Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Horsehead is a Delaware corporation, with its primary place of business in Pennsylvania, that has an Illinois manufacturing facility. Tax liability notices were issued due to Horsehead’s failure to pay Illinois use tax (35 ILCS 105/1) on its out-of-state purchases of metallurgical coke in 2007-2011. Horsehead argued that it was exempt from paying use tax on the coke under section 3-5(18) of the Use Tax Act for machinery and equipment used primarily in the manufacturing of tangible personal property, specifically citing the “chemical exemption.” The Illinois Independent Tax Tribunal affirmed the notices and the imposition of use tax, interest, late filing penalties, and late payment penalties totaling $1,521,041. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part. Based upon the plain language of section 3-50(4), the legislature chose to limit the exemption to only those chemicals that cause a “direct and immediate change” on the final manufactured product. At no time in the described chemical processes and reactions does the coke have a direct and immediate effect on the zinc or iron being manufactured. The broad interpretation of the use tax chemical exemption urged by Horsehead would result in virtually any chemical used in the manufacturing process qualifying for the exemption. View "Horsehead Corp. v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The prosecution alleged that on September 19, 2011, Bates entered A.P.’s home and, armed with a knife, sexually assaulted her; on October 6, 2011, he entered C.H.’s home, armed with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. The State elected to try him for the assault of A.P. first and moved to introduce other crimes evidence of the assault of C.H. (725 ILCS 5/115- 7.3(b)). After that motion was granted, Bates retained private counsel for the A.P. trial. The public defender continued to represent Bates regarding the C.H. assault. The court authorized payment for DNA testing and granted the defense a continuance but allowed C.H. to testify about her assault, despite a defense argument that counsel “couldn’t possibly do as good a job in defending my client since it wasn’t my case.” During closing argument, defense counsel asked the jury not to put much weight on the “case within a case,” stating that “[t]here’s been no review by any DNA experts.” The jury found Bates guilty. In an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, counsel claimed that he was surprised at the depth of the evidence introduced regarding the other crimes and that counsel would have had that evidence tested by his own experts had he known the depth.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that counsel’s statements constituted an admission that he neglected Bates’s case, such that a Krankel hearing was warranted. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must come from the defendant. An attorney may raise his own ineffectiveness only if he does so clearly and at the defendant’s direction and informs the court that the defendant has instructed him to make such a claim. View "People v. Bates" on Justia Law

