Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Named plaintiffs filed a two-count class-action complaint on behalf of “all residents of the City of Chicago who have resided in an area where the City has replaced water mains or meters between January 1, 2008, and the present.” The complaint raises claims of negligence and inverse condemnation in relation to the replacement of water meters and water main pipes, as well as the partial replacement of lead service lines that run between the water mains and residences throughout Chicago. The complaint claimed the city’s actions created an increased risk that lead will be dislodged or leach from the residents’ individual service lines. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the complaint.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The complaint did not allege that anyone is suffering from any physical impairment, dysfunction, or physically disabling consequence caused by the city's actions. An increased risk of harm is not, itself, an injury consistent with the traditional understanding of tort law. The plaintiffs have alleged only that the replacement of water mains and meters has made the proposed class members’ property “more dangerous.” The concept of “dangerousness” is not susceptible to objective measurement and, thus, cannot by itself constitute damage under the Illinois takings clause. View "Berry v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Sharpe and Westmoreland were married and had a child, A.S. The marriage was dissolved in 2013. Sharpe and Westmoreland agreed to a joint parenting agreement. The parents shared equal parenting time. A.S.’s legal residence was with Sharpe. Sharpe entered into a civil union with Fulkerson. A.S. continued to reside with Sharpe, Fulkerson, and Fulkerson’s children. Sharpe died in 2017. After Sharpe’s death, Westmoreland no longer let A.S. live with or visit Fulkerson and Fulkerson’s children. Fulkerson sought visitation and an allocation of parental responsibilities. The appellate court responded to certified questions, finding that a party to a civil union lacks “step-parent” standing as defined by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/101, to request visitation with her deceased partner’s child or to request parental responsibilities.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. in enacting the Civil Union Act, the General Assembly intended to create an alternative to marriage that was equal in all respects. That intent was not limited to partners’ rights as to each other. When a child’s parent enters into a civil union with an individual who is not the child’s other parent, that individual becomes the child’s stepparent as defined by the Dissolution Act and meets that aspect of the standing requirement to petition the court for visitation, allocation of parental responsibilities, or both. View "Sharpe v. Westmoreland" on Justia Law

McAllister injured his knee while working as a sous chef for a restaurant. The injury occurred as he stood up from a kneeling position while attempting to retrieve food that had been misplaced in the cooler. He had previously had surgery on the knee and had received workers’ compensation benefits at that time. An arbitrator awarded him workers’ compensation benefits but the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed, finding that the injury did not “arise out of” his employment. The circuit court and the Appellate Court, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division, affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The injury arose out of an employment-related risk; the acts that caused the injury were risks incident to his employment because these were acts his employer might reasonably expect him to perform in fulfilling his assigned job duties. McAllister was responsible for arranging the walk-in cooler and had a duty to find misplaced food. The court overruled certain cases to the extent that they held that injuries attributable to common bodily movements or routine everyday activities, such as bending, twisting, reaching, or standing up from a kneeling position, are not compensable unless a claimant can prove that he was exposed to a risk of injury from these common bodily movements or routine everyday activities to a greater extent than the general public. View "McAllister v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission" on Justia Law

In 1998, a jury convicted Stoecker of first-degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. Stoecker filed numerous unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief. In 2005 Stoecker filed a petition for relief from judgment, arguing that the procedures in imposing his life sentence for murder violated the Supreme Court’s 2000 “Apprendi” holding that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Appointed defense counsel acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court had held that Apprendi did not apply retroactively to cases whose direct appeals had been exhausted. The petition was dismissed. Although Stoecker filed subsequent petitions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, he did not appeal the Apprendi ruling.Seven years later, Stoecker again sought relief from judgment, raising the Apprendi issue. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the petition as untimely. Four years later, Stoecker again sought relief from judgment, arguing that under recent Supreme Court decisions, Apprendi applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The state moved to dismiss the petition. Four days later, the circuit court dismissed the petition. The state was present but made no argument. Appointed counsel was apparently not notified of the proceeding. The court ruled that the state was correct as a matter of law. Stoecker filed an unsuccessful pro se motion to reconsider.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Any violation of Stoecker’s due process rights was harmless because the deficiencies in the petition could not be cured. The petition was untimely, barred by res judicata, and meritless. Any deficient performance by appointed counsel did not warrant remand. View "People v. Stoecker" on Justia Law

