Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On May 9, the mental health facility director at Mount Sinai Hospital filed a petition alleging that Linda was a person subject to emergency involuntary admission to a treatment facility (405 ILCS 5/3-600) and had been admitted to the “Mental Health Facility/Psychiatric Unit” on April 22. On June 11, the court held a hearing; a psychiatrist testified that Linda’s hospitalization began on April 22, when she was admitted to a “medical floor,” where she was also “treated psychiatrically.” She was tachycardic and severely anemic. Linda had sitters throughout her stay on the medical floor. There had been multiple prior hospitalizations. Linda had been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and was noncompliant in taking medications. Linda’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, having been filed more than 24 hours after admission. The court found Linda subject to involuntary admission. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court applied the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and affirmed, finding Linda’s “physical” admission was not synonymous with “legal” admission under the Mental Health Code, and the medical floor of the hospital was not a “mental health facility” within the meaning of the statute, regardless of whether psychiatric treatment was rendered there. Legal status may change while one is in a mental health facility. Linda has not demonstrated that her physical entry into the facility, and her initial treatment, were involuntary. View "In re Linda B." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with residential burglary and disarming a peace officer. The circuit court allowed defendant’s public defender to withdraw. Defendant proceeded pro se and was convicted. On appeal, defendant’s sole claim was that his waiver of trial counsel had not been voluntary. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Defendant sought post-conviction relief (725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)). The appellate court affirmed dismissal of the petition. Defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a second postconviction petition (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)). Defendant did not address cause and prejudice but claimed actual innocence, newly discovered evidence, denial of due process, speedy trial violation, and ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed that his expected favorable ruling in a suit against the trial judge would provide the evidence necessary to support his claims. The circuit court held a hearing and dismissed; defendant was not present, nor was he represented. Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in permitting the state to participate at the cause and prejudice stage. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act permits a defendant to file a successive postconviction petition only if he can demonstrate cause and prejudice by alleging facts to explain why the claims being asserted in the successive petition could not have been raised in the initial postconviction petition. Whether this prima facie showing of cause and prejudice has been made is a question of law for the circuit court. Here, the circuit court erroneously permitted the state to argue against a finding of cause and prejudice, however, as a matter of law, defendant failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice. View "People v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant, age 20, was charged with six counts of first-degree murder and six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), and agreed to plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for 22 years’ imprisonment, and dismissal of the AUUW charges and a separate pending charge for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Five years later, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his due process rights were substantially violated because he was not advised that he would be required to serve a 3-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) upon completion of the prison sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the record contradicted defendant’s allegations. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the admonishment satisfied due process and “conveyed the necessary warning regarding the three-year term of MSR in no uncertain terms, such that an ordinary person in defendant’s circumstances would understand it.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The record reflects that before accepting defendant’s plea, the court advised defendant that, for the offense of first-degree murder, the sentence required a term in prison ranging between 20 and 60 years, that the maximum period of imprisonment could be life, and that “[u]pon your release from the penitentiary, there is a period of three years mandatory supervised release, sometimes referred to as parole.” View "People v. Boykins" on Justia Law

The Illinois Commerce Commission granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Rock Island for construction of a high voltage electric transmission line between O’Brien County, Iowa, and a converter station adjacent to Commonwealth Edison Company’s Grundy County, Illinois substation. Rock Island is a wholly owned subsidiary of Wind Line, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Clean Line, which is owned in part by Grid America, a subsidiary of National Grid, which owns and operates more than 8600 miles of high-voltage transmission facilities. Rock Island has never constructed a high voltage transmission line and does not yet own, control, operate, or manage any plants, equipment, or property used or to be used in the transmission of electricity or for any other purpose related to utilities; it has an option to purchase real property in Grundy County. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Commission had no authority under the Public Utilities Act, 220 ILCS 5/1-101, to consider Rock Island’s application because the company did not qualify as a public utility under Illinois law. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Whatever Rock Island’s motives for seeking a certificate of public necessity and convenience, it does not qualify as a public utility; eligibility for a certificate of public convenience and necessity unambiguously requires present ownership, management, or control of defined utility property or equipment. View "Illinois Landowners Alliance, NFP v. Illinois Commerce Commission" on Justia Law

