Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs filed suit concerning flood damage to their Maine Township property after heavy rains in September 2008, alleging that public entities breached duties owed to them with respect to a stormwater drainage system located near their properties. Plaintiffs claimed that certain actions by the defendants increased water flow to the area and that there has been major flooding in the past. After a 2002 event, the Illinois Department of Natural Resources discovered “numerous bottlenecks and obstructions to flow as the causes of the invasive flooding” in the community. The trial court dismissed, finding that the defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs under the public duty rule and plaintiffs had not alleged any special duty. In the meantime, the Illinois Supreme Court (Coleman) abolished the public duty rule, which provided that a local governmental entity does not owe any duty to individual members of the public to provide adequate governmental services. The trial court found that the new law set forth in Coleman should not be retroactively applied.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Coleman clearly established a new principle of law, overturning decades of existing precedent. Given these circumstances and the two rationales for abolishing the public duty rule, the new law announced in Coleman would not be thwarted by its prospective application. Prospective application avoids substantial inequitable results for defendants who have relied upon the public duty rule throughout the long course of this litigation. View "Tzakis v. Maine Township" on Justia Law

J.B. and Cordova had purchased a Romeoville home together and had three children. In January 2010, Cordova moved from the home. J.B. was granted an order of protection, prohibiting Cordova from having any contact with J.B. or the children and from entering the home. J.B. testified that, on November 20, 2010, as she was getting ready for a date, Cordova kicked in her locked bedroom door and entered the room, “going crazy.” He made threats, damaged property, and raped J.B. He then began choking her. Cordova only let go when J.B.'s cell phone rang; he stated he was going to return and then left. J.B. went to her neighbor’s house and called the police. J.B. was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. Cordova testified that he and J.B. had arranged to meet that day so he could retrieve some of his mother’s items. He denied any violence and testified they had consensual sexual relations. Cordova was convicted of criminal sexual assault, 720 ILCS 5/12- 13(a)(1), and home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault, section 12-11(a)(6).The trial and appellate courts rejected Cordova’s argument that under the one-act, one-crime doctrine he could be sentenced only on the home invasion conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Proof of criminal sexual assault is a necessary element of proof of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault. All the elements of criminal sexual assault are included in the offense of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault contains no element not included in home invasion. View "People v. Reveles-Cordova" on Justia Law

Cahill was the office administrator for the Family Vision optometry practice and handled insurance billings. She left her employment and filed for bankruptcy protection. About 90% of Family’s revenue came from claims submitted to VSP, which covers claims from optometrists only if they have “majority ownership and complete control” of their medical practices. VSP disburses payments after the provider signs an agreement certifying itself as “fully controlled and majority-owned” by an optometrist. At the time Cahill was submitting Family’s claims, the practice was actually owned by a practice management company with more than 150 surgery centers and other medical practices.About a year after Cahill left Family, the trustee of Cahill’s bankruptcy estate sued under the Insurance Claims Fraud Prevention Act, 740 ILCS 92/1, which added civil penalties to existing criminal remedies for fraud against private insurance companies and allows a claim to be raised on the state’s behalf by a private person (relator), in a qui tam action. The relator becomes entitled to remuneration if the lawsuit succeeds. A relator must be an “interested person” but the Act does not define that term.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reinstatement of the case. A former employee-whistleblower with personal, nonpublic information of possible wrongdoing qualifies as an “interested person” under the Act and need not allege a personal claim, status, or right related to the proceeding. The state need not suffer money damages to partially assign its claim to a relator. The Act is intended to remedy fraud against private insurers, where the only injury to the state is to its sovereignty, based on a violation of criminal law. View "Leibowitz v. Family Vision Care, LLC" on Justia Law

From behind a closed hotel bathroom door, Casler told Sgt. Draper that his name was Jakuta King Williams, that he had no identification, and that he was from Virginia. Draper recognized Casler when he emerged and remembered having previously arrested him. Draper asked whether he was Rasheed Casler. Casler did not respond. The dispatcher indicated that Casler had an outstanding warrant. Draper arrested Casler. Casler did not attempt to resist or flee. There was no indication that Casler had disposed of evidence in the bathroom. The officers discovered Casler’s Illinois identification card.Casler was charged with possessing less than 15 grams of cocaine and less than five grams of methamphetamine and with obstructing justice by providing false information. Casler testified that, while in the bathroom, he thought that his friends were joking around, so he answered Jakuta King Williams; he did not know there were officers outside the bathroom and was not attempting to avoid arrest. Casler was acquitted of the drug possession charges and convicted of obstructing justice. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; 720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1), which criminalizes obstructing justice by furnishing false information, includes as an element of the offense that the false information materially impeded the administration of justice. In this case, the charge and the jury instructions did not identify that element of the offense. Retrial is not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "People v. Casler" on Justia Law

Cook County Sheriff Dart instituted disciplinary proceedings against several Sheriff’s officers (plaintiffs) by filing charges with the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board under Counties Code, 55 ILCS 5/3-7011. The plaintiffs filed motions with the Board to dismiss the charges. While the administrative proceedings were pending, the plaintiffs filed suit, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the Sheriff, Cook County, the Board, and the Cook County Board of Commissioners, asserting that the Board was not legally constituted because several of its members were appointed to or served terms that did not comply with the Code section 3-7002 requirements.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because the plaintiffs challenged the authority of the Board to address the charges, the “authority” exception to the exhaustion requirement applied. The circuit court can adjudicate the requests for back pay and other claims, which do not fall within the particular expertise of the Board. The plaintiffs raised the issue before the Board, which refused to hear them until after the disciplinary proceedings were complete. Given that the Board had not taken any substantive action regarding the disciplinary charges before the filing of the lawsuit, the “de facto officer doctrine” does not apply. View "Goral v. Dart" on Justia Law

