Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thompson, was convicted of violating the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, (720 ILCS 646/25(a)(2), (d)(2), following a jury trial in which the circuit court admitted lay opinion identification testimony of four witnesses (Illinois Rule of Evidence 701), who identified Thompson as the person depicted in a surveillance videotape or still photographs that were taken from the crime scene. The appellate court reversed, stating that none of the witnesses aided the jurors’ own identification of who was depicted in the video and, therefore, the testimony encroached upon the function of the jury. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, noting that one witness merely laid the foundation for admission of the video and another had a perspective of the defendant that the jury did not have, so that there was some basis to conclude he was more likely to correctly identify the defendant. While admission of the testimony of the other two witnesses was in error, the error was harmless. Thompson acknowledged that he was the person on the video and the jury was repeatedly told by both attorneys and instructed by the court that it was up to the jury to make the ultimate determination of whether Thompson was the individual depicted on the video. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In separate trials, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of vehicle titles and unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle. In each case, defendant moved for a new trial more than 30 days after the jury verdict, but less than 30 days after sentencing. The state did not object to timeliness. The court heard arguments, then denied the motions. The appellate court concluded that both appeals were untimely so that it did not have jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, but, because of the unique facts, found defendant’s confusion regarding when to file his appeals was understandable. At the sentencing hearing, weeks after the 30-day deadline to move for new trial, counsel and the court discussed scheduling a time to file and hear a motion for new trial. Counsel also moved for jury information to be used in his motion for new trial. Neither the State’s Attorney nor the court challenged the timeliness of defendant’s motions; the state responded on the merits. Timeliness was not discussed until the state filed appellate court responses. Even then, the parties were preoccupied with the revestment doctrine, indicating additional confusion on the part of all parties regarding when to file a motion for new trial and subsequent notice of appeal. The court reinstated the appeal, citing the fundamental right to appeal a criminal conviction. View "People v. Salem" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in the deaths of Coleman, a 68-year-old man shot multiple times at his Chicago home in a botched robbery in 2005, and Stanley, defendant’s alleged coconspirator, gunned down in an alley the next day. Defendant’s statements in taped police interrogation were admitted as evidence against him at trial, after he sought suppression of those statements, arguing they were involuntary due to police questioning him off-camera and without Miranda rights, and due to physical coercion from handcuffs kept on him an excessively long time. The appellate court concluded the confession should have been suppressed, due to doubts it was voluntary, based on defendant’s age (then 19), educational level, sleep and food deprivation, prior substance abuse, deceptive conduct by police, length of interrogation, coercive atmosphere, lack of experience with the criminal justice system, and use of marijuana while in custody. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded. While defendant adequately preserved the broad issue of voluntariness of his confession, his arguments on appeal were almost entirely distinct from his arguments before the trial court. The drastic shift in factual theories deprived the state of the opportunity to present evidence. A court of review could not be confident in the adequacy of this record to address those arguments. View "People v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant was convicted under the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)) and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. That statute was found to be unconstitutional in 2013 (Aguilar case). The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding that, in Aguilar, the Illinois Supreme Court limited its finding of unconstitutionality to the “Class 4 form” of the offense and that the “Class 2 form,” applicable to felons, like defendant, was constitutional and enforceable. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A “Class 2 form” of AUUW does not exist. There is only one offense of AUUW based on section 24-1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(A) and a prior felony conviction is not an element of that offense. A prior felony conviction is a sentencing factor which elevates the offense from a Class 4 felony to a Class 2 felony. On its face, the provision constitutes a flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home and amounts to a wholesale ban on the exercise of a personal right that is specifically guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court. Because the prohibition is not limited to a particular subset of persons, such as felons, the statute, as written, is unconstitutional on its face. View "People v. Burns" on Justia Law

The Chicago Board of Education and the Teachers Union 2007-2012 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) established a grievance procedure that culminated in binding arbitration. In 2010, the Board notified the Union of a new policy: designating as ineligible for rehire probationary appointed teachers (PATs) who have been non-renewed twice, or have had an unsatisfactory performance rating. The Board began implementing this policy and notified PATs that they were being non-renewed, but did not inform them that it had placed a “do not hire” (DNH) designation in their personnel files. The Union presented grievances and demanded arbitration. The Board refused to arbitrate, claiming that Board hiring decisions were exclusive management rights. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act found that, under the Act and the CBA, the Board had a duty to arbitrate the DNH grievances and, by refusing, had violated 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1). The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. PATs are employed for a single school-year; the Board alone is vested with selection of such employees as a matter of inherent managerial policy. The policy of placing a DNH designation in PAT files following two nonrenewals or an unsatisfactory performance rating was within the Board’s authority because it directly relates to its exclusive right to determine hiring guidelines. View "Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Bowman, as special administrator of the Brown estate, brought a medical malpractice action against Doctor Ottney. Following pre-trial rulings on substantial issues involving discovery disclosures, Bowman voluntarily dismissed her complaint. Four months later, she refiled, asserting the same claims of negligence. The refiled suit was assigned to the same judge who had presided over the earlier proceedings. Bowman moved for substitution of judge as of right (735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2)(ii) . The circuit court denied the motion, but certified a question to the appellate court, which concluded that the court had discretion to deny a motion for substitution filed by a plaintiff, where the court had ruled on matters of substance in plaintiff’s previously dismissed suit. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Bowman could have moved for substitution of judge as of right during the proceedings on her 2009 complaint; even after the judge ruled on matters of substance, Bowman could have moved for substitution for cause under section 2-1001(a)(3) in either the 2009 or the 2013 litigation. Substantiating such a petition is a heavy burden. Acceptance of Bowman’s argument would allow a plaintiff to avoid satisfying that burden through the mechanism of a voluntary dismissal and refiling, thwarting the purpose of the statute. View "Bowman v. Ottney" on Justia Law

