Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of domestic battery, a Class 4 felony due to a prior aggravated battery conviction. The circuit court sentenced him to three years in prison, and imposed fines and fees. Defendant filed a pro se “Petition for Reduced Sentence,” alleging that his trial counsel should have pointed out several errors in the presentence investigation report but did not raise any issue regarding the fines, fees, or per diem credit. The trial court reappointed Defendant’s trial counsel and denied the motion. The appellate court found that the court's failure to conduct an inquiry into the ineffective assistance claim warranted remand and, noting the state’s concession of error with respect to the $20 "CASA" fee, and directed the circuit court to apply Defendant’s $5 per diem credit toward that assessment. The court rejected a claim that the $2 state’s attorney automation fee is actually a fine, subject to per diem credit, and stated that claims that the sheriff’s fee was improperly assessed; the clerk should not have assessed the $250 DNA fee because defendant was already in the database; and the trial court should not have imposed the $10 Crime Stoppers assessment, relate “to the imposition of fees, not fines,” and did not affect "fundamental fairness.” The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the Crime Stoppers assessment, which the state conceded was not properly imposed as a “fine,” but otherwise affirmed, noting that the DNA fee has been administratively corrected. View "People v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Bingham had a 1993 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault but was not required to register as a sex offender at that time because the conviction occurred before the 1986 enactment of the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1). Under section 3(c)(2.1) of the Act as amended in 2011, Bingham’s 2014 felony theft conviction triggered a requirement that he register as a sex offender on account of his 1983 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault. Sex offender registration was not reflected in the trial court’s judgment. Bingham argued that the registration requirement was unconstitutional as applied to him on due process grounds and that it violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The appellate court upheld the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, concluding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. That court was not exercising any of the powers delineated in Ill. S. Ct. Rule 615(b)(2) with respect to defendant’s argument, which did not ask the reviewing court to reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken, nor did it ask to set aside or modify any “proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” View "People v. Bingham" on Justia Law

N.G., born in 2011, was declared a ward of the court, based on neglect, and was placed with relatives. Her father, Floyd, was incarcerated. The Will County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of N.G.’s mother and of Floyd, on the grounds that he was an unfit person under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)) because, before N.G.’s birth, he had been convicted of at least three felonies and was therefore “depraved.” The appellate court held that because one of the felonies on which the circuit court had relied, a 2008 conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d)), was based on a statute the Illinois Supreme Court declared unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in 2013, the conviction had no legal effect and should not have been considered in making the fitness determination. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that it had “an affirmative duty to invalidate" Floyd’s AUUW conviction and to treat the statute on which it was based as having never existed. Absent that conviction, the statutory presumption of depravity under section 1(D)(i) would not have been triggered. Under Illinois law, there is no fixed procedural mechanism or forum, nor is there any temporal limitation governing when a void ab initio challenge may be asserted. View "In re N.G." on Justia Law

Monson was shopping in Danville. Walking to her car, she felt her foot hit a piece of concrete, tripped and fell onto the sidewalk, sustaining injuries. Public Works Director Ahrens made final decisions about which sections would be repaired during a project to inspect and repair sidewalks that ended in March 2012. Ahrens considered the concrete’s condition; variations between slabs; the path of pedestrian travel; the area’s intended use; proximity to other structures; and available time and cost. There was no policy addressing these factors. Ahrens could not recall inspecting the section but stated, "we … looked at every slab” and that the section where Monson fell was “either not prioritized” or “replacement could not fit with the allowable time and budget ... I used my discretion.” In Monson’s lawsuit, the court granted the city summary judgment, citing the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A negligence claim based on a municipality’s violation of the duty to maintain its property can be subject to discretionary immunity under section 2-201 if the employee held either a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving the exercise of discretion and the act or omission giving rise to the injuries was a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion; ministerial acts are not immune. Decisions involving repairs to public property can be discretionary, so a public entity claiming immunity for an alleged failure to repair a defective condition must present sufficient evidence that it made a conscious decision not to perform the repair. Danville has not done so. View "Monson v. City of Danville" on Justia Law

Vara was convicted of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6)(vii)). The circuit court sentenced him to three years of imprisonment and imposed fines mandated by statutes: a $1000 child pornography fine (720 ILCS 11-20.1(c)), a $500 sex offender fine (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.15)), and a $500 additional child pornography fine (720 ILCS 5-9-1.14). The court also imposed a $200 fine that was described at the hearing as a “sheriff’s office fine” but was referenced in the written sentencing order as a “sexual assault fine” (720 ILCS 5-9-1.7). The clerk of the Stephenson County Circuit Court included several entries in the electronic accounts receivable record pertaining to Vara’s conviction; some indicated that he was obligated to pay fines not specified in the judgment: “Court” ($50), “Youth Diversion” ($5), “Violent Crime” ($100), “Lump Sum Surcharge” ($250), “Sexual Assault” ($200), “Sex Offender Regis” ($500), “Medical Costs” ($10), “State Police Ops” ($15), “Child Pornography” ($495), and “Clerk Op Deduction” ($5). The appellate court vacated the challenged data entries, rejecting the state’s argument that it had authority to order imposition of mandatory fines that were not imposed by the circuit court. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated. The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the clerk’s recording of fines that were not ordered by the circuit court. View "People v. Vara" on Justia Law

