Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

First Midwest sued defendants for breach of a promissory note. Defendants responded that First Midwest or its predecessor had already sued them twice for the same breach of the same promissory note: once in a foreclosure suit in 2011 and once in a breach of promissory note suit in 2013. First Midwest claimed that the first lawsuit involved a claim for foreclosure on a mortgage, which is different from a breach of a promissory note. The circuit court agreed, but the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision. In Illinois, a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses a claim has only one opportunity to refile that same claim. Whether two lawsuits assert the same claim does not depend solely on how the plaintiff titles the complaint. A lawsuit for breach of a promissory note asserts the same cause of action as a prior foreclosure complaint when that foreclosure complaint specifically requested a deficiency judgment based on the same default of the same note. View "First Midwest Bank v. Cobo" on Justia Law

The administrator of the decedent’s estate brought a wrongful death and survival action against Union Health Service based on alleged negligence in providing medical treatment the decedent. UHS moved to dismiss on the grounds that it is immune from suit under the Voluntary Health Services Plans Act (215 ILCS 165/26), as a “health services plan corporation”. The Act provides: A health services plan corporation incorporated prior to January 1, 1965, operated on a not for profit basis, and neither owned or controlled by a hospital shall not be liable for injuries resulting from negligence, misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or malpractice on the part of any officer or employee of the corporation, or on the part of any person, organization, agency or corporation rendering health services to the health services plan corporation’s subscribers and beneficiaries.” The circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that a 1988 amendment to section 26 was unconstitutional because it left intact UHS’s statutory immunity while eliminating that immunity for all other similarly situated entities. The Illinois Supreme court reversed. UHS was also immune under the prior version of the law. The former version of the law has been upheld by our appellate court against constitutional attack. addressing the constitutionality of the 1988 amendment is not necessary for resolution of this case. View "Gonzalez v. Union Health Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, participants in public pension funds, sued, challenging the constitutionality of three reforms in Public Act 97-651, which altered articles 8, 11, and 17 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/8, 11, 17) and modified the calculation of annuities. The circuit court invalidated two provisions eliminating the right to earn union service credit for leaves of absence beginning after the amendments' effective date as violating the Illinois Constitution's (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, 5) pension-protection clause but upheld the constitutionality of the third reform. The Illinois Supreme court affirmed regarding the elimination of the right to earn service credit for a union leave of absence; for participants who were already members on the Act's effective date, the ability to earn service credit on leave of absence for labor organization employment is a "benefit" that "cannot be diminished or impaired." The court reversed the dismissal of a claim that the change in the law to deny the use of a union salary under section 8-226(c) or 11-215(c)(3) to calculate the “highest average annual salary” violate the pension clause. The court also reversed the rulings on the that resulted from the circuit court’s construction of section 8-226(c)(3) to include defined contribution plans within the definition of “any pension plan.” View "Carmichael v. Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2012, then-Governor Quinn nominated Gregg to be a salaried member of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (IPRB). Gregg submitted a statement of economic interests for the preceding calendar year, indicating that in 2011, he was mayor of Harrisburg. Asked to identify any gift valued over $500 and its source, Gregg wrote “None.” At the time, Gregg was recovering from an illness. Gregg did not complete a statement of economic interests for calendar year 2012. In 2013, Gregg resigned as mayor of Harrisburg. A former Harrisburg city treasurer notified the Illinois Department of Corrections that Gregg failed to include in his statement of economic interests a medical lift chair received as a gift. IPRB legal counsel investigated; neither the IPRB nor the Governor’s office took further action. In November 2013, the Illinois Senate approved Gregg’s appointment for a six-year term. In 2014, Gregg filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Governor Rauner took office in 2014 and removed Gregg from the IPRB based on his misstatements and omissions on the statement of economic interest and his bankruptcy petition. The circuit court found that Gregg’s removal was judicially reviewable and determined that Rauner wrongfully terminated Gregg’s appointment.The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Rauner’s decision to remove Gregg from the IPBR was not subject to judicial review. The Illinois Constitution, article V, section 10 provides: “The Governor may remove for incompetence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office any officer who may be appointed by the Governor.” The IPRB is not one of those rare agencies whose functions require complete independence from gubernatorial influence. View "Gregg v. Rauner" on Justia Law

Easton pled guilty to aggravated unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and four counts of unlawful use of a credit card. At sentencing, the court imposed concurrent 10-year prison terms for all six convictions. Defendant moved for reconsideration of the sentences. Defense counsel filed an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) certificate. The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court vacated, holding that the certificate did not comply with Rule 604(d), which was amended during the pendency of the appeal, requiring that counsel certify that he “has consulted with the defendant ... to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty”. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the certificate did not comply with the unamended rule. The amended rule, although procedural in nature, did not apply to the petition. The defendant’s post-plea proceedings in the circuit court were completed more than a year before Rule 604(d) was amended, so there were no “ongoing proceedings” to which the amended rule would apply. The result of the appellate court’s decision was to necessitate new proceedings in order to apply an amendment to a procedural rule that postdated the post-plea proceedings, which is not warranted under Illinois retroactivity jurisprudence. View "People v. Easton" on Justia Law