The state sought adjudication of wardship against Michael, charging him with misdemeanor theft. Count I alleged that he obtained control over property of another under circumstances that would have reasonably induced him to believe that it was stolen. Count 2 alleged that he committed theft by deception. Following Michael’s conviction on Count 2, the probation officer recommended that Michael be placed on supervision for one year. The state recommended a sentence of one year’s probation and restitution of $160. The court continued the case under supervision for one year, referred Michael for evaluation, and ordered him to pay $160 in restitution. The continuance was memorialized in a “Supervision Order” and a “Sentencing Order.” On the sentencing order, the judge checked the box for “No finding or judgment of guilty entered.” The court did not adjudge Michael a ward of the court, but advised Michael of his appeal rights, and appointed the State Appellate Defender to represent him. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. While a recent statutory change allows supervision orders to be entered in juvenile cases after a finding of guilt (705 ILCS 405/5-615(1)(b)), the change did not make such interlocutory orders appealable under any supreme court rule. View "In re Michael D." on Justia Law

The petitioner, DG Enterprises, LLC-Will Tax, LLC, purchased the 2007 delinquent real estate taxes for a property at 716 Henderson Avenue, Joliet, Illinois, from the Will County collector at a public auction on November 6, 2008. On February 4, 2009, in accord with requirements of section 22-5 of the Tax Code, petitioner drafted and then requested that the Will County clerk send by certified mail the completed "Take Notice I" form to the respondent Lorrayne Cornelius, the owner of record and the party in whose name taxes were last assessed. Petitioner filled in all of the required information for the Take Notice I except the address and phone number for the Will County clerk. The certified mail notice was returned by the post office unclaimed. On July 6, 2011, the same day it filed its petition for tax deed, petitioner placed the take notices required by section 22-25 for mailing with the clerk of the circuit court of Will County. The notice was sent by the clerk of the court by certified mail, and was mailed to “Lorrayne M. Cornelius, Melvin R. Cornelius and Occupants,” at the 716 Henderson Avenue address. Three attempted certified mailings were later returned unclaimed to the clerk by the postal service. The petitioner also took additional steps to complete personal service on the respondent and all other interested parties. On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed an appearance through counsel and a combined motion to dismiss, arguing that petitioner's take notices and publication notices were fatally defective under the applicable statute and failed to comply with due process, depriving the court of jurisdiction and rendered the order for the tax deed void so that it could be attacked at any time. The principal issues presented for the Supreme Court's review in this case were: (1) whether an order issuing a tax deed is void and subject to collateral attack because of the failure to include the address and phone number of the county clerk in the publication and certified mail take notices that were required to be sent to the delinquent owner prior to the issuance of the tax deed; and (2) whether due process standards were violated where certified mail notices to the owner were return unclaimed. The Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision to affirm the circuit court's order vacating petitioner's tax deed. View "DG Enterprises v. Cornelius" on Justia Law

Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Loan Tr. 2004-1, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-1, purchased a condominium unit at a judicial foreclosure sale in 2010. On March 27, 2012, plaintiff 1010 Lake Shore Association mailed defendant a demand for payment of the unit’s assessments for common expenses. After defendant filed its answer, plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing there were no questions of material fact on the amount owed or defendant’s failure to pay the assessments. Based on section 9(g)(3) of the Condominium Property Act (Act, 765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2008)), plaintiff asserted that the lien against the property for the prior owner’s unpaid assessments had not been extinguished because defendant failed to pay the assessments accruing after it purchased the unit at the judicial foreclosure sale. Defendant responded that it could not be held liable under section 9(g)(3) of the Act for unpaid assessments that accrued before it purchased the unit at the judicial foreclosure sale. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff, and awarded plaintiff possession of the property. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court misconstrued section 9(g)(3) of the Act, arguing that a purchaser of a condominium unit at a foreclosure sale is only required to pay the common expenses that accrued following the sale. The appellate court affirmed the trial court, with one justice dissenting. Finding no error in the majority's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "1010 Lake Shore Ass'n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

In the summer of 2013, the State filed an information charging defendant Sandro Espinoza with domestic battery. The information stated that, “said defendant, knowingly, without legal justification made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with a minor, a family or household member, in that said defendant struck the minor about the face, in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-3.2(a)(2), of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, 2012.” At Espinoza’s bond hearing, the State indicated that the victim was defendant’s son, who sustained a bloody nose. The trial court granted the State’s request for a no contact order, admonishing defendant that, as a condition of his bond, he was to have no contact with the minor, D.E. At a subsequent pretrial hearing, defense counsel indicted that Espinoza wanted to plead guilty and accept the State’s plea offer. However, defense counsel also noted his concern that there were no identifiers in the complaint, and orally moved to amend the charging instrument. The trial court declined to consider the oral motion, and directed defense counsel to file a written motion. The trial court also declined to accept Espinoza’s guilty plea to a complaint that was defective on its face. At issue in this case was whether the charging instrument, which identified the victim simply as “a minor,” was sufficient pursuant to section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. In two separate criminal cases, the trial courts dismissed criminal complaints based upon the insufficiency of the charging instruments, where those charging instruments identified the victims only as “a minor.” The cases were consolidated on appeal. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed. Finding no reason to disturb the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Illinois v. Espinoza" on Justia Law