Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

From 1966-1970, Folta was a shipping clerk and product tester for Ferro Engineering and was exposed to products containing asbestos. In 2011, Folta was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease associated with asbestos exposure. He sued Ferro, alleging negligence. Ferro moved to dismiss under ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9), arguing that the claimswere barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a)) and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/5(a)). Ferro maintained that his action fell outside the exclusive remedy provisions because his claims were not “compensable” under the statutes: the symptoms did not manifest until more than 40 years after his last exposure to asbestos, and any potential asbestos-related compensation claim was barred under the 25-year limitation provision. The circuit court dismissed, holding that the action was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the term “compensability” must relate to the “ability to recover under the Act.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, noting that the acts do not prevent an employee from seeking a remedy against other third parties for an injury or disease and that Folta had also sued manufacturers. View "Folta v. Ferro Eng'g" on Justia Law

Henderson Square Condominium Association sued the developers, alleging: breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, breach of the Chicago Municipal Code’s prohibition against misrepresenting material facts in the course of marketing and selling real estate. The court dismissed with prejudice, finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the Chicago Municipal Code violation and breach of fiduciary duty and that those counts were time-barred. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of those counts and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The claims at issue are construction-related and governed by the limitation and repose of section 13-214 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the fraud exception applied and issues of material fact remained concerning misrepresentations or actions that could support a finding of fraudulent concealment. The defendants were alleged to be “more than silent” regarding insulation and funding of the reserves. The Municipal Code allows private parties to seek damages under its provisions and there were allegations that defendants had a fiduciary duty to budget for reasonable reserves, given allegedly known latent defects. View "Henderson Square Condo. Assoc'n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant admitted the allegations of petitions to revoke his probation in two cases and admitted the allegations of a delinquency petition in a third case. He was sentenced to indefinite commitment in the Department of Juvenile Justice. He moved for reconsideration. The court denied the motion. Supreme Court Rule 604(d) governs appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea and provides: “defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by mail or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence or the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Defense counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate three weeks after the motion hearing. The appellate court vacated the denial for noncompliance with the rule. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Strict compliance with the rule does not require counsel to file a certificate of compliance before or at the hearing on the post-plea motion, but requires counsel to prepare a certificate that meets the rule’s content requirements and to file it with the trial court before filing of any notice of appeal. View "In re H.L." on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint and sought class certification, alleging that defendant sent unsolicited fax advertisement, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227) and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2) and constituting common-law conversion of toner and paper. Each count included class allegations indicating that plaintiff was filing on behalf of a class estimated at over 40 individuals. Defendant unsuccessfully sought summary judgment solely on count I (federal Act), alleging that on three separate occasions it tendered an unconditional offer of payment exceeding the total recoverable damages, rendering the claim moot. The court reasoned that defendant did not offer tender on count I before plaintiff moved for class certification and rejected defendant’s argument that the motion was merely a “shell” motion. The appellate court affirmed certification of the class on counts II and III but reversed class certification on count I, agreeing that plaintiff’s initial motion for class certification, filed concurrently with its complaint, was an insufficient “shell” motion. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision, holding that its precedent did not impose any explicit requirements on the motion for class certification, let alone a heightened evidentiary or factual basis for the motion. View "Ballard RN Center, Inc. v. Kohll's Pharmacy & Homecare, Inc." on Justia Law

Haney rented a car from Enterprise. While being driven by Artley, the vehicle collided with an oncoming car operated by Nelson. Nelson sued Artley, who was uninsured, and obtained a default judgment. Nelson brought a supplementary action against Enterprise. Enterprise denied that it was in possession of any property of Artley and raised affirmative defenses to recovery: that Artley was not its customer, was not listed on its rental agreement with Haney and did not have Haney’s permission to use the vehicle. Haney had reported the vehicle as stolen. Enterprise contended in the alternative that it was self-insured, that its total financial responsibility for the liability of any authorized driver was $100,000 per occurrence, and that it had paid $50,000 to settle another claim from the same accident and had tendered $50,000 to the court to allocate between Nelson and a third injured party, exhausting its liability limits. Enterprise also argued that there was nothing in its rental agreement nor in Illinois statutes to obligate Enterprise to pay costs or post-judgment interest connected with the default judgment. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that, under a 2005 appellate court decision, Enterprise’s liability was limited to the minimum coverage provisions applicable to rental car companies that meet their financial responsibility obligations through the purchase of an insurance policy and not the full amount of the default judgment. View "Nelson v. Artley" on Justia Law

