’s request, the court admonished Knapp concerning his right to testify. Knapp acknowledged that he had discussed the issue with his attorney and made a choice not to testify.On appeal, Knapp unsuccessfully argued that his counsel was ineffective because counsel “elicited inadmissible other crimes evidence that was similar to the charged offense and also false” and failed to “pursue a ruling on the State’s motion to introduce gang evidence or renew his objection to the admission of such evidence.” Knapp then filed a pro se post-conviction petition, raising claims of actual innocence, involuntary waiver of his right to testify, and ineffective assistance.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the summary dismissal of the petition. While a pro se petitioner is not required to use precise legal language alleging a “contemporaneous assertion of the right to testify” to survive first-stage summary dismissal, summary dismissal is warranted when the record positively rebuts the allegations. The record contains nothing to suggest that Knapp ever alerted the court of his desire to testify, that he had any questions about that right, or that he otherwise was unsure about waiving his right to testify. View "People v. Knapp" on Justia Law

Reents obtained a tax deed to 10 locked and gated acres in Rockford. In 2017, the Attorney General, at the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, filed a civil enforcement action for violations of 415 ILCS 5/1, against Reents and Stateline Recycling, including allegations of open dumping of waste without a permit; disposal, storage, and abandonment of waste at an unpermitted facility; open dumping of waste resulting in litter and the deposition of construction and demolition debris; and failure to pay clean construction and demolition debris fill operation fees. Reents refused to permit an inspection of the property during pretrial discovery. The Winnebago County circuit court granted a motion to compel her to comply with the Rule 214(a) inspection request. After Reents asserted a good-faith objection and respectfully refused to comply, the court held her in contempt so that she could file an appeal. The appellate court reversed, citing Fourth Amendment principles.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated. The appellate court erred in deciding the appeal on constitutional grounds; the issue presented involves a civil discovery order that the appellate court should have reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Reents did not raise any constitutional issues and has forfeited any such challenge. Courts should not find discovery rules unconstitutional when a particular case does not require it. The circuit court applied the plain language of Rule 214(a) as written. View "Madigan v. Stateline Recycling, LLC" on Justia Law

Fox Lake patrol officer Zander was charged with misconduct arising from multiple job-related incidents. The chief recommended termination. Zander's union, FOP, assigned Attorney Carlson, an FOP employee. Zander had no input into the choice of an attorney, had no retainer agreement with Carlson, and was not charged for Carlson’s services. Under the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-1-1), police officers who face removal or discharge are entitled to a hearing before the local board of fire and police commissioners unless a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provides for arbitration. The CBA between Fox Lake and FOP gave officers the option of pursuing either avenue. On Carlson’s advice, Zander chose arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the termination. Zander sued, alleging legal malpractice and that FOP has no right to employ attorneys to furnish legal services under its direction to FOP members, and cannot control what attorneys assigned to help FOP members may do and “should be vicariously liable.”The circuit court dismissed, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s "Atkinson" holding, which immunizes union members and officers against personal liability for actions taken while acting as a union representative in the context of the collective bargaining process. The court noted the parallels between federal labor law and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. But for the collective bargaining agreement. FOP would have owed Zander no duty. Zander’s claim against the union fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Labor Relations Board. View "Zander v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Sparta instituted a policy for evaluating the performance of full-time police officers. Day-shift officers must accumulate at least 82 points, while the standard for night-shift officers is 65 points. Points are awarded for traffic citations, drug task force duties, investigations that take more than one shift, shooting range training; training outside the department, court time, and extra duty shifts. Awards for Officer of the Month and of the Year will be based on the most points earned over the Officer’s monthly minimum standard. Failure to reach the minimum monthly points will result in discipline that is corrective and progressive in nature. The Union alleged the policy establishes an unlawful ticket quota in violation of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-1-12). The circuit court granted Sparta summary judgment.The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute prohibits consideration of the number of citations issued when evaluating a police officer’s performance based on points of contact. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 11-1-12 first provides a general statement prohibiting citation quotas, defined as “requir[ing] a police officer to issue a specific number of citations within a designated period of time.” The second paragraph, applicable here, does not prohibit evaluating police officers with points-of-contact system and defines a “point of contact” as “any quantifiable contact made in the furtherance of the police officer’s duties,” with the sole exception being “the issuance of citations or the number of citations issued.” View "Policemen's Benevolent Labor Committee v. City of Sparta" on Justia Law