Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, then 17 years old, was arrested and charged with eight aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) counts and one unlawful possession of a firearm count. On June 2, 2009, defendant, as part of a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to count I (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)); the state agreed to a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges. The court accepted the plea and sentenced defendant to 24 months’ probation based on the Class 4 felony offense of AUUW. Defendant completed his sentence. In 2013, defendant brought a petition under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, seeking to vacate the conviction as void under the Illinois Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, People v. Aguilar, that the Class 4 form of AUUW was facially unconstitutional. Conceding that defendant’s conviction should be vacated, the state moved to reinstate AUUW counts that were previously nol-prossed. The court denied the motion on the basis that reinstatement of the charges would violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine. The appellate court determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider the state’s appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the statute of limitations served as an absolute bar to refiling the charges, rejecting an argument that its decision will have a chilling effect on plea bargains. View "People v. Shinaul" on Justia Law

Stone Street discovered that a judgment had been recorded against its property for failure to pay $1050 in fines and costs imposed by Chicago’s department of administrative hearings for violations of the building code more than a decade earlier. Stone Street sued, arguing that the original administrative proceedings were a nullity and could not serve as the basis for the judgment because it had not been given the requisite notice and had no opportunity to contest the alleged violations before judgment was entered. While notice was never given to Stone Street, a person named Johnson entered a written appearance in the administrative proceeding that culminated in the fine. Johnson represented that he was there on behalf of Stone Street, but Johnson, who died before the litigation arose, was not an attorney, had no affiliation of any kind with the company, and did not live in the property. The Illinois Supreme Court held that, bbecause Stone Street was never properly served with notice and because Johnson had no authority to appear on the company’s behalf, the Department failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over it. The Department’s 1999 judgment was therefore void ab initio and could be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally. View "Stone Street Partners, LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings" on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services indicated a finding of child abuse against Grimm. Grimm, a teacher, claimed that the report was inaccurate and requested its expunction. An administrative law judge recommended that Grimm’s request be denied. Nine days later (July 30), the Department issued its decision in a letter signed by its director, addressed to Grimm's attorney and indicating that it was sent via certified mail; it adopted and enclosed the ALJ's decision, stating, “you may seek judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law, 735 ILCS 5/3-101 … within 35 days of the date this decision was served on you.” On September 4, 36 days after the date of the letter, Grimm filed her complaint for judicial review, stating that her attorney received the decision no earlier than July 31, and that she did not receive the decision until August 12 or 13. The Department stated that it served Grimm when it mailed the letter. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts in finding that the Department’s decision was misleading and violated due process. The courts balanced Grimm’s constitutionally protected interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the value of substitute procedures against the burden on the Department to change boilerplate language in a letter announcing its final decision. View "Grimm v. Calica" on Justia Law

In April 2013, Ayres, pled guilty to aggravated battery and was sentenced to 12 months’ conditional discharge, with the requirement he not leave the state without court permission. In July, the state sought to revoke his conditional discharge alleging Ayres left the state without court approval. Ayres stipulated he left the state without permission. At sentencing, McClellan testified he had been Ayres’s attorney in the past and had received a telephone call from Ayres months earlier. Ayres stated he was the subject of a police investigation involving a shooting. McClellan responded “you need to get the hell out of Dodge.” McClellan stated that, based on previous conversations with Ayres’s mother, Jones, he believed Ayres had places within the state where he could go. He denied being told Ayres could only go to Indianapolis. Jones testified she told McClellan the only place Ayres could go was Indianapolis. The court sentenced Ayres to seven years’ imprisonment. Ayres’s attorney filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing it was excessive. Ayres mailed a pro se petition to withdraw guilty plea and vacate sentence, alleging “ineffective assistance of counsel.” The court held a hearing and denied counsel’s motion. Ayres was not present. The court did not reference defendant’s petition. The appellate court affirmed, finding the words “ineffective assistance of counsel” without explanation or supporting facts insufficient to trigger the court’s duty to inquire. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the allegation sufficient to trigger a duty to determine whether new counsel should be appointed. View "People v. Ayres" on Justia Law

Defendant, age 16, was charged with multiple counts of first-degree murder and tried in adult court under the “automatic transfer” provision of the Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/5-130. He was convicted only of the uncharged offense of second-degree murder, 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2). The court found that the state had proved the elements of first-degree murder but also found that “at the time of the killing [defendant] believed the circumstances to be such that if they existed would have justified or exonerated the killing under the said principles of self-defense, but his belief was unreasonable.” The state had not filed a written motion requesting that defendant be sentenced as an adult pursuant to 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(c)(ii), nor did defendant object or argue at the time of sentencing that he should have been sentenced as a juvenile. Instead, the trial court and the parties proceeded directly to sentencing. Defendant was sentenced, as an adult, to 18 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in automatically sentencing defendant as an adult pursuant to section 5-130(1)(c)(i) because second-degree murder was not a “charge[ ] arising out of the same incident” as the first-degree murder charges. View "People v. Fort" on Justia Law

