Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Fukama-Kabika was charged with criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual abuse, unlawful restraint. The court advised him of the potential penalties if the jury were to find him guilty, including required terms of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Defense counsel confirmed the accuracy of the potential penalties. After conviction, the trial court did not mention the MSR terms during the sentencing hearing. That day, a written sentencing order was entered, stating an MSR term of “3 years” on counts I and IV and an MSR period of “1 year” on counts II and III. While an appeal was pending a record office supervisor requested an “amended order, issued nunc pro tunc to the original sentencing date” correcting the MSR. The prosecutor forwarded the letter to the trial court, noting that the court had the authority to amend the written sentencing order under Rule 472. That same day, apparently without providing notice to the parties, the court issued an amended order confirming that the MSR term on counts I and IV was “3 years to natural life.”After the rejection of his direct appeal, the appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Fukama-Kabika’s postconviction petition. The trial court was powerless to impose a term of MSR other than that provided by statute, three years to natural life and the misstatement of the MSR term on the written sentencing order was a clerical error. View "People v. Fukama-Kabika" on Justia Law

In 2016, Bush was involved in a neighborhood dispute involving two families that culminated in Bush firing the shots that killed Jones and injured Gulley. Bush was convicted of felony murder, second-degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, two counts of mob action, reckless discharge of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon.The appellate court reversed the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction, vacated the jury’s finding of guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm, and affirmed the convictions and sentences of felony murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Bush’s arguments that the prosecution did not prove that he engaged in the predicate felony of mob action; that mob action could not serve as the predicate felony for felony murder because there was no “independent felonious purpose”; and that the court erred in denying his motion in limine to admit a rap video to establish prior inconsistent statements by a witness and in allowing a juror to remain on the jury after the juror revealed an implied bias. The jury could rationally infer that Bush was actively engaged in carrying out a common plan to use force or violence to avenge an earlier beating. View "People v. Bush" on Justia Law

Montanez was convicted based on the 2002 murder of Villalobos and Ramirez. The court sentenced him to mandatory natural life for two first-degree murder convictions, a 20-year consecutive sentence for an aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction, and a 27-year consecutive sentence for an aggravated kidnapping conviction.Montanez challenged the denial of his request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. He sought to raise a claim that the prosecution violated “Brady” by failing to disclose evidence relevant to his defense that was stored in a file in the basement of the Chicago Police Department and was discovered after his convictions. Montanez claims that although he became aware of the file during his first postconviction proceedings (which included 46 constitutional claims) he was unable to obtain the file during those proceedings to establish that it contained material that would have been helpful to his defense.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial. In addition to failing to raise a Brady violation claim based on the entirety of the CPD file in his proposed successive petition, Montanez’s attempt to raise this claim on appeal was barred by res judicata. Montanez’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition falls short of demonstrating that the procedural hurdles for filing a successive petition should be lowered in this case. View "People v. Montanez" on Justia Law

The Municipal Code of Chicago included provisions concerning public parking, including parking meters. The fine for exceeding the time purchased at a parking meter differs depending on whether the violation occurs in the “central business district” or the “non-central business district.” At the time of the alleged violation, failure to comply with the parking meter regulations in the central business district resulted in a $65 fine. A $50 fine applied to similar violations outside the central business district.Pinkston filed a class-action, alleging that Chicago had engaged in the routine practice of improperly issuing central business district tickets for parking meter violations. The circuit court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings and voluntarily paying his fine. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The underlying issue—whether Pinkston received an improper parking ticket—is routinely handled at the administrative level; an aggrieved party cannot circumvent administrative remedies “by a class action for declaratory judgment, injunction or other relief.” View "Pinkston v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Brusaw was charged with aggravated DUI and aggravated driving while his license was revoked. The case was assigned to Judge Jones. A pretrial hearing was set for October 25, 2017. On October 5, Brusaw filed a pro se motion for substitution of Judge Jones under 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a), which gives a defendant the right to an “automatic” substitution of a judge upon the timely filing of a proper written motion containing a good-faith allegation that the judge is prejudiced. After two continuances and at least one pretrial appearance, neither Brusaw nor his attorney brought the motion to Judge Jones’s attention. The judge never entered a ruling on the motion. None of the three posttrial motions mentioned the motion for substitution of judge. Judge Jones sentenced Brusaw to a nine-year prison term. Brusaw spoke at sentencing but did not mention the substitution motion.The appellate court reversed his convictions, reasoning that the “plain language of section 114-5(a)” establishes that a motion for substitution brought under that provision “is not subject to the common abandonment principle.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the convictions but vacated the sentence on other grounds. The common law waiver rule applies. Brusaw and his attorney had multiple opportunities to bring the motion to the court’s attention yet never did so. View "People v. Brusaw" on Justia Law

