Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas sell and deliver natural gas to millions of residential and commercial Chicago area customers through their lines. Their operating costs include the costs of the gas itself and the costs of distribution. The Illinois Commerce Commission approved a volume-balancing-adjustment rider, or Rider VBA, which imposed so-called “revenue decoupling” on the companies’ customers. Rider VBA prevents under-recovery and over-recovery of fixed distribution costs by “decoupling” the revenue for those costs from the volume of gas delivered. If actual revenues dip below a level set by the Commission due to decreased delivery volume, the company issues customers a surcharge for the difference. If revenues tick above that level due to increased volume, the company issues customers a credit. In 2012, the Commission approved the rider on a permanent basis. The Attorney General and the Citizens Utility Board challenged that decision. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that Rider VBA departed from “principles of rate-of-return regulation,” that a just and reasonable rate under the Act provides only an opportunity for, and not a guarantee of, a profit; that Rider VBA constituted impermissible single-issue rate-making; and that Rider VBA constitutes impermissible retroactive rate-making. View "People v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Simpson was convicted of first degree murder in connection with the2006 beating death of Thomas. At defendant’s 2010 trial Franklin testified that he was near the crime scene on the date of the murder, but did not recall what defendant said to him or what he told police that night. The state then admitted Franklin’s videotaped statement to police in which he stated that defendant told him that he had hit the victim 30 times with a bat. The state emphasized the statement in its closing argument. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the introduction of Franklin’s statement where the “personal knowledge” requirement for admission of a prior inconsistent statement was not satisfied under 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(2). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; for a prior inconsistent statement to be admissible under section 115-10.1, the witness must have actually perceived the events that are the subject of the statement, not merely the statement of those events made by the defendant. View "People v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Acting under power of attorney, Chenoweth sold her stepmother’s house in 2005 and used most of the money for personal expenses. Chenoweth was charged in 2009 and convicted of financial exploitation of an elderly person, 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3(a). She sought dismissal under the standard three-year period of limitations (720 ILCS 5/3-5(b), arguing that the indictment failed to allege any circumstances that would have placed the indictment within the one-year extended limitations of 720 ILCS 5/3-6(a)(2). The court rejected her arguments and she was sentenced to four years’ probation, and ordered to pay $32,266 in restitution. The appellate court vacated the conviction, holding that the extended period of limitations (720 ILCS 5/3-6(a)(2)) had expired prior to prosecution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the one-year extended period of limitations commenced on January 22, 2009, when the Adams County State’s Attorney became aware of the offense when he received the police investigation file. The legislature enacted section 3-6(a) specifically to deal with the offender who has successfully avoided detection of a breach of fiduciary obligation for the term of the general time limitation. View "People v. Chenoweth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a fraternal organization and tax exempt not-for-profit corporation, owns and operates, a Macon nursing home that s licensed by the Illinois Department of Public Health, with a permit to enter into life care contracts under 210 ILCS 40/1. In 2002, the Department of Public Aid directed plaintiff to pay the “Nursing Home License Fee” of $1.50 for each licensed nursing bed day for each calendar quarter, 305 ILCS 5/5E-10. The Department then claimed that plaintiff was delinquent since 1993 and owed $244,233 in back fees plus $237,890 in penalties. Plaintiff paid under protest and sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the fee was unconstitutional as applied to it because the fee’s purpose is to fund Medicaid-related expenditures that are neither precipitated by nor paid to plaintiff. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment under the uniformity clause The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The taxing classification “every nursing home,” bears some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation and to public policy. The object of the fee is not simply Medicaid reimbursement; all fees are deposited into the Long-Term Care Provider Fund, which may be used for Medicaid reimbursement, administrative expenses of the Department and its agents, enforcement of nursing home standards, the nursing home ombudsman program, expansion of home-and community-based services, and the General Obligation Bond Retirement and Interest Fund. View "Grand Chapter, Order of the E. Star of Ill. v. Topinka" on Justia Law

