Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Maria and Jim began living together. During a 2003 trip to Slovakia to visit family, Maria met Scarlett, an orphan born in 1999. Under Slovakian law, Jim was not permitted to adopt Scarlett because he was neither a Slovakian national nor married to Maria. Maria commenced the year-long adoption process and lived in Slovakia during that time. Jim financially supported the process, traveled there five times, and participated in a psychological evaluation. In 2004, Maria adopted Scarlett under Slovakian law, and the three returned to Elmhurst, Illinois. Scarlett used the hyphenated form of their last names. Scarlett referred to Jim as “daddy.” Jim’s name appears in Scarlett’s school records as Scarlett’s father. Jim paid all family expenses; he established a $500,000 irrevocable trust for Scarlett. In 2008, Maria moved out of Jim’s home, taking Scarlett. Jim sought a declaration of parental rights. Jim also alleged common law contract claims. The circuit court dismissed Jim’s common law claims and concluded that Jim lacked standing and was not subject to paying child support. The appellate court reversed, holding that the equitable adoption doctrine might present a potentially viable theory of standing , but affirmed the dismissal of Jim’s contract claims. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the doctrine of equitable adoption, previously recognized in a will contest, does not apply to child custody proceedings. View "In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D." on Justia Law

A brief relationship between mother, a Missouri resident, and father, an Illinois resident, resulted in a child, L.M., born in Missouri in 2009. In 2010, father sought to establish the existence of a father-child relationship and to obtain joint custody under the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/1), which allows parentage actions to be brought in the county in which any party resides. Mother filed an appearance. Both attended the hearing and stated that they had entered into a joint parenting agreement. The court entered its judgment, incorporating the agreement, in which they submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction. Father began a military tour of duty. Upon leaving the service in 2012, he was able to visit L.M. frequently in Missouri. In November 2012, mother moved to Las Vegas, taking L.M. Father sought custody. Mother filed suit in Nevada, asserting that the Illinois judgment was void due to lack of Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (750 ILCS 36/101] subject matter jurisdiction. At her request, the Champaign County circuit court vacated its 2010 order and dismissed father’s complaint. The appellate court vacated, holding that compliance with the statute was not a prerequisite to jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. As used in the statute, “jurisdiction” is a procedural limit on when the court may hear initial custody matters, not a precondition to the exercise of its inherent authority. Determination of who should have custody of L.M. presented a justiciable matter that fell within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Once a court has subject matter jurisdiction, its judgment will not be rendered void merely because of an error in its determination of the facts or application of the law. View "McCormick v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Parks, incumbent mayor of East St. Louis, is seeking reelection in the April 2015 election. East St. Louis officials run for office on a nonpartisan basis. Parks’ nominating petitions were subject to Election Code rules governing petitions for independent candidates, 10 ILCS 5/10-3.1, which require signatures by a minimum number of qualified voters of the political subdivision. Under the formula for determining that number, petitions for East St. Louis mayoral candidates were required to have a minimum of 136 valid signatures. Parks filed petitions with 171 signatures. Jackson-Hicks, also a candidate for mayor, filed an objection under 10 ILCS 5/10-8. At a hearing, the attorney for the Election Board presented evidence that at least 48 signatures on Parks’ petitions were invalid; 12 additional signatures were questioned on the grounds that those persons were not registered to vote at the time they signed. The Election Board denied the objection, stating that the objection was in the proper form; that all required notices had been issued and served; and that Parks’ nominating papers had “insufficient signatures.” Despite this deficiency, the Board found “substantial compliance” and ordered that Parks’ name appear on the ballot. The circuit court and appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the minimum signature requirement mandatory. View "Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Bd. of Election Comm'rs" on Justia Law

LVNV collection agency bought Trice’s unpaid debt and filed suit. Trice later sought to vacate a judgment against him on the ground that LVNV was not an Illinois registered agency. The circuit court of Cook County declared sections of the Collection Agency Act (225 ILCS 425/4.5, 14, 14b) unconstitutional. The appellate court remanded after holding that “a complaint filed by an unregistered collection agency is … a nullity, and any judgment entered on such a complaint is void/” The circuit court then found the penalty provisions unconstitutional on grounds of due process, equal protection and vagueness, but held that though LVNV was unlicensed when it filed suit, the resulting judgment should have been “voidable rather than void.” The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s findings, rejected the analysis of the appellate court, and remanded. The circuit court’s initial denial of Trice’s petition was correct, LVNV has been granted relief on a nonconstitutional ground. Failure to comply with a statutory requirement or prerequisite does not negate the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction or constitute a nonwaivable condition precedent to that jurisdiction, so there was no need for the circuit court to address the Act’s constitutionality. View "LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice" on Justia Law

