Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Crystal Lake South High School is surrounded by land zoned “R-2 residential single family,” and constitutes a legal, nonconforming use. The campus is owned by District 155. In 2013, the District’s Board decided to replace the bleachers at the Crystal Lake South football stadium after a failed structural inspection. The plan involved relocating new, larger, home bleachers to be adjacent to residential property and closer to the property line than existing bleachers. The McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools approved the plans and issued a building permit under the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/3-14.20. The District began work without notifying the city of Crystal Lake or seeking a building permit, zoning approval, or storm water management approval. The city ordered the Board to stop construction until it obtained a special-use permit, a stormwater permit, and zoning variances. The Board disregarded the order and proceeded with construction. Owners of adjoining residential properties sought to privately enforce the zoning restrictions under the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15. The Board sought declaratory judgment. The circuit court awarded the city summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local governmental zoning and storm water restrictions. View "Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155" on Justia Law

In 2010, O’Toole tripped and fell on a paved pathway at Brookfield Zoo and sustained injuries. In 2012, she filed a single-count negligence complaint against the Chicago Zoological Society, alleging that it breached its duty to inspect and maintain the pathway, proximately causing her damages. The Society sought dismissal, arguing that the one-year limitations period of section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a)), rather than the two-year limitations period of section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202), applied and time-barred O’Toole’s complaint. The trial court dismissed, finding that the Society fell under the Act’s definition of “[l]ocal public entity” as a “not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business.” The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the Society conceded that it was not a department or agency of any government; that it received less than half of its funding from tax proceeds; that its employees were not appointed or paid by the Forest Preserve District and were not covered by any public pension or workers compensation funds; and that the vast majority of its trustees were not District officials. View "O'Toole v. Chicago Zoological Soc'y" on Justia Law

In December, 2009, Heelan, a Vernon Hills police officer for approximately 20 years, responded to an emergency call, slipped on ice, and fell. He was ultimately diagnosed with significant osteoarthritis in both hips, aggravated by the fall, and had two hip replacement surgeries. He did not return to work. The Village Police Pension Board awarded a line-of-duty disability pension, 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1. The Village sought a declaration that it was not obligated to pay Heelan’s health insurance premium under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (the Act), 820 ILCS 320/10. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Heelan. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, Proof of a line-of-duty disability pension establishes a catastrophic injury under section 10(a) of the Act as a matter of law; a public safety officer’s employer-sponsored health insurance coverage expires upon the termination of the officer’s employment by the award of the line-of-duty disability pension. The Act lengthens such health insurance coverage beyond the termination of the officer’s employment. View "Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan" on Justia Law

In 2008 the Illinois Department of Public Health issued a stop-work order issued to Lake Environmental during an asbestos cleanup at Scott Air Force Base.. The Department lifted the stop-work order after several months, but in 2010 removed Lake from the list of state-approved asbestos abatement contractors based on the violations at Scott, which had been remedied. Lake sought judicial review. The trial court held that the Department was barred by res judicata from revoking Lake’s license. Lake then sought sanctions against under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 for bad faith.The trial court denied the motion without explanation. The appellate court concluded that the circuit court erred by failing to provide an explanation and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plain language of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 imposes no requirement on a circuit court to explain its reasons for denying a motion for sanctions. A record is not inherently insufficient when the circuit court does not provide its reasons for denying the motion. View "Lake Envtl., Inc. v. Arnold" on Justia Law

On October 14, 2010, OneWest Bank sued Standard, as trustee, and unknown trust beneficiaries, to foreclose a “reverse equity” adjustable-rate mortgage on property held by the trust and executed in 2009. Standard filed an answer and counterclaim on July 19, 2011, seeking to rescind the mortgage, alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 15 U.S.C. 1601. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Standard was not an “obligor” under TILA and was not entitled to rescind the transaction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The trustee has legal and equitable title to the property and is the only party with an ownership interest in the property since the beneficiary’s interest is in the trust itself and is considered personal property. Standard, was entitled to receive TILA disclosures, including notice of the right to rescind after it entered into the consumer credit transaction. Because TILA disclosures were not provided to Standard, the three-day right to rescind period was extended to three years. Standard timely exercised its right to rescind when it gave notice on June 2, 2011. View "Fin. Freedom Acquisition, LLC v. Standard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

