Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2014, a $30,880 judgment covering backpay and pre-judgment interest was entered against Oakridge Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC, for its age and disability discrimination against a former employee, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101. Oakridge Rehab had already gone out of business and transferred the assets and operation of its nursing home facility to Oakridge Healthcare Center, LLC in 2012. Unable to enforce the judgment against Oakridge Rehab, the state instituted proceedings to enforce the judgment against Oakridge Healthcare.The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Oakridge Healthcare, declining to adopt the federal successor liability doctrine in cases arising under the Human Rights Act. The court noted four limited exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for corporate successors and declined to apply the fraudulent purpose exception, which exists “where the transaction is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability for the seller’s obligations.” The court stated that it is within the legislature’s power to abrogate the common-law rule of successor nonliability or otherwise alter its standards through appropriately targeted legislation for employment discrimination cases. View "Department of Human Rights v. Oakridge Healthcare Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Deleon was charged with four counts of criminal sexual assault. The conditions of Deleon’s bond release prohibited him from contacting the victim or visiting her home, school, or workplace. Under 725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5, the State’s Attorney sought a plenary civil no-contact order prohibiting Deleon from contacting the victim, harassing or stalking her, and entering her place of employment. The circuit court orally pronounced that section 112A-11.5 was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied; an evidentiary hearing was never held nor evidence proffered as to its unconstitutionality as applied to Deleon. The court found that the statute allows the state to make a prima facie case for the issuance of a protective order by producing the indictment without requiring the alleged victim to testify and be subject to cross-examination; that the requirement that a defendant present evidence of a meritorious defense to rebut the prima facie evidence violated constitutional protections against self-incrimination; and that the statute improperly shifts the burden of persuasion to the defense.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. There is no basis for concluding that due process precludes the use of an indictment, alone, for restricting a defendant’s liberties before trial. The government has a substantial interest in protecting victims of sexual assault and related crimes from continued contact by the accused pending trial. The conditions of the no-contact order were relatively limited and largely identical to the restraints imposed as conditions of pretrial bond release. There is no legal compulsion for a defendant to rebut the prima facie evidence and no self-incrimination concerns. View "People v. Deleon" on Justia Law

In 2013, the defendant was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder and single counts of aggravated kidnapping and violating an order of protection. The defendant pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder; the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend a sentence of 55 years' imprisonment. Defense counsel noted that the terms were “effectively a life sentence” and that, against counsel’s advice, the defendant chose to “take it.” The court accepted the prosecution's factual basis for the plea and inquired about criminal history. The defendant had previously been convicted of manufacture or delivery of cannabis, a Class 1 felony. The parties waived a presentence investigation (PSI) report. The court imposed a 55-year sentence.The defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea, claiming he had not been “in a coherent state of mind” and ineffective assistance. The appellate court vacated his sentence, citing failure to comply with 730 ILCS 5/5-3-1, which requires a circuit court to consider a PSI before sentencing a defendant for a felony offense, except where “both parties agree to the imposition of a specific sentence, provided there is a finding made for the record as to the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality.” The court held that the PSI requirement cannot be waived.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the sentence. The defendant forfeited any section 5-3-1 claim by failing to raise it in his three motions to withdraw the plea. Despite his attorney’s stated willingness to take the case to trial, he persisted in taking the plea deal. View "People v. Sophanavong" on Justia Law

Legoo was charged with the misdemeanor offense of being a child sex offender in a public park (720 ILCS 5/11- 9.4-1(b)). An officer, attending his grandson’s T-ball game at Mendota's Strouss Park, recognized Legoo and believed he was a registered sex offender. Legoo rode his bicycle through an area between three baseball diamonds. Another officer Corrigan testified went to Legoo’s residence later that night. When asked about his presence in the park, Legoo stated he went there to look for his son. Legoo’s son, C.G., later testified that he was watching a baseball game in the park when Legoo arrived and told him to go home. Legoo then left the park. Legoo testified that he rode his bicycle to the park looking for C.G. and left the park after less than five minutes. Legoo testified that no one else was available to retrieve C.G. from the park that night.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Legoo’s conviction. An exception to liability, found in section 11-9.3(a10) applies when a child sex offender, in a public park, approaches, contacts, or communicates with a child under 18 years of age unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds. The exception does not apply to the section under which Legoo was convicted. View "People v. Legoo" on Justia Law

The Police Union sued the City of Chicago for failing to destroy records of police misconduct that were more than five years old, as required under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An arbitrator held that the CBA should prevail and directed the parties to come to an agreement regarding the destruction of the documents.The circuit court rejected the award. The appellate court agreed, finding requiring the city to destroy all records related to alleged police misconduct without consideration of whether the records have administrative, legal, research, or historical value ignored the requirements of the Local Records Act (50 ILCS 205) and resulted in diminishing the Local Records Commission’s authority to determine what records should be destroyed or maintained. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The arbitration award violated an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy. Although the city could comply with the Local Records Act by submitting disciplinary records to the Commission, that is not required under the CBA. Submission to the Commission is only part of the statutory procedures a local government must follow under the Act. The most crucial aspect is compliance with the Commission’s ultimate decision regarding the retention or destruction of the government records. View "City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7" on Justia Law

