Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cohen was riding his bicycle on Lakefront Trail, a shared-use path that runs along the shore of Lake Michigan, when his front wheel caught in a crack in the pavement and he fell. Cohen sued the Chicago park district, alleging it acted willfully and wantonly in failing to maintain the path and was responsible for his injuries. The circuit court granted the park district summary judgment, concluding that it was immune from suit under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/3-107(a), which grants absolute immunity to local public entities for injuries caused by a condition of a “road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas” or was immune from suit under section 3-106, which immunizes local public entities for injuries occurring on recreational property, except when the local public entity engages in willful and wanton conduct proximately causing the injuries. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part. Section 3-107(a) is inapplicable The district is, however, immune from suit under section 3-106. Lakefront Trail is not open to public, motorized traffic and is not a “road” within the meaning of section 3-107(a). The district’s actions were not willful or wanton. Cracks in paved surfaces are unavoidable in climates such as Chicago’s. The risk of injury from the crack was not an extraordinary and unusual risk; there were no prior injuries involving the crack. View "Cohen v. Chicago Park District" on Justia Law

Erie is a Chicago “Federally Qualified Health Center” (FQHC), 42 U.S.C. 254b (2012). FQHCs rely heavily on federal grants and Medicaid reimbursement. Erie Employees are federal employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a). Erie was founded as a project between Northwestern Memorial Hospital (NMH) and Erie Neighborhood House in 1957. NMH provides financial support and technical assistance, but Erie physicians seeking NMH privileges are required to apply for them. In 2005, Yarbrough went to the Erie after searching for a clinic that would not require insurance coverage. Yarbrough was informed that she would have her ultrasounds done at Northwestern and would likely deliver her baby at NMH. Based upon information she received during the visit, Yarbrough believed that Erie and NMH were the same entity. Yarbrough sued NMH. based on her daughter’s premature birth, alleging medical negligence. The Illinois Supreme Court answered a certified question: A hospital cannot be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of apparent agency set forth in Gilbert v. Sycamore, for the acts of the employees of an unrelated, independent clinic that is not a party to the litigation. Yarbrough sought treatment at Erie but looks to impose liability on NMH. Erie is neither owned nor operated by NMH. While Erie receives some charitable assistance from NMH, it relies heavily on federal money. Erie does not utilize the Northwestern name, Northwestern-related branding, or Northwestern’s trademark purple color. View "Yarbrough v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

In 1996, defendant was indicted for the manufacture or delivery of cocaine in excess of 900 grams, a Class X felony. The Du Page County court granted bail; defendant posted a cash bond and regularly appeared in court. In June 1998, defendant failed to appear and his bond was forfeited. During the next 30 days, defendant did not surrender. A bench warrant issued for his arrest. A judgment was entered in the bail amount for the state. Defendant was tried in absentia and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. In 2014, police stopped defendant for a traffic offense. Defendant presented false identification. Later, defendant revealed his true identity and admitted he had used false identities. Defendant began serving his sentence and was indicted for the violation of his 1996 bail bond, a Class 1 felony. Defendant claimed that, under the general statute of limitations for felonies, the state had three years to bring that charge. The state filed a superseding information, which alleged continuing violation of bail bond (720 ILCS 5/32-10(a)) The appellate court concluded that a 1990 appellate decision, Grogan, was improperly decided and that violation of bail bond is a continuing offense. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, reversing Grogan; violation of bail bond is a continuing offense under 720 ILCS 5/3-8. The 2014 indictment was, however, untimely, because defendant's intervening conviction ended his duty to surrender and appear. View "People v. Casas" on Justia Law

Charged with first-degree murder, Staake was convicted of second-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1)) for the stabbing death of Michael Box. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the state’s amendments of the initial charge from second-degree to first-degree murder did not amount to a “new and additional” charge for speedy-trial purposes and Staake’s failure to make an offer of proof deprived the appellate court of a proper record to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the state’s motion in limine to preclude Staake from presenting evidence and argument as to an intervening cause of death (Box’s reluctance to accept medical treatment). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The first-degree murder charge was not a new and additional charge; it relates back to the original second-degree murder charge. Any delays attributable to Staake on the initial charge are also attributable to him on the subsequent charge. Staake, having conceded that the state had proven causation beyond a reasonable doubt, cannot now claim that he was precluded from arguing a lack of causation; the trial court made it clear that its ruling in granting the motion in limine was conditional and based on a lack of evidence to show anything other than that the stab wound caused Box's death View "People v. Staake" on Justia Law

Christine, represented by Goldstine, sought dissolution of marriage from Andrew. Andrew was represented by Boback. Holwell later became Andrew’s counsel. Before withdrawing, Boback successfully moved to disqualify Goldstine for improperly ordering Christine to provide Andrew’s mail that arrived at the marital home, opening and viewing the mail. Holwell billed Andrew $37,094.49 for the disqualification matter. Later, Jaquays appeared for Christine. LeVine appeared for Andrew. Christine sought interim attorney fees, arguing that she had paid Jaquays a retainer of $5000 and had an outstanding balance of $27,142.60 and that if the court determined that Andrew lacked the ability to pay her fees, it should order disgorgement from the money that Andrew had paid to Holwell. Andrew also sought attorney fees, owing $17,500.38 to Holwell and $26,000 to LeVine; Holwell testified that she was holding $13,000 that Andrew had paid to Boback because of a dispute as to who owned the money. The court found that both parties lacked an ability to pay reasonable attorney fees. Andrew had paid $66,382.28 to Holwell, $10,000 to LeVine, and $23,639.99 to Boback. Christine had paid $5000 to Jaquays and $13,117.04 to Goldstine. The court held that to “level the playing field,” each party should have $59,069.65 for attorney fees. The court ordered Holwell to disgorge $40,952.61 for payment to Jaquays. Holwell was held in contempt. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed reversal of the disgorgement order. Fees that have already been earned by an attorney in a dissolution of marriage proceeding are not considered “available funds,” such that they may be disgorged under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(3). View "In re Marriage of Goesel" on Justia Law