After receiving an anonymous tip, officers encountered defendant at a Chicago liquor store and, in response to an inquiry about why he was there, defendant replied, “I just got to let you know I got a gun on me.” Officers searched defendant and recovered a loaded firearm. Defendant was convicted of multiple firearm offense counts arising from his possession of a single loaded handgun while he was a felon. He challenged the convictions under the the one-act, one-crime rule. The appellate court concluded that defendant could receive only one conviction “based on the same physical act of possessing one loaded firearm,” but rejected defendant’s fourth amendment challenge to his arrest and recovery of the loaded firearm. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction and sentence for unauthorized use of a weapon by a felon based on his possession of firearm ammunition. Defendant was properly convicted of armed habitual criminal. The court rejected defendant’s fourth amendment challenge because the underlying incident was a consensual encounter. View "People v. Almond" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers received a call about a person with a gun in a park. Arriving, officers approached defendant, 19 years old. He walked away. The officers demanded that defendant stop, but he ran. Officers pursued defendant, noticing his hand was on his right waist. An officer witnessed defendant reach inside his waistband and pull out a revolver, which he dropped to the ground. Officers recovered the weapon and found that it was loaded. Defendant was convicted of six counts of violating the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6) The court held that, due to its findings of statutory unconstitutionality, facially and as applied, all six AUUW convictions would be vacated and a conviction of unlawful use of a weapon under 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) would be entered, and imposed a Class A misdemeanor sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed as to sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), and 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) “the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible at the time of the offense,” but reversed as to sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C), and 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(C), “the person possessing the firearm has not been issued a currently valid … [FOID Card] … the person possessing the weapon was under 21 years of age, which it found to be constitutional and severable. Section 24-1.6(d)(2) (sentencing) was invalid, as relying upon the unconstitutional (a)(3)(A) subsection. View "People v. Mosley" on Justia Law

The state charged a 16-year-old (Jordan) with three counts of unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF), alleging that he carried in a vehicle an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)); carried a handgun in a vehicle while under 21 years of age (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I)); and carried a firearm in a vehicle without a valid FOID card (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C)). The UPF count alleged that Jordan, under 18 years of age, knowingly possessed a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person (24-3.1(a)(1). Jordan moved to dismiss, contending that the AUUW statute had been found unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in 2012, as violating the second amendment right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home. The circuit court dismissed the AUUW counts, but denied the motion as to the UPF count. The state conceded that one count had been properly dismissed but argued that the remaining counts remained constitutionally valid because they required proof of independent aggravating factors. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the first count based on section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), which it found to be facially unconstitutional in 2013; reversed dismissal of charges based on sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I), which are severable from the unconstitutional provision. View "In re: Jordan G." on Justia Law

Tuzzolino and his law firm represented Coletta. Coletta alleged that, in litigation, Tuzzolino failed to timely disclose expert witnesses; failed to retain needed expert witnesses; advised Coletta to settle for an amount far less than Coletta’s losses; told Coletta that negotiations were continuing after dismissal; and signed settlement documents without informing Coletta. According to Coletta, Tuzzolino offered to pay $670,000 to settle any potential malpractice claim, but never paid. Three months later, shortly before the expiration of the firm’s 2007-08 malpractice policy with ISBA Mutual, Tuzzolino completed a renewal application. In response to: “Has any member of the firm become aware of a past or present circumstance(s), act(s), error(s) or omission(s), which may give rise to a claim that has not been reported?” Tuzzolino checked “no.” Mutual issued the policy. Tuzzolino’s partner, Terpinas, learned of Tuzzolino’s malfeasance a month later, when he received a lien letter from Coletta’s attorney. Terpinas reported the claim to Mutual, which sought rescission and other relief. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Tuzzolino and rescinded the policy, finding that Mutual had no duty to defend Terpinas or the firm against Coletta’s action. The appellate court reversed as to Terpinas, citing the common law “innocent insured doctrine.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the rescission, citing 215 ILCS 5/154, which allows rescission in cases involving misrepresentations “made by the insured or in his behalf,” with an actual intent to deceive or that “materially affect the acceptance of the risk or hazard assumed by the insurer.” View "Ill. State Bar Ass'n Mut. Ins. Co. v. Law Office of Tuzzolino & Terpinas" on Justia Law

Defendant, serving a life sentence for murder, mailed letters that were opened by prison officials and was charged with solicitation of murder and attempted solicitation of murder on a “request” theory. Defendant argued that to be found guilty of solicitation, the defendant must have actually communicated to the person allegedly solicited. “A command, encouragement, or request cannot be made if no one" receives it. Defendant suggested that, though Illinois substantially adopted its solicitation statute from the Model Penal Code, including the “commands, encourages, or requests” language, Illinois had declined to adopt the section that would proscribe uncommunicated solicitation. The State dropped the solicitation charge and proceeded on the attempt charge. Defendant argued, “This crime is an impermissible stacking of double inchoate crimes. … the attempt statute is void for vagueness as applied because it combines the elements of three crimes and does not offer … a reasonable opportunity to know what activity is prohibited.” Defendant was convicted. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the lack of specific attempt language within the statutory definitions of solicitation and solicitation of murder was indicative of legislative intent that the general attempt statute apply to the offense of solicitation of murder. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The legislature did not intend that a defendant escape criminal liability simply because authorities were vigilant enough to intercept his letters before they reached the intended recipient. View "People v. Boyce" on Justia Law

Smith was charged with shooting White in the back and causing his death, as “an armed habitual criminal.” The state indicated that it intended to seek a sentencing enhancement of 25 years to natural life imprisonment on the ground that Smith used a firearm. Smith pleaded guilty to first degree murder. In exchange, the state dismissed counts I and III, recommended a sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment, and withdrew its notice of intent to seek the firearm sentencing enhancement. The circuit court advised Smith that he was eligible for a sentence of 20 to 60 years, accepted the plea, and imposed a sentence of 30 years. Smith did appeal, but filed a pro se post-conviction petition claiming that his sentence and plea were void under the 2011 Illinois Supreme Court decision, People v. White, because his sentence did not include the statutory firearm enhancement. The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the factual basis for Smith’s plea established that a firearm was used in the murder, thereby requiring the imposition of the firearm sentencing enhancement, which required a 25-year prison term in addition to the minimum 20-year prison term for murder. The appellate court concluded that White did not establish a new rule of law and applied to the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that White does not apply retroactively. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law