Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The 2009 Video Gaming Act (230 ILCS 40/1)) legalized the use of video gaming terminals in licensed establishments, including bars, veterans’ organizations, and truck stops, and authorizes the Illinois Gaming Board to supervise all video gaming operations governed by the Act. A video gaming terminal may be placed in a licensed establishment only if the establishment has entered into a written use agreement with the licensed terminal operator. A use agreement may be assigned only from one licensed terminal operator to another. Action, an unlicensed terminal operator, executed “Exclusive Location and Video Gaming Terminal Agreements” with each of 10 establishments, stating that Action and the establishments would obtain licenses. In 2012 the parties amended their agreements by adding clauses, purportedly “necessary in order for the Agreement to comply with the [Act] and the rules and regulations," including clauses providing that Action could assign its rights and acknowledging that the agreement and the amendment “are subject to and contingent upon the [Gaming Board’s] review.” In 2012, the Board denied Action’s license application based on findings that Acton employees were associated with individuals who had been convicted of illegal gambling. Action assigned its rights under the agreements to J&J, a licensed operator. The establishments were not yet licensed. Subsequently, each of the establishments signed separate location agreements with Accel, a licensed operator. J&J and Action sued; the circuit courts ruled that the location agreements were not use agreements, but were valid contracts, and enjoined Accel from operating terminals at the establishments. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme court held that the circuit courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Board has exclusive authority over contracts for the placement of video gaming terminals. The comprehensive statutory scheme vests jurisdiction over video gaming operations with the Board; the agreements purport to control placement and operation of video gaming terminals. View "J&J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium against defendants (doctors and medical providers). Defendants moved for leave to file a 12-person jury demand and “to declare Public Act 98-1132, which amended 735 ILCS 5/2-1105(b), as unconstitutional.” Act 98-1132 limits the size of a civil jury to six persons and increases the amount paid per day to jurors across the state. The circuit court found the provision regarding the size of a jury facially unconstitutional based on article I, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution, which protects the right of trial by jury “as heretofore enjoyed.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that “as heretofore enjoyed,” means the right as it was enjoyed at the time the constitution was drafted. Transcripts from the convention debates make clear that the drafters did not believe the legislature had the authority to reduce the size of a jury below 12 members and the drafters did not act to give the legislature such power. The provision regarding jury size cannot be severed from the remainder of the Act, which addresses juror pay, so the Act is entirely invalid. View "Kakos v. Butler" on Justia Law

Bayer, an ironworker with Area Erectors, which was hired by Garbe to build Panduit’s warehouse facilities, fell and is now quadriplegic. Bayer filed a claim against Area under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1). Area began making temporary total disability payments and payments for Bayer’s medical expenses. Bayer also sued Panduit, Garbe, and a structural engineering company for negligence. Panduit and Garbe sued Area under the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/0.01). Bayer's settlement with Area was approved, so Area was discharged from contribution liability. Other claims were resolved, leaving only Bayer’s action for negligence against Panduit. Judgment ($64 million) was entered in Bayer’s favor. Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(b)), Area was entitled to recover out of that judgment the amount of compensation it paid or would pay to Bayer, including amounts paid or to be paid under the Act for medical expenses, vocational rehabilitation, and temporary partial disability benefits. The court suspended future workers’ compensation payments. The Act provides that where, “the services of an attorney at law of the employee . . . have . . . substantially contributed to the procurement ... of the proceeds out of which the employer is reimbursed, then, in the absence of other agreement, the employer shall pay such attorney 25% of the gross amount of such reimbursement,” 820 ILCS 305/5(b), so Bayer’s lawyers were entitled to fees equal to 25% of the amount Area had paid for lost wages, medical expenses, and other compensable items before payments were suspended. Building on its 1990 holding that the gross amount of reimbursement subject to attorney fees includes both benefits paid before the third-party recovery and the amount of such benefits the employer will be relieved from paying in the future by reason of the third-party action, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the value of future medical care should be included in this calculation. View "Bayer v. Panduit Corp." on Justia Law

