Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A condominium resident suffered serious injuries due to a gasoline leak from an underground storage tank owned and operated by a gas station located over a mile away. The resident filed a lawsuit against the owners and operators of the gas station, alleging common-law negligence and liability based on the violation of Illinois environmental statutes and regulations governing underground storage tanks. The resident passed away during the course of the litigation, and her daughter was appointed as a special representative to continue the action.The Cook County circuit court dismissed the statutory claims, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The courts held that the statutes at issue did not create private statutory rights of action, express or implied. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that there was no express private right of action under the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Program (LUST Program) provisions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. The court also concluded that implying a private right of action was not necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. The court noted that the plaintiff's common-law negligence claim, based on the same acts and omissions that she alleged violated the LUST Program of the Act, was a sufficient remedy. Therefore, it was not necessary to imply a private right of action. View "Rice v. Marathon Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves Char M. Shunick, who was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. After his conviction, Shunick filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was summarily dismissed by the circuit court of Knox County. Shunick then filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal, which was also denied by the circuit court. The appellate court found that Shunick's motion to reconsider was untimely and, as a result, his notice of appeal was also untimely. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the substantive merits of the appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court found that Shunick's motion to reconsider was not timely filed under the Illinois mailbox rule, rendering his subsequent notice of appeal untimely and preventing appellate court jurisdiction over the substantive merits of his appeal. The court also found that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to order a remand to allow Shunick to cure the jurisdictional defect by supplying a compliant certificate of service. The court concluded that the appellate court correctly followed precedent and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to remand the cause to allow Shunick to cure the jurisdictional defect by supplementing the record with a compliant certificate of service. View "People v. Shunick" on Justia Law

Tri-Plex Technical Services, Ltd., an Illinois corporation that develops, manufactures, distributes, and sells commercial-grade carpet cleaning products, filed a complaint against its competitors, including Jon-Don, LLC, alleging violations of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to disclose that their cleaning products contained excessive amounts of phosphorous and volatile organic material, in violation of Illinois environmental laws. The plaintiff argued that this harmed its business because its products complied with Illinois law and the carpet cleaning companies preferred and purchased the defendants’ products because they contained phosphorus and cleaned better, albeit illegally.The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on several grounds, including that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim and that the plaintiff lacked standing. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reversed the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint. The court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing its claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to plead all the elements of a Consumer Fraud Act claim, as it did not plead that it was the intended recipient of the defendants’ alleged deceptions. The court further held that the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim, which rested upon the validity of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Fraud Act claims, also failed. View "Tri-Plex Technical Services, Ltd. v. Jon-Don, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84 (the School District) and Grand Tower Energy Center, LLC (Grand Tower), the owner of a power plant in Jackson County, Illinois. For the 2014 tax year, the Jackson County assessor imposed an assessed value of $33,445,837 on Grand Tower’s property. Grand Tower appealed the assessment to the Jackson County Board of Review, which reduced the assessed value of the property to $31,538,245. Grand Tower then appealed to the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) under section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code, seeking a further reduction of the final assessment imposed by the board of review. The School District, which receives funding from property taxes generated in that county, was granted leave to intervene in the appeal.While the appeal was pending before the PTAB, Grand Tower’s 2014 property taxes came due. Grand Tower did not pay the taxes. In December 2015, the Jackson County collector prepared the annual list of properties with delinquent taxes, which included Grand Tower’s property. The collector then applied to the circuit court of Jackson County for a judgment and order of sale for taxes on the 2014 delinquent properties, including Grand Tower’s. The court entered a judgment and order of sale.The School District filed a motion before the PTAB seeking dismissal of Grand Tower’s appeal, arguing that Grand Tower was required to pay the 2014 property taxes under protest in order to pursue an appeal before the PTAB. The School District also argued that once the Jackson County collector made the application for judgment and order of sale, the circuit court acquired jurisdiction over the taxes and all supplemental matters, including the determination of the assessment, thereby divesting the PTAB of jurisdiction to review the 2014 assessment. The PTAB denied the School District’s motion to dismiss.The School District appealed the PTAB’s decision to the appellate court, which affirmed the decision of the PTAB. The appellate court held that payment of the contested taxes was not a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB and that the tax sale proceedings in the circuit court did not divest the PTAB of jurisdiction to review the 2014 and 2015 property assessments.The School District then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the payment of disputed property taxes is not a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB under section 16-160 of the Code, and that the county collector’s application for judgment and order of sale did not divest the PTAB of its jurisdiction to review Grand Tower’s properly filed appeals. The court also held that the entry of the judgment and order of sale did not estop Grand Tower from seeking review of its 2014 and 2015 assessments before the PTAB. View "Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84 v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board" on Justia Law

