Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Nichols, age 11, received $600,000 in a settlement for injuries she suffered in a motor vehicle accident. The court appointed her mother as her guardian to administer her estate and appointed attorney Fahrenkamp as guardian ad litem. In 2012 Nichols sued her mother, claiming that she used $79,507 of settlement funds for her own benefit. The trial court ruled in Nichols’s favor but limited recovery to $16,365, a 2007 Jeep Compass, and $10,000 in attorney fees. Nichols sued Fahrenkamp for legal malpractice in approving expenditures that were not in Nichols’s interests. She claimed that Fahrenkamp never met with her or consulted with her regarding her mother’s expenditures. The circuit court granted Fahrenkamp summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that guardians ad litem have a duty to protect their wards’ assets and interests and that immunizing guardians ad litem from tort suits would be inconsistent with this duty. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated summary judgment in Fahrenkamp’s favor, applying the “functional test” and looking past the title attached to the position to look to the position holder’s role. In the past, the guardian ad litem served in almost a trustee-like capacity, seeking to specifically advocate the pecuniary interests of the ward, but a present-day guardian ad litem functions as a representative of the court appointed to assist in protecting the ward's best interests. View "Nichols v. Fahrenkamp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s class action complaint alleged that Walgreens violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, by unlawfully collecting a municipal tax imposed by Chicago on purchases of bottled water that were exempt from taxation under the ordinance. The circuit court dismissed the action, citing the voluntary payment doctrine, which provides that money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts cannot be recovered on the ground that the claim for payment was illegal. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the complaint pleaded that the unlawful collection of the bottled water tax was a deceptive act under the Consumer Fraud Act. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, first holding that claims under the Consumer Fraud Act are not categorically exempt from the voluntary payment doctrine. The court rejected an argument that the receipt issued by Walgreens constituted a representation that the tax was required by the ordinance. Misrepresentations or mistakes of law cannot form the basis of a claim for fraud. View "McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

In December 2007, the decedent had gastric bypass surgery and developed a bed sore that became infected. The Hospital discharged him four days after the procedure. In January 2008, the decedent died from complications associated with a bacterial infection. Ward's initial nine-count complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure. First and second amended complaints were also dismissed. The Hospital filed its answer to a third amended complaint. Four years later, in December 2015, the judge issued a pretrial conference order. A jury trial was set for January 2016. On December 31, 2015, the Hospital moved to bar Ward’s disclosure of a rebuttal witness the day before, 20 days before the start of the trial, noting that the case had been pending for six years. Ward unsuccessfully sought leave to file a fourth amended complaint, alleging a survival claim against the Hospital under a theory of respondeat superior and a wrongful death claim against the Hospital under a theory of respondeat superior. Ward successfully moved to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice. In May 2016, Ward initiated another lawsuit against the Hospital, nearly identical to the proposed fourth amended complaint. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ward, overturning summary judgment in favor of the Hospital. None of the orders dismissing counts of the various complaints in the initial action were final. The lack of finality renders the doctrine of res judicata inapplicable. View "Ward v. Decatur Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for tortious interference with Plaintiff’s share of the trust by making false statements and presenting misleading evidence against Plaintiff in earlier litigation. Both parties were licensed attorneys, acting pro se. The complaint was dismissed. The Cook County circuit court entered an order imposing Rule 137 sanctions against Plaintiff. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim and the finding that Plaintiff violated Rule 137 in filing that frivolous claim but reversed a finding that Defendant was entitled to attorney fees. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded with directions to reinstate Defendant’s attorney fee award View "McCarthy v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Illinois General Assembly directed the Pollution Control Board to adopt rules for the use of clean construction or demolition debris (CCDD) and uncontaminated soil (US) as fill material at clean construction or demolition debris fill operations. The rules were to include “standards and procedures necessary to protect groundwater.” The legislature provided “an inexhaustive list of 12 ways to do so that the Board may consider,” including groundwater monitoring. The rules ultimately promulgated by the Board required stronger “front-end” testing and certification requirements for CCDD and US but not a “back-end” groundwater monitoring requirement. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision. Objectors failed to establish that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious for relying upon an improper factor when it considered whether CCDD and US are waste. The courts rejected an argument that the Board ignored the costs of groundwater monitoring and the hazards of older and noncompliant fill. When acting in its quasi-legislative capacity, the Board has no burden to support its conclusions with a given quantum of evidence; the court rejected an argument that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious for offering an explanation that was counter to the evidence or implausible. View "County of Will v. Pollution Control Board" on Justia Law