Swenson was convicted of disorderly conduct after a telephone conversation with the advancement director of a private school, during which he asked about the school’s security measures and spoke extensively about shootings and violence. The directed testified that “[h]e said if he were to show up at the campus with a gun what would be the protocol of our school?” He asked whether the school gave teachers “PEZ dispensers to defend themselves” and what the students would think “of seeing a gun pointed in their teacher[’]s face.” The conversation caused a soft lockdown at the school and police response. The director indicated that she thought Swenson was on campus and she did not know why Swenson shared with her that he had been kicked out of the school as a child. Swenson testified that he did not own any weapons.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Swenson’s statements were objectively threatening under the circumstances; he was subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his speech. The director reasonably perceived the questions and statements as a threat. Swenson’s speech constituted a true threat, unprotected by the first amendment. A rational trier of fact could conclude that the elements of disorderly conduct were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Swenson" on Justia Law

The Emergency Medical Services Systems Act. 210 ILCS 50/3.150, provides immunity from liability to an ambulance owner and its driver who "provides emergency or non-emergency medical services during a Department-approved training course, in the normal course of conducting their duties, or in an emergency," for acts or omissions in providing such services unless such acts or omissions constitute willful and wanton misconduct. Hernandez suffered bodily injuries when an ambulance owned by Lifeline and driven by Nicholas ran a red light and collided with his vehicle. The ambulance was being used for the non-emergency transport of a patient that had undergone dialysis at a health care facility. The complaint alleged that, at the time of the collision, Nicholas was not operating with his lights and siren engaged and was not responding to an emergency and that nobody on board was in the process of providing emergency or nonemergency medical services.The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the defendants were not protected from liability. Under the Act, ‘[n]on-emergency medical services” means: “medical care, clinical observation, or medical monitoring rendered to patients whose conditions do not meet this Act’s definition of emergency, before or during transportation of such patients to or from health care facilities visited for the purpose of obtaining medical or health care services which are not emergency in nature, using a vehicle regulated by this Act.” Nicholas’s actions in driving and running the red light were not integral or in any way related to providing non-emergency medical care. View "Hernandez v. Lifeline Ambulance, LLC" on Justia Law

Following the death of his 26-month-old daughter from traumatic brain injuries, Radford was convicted of endangering the life or health of a child, 720 ILCS 5/12-21.6(a) in Kankakee County. His conviction and sentence were affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to a public trial by partially closing the courtroom during jury selection and that no jury instruction error occurred.The trial court observed “emotions running high” due to the “nature of the case” when it determined that a partial closure was necessary. The court expressed concern about the possibility of having to declare a mistrial if members of the public expressed emotion in a way that impacted the venire. The court was aware that this case would require a large venire in order to find a suitable jury and there were limited seats in the courtroom. The trial was expected to last two weeks and was to begin before the Thanksgiving holiday. Media coverage had been granted; the parties had listed approximately 50 potential witnesses. Neither side objected to the court’s solution of allowing only two family members from each side to remain in the courtroom during jury selection. The court reopened after jury selection. Because the court gave the pattern jury instructions, which did not require a definitional instruction on “willfully” and tracked the language of both the statute and indictment, it did not commit clear error when instructing the jury. View "People v. Radford" on Justia Law

Robinson and two others were charged with the 1997 shooting death of Giles. Tucker testified that Robinson told him that he had killed Giles and had given details about the killing and the disposal of the body and of evidence. Muhammad testified that she had driven the men to the scene where the body was burned. McClendon testified that she was Robinson’s girlfriend and that Robinson told her they had burned Giles’s body and that he had shot Giles in the head. McClendon identified a picture of a rifle and testified that she had seen that weapon twice within the month before the shooting. After being advised of his rights, Robinson, then 18, had confessed to shooting Giles and burning the body. The state did not present physical evidence linking him to the crime; Robinson did not present a defense. His convictions were affirmed. His first post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, was unsuccessful.In 2015, Robinson sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, alleging actual innocence. He asserted that he was not involved in the crimes and that Giles was murdered by Tucker. He attached his own affidavit plus four others. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, in favor of Robinson. The only issue is whether Robinson may file his successive post-conviction petition alleging he is actually innocent. The new evidence supporting the petition need not be completely dispositive of innocence but need only be of such a conclusive character as to probably change the result upon retrial. Robinson satisfied the pleading requirements for granting leave to file a successive petition, so his claim must be advanced to second-stage proceedings. The court noted reasons for questioning the credibility of the witnesses at trial and reasons why the affiants might be credible. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Pension Code allowed elected county board members to participate in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) if the participant occupied a position requiring 1000 hours of service annually and the public employee filed an election to participate. A 1968 administrative rule required the governing body of a participating employer to adopt a resolution certifying that the position of elected governing body members required the hourly standard. Williamson County complied with the 1968 rule. The plaintiffs satisfied the original requirements for IMRF participation, electing to participate in 2004, 2008, and 2012. In 2016, Public Act 99-900, amended parts of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/7-137.2(a), requiring, for the first time, that all county boards certify within 90 days of each general election that their board members were required to work sufficient hours to meet the hourly standard for participation and that members who participate in IMRF submit monthly timesheets. The Fund issued “Special Memorandum #334” to the authorized IMRF agent in every county, explaining the change: “If the County Board fails to adopt the required IMRF participation resolution within 90 days after an election, the entire Board will become ineligible and IMRF participation will end for those Board members.” The Fund also sent a direct mailing to individual county board members participating in IMRF. Williamson County did not timely adopt the required resolution. The Fund notified the plaintiffs that they were not eligible for continued IMRF participation.The Illinois Supreme Court found Public Act 99-900 invalid under Illinois Constitution article XIII, section 5. A public employee’s membership in a pension system is an enforceable contractual relationship; continued IMRF participation was protected from unilateral legislative diminishment or impairment when the plaintiffs became IMRF participants and began accruing the service credits. View "Williamson County Board of Commissioners v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund" on Justia Law