Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, defendant (age 31) was charged with several controlled drug incidents, In a negotiated plea agreement, he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church—a Class 1 felony with a sentencing range of 4-15 years, 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a). The state agreed to dismiss seven remaining charges and to recommend a sentencing cap of 13 years’ imprisonment. After the circuit court delivered Rule 402 admonishments. Defendant acknowledged that he understood he was agreeing to a sentence of no less than 4 years and no more than 13 years. Defendant’s presentence investigation report included prior convictions for resisting a peace officer, criminal trespass to property, four counts of aggravated driving under the influence involving two fatalities and two counts of great bodily harm, operating an uninsured motor vehicle, and unlawful restraint. Defendant sought a six-year sentence, noting mitigating factors, including a substantial history with alcohol abuse without meaningful intervention, difficult childhood circumstances, poor education, and defendant’s participation in rehabilitation programs and expressions of remorse. The court expressly stated that the state’s recommendation for a 13-year sentence was justified, then imposed a sentence of 11 years. At the hearing on defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, defendant argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a defendant who enters into a negotiated plea agreement may not challenge his sentence on the basis that the court relied on improper statutory sentencing factors. This was an excessive sentence challenge. Under Rule 604(d), defendant’s recourse was to seek to withdraw the plea and return the parties to the status quo before the plea. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In a 2004 Chicago altercation, Vanecko punched Koschman in the face, causing Koschman to fall back and strike his head on the sidewalk. Koschman died from his injuries. In 2004-2011, law enforcement investigated. No charges were filed. In 2011, the Koschman family sought the appointment of a special prosecutor, alleging that Vanecko was a nephew of then-Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley and a grandson of former Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley. In 2012, the court appointed Webb as special prosecutor, 55 ILCS 5/3-9008. In 2012, on petition of the special prosecutor, the criminal court impaneled a special grand jury. A court order placed under seal “all Grand Jury materials.” The special grand jury issued 160 subpoenas and collected more than 22,000 documents and indicted Vanecko for involuntary manslaughter. In 2014, Vanecko pled guilty; the court unsealed the report and released it to the public. The trial court rejected subsequent requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 ILCS 140/1, for the sealed grand jury documents. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, which rejected disclosure of most of the FOIA requests but remanded to the circuit court for an in camera inspection of a specific category of documents to determine which may be disclosed. A lawful court order takes precedence over the disclosure requirements of FOIA; a requester must first have the court that issued the injunction modify or vacate its order. If the issuing court refuses, the requester may challenge the refusal in a direct appeal. View "In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged following a search of his residence pursuant to warrant. He unsuccessfully moved to quash the warrant and suppress evidence and was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon but was acquitted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that the facts recited in the warrant application did not establish a sufficient nexus between the residence and the criminal activities. The officer had stated that: two of three drug buys conducted over 19 days occurred in the vicinity of the residence; Casillas arrived at the first drug buy in a vehicle registered to Hernandez (defendant’s live-in girlfriend) at the residence; while the officer was texting Casillas about the third drug buy, other officers, watching the residence, observed Casillas exit the residence and walk to meet the officer and exchange cocaine for $150 in cash; Casillas had been identified from a driver’s license photograph; law enforcement records showed that Casillas was an associate of Hernandez. The connection between Casillas and Hernandez was not further explained. The statement alone did not create an inference that the two were involved in drug dealing together, let alone that Casillas was storing evidence at defendant’s home. There was no evidence that Hernandez had ever been suspected of or charged with any crime nor any evidence that Casillas had been involved in drug dealing before his three transactions with the officer. There was no evidence that Casillas used Hernandez’s vehicle more than the one time described in the complaint. View "People v. Manzo" on Justia Law

