Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Chicago's personal property lease transaction tax ordinance levies a tax on the lease or rental in the city of personal property or the privilege of using in the city personal property that is leased or rented outside the city. The lessee is obliged to pay the tax. In 2011, the department of revenue issued Ruling 11, as guidance to suburban vehicle rental agencies located within three miles of Chicago’s borders. Ruling 11 stated that, in the event of an audit, the department of revenue would hold suburban rental agencies responsible for paying the tax unless there was written proof that the lessee was exempt, based upon the use of the leased vehicle outside the city. Absent such proof, the department would assume that a customer who is a Chicago resident would use the leased vehicle primarily in the city and that a customer who is not a Chicago resident would use the vehicle primarily outside the city. Hertz and Enterprise filed suit. The circuit court enjoined enforcement of the ordinance against plaintiffs with respect to short-term vehicle rental transactions occurring outside the city’s borders. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court found the tax unconstitutional under the state constitution Home Rule Provision. Absent an actual connection to Chicago, Ruling 11, which imposed the tax based on only a lessee’s stated intention or a conclusive presumption of use in Chicago based solely on residency, imposed a tax on transactions that take place wholly outside Chicago borders. View "Hertz Corp. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Johnson filed a referendum petition seeking to place on the November 2016, general election ballot the question of imposing term limits on the elected office of Broadview village president. The Broadview electoral board invalidated the referendum as vague and ambiguous “because it is not clear whether the Referendum applies retroactively as well as prospectively.” The circuit court concluded the referendum was self-executing, not vague or ambiguous, and ordered the referendum to appear on the ballot. The appellate court affirmed. The proposition appeared on the ballot, but the results were not released, in compliance with an appellate court injunction. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered that the injunctive order be vacated and took judicial notice that the referendum was approved, then affirmed. While the proposition did not provide an express date marking the relevant timeframe for the prior terms of office, it is directed at that those “who seek election to or hold the office of Village President” beginning with the April 2017 election who have “been previously elected” to that office for two consecutive full terms. When read in its entirety, the language adequately explains that the initial starting point for determining whether candidates were “previously elected” village president is the April 2017 election. View "Johnson v. Ames" on Justia Law

An indictment alleged that defendant, in committing a battery, “knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Correctional Officer Jody Davis, in that the defendant threw an unknown liquid substance" on Davis "striking him about the body, knowing Jody Davis to be a correctional institution employee ... engaged in the performance of his authorized duties.” The state filed notice that defendant was eligible for mandatory Class X sentencing under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b), should defendant be convicted of the Class 2 felony of aggravated battery, 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i)(h). Following questioning and admonishment, defendant waived his right to counsel, electing to proceed pro se. Defendant then filed an unsuccessful motion to suppress an incriminating statement that he made to corrections officer Snyder. At his jury trial, defendant continued to appear pro se and was convicted. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction but vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded, holding that defendant was not eligible for Class X sentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgment. Defendant was not in custody and was not coerced into incriminating himself during his interview with Officer Snyder; the court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant was properly sentenced as a Class X offender. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury convicted Price of aggravated arson and the first-degree murder of a 4-year-old who died in the fire. The court denied his request for separate verdict forms for the theories of murder charged (intentional, knowing, and felony murder), so the jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The court sentenced defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment for murder and a consecutive term of 30 years’ imprisonment for aggravated arson. The appellate court affirmed. In 2000 and in 2003, defendant unsuccessfully pursued relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. In 2010, defendant unsuccessfully sought relief from judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 2-1401 . He did not challenge, on direct or collateral review, the denial of his request for separate verdict forms. In 2012, defendant filed his second section 2-1401 pro se petition, arguing that the two-year time bar did not apply to “voidness grounds,” 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f), and that the court erred in denying his request for separate verdict forms and, therefore, lacked authority to render judgment. The trial court dismissed, finding that the underlying judgment was not void and that the Illinois Supreme Court’s 2009 decision (Smith) did not apply retroactively on collateral review. The appellate court remanded for resentencing on felony murder alone, finding that the rule regarding special verdict forms announced in Smith applied retroactively on collateral review. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently announced its “Castleberry” decision, abolishing the void sentence rule, then held that, in light of Castleberry, defendant’s section 2-1401 petition was untimely and properly dismissed. View "People v. Price" on Justia Law