Walter, age 39, died at home. Walter’s body was transported to the Moultrie County morgue, where the coroner was unable to determine the cause of death. Walter’s body was transferred to Springfield Memorial Medical Center for a full autopsy, where it was received by employees of Securitas, a private security firm that contracted with Memorial. Those employees placed the body in a closed steel case used to store severely decomposed remains, but did not place a visible identification tag on Walter’s body, nor affix an identification label to the case. They erroneously recorded in the morgue’s logbook that the body contained in the case was that of Carroll. Days later, Butler Funeral Home was given Walter’s body, rather than with Carroll’s body. Before the error was discovered, Butler cremated Walter’s body; no autopsy was performed on Walter’s body and no cause of death was ever determined. Walter’s mother sued. She settled with Memorial and Butler, and claimed tortious interference with her right to possess Walter’s body against Securitas. The circuit court dismissed, finding that plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support the allegation of a duty owed by Securitas to the plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, rejecting defendant’s argument that, in order to state a claim for tortious interference with the right to possess a corpse, a plaintiff must plead specific facts demonstrating that the defendant’s misconduct was wilful and wanton. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Recovery in such cases is permissible upon a showing of ordinary negligence. View "Cochran v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Aspen American Insurance sued, claiming that the roof of a Michigan warehouse owned by Interstate had collapsed, causing the destruction of goods owned by Aspen’s insured, Eastern Fish. The complaint alleged that Interstate “maintain[s] a facility in or near Chicago.” Interstate acknowledged that it owns a warehouse in Joliet, Illinois. Interstate, an Indiana corporation, unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Aspen did not show that Interstate’s contacts with Illinois render it at home in that state under subsection (c) of the long-arm statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-209. While a foreign corporation must register with the Secretary of State and appoint an agent to accept service of process in order to conduct business in Illinois, absent any language to the contrary, the fact that a foreign corporation has registered to do business does not mean that the corporation has waived due process limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, including with respect to cases that are completely unrelated to the corporation’s activities in Illinois. View "Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate Warehouseing, Inc." on Justia Law

Manago was 12 years old when he was treated at Cook County’s Stroger Hospital in 2005 for injuries sustained while he was “surfing” on the roof of an elevator owned and operated by the Chicago Housing Authority. His mother’s complaint sought damages for personal injuries and included an allegation that his mother, Pritchett, had “expended and incurred obligations for medical expenses and care and will in the future expend and incur such further obligations” but did not include a claim for those expenses. The County filed a notice of lien under 770 ILCS 23/1 on behalf of the hospital for Manago’s unpaid medical bills, totaling $79,572.53. Manago turned 18; the complaint was amended accordingly. The court declined to award medical expenses, citing Pritchett’s failure to prove she was obliged to pay the hospital bill. The plaintiff was awarded $250,000 for scarring, $75,000 for pain and suffering, and $75,000 for loss of normal life. His award was reduced to $200,000 because Manago was found 50% responsible. On Manago’s motion, the trial court extinguished the hospital’s lien. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Nothing in the Lien Act precludes a lien from attaching to a damage award recovered by or on behalf of a minor or limits the lien’s potential funding sources to sums earmarked for medical expenses. View "Manago v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

The Attorney General filed a complaint in which Count IV alleged that Wildermuth, an attorney, and Kleanthis, a veteran of the real estate business, engaged in acts and practices that violated section 3-102 of the Illinois Human Rights Act by a pattern and practice of discrimination in the offering of loan modification services to Illinois consumers. The complaint alleged that defendants advertised that they would succeed where other loan modification providers had failed, help consumers save their homes and obtain significant reductions in their monthly payments. The circuit court of Cook County denied defendants’ motion to dismiss but certified for interlocutory appeal the question: “Whether the State may claim a violation under the Illinois Human Rights Act pursuant to a reverse redlining theory where it did not allege that the defendant acted as a mortgage lender.” The appellate court answered the question in the affirmative. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part, stating that it is not necessary to allege that one is a mortgage lender to sustain a claim for a violation of the statute. The court concluded, nonetheless, that Count IV should have been dismissed, rejecting the state’s argument that the defendants engaged in a “real estate transaction” by providing “financial assistance for ... maintaining a dwelling.” Defendants’ services cannot be considered necessary; they were not “necessary conduits” through which funds flow, nor did they act as real estate brokers. View "Madigan v. Wildermuth" on Justia Law

Gray and Carthon spent an evening drinking. The two had been friends for 20 years and had dated each other exclusively for two years, 15 years ago. The two regularly spent the night together and, on the night in question, had sex. In the morning, Gray began strangling Carthon and stabbed her with a knife. Gray was convicted of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3), after arguing that he wounded Carthon in self-defense. The appellate court held that the statutory definition of “family or household members,” as including “persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship. ... For purposes of this Article, neither a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to constitute a dating relationship,” violated substantive due process as applied to defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, first rejecting Gray’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The court applied the rational basis test, reasoning that the statutory definition does not deprive Gray of a fundamental right. The absence of a time limit on former dating relationships, as applied to the instant case, was reasonable and rationally related to the statutory purpose of curbing domestic violence. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law

Holman, then age 17, was convicted of the 1979 murder of an 83-year-old woman. Holman had a criminal history as a juvenile and confessed to his involvement in a crime spree that involved other murders. He had been diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded.Holman’s attorney told the court that Holman did not want to offer any mitigating evidence and that Holman’s mother did not want to testify on his behalf. Holman received a sentence of life without parole. His appeal and post-conviction petitions were unsuccessful. In 2010, Holman filed a pro se petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, arguing that his life sentence was unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent. The appellate court rejected that argument because it was not raised before the trial court and noted that the sentence was not unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama (2012) because Holman was “afforded a ‘sentencing hearing where natural life imprisonment [was] not the only available sentence.’ ” The Illinois Supreme Court held that Miller announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applied retroactively. On remand, the appellate court reached the merits, recognized that Supreme Court precedent requires trial courts to consider youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing life sentences on juveniles, and concluded that the trial court in this case did so. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. The trial court looked at the evidence and concluded that Holman’s conduct placed him beyond rehabilitation; his sentence passes constitutional muster. View "People v. Holman" on Justia Law