Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed by American since 1988. On January 1, 2012, while working as a tower planner at O’Hare, plaintiff received a call from a friend at another airline, asking plaintiff to do something for a passenger who was scheduled to fly on American. Plaintiff requested that the catering department deliver a bottle of champagne and asked a flight attendant whether it would be possible to upgrade the passenger. The passenger was upgraded to first class. Plaintiff's employment was terminated because she upgraded the passenger and requested the champagne without proper authorization. American cited employee policies concerning dishonesty. Plaintiff applied for unemployment insurance benefits with the Department of Employment Security. American protested, alleging that plaintiff was ineligible because she was “discharged for misconduct connected with [her] work,” under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 820 ILCS 405/602(A). Following a hearing, a Department referee denied plaintiff’s application. The Board of Review affirmed. The circuit court reversed, finding that the actions which led to plaintiff’s discharge did not constitute “misconduct” under the strict statutory definition. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the circuit court decision, finding no illegal or intentionally tortious conduct, nor evidence of a deliberate rule violation. View "Petrovic v. Dep't of Emp't Sec." on Justia Law

In 2011, Henderson Square Condominium Association sued, alleging: breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, breach of the Chicago Municipal Code’s prohibition against misrepresenting material facts in marketing and selling real estate, and breach of a fiduciary duty. The defendants were developers that entered into a contract with the city for a mixed use project, the Lincoln-Belmont-Ashland Redevelopment Project. Sales in the project had begun in 1996. The trial court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the Chicago Municipal Code violation and breach of fiduciary duty and that counts were time-barred under the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214). The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A condominium association generally has standing to pursue claims that affect the unit owners or the common elements. A question of fact remains as to whether defendants’ failure to speak about construction deficiencies or to adequately fund reserves, coupled with earlier alleged misrepresentations, amounted to fraudulent concealment for purposes of exceptions to the limitation and repose periods. It is possible that minor repairs, along with the limited nature of water infiltration, reasonably delayed plaintiffs’ hiring of professional contractors to open the wall and discover latent defects. The date when plaintiffs reasonably should have known that an injury occurred and that it was wrongfully caused was a question of fact. View "Henderson Square Condo. Ass'n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving a van registered to a woman named Chattic in the city of Sterling. Sterling police officer Bland pulled the van over because there was a warrant out for Chattic’s arrest. Bland was unable to see the driver of the van until after he had pulled the vehicle over. Upon approaching, Bland saw defendant was a man and could not have been Chattic. Bland asked defendant for a driver’s license and proof of insurance before explaining the reason for the stop. Defendant responded that he did not have a driver’s license and Bland cited him for driving while his license was suspended. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed suppression of the evidence, finding that Bland’s license request impermissibly prolonged the seizure of defendant and the van. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Rodriguez makes clear that a driver’s license request of a lawfully stopped driver is permissible irrespective of whether that request directly relates to the purpose for the stop. As a result, Officer Bland’s request for defendant’s license did not violate the fourth amendment by prolonging the stop. View "People v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Tolbert, age 17, was charged with possessing an “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible” firearm, under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) and with possessing a handgun while under 21 years of age under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(I). Chicago police officers testified that they responded to a call about a “person with a gun” and found Tolbert and another man in the gated front yard. Others were outside the gate. The officers detained those individuals, searched, and recovered a loaded pistol from the house’s porch. According to the officers, Tolbert admitted to being its owner. He was transported to the police station where he was read his Miranda rights and again, according to officers, admitted to owning the pistol and placing it on the porch. The appellate court vacated his conviction under section 24-1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(A) as unconstitutional. With respect to section 24-1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(I), the court concluded that the charging instrument was fatally defective, citing statutory language that there is no criminal liability if the person is “on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person’s permission,” and holding that the state bore the burden of including the element in the charging instrument. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the invitee requirement is an exemption that the defendant must raise and proof. View "People v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

A search warrant was served at a home belonging to Chambers’ mother. He was found inside, along with a large quantity of cocaine, cash, weapons, and ammunition. The Cook County circuit court denied his repeated requests for a Franks hearing. He was convicted of armed violence and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 and 45 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court held that the trial court should have conducted a Franks hearing and remanded for determination of whether the search warrant was properly issued, stating that the informant’s appearance and testimony before an issuing judge is “but one factor to consider in determining whether to grant a Franks hearing, but it does not categorically preclude the court from holding a Franks hearing.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Chambers made a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly included in the warrant affidavit; it is irrelevant that the officer’s suspicions about the presence of guns and drugs at the address turned out to be well-founded. View "People v. Chambers" on Justia Law