Keith's estate filed a wrongful death and survival action against Ortberg, a licensed clinical social worker and employee assistance program counselor, and her employer Rockford Memorial Hospital, alleging that, on September 30, 2005, Keith had an initial appointment with Ortberg; that it was Ortberg’s duty to evaluate Keith’s mental health condition; that Ortberg breached her duty by performing an inadequate assessment and failed to recognize that Keith was at high risk for suicide, and failed to refer him to an emergency room or a psychiatrist for immediate treatment. Keith died by suicide on or about October 6, 2005. The circuit court submitted an instruction, over plaintiff’s objection, asking the jury to respond “Yes” or “No”: Was it reasonably foreseeable to Ortberg on September 30, that Keith would commit suicide on or before October 9? The jury entered a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding damages of $1,495,151, but answered “No” on the special interrogatory. The circuit court ruled that the special interrogatory answer was inconsistent with the general verdict and entered judgment in defendants’ favor. The appellate court found, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, that the special interrogatory was not in proper form and should not have been given to the jury; it did not apply the objective “reasonable person” standard for determining foreseeability and, therefore, misstated the law, Because the special interrogatory was ambiguous, the jury’s answer was not necessarily inconsistent with its general verdict. View "Stanphill v. Ortberg" on Justia Law

Defendant sold cocaine to an undercover officer and was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance. He did not post bail and spent 482 days in pre-sentence custody. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison. The court imposed various fines, fees, and costs under the heading “Fees and costs not offset by the $5 per-day presentence incarceration credit.” On appeal, the defendant argued that certain charges imposed were fines, not fees. The state conceded that several of the charges were fines and the defendant withdrew his challenge to the $25 “Court Services (Sheriff)” charge. The state then conceded that the $2 Public Defender Records Automation Fund charge is a fine. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the classification as fees of the remaining items: the $2 Public Defender Records Automation Fund fee (55 ILCS 5/3-4012), the $2 State’s Attorney Records Automation Fund fee (section 4-2002.1(c)), the $15 Court Document Storage Fund fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3a), the $190 “Felony Complaint Filed, (Clerk)” fee (section 27.2a(w)(1)(A)), and the $15 court automation fee (section 27.3a). All of those items compensate the state for a cost related to the defendant’s prosecution and not subject to the defendant’s presentence incarceration credit. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

The owners of units in Sienna Court Condominiums, a newly-constructed 111-residential-unit Evanston property sued, alleging that the developer, TR, sold the units with latent defects that resulted in water infiltration and other conditions that rendered the individual units and common areas unfit for habitation. The complaint alleged breach of an express warranty and breach of an implied warranty of habitability against TR, the general contractor, the architect and engineering design firms, material suppliers and several subcontractors. TR and the general contractor were bankrupt. The unit owners obtained relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay. TR and the general contractor had two separate insurance policies, each providing coverage of $1 million per occurrence with $2 million aggregate limits. Plaintiffs had recovered approximately $308,000 from TR through a warranty escrow fund required by Evanston ordinance. Subcontractors and the material suppliers asserted that they were not subject to an implied warranty of habitabililty. The circuit court denied their motion to dismiss. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that a purchaser of a newly constructed home may not assert a claim for breach of an implied warranty of habitability against a subcontractor who took part in the construction of the home, where the subcontractor had no contractual relationship with the purchaser. View "Sienna Court Condominium Assoc. v. Champion Aluminum Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant struck Plaintiff, a pedestrian with his vehicle. Plaintiff filed a personal injury suit. Defendant filed an answer with an affirmative defense. Defendant answered an interrogatory about his drivers' license by stating that he had diabetes and required medical approval to drive, but refused to answer follow-up questions about his medical condition, stating that the question violates HIPAA, doctor-patient privilege; the Defendant has not placed his medical condition at issue. The court found that Plaintiff had legitimate cause to believe that Defendant had sight problems that could have been related to the accident and held Defendant’s attorney in contempt. The court found the attorney was not entitled to assert the physician-patient privilege, 735 ILCS 5/8-802. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the contempt order. A plaintiff may not waive a defendant’s privilege by putting the defendant’s medical condition at issue. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant asserted anything about defendant’s physical or mental condition. If these allegations put a defendant’s medical condition in issue, then it will be at issue in most traffic accident cases. The court urged the legislature to clarify the meaning of “at issue” and noted that, when a patient obtains a physician’s report to maintain his driving privileges, he is not seeking treatment so the privilege does not apply to the record filed with the Secretary of State. View "Palm v. Holocker" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought reinstatement of his withdrawn post-conviction petition. The state argued that neither the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-5 nor the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/13-217 authorizes “reinstatement,” so that the motion should, instead, be treated as a motion for leave to file a new, successive petition that must meet the cause-and-prejudice test. Referencing only section 122-5, Petitioner argued, broadly, that a “judge has discretion to allow a post-conviction petitioner’s motion to reinstate his petition after he has voluntarily withdrawn it.” Petition argued that the state coerced him into withdrawing his petition by stating that it would again seek the death penalty upon retrial if he succeeded in his challenge; that his attorney and the court failed to adequately admonish him regarding his options, the current law, and the likely course of death penalty jurisprudence; and that the procedure by which the withdrawal took place was generally unlawful. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s denial of the motion as untimely, having been filed seven years after the motion to withdraw; “it is clear that petitioner sought reinstatement well beyond either statute's time limitations.” The facts of record would not have supported a finding that petitioner’s delay in refiling was not due to his culpable negligence. The timing was intentional and strategic. Petitioner is, free to seek leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. View "People v. Simms" on Justia Law