Tabirta was driving a truck in Ohio, when another truck, driven by Cummings, collided with his vehicle. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries, including the amputation of both legs. Cummings’s vehicle was owned by his employer, GML. Tabirta filed a negligence action in Cook County. The defendants moved to transfer venue. Under 735 ILCS 5/2-101, venue is proper either in the county of residence of any defendant or in the county where the transaction occurred. Tabirta cited the Cook County home office of GML employee Bolton (a part-time account representative) and argued that GML was “doing business” in the county. Cummings is not a resident of Cook County. GML is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business and registered agent located in Randolph County.The Illinois Supreme Court held that Cook County is not the proper venue for the suit. Bolton's work for GML from his home office, standing alone, does not establish that the home was an “other office.” GML did not “purposely select” a location in Cook County to carry on its business but selected Bolton, a person with extensive experience in the food industry. Even if Bolton’s proximity to customers played a role in his hiring, GML did not own, lease, or pay any expenses associated with Bolton’s residence. GML did not hold out to customers or the public that Bolton’s residence was a GML office. GML had no office or other facility in Cook County. Bolton did not sell products from his home office. The work he conducted from his residence was merely incidental to GML’s usual and customary business of food product manufacturing. View "Tabirta v. Cummings" on Justia Law

In 2002, Lusby was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and home invasion and sentenced to 130 years’ imprisonment. Though he was 23 years old at the time of the trial, he was only 16 years old at the time of the offenses. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings, he sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, asserting that his sentencing hearing was constitutionally inadequate under the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Miller v. Alabama. The Will County Circuit Court denied that motion. The appellate court reversed.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s decision, denying relief. Lusby failed to show cause and prejudice such that the trial court should have granted leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. Lusby had every opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to offer any. The trial court considered his youth and its attendant characteristics before concluding that his future should be spent in prison. The de facto discretionary life sentence passes constitutional muster under Miller; Lusby has not shown prejudice under 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1). Miller does not require a court to use “magic words” before sentencing a juvenile defendant to life imprisonment but only requires consideration of “youth-related factors.” View "People v. Lusby" on Justia Law

Glispie has four Illinois convictions for residential burglary, having pled guilty to knowingly and without authority entering into other people’s dwelling places to commit thefts. He subsequently pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)), reserving the right to challenge his designation as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Burglary is included in the definition of a violent felony. The Supreme Court has ruled that burglary “contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The district court determined that Illinois’s residential burglary statute was no broader than generic burglary and that Glispie’s convictions qualified as violent felonies, increasing his sentencing range from a maximum of 10 years to a minimum of 15 years' imprisonment (and a maximum of life). The court imposed a 15-year sentence.The Seventh Circuit agreed with Glispie that, if the limited authority doctrine applied to the Illinois statute, his convictions would not constitute aggravating offenses. That doctrine provides that the “authority to enter a building for a specific lawful purpose is vitiated when the wrongdoer departs from that purpose and commits a felony or theft.” Answering a question certified by the Seventh Circuit, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the doctrine does apply. Over the course of multiple statutory amendments, the legislature was aware that the term “without authority” in both the burglary and home invasion statutes incorporates the limited authority doctrine. View "United States v. Glispie" on Justia Law

After a dispute at his parents’ house, Gaines was charged with criminal damage to property, criminal trespass to a residence, misdemeanor criminal damage to property, misdemeanor domestic battery, and misdemeanor aggravated assault. At a hearing, the judge initially accepted a negotiated plea to two counts, but subsequently rejected the plea and reinstated the charges. At trial, Gaines was convicted of felony criminal trespass to a residence and misdemeanor domestic battery. Gaines did not raise a double jeopardy argument in post-trial motions. The appellate court ordered his release.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the misdemeanor battery conviction. In the context of a guilty plea proceeding, jeopardy attaches when the court unconditionally accepts the guilty plea. A formal finding of guilt is not required, nor is imposition of a sentence. The court unconditionally accepted Gaines’s guilty plea; jeopardy attached. Jeopardy did not, however, terminate improperly, where the court sua sponte vacated the guilty plea. The court did not abuse its discretion because it had “good reason to doubt the truth of the plea.” Because jeopardy did not terminate improperly, (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)), Gaines’s subsequent trial on the same offense did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Gaines cannot demonstrate prejudice, so his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. View "People v. Gaines" on Justia Law

Hollahan was charged with aggravated DUI. His initial jury trial ended in a mistrial when a video recording of the traffic stop was inadvertently played beyond the point of admissible evidence. During a second jury trial, a redacted video of the traffic stop was played for the jury. Following the presentation of evidence, closing arguments, and instruction as to the applicable law, the jury retired to deliberate. Shortly thereafter, the jury asked to watch the video again. The judge granted that request. The video was shown to the jury in the courtroom because the court did not have the “arrangement” necessary to allow the jury to view the video in the jury deliberation room. The court allowed Hollahan, the attorneys, and two alternate jurors to remain in the courtroom while the jury watched the video. Defense counsel did not object. Before the jury was returned to the courtroom, the court admonished that the jury would be watching the video and that “[n]o one will have any conversation.” The judge told the jurors, “we will not be talking to you other than to get the video, period.” After watching the video, the jury returned to the jury room and found Hollahan guilty.The Illinois Supreme Court found no reversible error. Deliberations were not taking place while the jurors were watching the video in the presence of non-jurors and there was no communication with non-jurors. Even if there were error, Hollahan has not shown that he was prejudiced by the procedure employed by the circuit court. View "People v. Hollahan" on Justia Law