Following a third trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the state failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining DNA test results, so the trial court erred in granting an extension of the speedy-trial deadline. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal; the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. In 2014, a private attorney retained by Defendant filed a post-conviction petition, which was summarily dismissed. Defendant’s attorney filed a notice of appeal. Two weeks later, defendant filed a timely pro se motion to reconsider the dismissal and to allow supplementation, alleging his post-conviction attorney had failed to include several claims that defendant had requested be part of the petition. Defendant stated that, after receiving a letter from his attorney “about money and why he didn’t raise ineffective [assistance] of direct appeal counsel,” defendant “never heard from counsel again, until [the] court dismiss[ed] [the] petition.” The circuit court denied the motion and did not consider the merits or whether defendant’s attorney should have included those claims. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A defendant who retains a private attorney at the first stage of postconviction proceedings is entitled to reasonable assistance of counsel. At the first stage, there are no hearings, no arguments, and no introduction of evidence; any assertion of deficient attorney performance will almost certainly be that counsel failed to include claims the defendant wanted to have raised. A defendant who retains private counsel is bound by the attorney’s decision not to include a claim in the petition. The rationale for requiring a reasonable level of assistance from privately retained counsel at the second and third stages of postconviction proceedings applies equally to first stage representation. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Defendant failed to cooperate with both an Assistant Public Defender (ADA) and private counsel, who withdrew. Defendant failed to appear and was taken into custody. The court appointed another ADA. who appeared twice, then informed the court that Defendant had not come into the office. The court urged Defendant to cooperate. In April 2013, while free on bond, defendant was arrested and charged with two additional counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. In June 2013, Defendant pled guilty to two counts in exchange for consecutive sentences of five years’ and six years’ imprisonment. The state dismissed four additional charges. In September 2013, Defendant pro se filed a post-conviction petition alleging that counsel failed to adequately investigate and that no justification was given for consecutive sentences. Defendant appeared with ADA Cappellini and requested a long continuance because he and Cappellini had a disagreement. Cappellini stated that Defendant refused to listen to him. Additional continuances followed; after falling out with another ADA, Defendant was required to proceed pro se. The court denied his petition. The Illinois Supreme Court found waiver by conduct of Defendant’s right to representation. Defendant was expressly warned, several times, that he could lose his right to counsel through his continued conduct and then would be required to represent himself; he was granted 17 continuances. The court took extraordinary pains to accommodate his desire to retain private counsel. Defendant’s "dilatory efforts served to thwart the administration of justice" by further delay caused the court to require him to represent himself. Defendant’s continued refusal to cooperate constituted a knowing and intelligent election to proceed pro se. View "People v. Lesley" on Justia Law

A Lake County jury convicted Dupree of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated robbery. His convictions were upheld on direct appeal. He filed a postconviction petition. At the second stage, Dupree filed a third-amended petition raising several claims, including a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an “exculpatory witness” to testify. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that Dupree failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal without considering the ineffective assistance claim on its merits but holding that the postconviction petition was properly dismissed, as a matter of law, solely because defendant failed to attach to his petition an affidavit from the proposed witness. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the trial court. Under the facts of this case, the failure to provide an affidavit was not, by itself, fatal to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition was appropriate because Dupree failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective. View "People v. Dupree" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the circuit court's decision granting landowners' motion to dismiss based on section 8-406.1 of the Public Utilities Act, holding that the circuit court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to review the legality and constitutionality of the Commission's administrative proceedings. In this case, the circuit court's sole rationale for granting those motions was its conclusion that the Commission's proceedings were in violation of due process. Because the legality and constitutionality of the Commission's proceeding was beyond the circuit court's power to decide, its answer to that question could not form the basis for dismissing the complaints here. View "Ameren Transmission Co. of Illinois v. Hutchings" on Justia Law

In this strict product liability action, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment and remanded to the trial court for its determination of whether the manufacturer of flexible bulk containers, Taihua Group, "is unable to satisfy a judgment as determined by the court," as mandated by section 2-621(b)(4) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.The court rejected the "bankrupt or nonexistent" standard for reinstatement under section 2-621(b)(4) promulgated in Chraca v. U.S. Battery Manufacturing Co., 2014 IL App (1st) 132325, and overruled that decision. Rather, the court read the statute to permit the trial court to rely on a broader range of factors to determine if a particular manufacturer is "unable to satisfy" the judgment against it. View "Cassidy v. China Vitamins, LLC" on Justia Law