The Bartonville police department’s union contract includes a grievance procedure. The Union may refer the grievance to arbitration if it is not settled within the three-step procedure. In 2014, Chief Fengel signed a complaint for termination, alleging that Lopez violated department procedures during a traffic stop. After scheduling a hearing by the board of fire and police commissioners, Lopez sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that the board was divested of jurisdiction because it had failed to commence the hearing within the 30-day time limit under Municipal Code 10-2.1-17. The board responded that it did so at Lopez’s request. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the board. The hearing had proceeded, with counsel stating that Lopez did not waive the issue of jurisdiction and that the Union’s presence did not waive its contractual right to grieve the termination. The board ordered termination. Lopez never sought judicial review under the Administrative Review Law, but filed a grievance. When the grievance was not resolved by the three-step process, the Union referred it to arbitration. The Department sought a stay, arguing that in relying on the Municipal Code, Lopez essentially admitted that the board had jurisdiction. Because the board issued a final merits decision, review was subject to the Administrative Review Law. The Department also argued that the grievance and arbitration provisions in the labor contract did not apply to termination proceedings because the parties did not negotiate an alternative form of due process in the labor contract. The trial court granted the Department summary judgment, finding no contract provision, “even inferring, that the grievance procedure should, or could, be used to determine disciplinary matters.” The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision, finding the grievance barred by waiver and res judicata. View "The Village of Bartonville v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Springfield School District Board of Education met in closed sessions to discuss a separation agreement with then-superintendent Milton. At the January 31 closed meeting, Milton signed and dated a proposed agreement. At a February 4 closed session, six (of seven) Board members signed, but did not date the agreement. The Board’s attorney explained that they would have to take a public vote but that they were bound by the agreement not to publicly disclose the details of their discussions or the agreement’s terms. A reporter filed a request under 5 ILCS 120/3.5(a), for review of alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act. Meanwhile, the Board announced the agenda for a March 5 public meeting; its website included item 9.1, approval of the separation agreement, with a link to the resolution, which linked to the separation agreement itself, containing Milton’s dated signature and the undated Board member signatures. At the public meeting, a dissenting Board member objected that neither she nor the public were aware of the reasons for the action. The resolution was approved. The agreement was then dated March 5. The Attorney General subsequently concluded: the February 4 signing constituted taking a final action in violation of the Act; even if it was permissible to ratify that action by an open-meeting vote, the Board failed to adequately inform the public of the nature of the matter; the Board failed to create and maintain verbatim recordings of closed sessions; and the Board failed to summarize discussions of the separation agreement in the minutes of closed meetings. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld lower court conclusions that the Board did not violate the Act because final action was taken at the March 5 open meeting, and that the website posting adequately informed the public of the nature of the matter. View "Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois" on Justia Law

In 2005, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant neither appealed nor sought certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. In August 2008, defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition. He asserted the petition’s due date as March 11, 2008, reasoning that he would have had until June 11, 2007 to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court and until September 11, 2007, to seek certiorari. An affidavit from inmate Askew, a “freelance paralegal,” indicated that defendant was unable to obtain the record until March 19, 2008; after that, timely completion of the petition was prevented by prison lockdowns from March 25 through April 18, and on April 24 and May 15, 2008. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely; the appellate court reversed. On remand, defendant testified that sometime in 2007, he received notice that his conviction had been affirmed, but was unsure how to proceed. In January 2008 he was approached by Askew, who told him to request transcripts. Defendant stated that he never knew what the deadline was. The judge granted the motion to file the petition late. The case was reassigned. The second judge dismissed defendant’s petition as untimely, also finding that defendant’s claims had no merit. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the second judge had authority to reconsider the prior order. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court in a criminal case has inherent power to reconsider and correct its rulings. While literal reading of the statute does not specifically include a deadline for filing a post-conviction petition when no petition for leave to appeal is filed, the correct reading of the statute indicates that the post-conviction petition was due on December 11, 2007, before any of the cited hardships. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Chicago's personal property lease transaction tax ordinance levies a tax on the lease or rental in the city of personal property or the privilege of using in the city personal property that is leased or rented outside the city. The lessee is obliged to pay the tax. In 2011, the department of revenue issued Ruling 11, as guidance to suburban vehicle rental agencies located within three miles of Chicago’s borders. Ruling 11 stated that, in the event of an audit, the department of revenue would hold suburban rental agencies responsible for paying the tax unless there was written proof that the lessee was exempt, based upon the use of the leased vehicle outside the city. Absent such proof, the department would assume that a customer who is a Chicago resident would use the leased vehicle primarily in the city and that a customer who is not a Chicago resident would use the vehicle primarily outside the city. Hertz and Enterprise filed suit. The circuit court enjoined enforcement of the ordinance against plaintiffs with respect to short-term vehicle rental transactions occurring outside the city’s borders. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court found the tax unconstitutional under the state constitution Home Rule Provision. Absent an actual connection to Chicago, Ruling 11, which imposed the tax based on only a lessee’s stated intention or a conclusive presumption of use in Chicago based solely on residency, imposed a tax on transactions that take place wholly outside Chicago borders. View "Hertz Corp. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Johnson filed a referendum petition seeking to place on the November 2016, general election ballot the question of imposing term limits on the elected office of Broadview village president. The Broadview electoral board invalidated the referendum as vague and ambiguous “because it is not clear whether the Referendum applies retroactively as well as prospectively.” The circuit court concluded the referendum was self-executing, not vague or ambiguous, and ordered the referendum to appear on the ballot. The appellate court affirmed. The proposition appeared on the ballot, but the results were not released, in compliance with an appellate court injunction. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered that the injunctive order be vacated and took judicial notice that the referendum was approved, then affirmed. While the proposition did not provide an express date marking the relevant timeframe for the prior terms of office, it is directed at that those “who seek election to or hold the office of Village President” beginning with the April 2017 election who have “been previously elected” to that office for two consecutive full terms. When read in its entirety, the language adequately explains that the initial starting point for determining whether candidates were “previously elected” village president is the April 2017 election. View "Johnson v. Ames" on Justia Law