CHR, a logistics company, had a transportation contract with Jewel Food Stores. Henry, who owned a semi-tractor that she leased to Dragonfly, a federally licensed motor carrier, agreed to deliver potatoes to CHR’s Illinois, warehouse for shipment to Jewel stores. While delivering the potatoes, Henry was unable to stop her tractor-trailer ahead of stopped traffic and ran over several vehicles. Two people died and one was seriously injured. Henry admitted negligence and liability. Dragonfly admitted liability and a “united” negligence with Henry. CHR denied liability. The jury returned plaintiffs verdicts, specifically finding that Henry was CHR’s agent. CHR was, therefore, vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The jury awarded damages totaling $23,775,000, jointly and severally, against the three. CHR paid the judgments, including post-judgment interest, then filed an amended consolidated cross-claim for contribution against Dragonfly under the Contribution Act. (740 ILCS 100/2, 3). Both stipulated that Henry had no assets. CHR asserted that it had a right to contribution, even if Dragonfly’s liability was vicarious, because the parties would be equally liable in those circumstances but CHR paid the entire amount. The trial court entered judgment for CHR for contribution of $14,326,665.54. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, rejecting CHR’s argument that it was entitled to a greater level of contribution based on a difference in relative culpability. Both were only vicariously liable for Henry’s negligent conduct. CHR is entitled to contribution from Dragonfly under the Contribution Act. View "Sperl v. Henry" on Justia Law

Mroczko was employed by A&R as a custodian in a building where Pepper was performing maintenance work. Pepper's subcontractor, Perez, was replacing the carpets. While Mroczko was cleaning, a desk that had been placed in an upright position fell and injured her. Mroczko filed a successful workers’ compensation claim against A&R but failed to file a timely personal injury action. A&R filed a subrogation action. The Workers’ Compensation Act. 820 ILCS 305/5(b), permits an employee to file her own personal injury action against a third-party tortfeasor to recover damages for a work injury. The employer is entitled to reimbursement of its workers’ compensation benefits out of the proceeds obtained by the employee and has a limited right to intervene to protect its workers’ compensation lien. If the employee fails to file her own action, the employer may file the same action that the employee could have filed. The statute is silent as to whether an employee has the right to intervene in the employer's action. While A&R’s litigation was pending, Mroczko filed her own personal injury action, which was dismissed as barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Mroczko filed an amended complaint against Pepper only, alleging that her injuries arose out of Pepper’s construction work so that her action was timely under the four-year construction statute of limitations. The court dismissed the action. Mroczko then sought to intervene in A&R’s subrogation action. The circuit court denied that petition, citing res judicata. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Whether Mroczko had an interest in A&R’s action based on A&R’s pursuit of damages, including for her pain and suffering, is irrelevant to res judicata, which applies because Mroczko previously asserted the same claim against the same defendant, which resulted in a final judgment on the merits. View "A&R Janitorial v. Pepper Construction Co." on Justia Law