McElwain, was involved in a traffic accident.. The driver and passenger of the motorcycle that hit McElwain's vehicle had substantial injuries; the passenger died. On the date of the accident, plaintiff was neither issued any tickets nor asked to take any chemical tests. During their investigation, police discovered rolling papers and a bag containing a residue that appeared to be cannabis in McElwain’s vehicle, but officers at the scene did not think he appeared to be under the influence of cannabis. Two days later, McElwain was questioned and admitted that he had smoked marijuana two weeks before the accident. The police issued a ticket for failing to yield when turning left and requested that he take a chemical test. The police read him statutory warnings (625 ILCS 5/11-501.6(c). McElwain refused. The Secretary of State suspended his driver’s license for three years. An ALJ upheld the suspension, rejecting an argument that the officers violated due process by waiting too long. The circuit court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied. While the state can condition receipt of a driver’s license on a driver’s agreement to consent to a chemical test if he is involved in a serious motor vehicle accident, the essential nexus between the state’s interest in protecting the public from intoxicated drivers and requiring consent to a chemical test following an arrest related to a serious accident no longer exists when the test is requested two days after the accident. View "McElwain v. Ill. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

Then 23-year-old Fiveash was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault, based on his sexual penetration of the vagina and mouth of his 6-year-old cousin, P.A., in 2003, when he was 14-15 years old. Fiveash was certified to teach grades 6 through 12 and had been teaching part-time at two schools. He moved to dismiss, arguing that the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-120) gave the juvenile court “exclusive jurisdiction” over offenses allegedly committed when he was 14, barring prosecution in criminal court, and that he could not be prosecuted in juvenile court because he was over 21. The trial court dismissed, finding the result “unjust, absurd, and clearly unfair to the victim.” The appellate court construed the language in section 5-120 as barring criminal proceedings only against defendants under the age of 21 for offenses they allegedly committed while under the age of 17. Because defendant was 23 when indicted, the court concluded section 5-120 did not apply, and reversed and remanded for trial in adult criminal court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 5-120 does not bar prosecution in criminal court for offenses allegedly committed when a defendant was 14 or 15 but not charged with until he was over 21 and not subject to the Act. View "People v. Fiveash" on Justia Law

Section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes a $50 filing fee in residential mortgage foreclosure cases, two percent of which is retained by the clerk of the court in which the foreclosure complaint is filed,735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 . The circuit court of Will County found section 15-1504.1 violated the judicial fee officer prohibition in article VI, section 14, of the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that fee officer prohibition, were aimed at officers who had a direct role in the adjudicative process of the court system, and were compensated for their services through the payment of fees taxed to the litigants. Although clerks of the circuit courts are officers of the judicial branch of government, they are nonjudicial officers. View "Walker v. McGuire" on Justia Law

The Freeport Journal published an online article concerning Hadley’s decision to again seek election to the Stephenson County Board. Online readers could post comments after completing a basic registration. “Fuboy” posted: “Hadley is a Sandusky waiting to be exposed. Check out the view he has [an elementary school] from his front door” and “Anybody know the tale of Hadley’s suicide attempt? ….” Hadley filed a defamation lawsuit against the Journal and its parent company. The company provided Hadley the IP address acquired from Fuboy’s internet service provider, Comcast. The federal court dismissed the suit against as barred by federal statute. Hadley returned to state court with a defamation action against Subscriber Doe a/k/a “Fuboy” and issued a subpoena to Comcast. The circuit court directed Comcast to comply and to notify the subscriber. An attorney moved to quash. The court stated that the better procedure to discover Fuboy’s identity would be Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224, under which Hadley would have the burden of setting forth allegations that would be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure 2-615, even if such a motion was not filed. The court allowed Hadley to add a count, directed at Comcast, seeking relief under Rule 224. The court concluded that count I could withstand a motion to dismiss, so Hadley was entitled to Rule 224 relief. The court found that the comment imputed the commission of a crime to Hadley; was not capable of innocent construction; and could not be considered an opinion. The court directed Comcast to provide identification. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hadley’s complaint states facts to establish a defamation cause of action sufficient to withstand a section 2-615 motion, so the court properly concluded that necessity was established under Rule 224. View "Hadley v. Subscriber Doe" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree murder. After the presentation of the evidence, the circuit court instructed the jurors. The term “reasonable doubt” appeared in three instructions: “The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him. This presumption remains with him throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on the verdict. It is not overcome unless from all the evidence in this case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.” “The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden remains on the State throughout the case. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence.” The third instruction sets forth specific propositions that the state must prove to sustain the charge of first degree murder: “If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.” During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for a definition of “reasonable doubt.” The court’s written reply stated: “We cannot give you a definition it is your duty to define.” The jury found defendant guilty. Following post-trial proceedings, the court sentenced defendant to 70 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court vacated defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated defendant’s conviction. Defendant failed to show that a clear or obvious error occurred, so his procedural default of the reasonable doubt claim must be honored. View "People v. Downs" on Justia Law