The Colemans lived in unincorporated Will County’s Sugar Creek area, for which separate entities handled police emergencies and fire and ambulance services. On June 7, 2008, Coretta called 911. She was connected to operator Zan. Coretta stated that she could not breathe. Zan transferred the call to Orland dispatcher Johnson. Although procedures required Zan to communicate the nature of Coretta’s emergency, Zan hung up as soon as the call was transferred. Johnson asked questions but received no response. Johnson hung up and called Coretta’s number but got a busy signal. Johnson testified that dispatchers are trained to call the transferring agency if more information is needed, but he did not. East Joliet ambulance 524 was dispatched, for an “unknown emergency.” Unable to enter or get a response, the crew looked in the windows, but did not see anyone. Neighbors approached. The crew said that they could not make a forced entry without police. Their supervisor ordered them back to service. Neighbors called 911. After confusion about the address, a crew entered the house 41 minutes after the initial call. Coretta, age 58, died. The family sued. The circuit court granted all defendants summary judgment, finding that the public duty rule applied and that defendants owed Coretta no special duty. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, abolishing the public duty rule and remanding for determination of whether defendants may be held liable for alleged willful and wanton conduct. The public policy behind the judicially created public duty rule and its exception have largely been supplanted by enactment of statutory immunities. View "Coleman v. E. Joliet Fire Prot. Dist." on Justia Law

Sanders was convicted of the 1992 first-degree murder and aggravated kidnapping of Cooks. Sanders was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60 and 15 years. Bingham, May, and Barfield were convicted in separate trials. In 2010, Sanders filed a second successive postconviction petition, alleging actual innocence. Despite the absence of any motion for leave to file the successive petition, the circuit court allowed it and advanced it to the second stage of proceedings. The court then dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding purported new evidence and a recantation “not so conclusive in character as would probably change the result on retrial.” View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The Klaines filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dressen and against Southern Illinois Hospital Services (SIHS), for the negligent credentialing of Dressen. During discovery SIHS provided 1,700 pages of documents. SIHS refused to provide other documents, which it listed in a privilege log, citing the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101) and the Health Care Professional Credentials Data Collection Act (410 ILCS 517/1). The circuit court agreed with SIHS, with the exception of documents contained in Group B, Group F, and Group J. SIHS complied with respect to Group B, but continued to maintain that the documents in Groups F and J were privileged. Group F consists of Dressen’s three applications to SIHS for staff privileges. Group J contains “procedure summaries and case histories” that list surgical procedures that Dressen performed at SIHS. The circuit court held SIHS in contempt and imposed a $1 monetary sanction. On interlocutory appeal, the court affirmed, with modifications: all references to an external peer review report contained in Dressen’s application for staff privileges were to be redacted, and any patient identifying information was to be redacted to the extent required by 45 C.F.R. 164.512(e). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis for holding that a physician-patient privilege applies to raw data regarding treatment and procedures performed. View "Klaine v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs." on Justia Law

Williams pleaded guilty to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance in exchange for a sentencing cap of 25 years’ imprisonment. Defendant later moved to withdraw his plea, claiming he had been improperly admonished regarding the maximum sentence he faced. The court had stated, several times, that he faced a maximum sentence of 60 years’ imprisonment. In making the statement, the court applied 720 ILCS 570/408(a) which provides: “Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this Act may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to twice the maximum term otherwise authorized.” Defendant had a prior felony conviction, and his enhanced Class X maximum sentence of 30 years on the unlawful delivery charge was doubled to 60. The court denied defendant’s motion; the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that section 408(a) is ambiguous so that it was appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity. The court reasoned that it was unable to say with certainty that the legislature intended that section 408(a) would apply only to offenses committed in violation of the Act, as defendant argued, or whether, as the state claimed, it may apply to double defendant’s enhanced Class X maximum of 30 years to 60 years. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2008 Gill was shot to death while sitting outside his Chicago home with Clark. The evidence of defendant’s guilt consisted solely of two eyewitness identifications. The first identification, made by the victim, was admitted into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Before Gill died, Gill’s father (Johnson) asked Gill who had shot him. Both Clark and Johnson testified that Gill responded that “Lucky” had shot him. Multiple witnesses testified that defendant, who lived across the street from Gill, was known by the nickname “Lucky.” Gill’s mother testified that Gill and defendant had been friends for years, that defendant often spent time in Gill’s home, and that defendant recently had been fighting with a member of Gill’s family. From photographs and during an in-person show-up, Clark identified defendant as the shooter. Clark admitted she had seen defendant only “[l]ike once or twice” before the shooting, had not spoken to him, and did not know him. Clark apparently contradicted herself about whether defendant wore a hood. Defendant filed a motion in limine to allow an attorney/licensed psychologist, to testify as an expert on the topic of memory and eyewitness identification. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed denial of the motion, finding that the requested testimony was relevant and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Lerma" on Justia Law