Chase owned the mortgage on plaintiff’s Northbrook home and had the right, in the event of a default, to enter onto the property to make repairs. Plaintiff defaulted in 2007. Chase obtained a judgment of foreclosure. Plaintiff had the right to possession until the redemption period expired on August 25, 2010. On June 17, 2010, Chase’s contractor for inspections and preservation services received a report that plaintiff’s property was vacant and placed an “initial secure” order. Its subcontractors, Gonsalez and Centeno, inspected, knocked on the door, and spoke with a neighbor who stated that the house was not occupied. Gonsalez entered the home and was confronted by plaintiff. Gonsalez left. Gonsalez and Centeno waited and plaintiff stayed on the phone with the dispatcher until the police arrived. No arrests were made. Gonsalez offered to replace the lock, but plaintiff declined. Plaintiff testified that she became afraid while in her home and fearful of attack. On the day of the incident, plaintiff went to the hospital. Subsequently, she sought treatment, therapy, and medication for issues with sleeping, post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and depression. Her employment was terminated. She sued. The court rejected claims of private nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Claims of trespass and negligent trespass are still pending. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Plaintiff did not allege a physical impact, as a direct victim, as required for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. There is no question of fact as to whether the conduct of Gonsalez and Centeno could be deemed extreme and outrageous, so summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was proper. View "Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services petitioned for wardship of M.I., a minor, 705 ILCS 405/2-3, alleging that M.I.’s mother had neglected her and that M.I.’s father had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court granted the petition, finding M.I. to be neglected. The court ordered father to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment, submit to random drug testing twice monthly, undergo a psychological examination, and complete a parenting class. Until he dropped out of high school, father was enrolled in special education courses for learning disabilities. He had been unemployed since 2007. Father had been incarcerated on eight different occasions for approximately 18-19 years in total but had not been incarcerated since 2005. He suffers from bipolar disorder and admitted to regular marijuana use, indicating that he had been clean for two months. Father is functionally illiterate, and possesses an IQ of 58. The state asserted that he did not attend drug testing or participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation and refused to provide an address to his caseworker. The court found both parents unfit. Thereafter, at five different permanency hearings, the juvenile court found that father had failed to make reasonable efforts to achieve the service plan and permanency goal. The court appointed DCFS as guardian. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the termination of father’s rights. The statute, 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), does not contain a willfulness requirement. The juvenile court considered father’s intellectual disability and other circumstances, such as his sporadic attendance at visitation, when it found him unfit under subsection (b). View "In re M.I." on Justia Law

McDonald killed his boyfriend, Gladney, during an altercation in 2004. Paramedics found Gladney lying on the ground in their Chicago backyard. His face was covered in blood; there was a very large laceration on his face. The paramedics could smell alcohol on Gladney’s breath and observed needle track marks indicating drug use. Gladney was bleeding profusely and was very combative as the paramedics attempted to treat him. He had three stab wounds. After McDonald’s 2007 conviction was overturned on appeal due to an erroneous jury instruction, he was again convicted of first-degree murder in 2012. The trial court instructed the jury on second-degree murder, unreasonable belief in self-defense, but declined to give instructions on second-degree murder due to serious provocation or involuntary manslaughter. The court sentenced defendant to 27 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the tendered instructions. Employing plain-error review, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. There was insufficient evidence of serious provocation to warrant the requested instruction; McDonald was trying to prevent Gladney from leaving by keeping him from taking his bicycle. As they struggled, defendant swung the knife at Gladney, stabbing him three times. There is no evidence that Gladney threatened McDonald. The stab wound to Gladney’s cheek was deep enough to strike the carotid artery. Defendant was not merely swinging the knife recklessly. View "People v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Beggs, a tenured teacher, was dismissed from her employment by Murphysboro Community Unit School District. Caring for her parents, Beggs had accrued several absences and was tardy several days. She had received a “letter of concern” and a “remedial warning,” had taken sick leave, and had been suspended before her termination. Beggs requested a hearing, Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/24-12. A hearing officer issued findings of fact and recommended that Beggs be reinstated with back pay and benefits because the Board failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she had violated the notice of remedial warning or that she had engaged in irremediable conduct that constituted grounds for dismissal. The Board nonetheless dismissed her. The circuit court ordered Beggs reinstated with back pay and benefits. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. While the Board’s frustration with Beggs before the notice of remedial warning was “understandable and well documented,” it was unclear from the Board’s decision whether it would have found cause for discharge based on a tardiness incident of March 19, 2012, alone. Only a clear and material breach of the warning notice that was causally related to her past deficiencies would support dismissal. That single incident was not a clear and material breach of the warning notice. The court expressed “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” View "Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186" on Justia Law

Castleberry was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(8)) based on separate contacts with the victim. The state argued that Castleberry was subject to a mandatory 15-year sentencing enhancement on each conviction because the crimes were committed while Castleberry was armed with a firearm. When added to the mandatory minimum term of six years’ imprisonment for each offense, the enhancements required a mandatory minimum term of 21 years’ imprisonment on each conviction. The court held that the legislature had intended the enhancement to be applied only once under the circumstances and sentenced Castleberry to a nine-year term on each conviction, adding the 15-year enhancement to only one sentence, for a total term of 33 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court rejected Castleberry’s constitutional challenge to the enhancement and, invoking the then-extant “void sentence rule,” remanded for resentencing. That rule stated that ‘[a] sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void.’ The Illinois Supreme Court granted a mandamus petition, requiring the circuit court to sentence Castleberry with the mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement imposed on each of his convictions. The court had abolished the “void sentence rule” as a means to correct sentences that do not comport with statutory mandates four days before the state’s filing. The court rejected Castleberry’s contentions that the relief sought was barred by the doctrine of laches and that a conflict in statutes defeats a “clear right to relief.” View "Alvarez v. Gaughan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a purported class action to recover damages resulting from an alleged scheme to inflate the interest rate delinquent property taxpayers in Madison County, Illinois, were compelled to pay to those who purchased delinquent taxpayer debt. Former Madison County Treasurer and Collector (Bathon) had purportedly agreed with certain defendants to manipulate the delinquent tax purchasing system, so that delinquent taxpayers were required to pay the maximum allowable interest to the purchasers of their tax debt to discharge the liens and redeem their properties. The purchasers of the tax debt allegedly provided financial support to Bathon. Plaintiffs brought suit against those involved in the scheme, Madison County, and RLI, the entity acting as surety on Bathon’s statutory public official bond under 55 ILCS 5/3-10003 and 35 ILCS 200/19-40. The bond identified “Madison County Government” as the named obligee. The court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs were not proper claimants under the terms of the public official bond or under the statutes. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Private citizens are precluded from making claims on the statutorily mandated public official bond at issue. View "Bueker v. Madison County" on Justia Law