The defendant, Korem M. Johanson, was found guilty of Class X felony predatory criminal sexual assault of a child following a bench trial in the circuit court of McHenry County. Before sentencing, Johanson argued that the penalty for this offense violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, as it contained identical elements to the less severe Class 2 felony offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse but carried a harsher sentence. The circuit court denied this motion and sentenced Johanson to 16 years' imprisonment.Johanson appealed, maintaining the same argument. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision, concluding that the two offenses did not contain identical elements. While both offenses required the victim to be under the age of 13, the court found that the definition of sexual conduct for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse could be satisfied without contact involving the sex organ or anus, which was a requirement for the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found a clear difference between the two offenses based on the statutory language. While acts that satisfy the contact element of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child also satisfy the element of sexual conduct, the opposite is not always true. Therefore, the two offenses do not contain identical elements. The court also rejected Johanson's argument that the elements of the offense as alleged in this case were identical for both offenses, stating that this was an as-applied challenge, which is not appropriate under the identical elements test. The court concluded that the more severe sentence provided for the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child is not constitutionally disproportionate to the less severe sentence for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. View "People v. Johanson" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Joliet and five commercial truck drivers who were fined for violating city ordinances prohibiting overweight and/or overlength vehicles on nondesignated highways. The drivers challenged the city's jurisdiction to administratively adjudicate the ordinance violations, arguing they were entitled to have the violations dismissed because applicable law required that they be adjudicated in the circuit court. The hearing officer overruled the drivers' objections and denied their motions to dismiss. The drivers then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Will County, which affirmed the decisions of the hearing officer.The appellate court reversed the decisions of the circuit court and hearing officer, following a previous First District's opinion which held that home rule municipalities are prohibited from administratively adjudicating "traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles," in addition to "reportable offense[s] under Section 6-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code." The City of Joliet appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Illinois.The Supreme Court of Illinois found that section 1-2.1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code does not preempt the City of Joliet's home rule authority to administratively adjudicate violations of its ordinances. Therefore, it vacated that part of the appellate court's judgment. However, the court also found that the hearing officer's administrative decisions were precluded by the Joliet Code of Ordinances, and thus affirmed, on different grounds, that part of the appellate court's judgment that reversed the judgment of the circuit court and the administrative decisions of the City. The court concluded that the administrative decisions were reversed, and the circuit court judgment was reversed. View "Cammacho v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois considered an appeal by Emanuel Wells, who had entered a fully negotiated plea agreement with the state. Wells had pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver and received the minimum six-year sentence. He also agreed to pay a $100,000 fine and was credited for the 54 days he had spent in custody. After sentencing, Wells filed a motion to receive credit for time he spent on home detention prior to the plea. The trial and appellate courts denied the motion, holding that a fully negotiated guilty plea constitutes a waiver of presentence custody credit not provided for in the plea agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that a fully negotiated plea deal that is a complete and final expression of the parties' agreement gives rise to a presumption that every material right and obligation is included and that neither party may unilaterally seek modification of the agreement. The court found that Wells, by entering into a plea deal that granted him 54 days of credit, agreed to forgo his right to credit for time he spent on home detention. Although it was unclear whether Wells was aware of the potential credit for his time spent on home detention, the court determined that Wells waived this right by entering into a plea agreement that provided for 54 days of credit. Consequently, Wells was not entitled to additional credit not included in the agreement. View "People v. Wells" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed a case where a defendant, Ramon Torres, was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of his four-year-old daughter. The State’s evidence included testimony that Torres tested positive for chlamydia in 2013 and again in 2016. On appeal, Torres argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the admission of evidence of these two test results. He maintained that the test results fell under the purview of the physician-patient privilege statute and that none of the statutory exceptions to the physician-patient privilege applied.This case required the court to interpret the physician-patient privilege statute and whether the test results would have been excluded from evidence at his jury trial had his attorney objected. The appellate court disagreed with Torres and affirmed his conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts’ judgments.The court held that the physician-patient privilege statute did not apply to the 2016 test results as Torres submitted to testing in 2016 not for the purpose of seeking medical treatment, but because he was ordered to do so by the Department of Children and Family Services. Therefore, the privilege and the exceptions to the privilege were irrelevant to the admissibility of the 2016 test results.Regarding the 2013 test results, the court found that the physician-patient privilege statute does apply. The court, however, determined that the exception set out in subsection (7) authorizes physicians to disclose information subject to the physician-patient privilege “in actions, civil or criminal, arising from the filing of a report in compliance with the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act.” Therefore, the 2013 chlamydia test results were admissible even though the physician-patient privilege attached to those test results. The court concluded that the defendant has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland standard, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. View "People v. Torres" on Justia Law

In a lawsuit between two competitors in the shipping logistics industry, Project44, Inc. and FourKites, Inc., Project44 alleged that FourKites agents sent defamatory emails to Project44's chief revenue officer and two members of its board of directors. FourKites argued that there was no publication to a third party because the emails were sent to members of the corporation who were, in effect, the corporation itself. The Cook County circuit court agreed with FourKites and dismissed Project44's complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding that there is publication to a third party when an allegedly defamatory statement is communicated to a member of a corporation’s executive leadership team. It was determined that a corporation has a distinct reputation from that of its management-level employees and an interest in protecting that reputation among its employees and the public at large. Therefore, defamatory statements made to corporate employees, even those with the power to act on behalf of the corporation, can harm the corporation’s business reputation among those employees. Communication of a defamatory statement regarding the corporation to these employees establishes the publication element for a defamation action brought by the corporation against the party that publishes the statement. View "Project44, Inc. v. FourKites, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois evaluated a case involving Jessica Logan, who was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of her 19-month-old son. Before her trial, Logan moved to suppress a video reenactment of her son’s death, arguing that police should have given her Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the video was admitted as evidence. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that the reenactment was not custodial.The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, but for different reasons. The court found that Logan was in custody during the reenactment and should have received Miranda warnings. Despite this, the court held that admitting the reenactment as evidence did not amount to plain error, as the evidence of Logan's guilt was not closely balanced. The court also rejected Logan's claims that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, finding that she had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if her counsel had acted differently. View "People v. Logan" on Justia Law