Reyes, then 16, was convicted of the first-degree murder of Ventura and the attempted murders of two others, having discharged a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by the three. Prosecuted as an adult, he received the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction plus 26 years’ imprisonment for each of the two attempted murder convictions. The sentences were required to run consecutively, resulting in aggregate sentence of 97 years’ imprisonment. Under the truth in sentencing statute he was required to serve a minimum of 89 years before he would be eligible for release. In the appellate court, defendant cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” The Court clarified that life-without-parole sentences must be based on judicial discretion rather than statutory mandates. The appellate court held that Miller applied only to actual sentences of life without the possibility of parole and not to aggregate consecutive sentences. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison. Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation. View "People v. Reyes" on Justia Law

An altercation ended with defendant shooting Miller multiple times with a laser-sighted firearm. He was convicted of armed violence predicated on aggravated battery and aggravated battery with a firearm; the jury found that an extended-term sentence was warranted (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(6)). After post-trial motions, defendant wrote a letter asserting ineffective assistance by his privately-retained counsel, who, allegedly, assigned defendant’s bond to his fee without defendant’s knowledge; failed to disclose a prior connection to Miller’s father; failed to interview certain witnesses, to test certain evidence, to hire a ballistics expert, and to contest the admission of certain evidence; and failed to prepare defendant to testify. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison for armed violence, into which was merged defendant’s aggravated battery conviction. The court appointed a public defender and scheduled a hearing on defendant’s ineffective assistance claims. At the hearing, no witnesses were called. Appointed counsel summarized the concerns raised in defendant’s letter. The court concluded that, under the “Stickland” standard, defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that counsel’s alleged errors substantially affected the outcome of defendant’s case. On appeal, defendant argued that aggravated battery cannot serve as the predicate for an armed violence conviction and that he received ineffective assistance from his appointed counsel by merely repeating the claims contained in defendant’s letter. The appellate court agreed that the statute prohibits predicating armed violence on the aggravated battery statute, but held that defendant was required to show that he was prejudiced by appointed counsel’s deficient performance. The court examined the record and determined that no prejudice occurred. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the armed violence conviction and affirmed as to ineffective assistance. Aggravated battery with a firearm is an enhanced form of battery; there is no reason why it cannot serve as the predicate for a charge of armed violence. The court rejected an argument that appointed counsel’s inaction “entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” such that a court may presume prejudice under United States v. Cronic. View "People v. Cherry" on Justia Law

Bishop, 69 years old, was found in his apartment bound and severely beaten. Defendant was arrested. The prosecution sought to depose Bishop under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 414, which allows an evidence deposition if there is a “substantial possibility” that the witness will not be available to testify at trial. Bishop had sustained serious head injuries during the attack; his condition was likely to deteriorate. Defendant objected, arguing that Bishop could only communicate by shaking his head, precluding meaningful cross-examination. The court granted the motion, stating that if Bishop could only shake his head, the deposition would be inadmissible. The order required that the sheriff transport defendant to the deposition. The words “over the objection of the defendant” were handwritten; the entire paragraph was then scribbled over by hand. Bishop’s video deposition took place with two assistant public defenders (APDs) present. Defendant did not attend. Bishop stated that defendant had attacked him and identified a photograph of the hammer recovered from his apartment. On cross-examination, Bishop stated that photographs had been shown to him before the deposition. Bishop remembered that he had previously shared an apartment with defendant. At a status hearing, with defendant present, an APD acknowledged waiving defendant’s appearance at the deposition. The prosecution moved to admit Bishop’s deposition as a hearsay exception (Illinois Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)), and presented testimony from Bishop’s physician. The court concluded that Bishop’s condition rendered him unavailable and admitted the deposition, concluding that there had been an opportunity to cross-examine. The jury heard testimony from neighbors about arguing between defendant and Bishop before the attack, testimony that defendant had admitted to the crime, DNA evidence, and Bishop’s deposition. Convicted of aggravated battery of a senior citizen, defendant was sentenced to 22 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that the admission of Bishop’s deposition violated his Sixth Amendment rights. A divided appellate court agreed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Although the court erred in not obtaining the written waiver, defendant clearly knew that the deposition had been ordered and that he could attend. Defendant was provided with the opportunity for confrontation. View "People v. Hood" on Justia Law