Herndon sued Whiteside, doing business as Beam Oil, for breach of contract and conversion because defendant refused to pay plaintiff royalties arising from an oil and gas lease. The Macon County circuit court dismissed, finding that plaintiff did not own the claimed overriding royalty interest but defendant did. The Fourth District affirmed the dismissal of the conversion claim but remanded the breach of contract claim. Defendant appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The instrument of assignment, signed after a series of transactions, unambiguously transferred all of plaintiff’s interest to defendant, so defendant’s refusal to pay plaintiff royalties was not a breach. Plaintiff and third parties each assigned to defendant “all of [their] right, title and interest in and to the oil, gas and mineral leases *** together with a like interest in and to all personal property located therein.” The instrument has no inconsistency or ambiguity that needs clarification. View "Ramsey Herndon LLC v. Whiteside" on Justia Law

Brown was charged with being an armed habitual criminal and home invasion with a firearm. Brown entered a negotiated guilty plea to being an armed habitual criminal and was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment, after the court explained that the charge was a Class X felony with a minimum sentence of six years and a maximum sentence of 30 years, and admonished Brown of his trial rights and the consequences of waiving those rights. Brown responded that he understood and that he agreed with the state's recommendation of 18 years. He denied that he was promised anything or forced to accept the plea. Brown later sought a reduction of sentence, asserting that he received ineffective assistance because his counsel erroneously advised that he would serve only 50% of his sentence. The statute requires a person convicted of armed habitual criminal to serve 85% of the sentence (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii). The court dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Brown’s allegations were insufficient to establish prejudice. There is little doubt that Brown would have been convicted of both charges and he has a significant criminal history. By pleading guilty, he received only a single felony conviction and a mid-range sentence. Brown avoided conviction for home invasion, a Class X felony with a mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement, for a sentencing range of 21-45 years’ imprisonment. Nothing in his plea colloquy demonstrates that Brown’s primary focus was serving 50% of his sentence; he denied that he was promised anything. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Citibank provided sales financing to Illinois retailers who offered customers the option of financing their purchases, including the amount of Illinois tax due on the purchases. Citibank originated or acquired consumer charge accounts and receivables from the retailers on a non-recourse basis. When a customer financed a purchase using that account, Citibank remitted to the retailer the amount the customer financed, which included some or all of the purchase price and the sales tax owed based on the selling price. The retailers then remitted the sales tax to the state. Under the agreements between Citibank and the retailers, Citibank acquired “any and all applicable contractual rights relating thereto, including the right to any and all payments from the customers and the right to claim Retailer’s Occupation Tax (ROT) refunds or credits.” Citibank filed a claim for tax refunds under 35 ILCS 120/6 for ROT taxes paid through retailers on transactions that ultimately resulted in uncollectible debt. The Department denied Citibank’s claim. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial, noting the legislature’s clearly expressed preference in the statutory framework for reporting, remission, and refund only through the retailer. Sophisticated lending institutions no doubt anticipate the eventuality of default and can order their commercial relationships accordingly. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Illinois Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint against Lake County and Highland Park for personal injuries arising out of a bicycling accident on the Skokie Valley Bike Path. The circuit court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-107(b), which provides immunity with respect to “an injury caused by a condition of: (a) Any road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city, town or village street, (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) a township or other road district highway. (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.” Plaintiff appealed against the city only. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Bike Path is not a “trail” as that word is ordinarily and popularly used; the words “hiking,” “fishing,” and “hunting” dictate a narrow construction of the term “trail.” If section 3-107(b) stated that immunity applied to “any jogging, riding, in-line skating, or stroller trail,” a shared-use path such as the Skokie Valley Bike Path would be a “riding trail.” However, the inclusion of the words “hiking,” “fishing,” and “hunting” in the same sentence as “riding” indicates that the legislature intended to apply blanket immunity only to primitive, rustic, or unimproved trails. View "Corbett v. The County of Lake" on Justia Law

Hardman was convicted of possessing 1-15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school, 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1), 407(b)(1). At a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a public defender fee of $500, 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a). The appellate court affirmed Hardman’s conviction and sentence, vacated the public defender fee, remanded for a new hearing on whether the public defender fee was appropriate, and amended the mittimus. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Hardman’s argument that, for purposes of demonstrating that an offense took place within 1000 feet of a school under section 407(b), the state was required to present particularized evidence that a building was an “active” ­ or “operational” school on the day of the offense; the status of the area at issue could be inferred from the testimony of two officers with demonstrated familiarity with the area. The court remanded assessment of the public defender reimbursement fee, which did not comply with section 113-3.1(a). Among other deficiencies, the trial court did not consider Hardman’s financial circumstances and did not obtain a financial affidavit. View "People v. Hardman" on Justia Law