Stapinski, indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (ketamine) with intent to deliver, 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(10.5), moved to dismiss, arguing that the indictment violated his due process rights and an executed cooperation agreement he had entered into with police. The state did not dispute the existence of the cooperation agreement, but argued that Stapinski did not fulfill his obligations. The Will County trial court dismissed the indictment. The appellate court reversed s. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Police entered into a cooperation agreement with Stapinski, promising not to charge him with possession of ketamine if he assisted in the apprehension of others; he fulfilled his obligations under the agreement. His due process rights were violated when, over a year after he was detained by police, he was charged with possession of ketamine. Whether the cooperation agreement was “valid” in the sense that it was approved by the State’s Attorney, is not important. An unauthorized promise may be enforced on due process grounds if a defendant’s reliance on the promise has constitutional consequences. Stapinski relied upon the agreement he made with police and incriminated himself in the process of fulfilling his obligations under the agreement. View "People v. Stapinski" on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiffs, former Beeland minority shareholders, hired the McGuireWoods law firm to sue Beeland’s managers and majority shareholder, alleging misappropriation of Beeland’s intellectual property. Plaintiffs brought these claims in their individual capacities and derivatively on behalf of Beeland. In 2008, the court dismissed several claims without prejudice all claims. Plaintiffs’ new counsel obtained leave to amend and added counts against Beeland’s corporate counsel, Sidley Austin. The court dismissed all claims against Sidley as untimely and dismissed all individual claims against Sidley on the grounds plaintiffs lacked standing in their individual capacities. In 2011, plaintiffs settled with Rogers; relinquished their ownership interests in Beeland, and, in their individual capacities, sued McGuireWoods for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to timely assert obvious claims against Sidley. The court granted McGuireWoods summary judgment. The appellate court noted that in the underlying action the court never ruled on the merits of derivative claims against Sidley and remanded for a determination as to whether plaintiffs would have been successful in a derivative but for failure to add Sidley in a timely manner. The Illinois Supreme Court held that plaintiffs are bound by the trial court’s determination in the underlying case that they had no standing to bring individual claims against Sidley; even assuming they were successful, plaintiffs could not have collected personally on any judgment against Sidley on the derivative claims. McGuireWoods’s failure to assert claims against Sidley in a timely manner caused no injury to plaintiffs in their individual capacities, which is the only capacity in which they are proceeding. View "Stevens v. McGuireWoods L.L.P." on Justia Law

The state filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Q.P. with obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)). Officer Irving testified that he responded to a report of a vehicle burglary in progress, arrived at the scene, and observed a person (Q.P.) matching the description given in the report. Irving placed him in the squad car. Q.P. stated his name was Antwan Ellis and offered to direct Irving to his residence. At the address given by Q.P., Irving spoke to a woman who stated she did not know anyone named Antwan. They approached the squad car and the woman stated she had dated Q.P.’s father and she knew him as Q. P.. Q.P. then gave his correct name, but misspelled both names. Irving transported Q.P. to the police station and discovered that Q.P. was a runaway. The circuit court found Q.P. guilty of obstructing justice. The appellate court reversed, holding that Q.P. was already apprehended when he gave false information, and a person already apprehended cannot act with the intent to prevent apprehension. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Q.P. gave false information shortly after he was placed in the squad car. At that point, Irving did not know about the juvenile warrant. Q.P. told a police detective that he gave the false name because he knew there was a warrant for his arrest. A rational trier of fact could have found Q.P. provided the false name with the intent to prevent his apprehension on the juvenile warrant. . View "In re Q.P." on Justia Law

In 2008 the Seymours filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. In 2010 the Seymours filed a personal injury action, based on a 2010 automobile accident that occurred while Seymour was being transported in an ambulance. A 2010 plan modification entailed a reduction in the Seymours’s monthly payment amount based on an allegation that Seymour was unable to work and was only receiving workers’ compensation payments. The Seymours never apprised the bankruptcy court that their circumstances had changed after the 2010 modification. Defendants in the injury action successfully obtained summary judgment, based on estoppel because the Seymours failed to disclose their personal injury action in the bankruptcy proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed,The fact that the Seymours had a legal duty to disclose this suit and failed to do so does not establish intent to deceive or manipulate the bankruptcy court. The 2010 motion to modify the bankruptcy plan did not evince their awareness of the need to disclose the personal injury cause of action. View "Seymour v. Collins" on Justia Law

Goossens, a police sergeant, was convicted of intimidation, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(6)), after he threatened not to respond to 911 calls from a local auto racetrack as long as two former police officers were employed at the facility. He was sentenced to a term of two years’ probation. The probation order contained numerous conditions, one of which required that Gossens “shall become current in his child support in case number 2002 D 528.” He appealed, arguing the trial court lacked the authority under section 5-6-3(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections to include the payment of child support as a condition of probation, 730 ILCS - 2 - 5/5-6-3(b). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The defense’s attempted construction contradicted prior interpretation of the plain language of the Code, which says, “[t]he Court may ... require that the person ... support his dependents.” View "People v. Goossens" on Justia Law