The Illinois Constitution of 1970 may be amended by constitutional convention; the General Assembly; or ballot initiatives, Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, sects. 1, 2, 3. Ballot initiatives may only be used for amendments directed at “structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV,” pertaining to Illinois’s legislative branch. The ballot initiative at issue addresses redistricting to redraw the legislative and representative districts following each federal decennial census. In May 2016, SIM filed with the Secretary of State a petition proposing the amendment of article IV, section 3, to replace the current system for redrawing Illinois’s legislative and representative districts. The General Assembly’s role would be eliminated from the process, with primary responsibility for drawing legislative and representative districts falling to a new “Independent Redistricting Commission” selected through a process involving limited legislative input. The State Board of Elections determined that the petition received more than the required number of valid signatures. Days after submission of the petition, a “taxpayer’s suit” was filed (735 ILCS 5/11-303), seeking to enjoin the disbursal of public funds to determine the petition’s compliance with the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/1-1. The circuit court found that the petition did not comply with requirements for inclusion on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, citing “the plain language of article XIV, section 3.” View "Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Blumenthal jointly owned her Chicago home with Brewer, her domestic partner since 1981. In 2010 Blumenthal sought partition of the residence when the relationship ended. Brewer counterclaimed for common-law remedies, including an interest in Blumenthal’s ownership share in a medical group so that their overall assets would be equalized. Blumenthal moved to dismiss the counterclaim under the Illinois Supreme Court’s 1979 Hewitt decision, which rejected a woman’s suit to divide assets she accumulated with a man during a long-term relationship in which they lived together, had children together, but never married. Brewer argued that it was “particularly irrational” to apply this principle to her because she and Blumenthal could not marry at the time their relationship ended because same-sex marriage was not recognized in Illinois. The counterclaim was dismissed; the partition action proceeded to final judgment. The appellate court vacated the dismissal, calling Hewitt “outmoded and ill-considered.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The legislature intended marriage to be the only legally protected family relationship under Illinois law. Permitting unmarried partners to enforce mutual property rights might “encourage formation of such relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society.” Marriage is a legal relationship that all individuals may or may not enter into, Illinois does not act irrationally or discriminatorily in refusing to grant benefits and protections under the Marriage and Dissolution Act to those who do not participate in that institution. View "Blumenthal v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of property owners, sought compensation from the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, alleging flooding on their properties caused by the District’s diversion of stormwater into nearby creeks. The District cited a 1948 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Pratt, as holding that a temporary flooding cannot constitute a taking under the Illinois Constitution. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss and certified a question based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 holding that temporary flooding can constitute a taking under the federal constitution, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States. The appellate court held that Arkansas Game overruled Pratt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois takings clause provides greater protection for property owners than its federal counterpart, in providing a remedy for property that is damaged, but, what constitutes a taking is the same under both clauses. The holding in Arkansas Game is relevant to the determination of whether government-induced temporary flooding is a taking under the Illinois Constitution. That holding, however, does not conflict with Pratt. Pratt did not hold that temporary flooding can never constitute a taking, but only that the flooding, in that case, did not amount to a taking. Similarly, the facts alleged by plaintiffs are not sufficient to allege a taking. The complaint does not allege that the flooding “radically interfered” with use and enjoyment of the properties. The parties did not address whether the properties were "damaged." View "Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist." on Justia Law

On May 5, 2014, defendant received a traffic citation from a Troy police officer for speeding. The citation was filed with the Madison County circuit court clerk’s office on May 9. Defendant moved to dismiss the citation, claiming it was not transmitted to the circuit court clerk within 48 hours after it was issued, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 552. At a hearing, the court noted that defendant submitted “a stack of tickets” issued by the city of Troy. The state described the exhibit, stating “of the (50) tickets that Defendant submitted into evidence, almost half of them were filed within the 48 hours.” An officer testified that after a citation is issued, it is placed in a secure box in the dispatch office. On Mondays and Fridays, a supervisor would remove the citations, review and record them on bond sheets, and deliver them to the courthouse. He estimated that 30-50 citations were filed each Monday and Friday and that it was not “physically possible” to transport the citations to the courthouse every day. The trial court determined that the evidence showed “a clear and consistent violation of Rule 552 and not an inadvertent action” and dismissed the ticket. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reading the Rule as directory, not mandatory, so that dismissal is appropriate only if a defendant shows prejudice by the delay; here, the violation was not intentional. View "People v. Geiler" on Justia Law