In 2014, a $30,880 judgment covering backpay and pre-judgment interest was entered against Oakridge Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC, for its age and disability discrimination against a former employee, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101. Oakridge Rehab had already gone out of business and transferred the assets and operation of its nursing home facility to Oakridge Healthcare Center, LLC in 2012. Unable to enforce the judgment against Oakridge Rehab, the state instituted proceedings to enforce the judgment against Oakridge Healthcare.The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Oakridge Healthcare, declining to adopt the federal successor liability doctrine in cases arising under the Human Rights Act. The court noted four limited exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for corporate successors and declined to apply the fraudulent purpose exception, which exists “where the transaction is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability for the seller’s obligations.” The court stated that it is within the legislature’s power to abrogate the common-law rule of successor nonliability or otherwise alter its standards through appropriately targeted legislation for employment discrimination cases. View "Department of Human Rights v. Oakridge Healthcare Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Deleon was charged with four counts of criminal sexual assault. The conditions of Deleon’s bond release prohibited him from contacting the victim or visiting her home, school, or workplace. Under 725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5, the State’s Attorney sought a plenary civil no-contact order prohibiting Deleon from contacting the victim, harassing or stalking her, and entering her place of employment. The circuit court orally pronounced that section 112A-11.5 was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied; an evidentiary hearing was never held nor evidence proffered as to its unconstitutionality as applied to Deleon. The court found that the statute allows the state to make a prima facie case for the issuance of a protective order by producing the indictment without requiring the alleged victim to testify and be subject to cross-examination; that the requirement that a defendant present evidence of a meritorious defense to rebut the prima facie evidence violated constitutional protections against self-incrimination; and that the statute improperly shifts the burden of persuasion to the defense.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. There is no basis for concluding that due process precludes the use of an indictment, alone, for restricting a defendant’s liberties before trial. The government has a substantial interest in protecting victims of sexual assault and related crimes from continued contact by the accused pending trial. The conditions of the no-contact order were relatively limited and largely identical to the restraints imposed as conditions of pretrial bond release. There is no legal compulsion for a defendant to rebut the prima facie evidence and no self-incrimination concerns. View "People v. Deleon" on Justia Law

In 2013, the defendant was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder and single counts of aggravated kidnapping and violating an order of protection. The defendant pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder; the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend a sentence of 55 years' imprisonment. Defense counsel noted that the terms were “effectively a life sentence” and that, against counsel’s advice, the defendant chose to “take it.” The court accepted the prosecution's factual basis for the plea and inquired about criminal history. The defendant had previously been convicted of manufacture or delivery of cannabis, a Class 1 felony. The parties waived a presentence investigation (PSI) report. The court imposed a 55-year sentence.The defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea, claiming he had not been “in a coherent state of mind” and ineffective assistance. The appellate court vacated his sentence, citing failure to comply with 730 ILCS 5/5-3-1, which requires a circuit court to consider a PSI before sentencing a defendant for a felony offense, except where “both parties agree to the imposition of a specific sentence, provided there is a finding made for the record as to the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality.” The court held that the PSI requirement cannot be waived.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the sentence. The defendant forfeited any section 5-3-1 claim by failing to raise it in his three motions to withdraw the plea. Despite his attorney’s stated willingness to take the case to trial, he persisted in taking the plea deal. View "People v. Sophanavong" on Justia Law

Legoo was charged with the misdemeanor offense of being a child sex offender in a public park (720 ILCS 5/11- 9.4-1(b)). An officer, attending his grandson’s T-ball game at Mendota's Strouss Park, recognized Legoo and believed he was a registered sex offender. Legoo rode his bicycle through an area between three baseball diamonds. Another officer Corrigan testified went to Legoo’s residence later that night. When asked about his presence in the park, Legoo stated he went there to look for his son. Legoo’s son, C.G., later testified that he was watching a baseball game in the park when Legoo arrived and told him to go home. Legoo then left the park. Legoo testified that he rode his bicycle to the park looking for C.G. and left the park after less than five minutes. Legoo testified that no one else was available to retrieve C.G. from the park that night.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Legoo’s conviction. An exception to liability, found in section 11-9.3(a10) applies when a child sex offender, in a public park, approaches, contacts, or communicates with a child under 18 years of age unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds. The exception does not apply to the section under which Legoo was convicted. View "People v. Legoo" on Justia Law

The Police Union sued the City of Chicago for failing to destroy records of police misconduct that were more than five years old, as required under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An arbitrator held that the CBA should prevail and directed the parties to come to an agreement regarding the destruction of the documents.The circuit court rejected the award. The appellate court agreed, finding requiring the city to destroy all records related to alleged police misconduct without consideration of whether the records have administrative, legal, research, or historical value ignored the requirements of the Local Records Act (50 ILCS 205) and resulted in diminishing the Local Records Commission’s authority to determine what records should be destroyed or maintained. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The arbitration award violated an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy. Although the city could comply with the Local Records Act by submitting disciplinary records to the Commission, that is not required under the CBA. Submission to the Commission is only part of the statutory procedures a local government must follow under the Act. The most crucial aspect is compliance with the Commission’s ultimate decision regarding the retention or destruction of the government records. View "City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7" on Justia Law

Swenson was convicted of disorderly conduct after a telephone conversation with the advancement director of a private school, during which he asked about the school’s security measures and spoke extensively about shootings and violence. The directed testified that “[h]e said if he were to show up at the campus with a gun what would be the protocol of our school?” He asked whether the school gave teachers “PEZ dispensers to defend themselves” and what the students would think “of seeing a gun pointed in their teacher[’]s face.” The conversation caused a soft lockdown at the school and police response. The director indicated that she thought Swenson was on campus and she did not know why Swenson shared with her that he had been kicked out of the school as a child. Swenson testified that he did not own any weapons.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Swenson’s statements were objectively threatening under the circumstances; he was subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his speech. The director reasonably perceived the questions and statements as a threat. Swenson’s speech constituted a true threat, unprotected by the first amendment. A rational trier of fact could conclude that the elements of disorderly conduct were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Swenson" on Justia Law