In 2012, Sauvageau became a Lakewood resident, paying for her residency through her pension and Social Security income without other government assistance. Sauvageau stopped paying in August 2013. On October 28, 2013, Lakewood sent her a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge. Sauvageau’s counsel requested a hearing. She applied for Medicaid benefits; the application was denied on January 13, 2014. On February 10, 2014, at a prehearing conference, Lakewood argued that, under the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/1-101), the Department could not conduct a hearing more than 10 days from the date of a resident’s request. The ALJ denied Lakewood’s motion. The hearing was conducted on March 24, 2014. In April 2014, the ALJ recommended that the involuntary discharge be approved. On May 6, the Department’s final administrative decision approved Lakewood’s notice of involuntary discharge. Sauvageau left Lakewood on May 29, 2014. Lakewood sought review, asserting that the Department lacked authority to exceed the statutory 10-day hearing time and 14-day decision time for involuntary transfer or discharge proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court held that section 3-411 of the Act is directory because it does not contain negative language precluding the Department from conducting a hearing beyond the 10-day time period and because the rights of nursing home residents will not be generally injured by a directory construction. View "Lakewood Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Department of Public Health" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Foundations and their insurance broker, Gallagher, discussed the renewal of the Foundations’ $25 million directors and officers (D&O) insurance coverage. The Foundations wanted to obtain the same coverage with a reduced premium. Gallagher offered renewal of the existing Chubb policy or the purchase of a $25 million Chartis policy, stating that the Chartis policy provided the same coverage with a premium that was $3400 lower. Unbeknownst to the Foundations, the Chartis policy contained a broad exclusion of claims related to securities transactions; the Chubb policy contained a narrower exclusion. In 2007, the Foundations sold their Tribune stock for $2 billion during a leveraged buyout. A year later, the Tribune filed for bankruptcy. The Foundations were named in suits filed by aggrieved shareholders, alleging fraud. The Foundations tendered the litigation to Chartis, which denied coverage. The Foundations, asserting that Chubb would have defended and indemnified them, sued Gallagher for breach of contract and professional negligence. Gallagher’s defenses asserted that the Foundations’ conduct was fraudulent and uninsurable and that the Foundations knew of “an ongoing, progressive loss” before changing insurers. Gallagher subpoenaed the Foundations and their attorneys, seeking communications related to the Tribune bankruptcy and the litigation. The Foundations asserted attorney-client privilege. The circuit court applied an exception, finding that Gallagher had a “common interest” with the Foundations because it was “standing in the insurer’s shoes for the purposes of this malpractice issue and may bear the ultimate burden of payment of the underlying claims and defense costs.”The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The common-interest exception to the attorney-client privilege does not extend to these circumstances, where there is no insured-insurer relationship between the parties and the party claiming the privilege is bringing suit based on the defendant’s negligence in failing to procure appropriate insurance as a broker. View "Robert R. McCormick Foundation v. Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Management Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Morger, convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and criminal sexual abuse of his teenage sister, challenged, as overbroad and facially unconstitutional, the probationary condition set forth in the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5- 6-3(a)(8.9). He argued that the section’s “complete ban on accessing ‘social networking websites’ as a condition of probation is unreasonable and unconstitutional under the First Amendment.” The condition applies to all probationers who are convicted of a sex offense, whether or not a minor was involved and whether or not the use of social media was a factor in the commission of the offense. The appellate court rejected that argument. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the condition overbroad. The court noted the absolute nature of the ban. Morger could not, without violating his probation, even access or use a device with Internet capability without the prior approval of his probation officer. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court examined the nature of Morger’s offenses; whether the condition reasonably relates to the rehabilitative purpose of the legislation; and “whether the value to the public in imposing this condition of probation manifestly outweighs the impairment to the probationer’s constitutional rights. View "People v. Morger" on Justia Law

Abdullah was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 40 years for first-degree murder and 20 years for attempted first-degree murder. In a subsequent motion, the prosecution argued that consecutive sentences were mandatory and sought a term of at least 45 years on the murder conviction: the 20-year minimum term for that offense plus a 25-year firearm enhancement. The indictment did not charge firearm enhancements. The state moved to dismiss Abdullah’s notice of appeal, arguing that Abdullah could not bring an appeal until valid sentences were imposed. The court resentenced Abdullah, imposing consecutive prison terms of 50 years for murder and 31 years for attempted murder, including a 25-year firearm enhancement for both. Abdullah unsuccessfully argued that once his notice of appeal was filed, the court lacked jurisdiction to increase his sentences. On Abdullah’s motion to reconsider, the court reduced the consecutive term for attempted murder to 26 years: the 6-year minimum for that offense plus a 20- year firearm enhancement. The appellate court affirmed. The trial court dismissed Abdullah’s post-conviction petition.Years later, Abdullah sought relief under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, arguing that the addition of the firearm enhancements violated ex post facto laws because it was unconstitutional at the time of his offense as violating the proportionate penalties clause of the state constitution (the “Morgan” decision was subsequently overturned) and that the enhancements were based on facts not alleged in the charging instrument and not submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Abdullah’s original concurrent sentences must be reinstated. The prosecution’s post-sentencing motion to modify Abdullah’s sentences was not authorized by statute or by rule and could not be used to delay or circumvent Abdullah’s right to appeal. View "People v. Abdullah" on Justia Law

