Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a class of property owners, sought compensation from the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, alleging flooding on their properties caused by the District’s diversion of stormwater into nearby creeks. The District cited a 1948 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Pratt, as holding that a temporary flooding cannot constitute a taking under the Illinois Constitution. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss and certified a question based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 holding that temporary flooding can constitute a taking under the federal constitution, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States. The appellate court held that Arkansas Game overruled Pratt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois takings clause provides greater protection for property owners than its federal counterpart, in providing a remedy for property that is damaged, but, what constitutes a taking is the same under both clauses. The holding in Arkansas Game is relevant to the determination of whether government-induced temporary flooding is a taking under the Illinois Constitution. That holding, however, does not conflict with Pratt. Pratt did not hold that temporary flooding can never constitute a taking, but only that the flooding, in that case, did not amount to a taking. Similarly, the facts alleged by plaintiffs are not sufficient to allege a taking. The complaint does not allege that the flooding “radically interfered” with use and enjoyment of the properties. The parties did not address whether the properties were "damaged." View "Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist." on Justia Law

On May 5, 2014, defendant received a traffic citation from a Troy police officer for speeding. The citation was filed with the Madison County circuit court clerk’s office on May 9. Defendant moved to dismiss the citation, claiming it was not transmitted to the circuit court clerk within 48 hours after it was issued, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 552. At a hearing, the court noted that defendant submitted “a stack of tickets” issued by the city of Troy. The state described the exhibit, stating “of the (50) tickets that Defendant submitted into evidence, almost half of them were filed within the 48 hours.” An officer testified that after a citation is issued, it is placed in a secure box in the dispatch office. On Mondays and Fridays, a supervisor would remove the citations, review and record them on bond sheets, and deliver them to the courthouse. He estimated that 30-50 citations were filed each Monday and Friday and that it was not “physically possible” to transport the citations to the courthouse every day. The trial court determined that the evidence showed “a clear and consistent violation of Rule 552 and not an inadvertent action” and dismissed the ticket. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reading the Rule as directory, not mandatory, so that dismissal is appropriate only if a defendant shows prejudice by the delay; here, the violation was not intentional. View "People v. Geiler" on Justia Law

Public Act 97-1161 amended the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 ) to create an exemption from property taxes on leasehold interests and improvements on real estate owned by the Metropolitan Airport Authority of Rock Island County and used by a fixed base operator (FBO) to provide aeronautical services to the public. When the law was enacted, Elliott was the only FBO leasing land from the Authority. The law was specifically designed to provide a financial incentive for that company to expand its operations at the Authority’s facilities rather than its operations in Des Moines, Iowa, which were not subject to property tax. The School District, which faced losing more than $150,000 per year in tax revenue as a result of the exemption, filed suit, asserting violation of the Illinois Constitution’s “special legislation” clause. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court agreed, finding nothing to justify distinguishing FBOs operating at the Quad City airport from any number of other FBOs at other Illinois airports or from other Illinois businesses that compete with companies in more tax-friendly jurisdictions. The law “presents a paradigm of an arbitrary legislative classification not founded on any substantial difference of situation or condition.” View "Moline School Dist. v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Rizzo was charged with violation of the Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5/11-601.5(b), which states “A person who drives a vehicle ... at a speed that is 40 miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit ... commits a Class A misdemeanor,” having allegedly driven his vehicle 100 miles-per-hour in a 55-mile-per-hour speed zone, and violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-709(a), improper lane usage, having allegedly “cut in between two semi-trucks at [a] high rate of speed.” Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Corrections Code, 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(p), which precluded a disposition of supervision for those who have violated the speed parameters of section 11-601.5. The circuit court found the prohibition of supervision “unconstitutional as violating the proportionate penalties clause, Article I, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution.” The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that one who challenges the constitutionality of a statutorily mandated “penalty” has the burden of clearly establishing that the challenged provision is in excess of general constitutional limitations and “cannot shift the burden of proof and research to the circuit court." That court “should proceed with the utmost caution before following an attorney’s ill-defined path to a finding of unconstitutionality” and should include an adequate discussion of relevant case law, differentiating the constitutional bases that might bear upon its finding. That was not done here. View "People v. Rizzo" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant, then age 17, was indicted on six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) The counts alleged that he carried in a vehicle, outside the home, a .38-caliber handgun and a 9-millimeter handgun, each of which was “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible,” without a valid FOID card, and while under 21 years of age (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)). He pleaded guilty to one count. Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his probation, which was ultimately terminated unsatisfactorily. In 2005, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and was sentenced to six years in prison. In 2008, defendant was charged in separate cases with multiple counts of armed robbery, AUUW, and unauthorized use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), “having been previously convicted of the felony offense of [AUUW].” Defendant had robbed three different victims at gunpoint within a 24-hour period. Defendant agreed, and acknowledged that he understood that he was agreeing, that he had a prior AUUW conviction. Convicted, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 29 years for each robbery, with a concurrent sentence of 10 years for the UUW convictions. The appellate court vacated one UUW conviction, citing one-act, one-crime principles, and vacated the remaining UUW, because the AUUW conviction arose from a statute that was held to be facially unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar, 2013. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Under the UUW by a felon statute, defendant’s felon status at the time of the offense properly served as sufficient proof of the predicate felony conviction. View "People v. McFadden" on Justia Law