Webster, 17 years old, fatally shot 15-year-old Gutierrez with a sawed-off shotgun while in the garage behind Webster’s home. Gutierrez sustained a wound to his hand, consistent with his arm having been in a defensive position, and two shotgun wounds to his face. Webster hid the shotgun, dragged Gutierrez’s body down the alley, and tried to clean the crime scene, depositing bloodstained items in neighboring garbage receptacles. In a video-recorded interview at the police station, Webster initially said that no one had been at his house that day and he had last seen Gutierrez about a month earlier. Eventually, Webster admitted that he shot Gutierrez, claiming that Gutierrez pulled out a shotgun, pointed it at Webster, and pulled one of the hammers and that Webster grabbed the shotgun from Gutierrez, “blacked out,” and shot Gutierrez twice to “finish him off.”Webster was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a term of 40 years. The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the sentence. Absent a finding of error or abuse of discretion, the appellate court is without authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) to vacate a defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. The 40-year sentence is within statutory sentencing limits and is presumed proper. View "People v. Webster" on Justia Law

In 2010, Agee strangled his girlfriend, Davis, during a physical altercation. He went directly to the police station and voluntarily made a statement, which was recorded on video. Agee did not realize that Davis had died and expressed concerns that she would be okay. Agee pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 25 years.Agee filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek an expert to testify as to his mental health. Postconviction counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition adding a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Agee that he could pursue a second-degree defense murder at trial. The court dismissed the amended petition. Agee appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel erroneously failed to allege all the elements of a second-degree murder claim. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Rule 651(c), requiring reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, does not require “any level of representation in the presentation of new claims.”The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The appellate court erred in finding that Rule 651(c) does not require any level of representation in the presentation of added claims in an amended pro se postconviction petition but Agee failed to demonstrate that postconviction counsel failed to make amendments to the pro se petition as necessary for an adequate presentation of his claims. He cannot show deficient performance. The record rebuts Agee’s claims about a second-degree murder defense. View "People v. Agee" on Justia Law

Roland, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his bench trial for a 2002 attempted murder when his attorney failed to present evidence of his mental health history. After a pre-trial evaluation, Roland had been found fit to stand trial. The expert determined he was legally sane at the time of the offense but that he may have been experiencing symptoms of a depressive mood disorder that was likely exacerbated by alcohol and illegal substances. At trial, Roland testified to having attempted suicide in jail and that he fired a gun while being chased by police because he had wanted police to shoot and kill him.After the petition was advanced to the second stage of proceedings, it was dismissed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. It is not reasonably likely that further evidence of Roland’s mental health history would have changed the trial court’s determination that Roland’s conduct during the shooting did not demonstrate that he wanted to commit suicide by police; the court noted that he fled from the police, taking evasive measures to avoid being shot. Roland’s postconviction petition failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of “Strickland.” View "People v. Roland" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the Illinois State Police (ISP), violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1) by failing to provide them with documents relating to their Firearm Owners’ Identification (FOID) cards under the Firearm Owner’s Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/0.01). ISP had denied the plaintiffs’ requests for the documents, finding the requested information exempt from disclosure under FOIA section 7.5(v). The circuit court ordered ISP to produce each plaintiff’s FOID card application and to produce copies of letters it had previously sent to the plaintiffs in which it informed them it was revoking their FOID cards. After consolidating the cases, the appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Section 7.5(v) states that the “names and information” of people who have applied for or received FOID cards are exempt from disclosure under FOIA; it makes no distinction between another person’s FOID card information and one’s own information. An individual may not consent to the disclosure of his FOID card information under FOIA. The plaintiffs may obtain their FOID card applications and revocation letters through the Firearms Services Bureau, the division of ISP that processes FOID card applications and determines FOID card eligibility but FOIA is not the proper means for obtaining the requested information. View "Hart v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

Hilliard was tried for attempted first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm following the 2013 shooting of Killingsworth, who sustained two gunshot wounds in an unprovoked attack. The court removed Hilliard from the courtroom after he threatened people and became belligerent. He could hear the proceedings in lockup and declined to return to the courtroom. Post-conviction, the court ordered a fitness examination. Hilliard refused to cooperate. The expert found no objective evidence that Hilliard had a major mental illness or cognitive impairment. Hilliard declined to answer questions in the preparation of his PSI, which stated that Hilliard had no relationship with his father, had not attended high school, and self-reported mental illness. Hilliard described his childhood as normal, denying any history of family abuse, substance abuse, or gang affiliation. Hilliard had no criminal history.The court merged the charge and imposed a 15-year sentence; for personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused bodily harm, the court imposed the 25-year minimum. The appellate court rejected Hilliard’s argument that the mandatory 25-year enhancement was unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied and that the 40-year sentence was excessive in light of his age and absent any prior criminal activity.In 2019, the court summarily dismissed Hilliard's postconviction petition on the basis that Hilliard was not a juvenile at the time of the shooting and did not receive the harshest penalty possible. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hilliard has no viable claim arising from cases providing heightened protection in juvenile sentencing under the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. His challenge under the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause was frivolous when his claims about his social history were compared to the nature of his crime. View "People v. Hilliard" on Justia Law