Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Cook County Inspector General’s (IG) Office is to “detect, deter and prevent corruption, fraud, waste, mismanagement, unlawful political discrimination or misconduct in the operation of County government,” including by “separately elected County officials.” It may request information from and conduct interviews under oath with county officials and may issue subpoenas. If an investigation results in information indicating wrongful conduct, the IG is to “prepare confidential reports and make recommendations for corrective action,” but the ordinance does not authorize the IG to implement any such recommendations or otherwise interfere with the operations of county departments, nor does it confer prosecutorial power. The IG is “[t]o notify the State’s Attorney or other appropriate law enforcement authority.” In 2015, the IG investigated the grant of homeowner’s exemptions to an Assessor’s office employee (35 ILCS 200/15-175) and sent a request for information and documents. The Assessor refused to comply, stating that the documents could be obtained by submission of a request under Illinois’s Freedom of Information Act. The IG served a subpoena on the Assessor’s office, seeking the documents and the employee's personnel file. The Assessor objected, claiming that the IG lacked authority to subpoena information from elected county officers. The circuit court ordered the Assessor to produce the materials. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board validly exercised its home rule authority when it enacted the IG Ordinance and rejecting the Assessor’s arguments that the ordinance infringed on the authority of the State’s Attorney to convene grand juries and prosecute crimes. View "Blanchard v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Plaintiff lived in a Klein Creek condominium in Carol Stream. After a 20-inch February 2011 snowstorm, the association's landscaping service cleared the complex’s sidewalks. Eleven days later, plaintiff left her unit and fell on a sidewalk, breaking her leg, knee, and hip. She filed suit, claiming that she fell on an unnatural accumulation of ice. She alleged negligence in failing to properly direct the drainage of water and melted snow, failing to repair defective sidewalks, and failing to repair downspouts to prevent an unnatural accumulation of ice on the sidewalk, and noncompliance with construction and maintenance codes. The condominium association's president stated that he was aware of water collecting on and around sidewalks in other areas of the complex, especially during heavy rainstorms, but was not aware of water pooling in the area behind the building where plaintiff fell. The property managers stated that they were unaware of drainage issues at the back of the buildings. The court found the claim barred by the immunity provided to residential owners and operators under the Snow and Ice Removal Act. 745 ILCS 75/0.01. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the immunity did not apply because there were no allegations of negligence relating to snow or ice removal efforts. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Act provides immunity from claims for injuries allegedly caused by icy sidewalks resulting from negligent snow and ice removal efforts, but it does not extend to claims for injuries allegedly caused by icy sidewalks that result from an otherwise negligent failure to maintain the premises. View "Murphy-Hylton v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Zahn is a residential consumer, decided to purchase electricity from North American Power & Gas (NAPG), an alternative retail electric supplier (ARES) under the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law , 220 ILCS 5/16-102. NAPG sent Zahn a letter stating that she would receive its “New Customer Rate” of $0.0499 per kilowatt-hour during her first month of service and a “market based variable rate” thereafter. NAPG's “Customer Disclosure Statement” indicated a month-to-month term and that “[o]ther than fixed and/or introductory/promotional rates, all rates shall be calculated in response to market pricing, transportation, profit and other market price factors” and that its prices were “variable” based on “market prices for commodity, transportation, balancing fees, storage charges, [NAPG] fees, profit, [and] line losses ... may be higher or lower than your [local public utility].” Zahn never received the $0.0499 per kilowatt-hour rate. During her first two months of service, NAPG charged her $0.0599 per kilowatt-hour. Thereafter, the rate it charged her was always higher than what she would have paid her local public utility. Zahn filed a class action, alleging Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act violations (815 ILCS 505/1), breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Zahn appealed dismissal of the case to the Seventh Circuit, which certified a question of Illinois law: Does the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) have exclusive jurisdiction over a reparation claim, as defined in precedent in Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison, brought by a residential consumer against an ARES? The Illinois Supreme Court responded that the ICC does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over such claims. The claims may be pursued through the courts. View "Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, defendant was charged with Class 2 felony aggravated DUI, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(2)(B), alleging two