Mother filed a contribution petition under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/513(a), requesting that Father be ordered to pay an equitable share of their daughter's college costs. The two were never married; although their 1997 agreed order addressed child-related issues, it was silent on college expenses. Father had the financial ability to pay but objected to paying because he had not been involved in the college selection process. The court stated: “People that are married ... have no obligation at all to pay for their children’s college education. Because of that, people who are married have input into where their children go to school. … The legislature has taken away that choice from people who are not married. The court ordered the parties each to pay 40% of their daughter’s college expenses. Father then challenged section 513 on equal protection grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court had upheld section 513 against an equal protection challenge in its 1978 “Kujawinski” decision. The trial court ultimately declared section 513 unconstitutional as applied, reasoning that Kujawinski's conclusion that section 513 satisfied the rational basis test because children of unmarried parents faced more disadvantages and were less likely to receive financial help with college from their parents than children of married parents was no longer viable. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated. Regardless of the impact of any societal evolution since the Kujawinski decision, that holding remains directly on point; the trial court lacked authority to declare that precedent invalid. View "Yakich v. Aulds" on Justia Law

Defendant and Matthew lived together along with her children and shared an iCloud account. Matthew was aware of this data-sharing arrangement but did not disable it. Text messages between Matthew and the victim, who was a neighbor, appeared on defendant’s iPad. Some of the text messages included nude photographs of the victim. Matthew and the victim were aware that defendant had received the pictures and text messages. Defendant and Matthew broke up. Defendant wrote a letter detailing her version of the break-up and attached four of the naked pictures of the victim and copies of the text messages. Matthew’s cousin received the letter and informed Matthew., Matthew contacted the police. The victim stated that the pictures were private and only intended for Matthew but acknowledged that she was aware that Matthew had shared an iCloud account with defendant. Defendant was charged with nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, 720 ILCS 5/11-23.5(b). The circuit court found section 11-23.5(b) an unconstitutional content-based restriction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The court declined to find “revenge porn” categorically exempt from First Amendment protection, concluded that the statute is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, and applied intermediate scrutiny. Stating that First Amendment protections are less rigorous where matters of purely private significance are at issue, the court found that the statute serves a substantial governmental interest in protecting individual privacy rights and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary. View "People v. Austin" on Justia Law

Murray was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)) and unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member (section 24-1.8(a)(1)). He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 50 years and 10 years respectively. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, rejecting an argument that the state failed to prove that the Latin Kings are a “street gang” as defined by the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act, 740 ILCS 147/10, finding that a detective’s testimony about the organizational structure of street gangs in general, and the Latin Kings in particular, and that the Latin Kings are a street gang within the meaning of Illinois law was sufficient. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The prosecution did not present evidence that established the elements codified in the statute. There was no “course or pattern of criminal activity” testimony that the Latin Kings were involved in two or more gang-related criminal offenses; that at least one such offense was committed after January 1, 1993; that both offenses were committed within five years of each other; and that at least one offense involved the solicitation to commit, conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or commission of any offense defined as a felony or forcible felony. View "People v. Murray" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a recreational vehicle (RV) from Vacationland for $26,000.25. When it leaked during a rainstorm, they brought it in for repair. When it leaked again, causing extensive damage, they brought it back. A little more than two weeks after they dropped it off the second time and without a timetable for when the vehicle would be repaired, they told the seller that they no longer wanted the RV and asked for their money back. Plaintiffs sued, citing revocation of acceptance under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. 2310(d); breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Act; revocation of acceptance and cancellation of contract under Illinois’s adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code; and return of purchase price under the UCC. Defendant argued that plaintiffs’ failure to give it a reasonable opportunity to cure was fatal to their claims. The circuit court granted the defendant summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed. Plaintiffs sought review of the revocation of acceptance claim under the UCC (810 ILCS 5/2- 608(1)(b)). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plain language of subsection 2-608(1)(b) does not require that the buyer give the seller an opportunity to cure a substantial nonconformity before revoking acceptance. View "Accettura v. Vacationland, Inc." on Justia Law