FutureGen was created to research and develop near-zero emissions coal technology and sought to use carbon capture and storage to develop the world’s first near-zero emissions coal power plant. The proposed retrofitted “clean coal” electric energy generating facility, known as “FutureGen 2.0,” was to be located in Meredosia, Illinois, and scheduled to begin operating in 2017. To secure private investment for FutureGen 2.0, the Illinois Commerce Commission issued an order finding that it has the authority to force public utility companies and smaller, privately owned and competitively operated Area Retail Electric Suppliers (ARES) to purchase all of FutureGen 2.0’s electrical output over a 20-year term. The appellate court affirmed the order. In 2015, while appeal was pending, the U.S. Department of Energy suspended funding for the FutureGen 2.0 project. The FutureGen Alliance board of directors approved a resolution in January 2016 ceasing all FutureGen 2.0 project development efforts and indicated its intention to terminate the sourcing agreements. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, vacating the decision of the appellate court. View "Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are partners in the business of dairy farming. Defendant is an agricultural cooperative in the business of producing and supplying dairy products. In 1980, plaintiffs became members of defendant’s cooperative, paid $15 for shares of defendant’s common stock, and entered into a “Milk Marketing Agreement” with defendant. In 2005, plaintiffs temporarily ceased milk production. Defendant notified plaintiffs that it had terminated their agreement and plaintiffs’ membership in the cooperative and tendered $15 to plaintiffs to redeem the shares of common stock. Plaintiffs rejected the payment and sought shareholder remedies pursuant to the Business Corporation Act (805 ILCS 5/12.56). Based on defendant’s alleged concealment, suppression, or omission of its interpretation of its by-laws, count II alleged a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1), and count III alleged common-law fraud. Plaintiffs’ counsel withdrew and they obtained multiple extensions. After a voluntary dismissal, plaintiffs refiled. The circuit court dismissed the refiled action on grounds of res judicata and the statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed and remanded and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Although nearly five years elapsed between the time plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended complaint and their voluntary dismissal, defendant did not seek a final order dismissing the matter with prejudice, definitively ending the action. View "Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy" on Justia Law

In 2005, Masterklad built a house in Glenview, including a brick patio that extended off the rear of the house. Because the ground underneath the patio sloped down, dirt and gravel were placed underneath it to support the bricks and make them level with the house's rear entrance. A retaining wall was built to contain the fill. In 2007, the house was sold by Masterklad to a Lubeck for $1,710,000. In the contract Lubeck “knowingly, voluntarily, fully and forever,” waived the implied warranty of habitability in exchange for an express warranty provided by Masterklad, with a one-year term. In 2010, Lubeck sold the house to Fattah, for $1,050,000, with a document stating that the house was being sold “as is” and that the seller made no representations or warranty regarding its condition. In 2011, parts of the retaining wall around the rear patio gave way and part of the patio collapsed. The owner sued. The circuit court found that the patio wall had given way due to latent defects in its construction, but that plaintiff could not recover because Masterklad had executed a valid, enforceable waiver of the implied warranty of habitability with Lubeck. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The implied warranty of habitability may not be extended to a second purchaser of a house when a valid, bargained-for waiver of the warranty has been executed between the builder-vendor and the first purchaser. View "Fattah v. Bim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an obstetrician and gynecologist (OB-GYN) licensed to practice medicine in Illinois since 1975, was reappointed to the staff at Northwestern in 2000 and 2001. In 2002, plaintiff applied for reappointment; the division chief of gynecology at the hospital, reviewed one of plaintiff’s gynecological surgeries and deemed that it did not meet relevant criteria; 21 of his cases were then reviewed. Plaintiff sued, following revocation of his privileges to practice at the hospital following a peer review conducted pursuant to the Illinois Hospital Licensing Act, 210 ILCS 85/1. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding that the hospital was immune from suit and that it had complied with its bylaws and had not engaged in any wilful and wanton conduct. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting constitutional challenges to the immunity granted by the Licensing Act. View "Valfer v. Evanston NW Healthcare" on Justia Law

The Johnson County circuit court appointed a psychiatric expert at the state’s request, who testified at trial under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), 725 ILCS 205/0.01, that Grant had not recovered and was substantially likely to commit future sex offenses. A jury found that he was still a sexually dangerous person. The appellate court reversed, holding that the SDPA does not contemplate the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert for the state in a recovery proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; “when the legislature wants to grant the State the right to an independent psychiatric evaluation of a respondent, it knows how to do so.” While the SDPA quite clearly allows a respondent in a sexually dangerous persons proceeding to retain a private expert witness, there is nothing in the plain language of the SDPA allowing the state to do so, and the SDPA must be strictly construed. View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law