prior DUI convictions in 1994 (Georgia) and 2013 (Illinois). The circuit court found defendant guilty of aggravated DUI, but expressed skepticism on whether defendant’s DUI conviction should be classified as a Class 2 felony for sentencing purposes. The prosecution submitted certified copies of defendant’s two prior DUI convictions and argued that it was aggravated DUI and a Class 2 felony under subsection (d)(2)(B) because it was a third conviction. The state acknowledged that another provision, subsection (d)(2)(A), generally classified aggravated DUI as a Class 4 felony, but argued that because defendant was charged under subsection (d)(2)(B), that provision’s express classification must control. The prosecution noted that defendant’s record included a 1989 Class 2 felony conviction, a 1981 Class X felony conviction, and a 1980 Class 2 felony conviction. The court sentenced defendant as a Class 4 offender to 24 months of probation, stating that the statute was inconsistent. The Illinois Supreme Court granted a petition for mandamus. Defendant’s third DUI conviction constituted aggravated DUI, a Class 2 felony under subsection (d)(2)(B)'s plain language; because defendant had two prior Class 2 felony or higher convictions, he must be sentenced as a Class X offender on this aggravated DUI conviction. View "Glasgow v. Carlson" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Montano, for 29 counts of first-degree murder, arising out of the 2013 shooting death of Solano, and 4 counts of attempted murder and 1 count of aggravated battery, arising out of the shooting of Maza. Montano was 15 years old at the time of the offenses. The charges were brought in criminal court, under section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act as then in effect. While the charges were pending, a statutory amendment raised the age for automatic adult prosecution for the enumerated offenses from 15 to 16. The prosecution objected to a transfer, arguing that because the implementation of the amendment was delayed until January 1, 2016, it was presumed to have a prospective effect. The court transferred the cause to juvenile court, reasoning that, because the legislature had not indicated the temporal reach of the amendment, the temporal reach was determined by section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. The court concluded that the juvenile transfer statute was procedural and would apply retroactively. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the state’s petition for mandamus. The amendment was retroactive under the Statute on Statutes and belongs in juvenile court, unless it is transferred to criminal court pursuant to a discretionary transfer hearing. View "Alvarez v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2010, the circuit court adjudicated Minnis a delinquent minor for committing the offense of criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-15(b) and sentenced him to 12 months’ probation. The adjudication for criminal sexual abuse rendered him a “sex offender” pursuant to the Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5), (B)(1); the court ordered Minnis to register as a sex offender. On December 17, 2010, defendant reported to the Normal police department to register. He disclosed his two e-mail addresses and his Facebook account. Defendant’s May 2011 registration form listed the same Internet information. Defendant registered again in August 2014, including his two e-mail addresses, but omitting his Facebook account. On September 9, Normal police officers viewed defendant’s publicly accessible Facebook profile online; Minnis had changed his Facebook cover photo only one month before his August 2014 registration. The circuit court of McLean County dismissed a charge of failure to register, finding that the Internet disclosure provision was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial, treating the challenge as one to facial validity. The Internet disclosure provision survives intermediate scrutiny. It advances a substantial governmental interest without chilling more speech than necessary. View "People v. Minnis" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-5). Before trial, the prosecution and defense agreed that the sentencing range would be 4-30 years. Defendant’s counsel stated that the state had tendered a “certified court docket from the ’04 JD case” indicating that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent on multiple counts of residential burglary, which would make defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence. Counsel also indicated that defendant denied having an adjudication for residential burglary. The court admonished defendant that he faced a sentencing range of 4-30 years. At trial, the evidence was limited to the aggravated robbery charge. No evidence regarding defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication was introduced. The jury found defendant guilty. A presentencing investigative report indicated that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent in 2005 of multiple offenses, including three counts of residential burglary. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s extended-term sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated Supreme Court rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) and Shepard v. United States (2005). Defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication is the equivalent of a prior conviction under Apprendi and falls within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and an exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the Illinois Criminal Code. The state was not required to allege the fact of his juvenile adjudication in the indictment or prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2006, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) invited contractors to bid on the purchase and removal of three abandoned railroad bridges that spanned Chicago streets. Happ’s, a scrap contractor, had worked railroads for 25 years recycling steel and railroad ties. Carney (dba Chicago Explosive) had a 20-year business relationship with Happ; the two entered “a handshake agreement” concerning the bid. UP accepted Happ’s bid, unaware of the agreement between Happ’s and Carney. Removal of the first bridge proceeded without incident. During the demolition of the larger Polk Street Bridge, a crossbeam snapped. The west girder, which was not secured or supported, fell. Plaintiff, standing north of the bridge on a gravel-covered steel plate, slid forward under the falling girder. Plaintiff’s legs were severed below his knees. Plaintiff sued UP, alleging negligence in failing to discover and disclose to Happ’s or plaintiff the presence of the steel plate and in hiring Happ’s. The trial court granted UP summary judgment. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated summary judgment. UP owed plaintiff no duty. There was nothing in the contract indicating that UP retained control such that Happ’s was not entirely free to do the work in its own way, nor was UP’s conduct inconsistent with the agreement. Plaintiff was an employee of Carney, not a “bystander.” UP did not build the bridge, did not possess the plans for the bridge, did not use the bridge, and had no reason to know that the steel floor plate extended several feet into the roadbed, precluding plaintiff’s premises liability claim. View "Carney v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

On May 18, 2009, plaintiff’s 90-year-old mother was admitted to Peoria’s Proctor Hospital for a rectal prolapse. During Kathryn’s hospitalization, she experienced numerous complications. On May 29, 2009, Kathryn died. In March, 2010, plaintiff received Kathryn’s medical records. In April 2011, plaintiff received an oral opinion that Drs. Williamson and Salimath were negligent in treating Kathryn. On May 10, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint against those doctors. On February 28, 2013, Kathryn’s CT scans were reviewed upon plaintiff’s request. Dr. Dachman opined that Dr. Rhode’s failure to properly identify certain findings caused or contributed to the injury and death of Kathryn. In March 2013, plaintiff filed suit under Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1) and the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6), claiming medical malpractice against Rhode. Defendants argued that plaintiff had sufficient information more than two years before he filed his complaint to put him on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct was involved, so that, even if the “discovery rule” applied, the complaint was untimely. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. A divided appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the discovery rule had no application to wrongful death or survival actions because both causes of action were legislatively created and not found at common law and that, even if that rule were applied, plaintiff’s complaint would be untimely. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the discovery rule applicable. A factual determination must be made as to when the statute of limitations began to run. Plaintiff filed his lawsuit less than two years after receiving the initial verbal medical expert report and within the four-year statute of repose. View "Moon v. Rhode" on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant was charged with burglary for entering and taking jewelry from an unoccupied house. The circuit court appointed a public defender and a Spanish-speaking interpreter. At a pretrial hearing, the parties informed the court that defendant would plead guilty to burglary, a Class 2 felony and would be sentenced to four months in the county jail, with credit for time served. The court admonished defendant in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) and, pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/113-8), stated that a burglary conviction “may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States.” Defendant stated that he understood and still wished to plead guilty. Later, the judge again admonished defendant that pleading guilty to burglary meant he “could be deported from the country,” a decision that would be “up to the federal government.” Defendant again acknowledged that he understood the potential immigration consequences. The court accepted defendant’s guilty plea. Within 30 days, defendant filed a pro se motion to “open and vacate” his conviction. The circuit court appointed new counsel. Counsel filed an amended motion, alleging that defense counsel failed to inform defendant of the consequences of his plea on his resident alien status. The court denied the motions, stating that any prejudice was cured by the court’s own admonishments. A divided appellate court vacated, citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the denial of the motion. “To accept the defendant’s claim would require us to characterize the court’s lengthy and exhaustive admonitions as merely a perfunctory or ritualistic formality; a characterization we are unwilling to make.” View "People v. Valdez" on Justia Law