Clark pled guilty to charges of burglary and unlawful use of a credit card and was released on bond pending the imposition of sentence. While awaiting sentencing, Clark was found guilty of violating 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) for knowingly failing to report to the Whiteside County Jail after leaving a substance abuse treatment center, as required by her bail bond. Section 31-6(a) has two independent clauses: one contains an escape from custody provision and the other contains a knowing failure to report provision. The appellate court found that Clark's failure to report did not constitute an escape because she was not in custody while on bond awaiting sentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the circuit court. The plain and unambiguous language of the knowing failure to report provision of section 31-6(a) does not contain a “custody” element; the statute is violated when two elements are proved: a person is convicted of a felony, and the person knowingly fails to report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

Roberts sued City Colleges of Chicago following his termination as director of medical programs at Malcolm X College, alleging retaliatory discharge, violation of section 20 of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/20), and wrongful termination. City Colleges gave no reason for his termination, which followed his complaints about the use of unqualified instructors. The circuit court dismissed the retaliatory discharge and Whistleblower Act counts with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s Whistleblower Act claim but reversed the dismissal of the retaliatory discharge claim. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the Whistleblower Act claim but reinstated the dismissal of the retaliatory discharge claim. Roberts did not establish that his termination violated a clearly mandated public policy; he failed to allege sufficient facts to conclude that the use of the instructors put federal funding at risk. Section 20 of the Whistleblower Act requires that an employee refuse to participate “in an activity that would result in a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” The complaint lacked sufficient facts to conclude that appointment of the instructors violated the standards of a recognized accrediting agency or misrepresented the nature of its educational program or employability of its students. View "Roberts v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Jane and her parents, sued two individuals and several entities including and affiliated with the United Church of Christ (UCC) after Jane was sexually assaulted by a youth pastor. Plaintiffs alleged that the First Congregational Church of Dundee (FCCD) and its pastor, James, negligently and willfully and wantonly hired, supervised, and retained FCCD’s director of youth ministries, Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice. All counts of the second amended complaint were dismissed as against FCCD and James. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the striking of portions of the plaintiffs’ complaint but reinstated all counts of the complaint. The stricken statements concerned FCCD’s and James’s post-assault actions, which do not support plaintiffs’ claims of an ongoing conscious disregard for Jane’s welfare or a pattern of conduct prior to the assault nor do they make it more likely or less likely that they acted negligently before the assault. The negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention counts were reinstated, as were the willful and wanton counts inasmuch as they overlap with the negligent supervision counts but not to the extent they overlap with the negligent retention counts. View "Doe v. Coe" on Justia Law

Chicago Ordinance 2012-4489 provides that “[n]o operator of a mobile food vehicle shall park or stand such vehicle within 200 feet of any principal customer entrance to a restaurant which is located on the street level.” Under a “mobile food vehicle stands program,” Chicago reserves designated areas on the public way where a certain number of food trucks are permitted to operate regardless of the 200-foot rule. Owners must install on their food trucks a permanent GPS device “which sends real-time data to any service that has a publicly-accessible application programming interface.” Plaintiffs alleged the 200-foot rule violated the Illinois Constitution's equal protection and due process clauses and that the GPS requirement constitutes a continuous, unreasonable, warrantless search of food trucks.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit and appellate courts in rejecting those arguments. Chicago has a legitimate governmental interest in encouraging the long-term stability and economic growth of its neighborhoods. The 200-foot rule, which helps promote brick-and-mortar restaurants is rationally related to the city's legitimate interest in stable neighborhoods. The GPS system is the best and most accurate means of locating a food truck, which is particularly important in case of a serious health issue. The GPS device does not transmit the truck’s location data directly to the city; Chicago has never requested location data from any food truck’s service provider. Food trucks generally post their location on social media to attract customers, so any expectation of privacy they might have in their location is greatly diminished. View "LMP Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2014, the defendant was charged with four counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against a nine-year-old girl. During deliberations, the judge indicated on the record that she had received a note from the jury: “After deliberating for five hours, and despite our best efforts, we are at an impasse.” The judge explained that the jury had also, earlier, informed the bailiff that they were at an impasse. The judge questioned the foreperson in open court in the presence of the jury. After the judge conferred with the attorneys, the judge discharged the jurors and the court declared a mistrial. The prosecution announced its intention to retry defendant. The court notified the parties, without objection that the matter was continued to reset for trial. Thereafter, defendant unsuccessfully moved to bar further prosecution based on double jeopardy principles, arguing that there had been no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial of that motion. When a mistrial is declared, a retrial may proceed without offending double jeopardy principles if the defendant consents or there is a manifest necessity for the mistrial. Manifest necessity was evidenced by two statements from the jury indicating. The judge initially urged the jurors to continue and subsequently took care to clarify where the jury stood with respect to the deliberative process. The judge specifically asked the foreperson whether additional time would be helpful and expressed concern about coercion. View "People v. Kimble" on Justia Law