In 2011, Dr. Parmar died, leaving an estate valued at more than $5 million. Plaintiff was appointed as executor of the estate. At the time of Parmar’s death, the estate was not subject to taxation under the Estate Tax Act, 35 ILCS 405/1. Two days after Parmar’s death, the state revived the tax for the estates of persons who died after December 31, 2010. Plaintiff filed the estate’s Illinois estate tax return and paid the tax liability. Plaintiff eventually filed a second amended return, claiming that the amendment to the Estate Tax Act did not apply to his mother’s estate and no tax was due, then filed a purported class action challenging the retroactivity and constitutionality of the Act. Plaintiff requested a declaration that the Estate Tax Act applies only to the estates of persons who died on or after the amendment’s effective date or that the Estate Tax Act is unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the suit’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; because the complaint seeks a money judgment against the state, it is barred under the State Lawsuit Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/1). The complaint must be filed in the Illinois Court of Claims. The damages that plaintiff seeks go beyond the exclusive purpose and limits of the Estate Tax Refund Fund and potentially subject the state to liability. Plaintiff could have filed suit in the circuit court under the Protest Moneys Act (30 ILCS 230/1). View "Parmar v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Perry filed suit under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking the disclosure from the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation of information concerning a complaint against his structural engineer’s license. After the circuit court ruled on Perry’s motion for summary judgment, section 2105-117 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law took effect, which, if applicable, would exempt the type of confidential source information sought by Perry from disclosure. The appellate court affirmed the denial of Perry’s motion to reconsider. During the pendency of the Institute’s separate FOIA lawsuit against the Department, seeking information about complaints against licensees, 225 ILCS 410/4-24 was added to the Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics, Hair Braiding, and Nail Technology Act, and, if applicable, would exempt the type of information sought by the Institute from disclosure. The circuit court granted the Institute summary judgment. The Illinois Supreme Court consolidated the cases and held that the amendments do not apply to the pending cases. Illinois’s retroactivity analysis governs where a change of law becomes effective during the pendency of a lawsuit. The legislature did not clearly prescribe whether sections 2105-117 and 4-24 should be applied to pending lawsuits, so courts must consider whether the changes are procedural or substantive. As both sections are substantive changes to the law, the amendments apply prospectively only. View "Perry v. Department of Financial and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

The Illinois Vehicle Code prohibits anyone with a revoked driver’s license from driving a “motor vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a); such an individual may still drive a “low-speed gas bicycle.” Section 1-14-.15 defines “low-speed gas bicycle” as a “2 or 3-wheeled device with fully operable pedals and a gasoline motor of less than one horsepower, whose maximum speed on a paved level surface, when powered solely by such a motor while ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds, is less than 20 miles per hour.” Plank, charged with driving a motor vehicle with a revoked license, claimed that the definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” was unconstitutionally vague. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” satisfies due process requirements. The statutory language means that a defining characteristic of a low-speed gas bicycle is an engine that is incapable of transporting 170 pounds at 20 miles per hour without help from gravity or pedaling. A bicycle’s motor will either have this capability or not, regardless of the weight of any particular driver. The vagueness doctrine is not implicated every time officers cannot conclusively determine at a glance whether someone has violated a statutory provision. Once someone is charged with violating section 6-303(a), the prosecutor has the burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt—including that the bicycle at issue had a strong enough motor to qualify as a “motor vehicle.” View "People v. Plank" on Justia Law

In 1998, the defendant was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. He pleaded guilty to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. In 2013, Bolingbrook Officer Alexander was patrolling a municipal park around 4:30 p.m. when he observed a van improperly parked, checked the van’s plates, and learned that it was registered to the defendant. The defendant acknowledged that he was a child sex offender but stated that his registration requirement had expired in 2010. Alexander informed the defendant that, as a child sex offender, he was forbidden to be on park property. Though the defendant was unaware of the ban, he was arrested for violating 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b), which provides, “It is unlawful for a sexual predator or a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any ... public park.” The trial court rejected a challenge that the law was facially unconstitutional and sentenced the defendant to 24 months’ conditional discharge plus community service. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction and sentence, noting that the rational basis test does not require narrow tailoring. There is a rational relationship between protecting the public, particularly children, from sex offenders and prohibiting sex offenders who have been convicted of crimes against minors from being in public park. The court remanded for consideration of a challenge under the ex post facto clause. View "People v. Pepitone" on Justia Law

State Farm issued two policies of motor vehicle insurance to plaintiff, covering a Pontiac Grand Am and a Pontiac GTO. Each policy provided liability, uninsured motorist, and underinsured motorist coverage in the amounts of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Each contained a “Driver Exclusion Endorsement” that excluded Evans. Plaintiff was a passenger in a Hyundai automobile that was owned and operated by Evans when Evans’s vehicle was involved in an accident with another automobile. Evans was at fault. Plaintiff was injured and had more than $30,000 in medical bills. Evans’s insurer paid plaintiff $20,000, the policy limit. State Farm denied plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist coverage. The circuit court granted plaintiff summary judgment. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, citing the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7-601(a)), under which no one may operate a motor vehicle or allow a vehicle to be operated without obtaining sufficient insurance, and the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a, 143a-2), requiring automobile liability insurance policies to include uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. The court reasoned that the named driver exclusion violated Illinois mandatory insurance requirements and public policy where the exclusion barred coverage for the named insured. View "Thounsavath v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law