Resident taxpayers of Lemont-Bromberek Combined School District 113A filed three taxpayer derivative actions on behalf of the District, asserting that certain officers and employees of the District and current and former members of its board of education had improperly transferred money from the District’s Working Cash Fund, in violation of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/20-1). Plaintiffs also sought recovery against the surety that issued the bond for the District’s treasurer and against the accounting firm that performed audits of the District’s finances. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. To seek recovery under section 20-6 for the unlawful diversion of funds or for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege that money improperly transferred from the Working Cash Fund was used for an improper purpose, resulting in an actual loss to the school district. View "Lutkauskas v. Ricker" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with armed robbery while in possession of a firearm, evading arrest, and reckless driving in 2005. He pled guilty to one count of armed robbery while in possession of a firearm in exchange for dismissal of the other charges and a recommendation for a maximum sentence of 30 years. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison, including a statutorily mandated 15-year sentencing enhancement for possession of the firearm, 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b). Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. The circuit court denied his motion; the appellate court affirmed. Defendant’s 2011 post-conviction petition was dismissed. The appellate court found the 15-year sentencing enhancement violated the proportionate penalties clause and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court instructed the appellate court to vacate its decision and reconsider in light of its 2013 decisions. The appellate court vacated and upheld the sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court then reversed. Public Act 95-688, enacted in 2007, amended the armed violence statute so that robbery can no longer serve as a predicate offense for armed violence; the crimes no longer share identical elements and neither violates the proportionate penalties clause. However, that amendment should not be applied retroactively. Defendant was sentenced prior to the enactment, the sentencing enhancement was disproportionate when applied and the sentence is facially unconstitutional and void. View "People v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The law firm sued, alleging that it agreed to act as co-counsel with defendant on workers’ compensation claims; plaintiff was to receive 45% of fees recovered and defendant would receive 55%. After the cases settled, defendant refused to pay plaintiff its share of the attorney fees. Plaintiff attached an attorney-client agreement, signed by plaintiff, defendant, and the clients, describing the allocation of responsibilities and fees. Defendant argued that under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/16a(J), the Commission was to hear “[a]ny and all disputes regarding attorney’s fees.” The circuit court found plaintiff’s complaint sought recovery based on a referral agreement, that the claims based on that agreement did not fall within the Act, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, and entered judgment for plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court holding that the Commission’s authority does not extend to “issues concerning a breach of a referral agreement delineating the percentage of the awarded fee that should be allotted to the attorney who represented the claimant before the Commission and the attorney who referred the claimant to that attorney,” but is limited to hearing attorney fee disputes “concerning the amount of fees to be awarded to those who represent clients before the Commission.” View "Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito" on Justia Law

Williams sued his employer, BNSF Railway, under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging an employment related injury. BNSF filed a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnity against QTS. A jury rendered a verdict, finding that plaintiff’s injuries resulted from his employment, but assessed 50% of the fault to Wllams, 37.5% to BNSF, and 12.5% to QTS. The jury also rendered a verdict in favor of QTS on BNSF’s claim for contractual indemnity, finding that BNSF’s notice of claim was untimely. The appellate court dismissed BNSF’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the notice of appeal was untimely. BNSF had filed its notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the written order, but 72 days after the trial court’s oral ruling on BNSF’s post-trial motion. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing Supreme Court Rule 272, which states: “judgment is entered at the time it is entered of record.” The trial court’s oral pronouncement was not entered of record in the law record book. View "Williams v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, seeking joint custody of the couple’s three children. The circuit court appointed attorney Rosenberg to represent the children, under 750 ILCS 5/506(a)(3). Husband sought to set a temporary parenting schedule, stating that he and wife were unable to reach agreement. At the hearing, Rosenberg stated that the parties had agreed on a schedule, but had failed to agree on conditions of visitation. Rosenberg presented a proposed order. Wife objected on the basis that it infringed on her right to parent and communicate with her children. The court entered the order, which “enjoin[ed]” the parties from: striking, threatening or interfering with the personal liberty of the children; discussing any aspect of the pending litigation in the presence of the children; discussing with the children their preferences as to custody or visitation; questioning, discussing, or coaching the children with regard to testimony or interviews; questioning the children with regard to the conduct or expenditures of the other party; engaging in all forms of recording or electronic surveillance of the other party or of the children; using alcohol or nonprescription drugs in the presence of the children; allowing an unrelated member of the opposite sex to reside overnight in a residence while the children are present; disparaging either party; and removing the children from the state without consent. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed an appeal as moot because the divorce had been granted, so the order was no longer in effect. View "In re Marriage of Eckersall" on Justia Law

Belknap was convicted of first degree murder in the beating death of five-year-old Silven, the daughter of his girlfriend, and sentenced to 24 years in prison. The appellate court reversed remanded for a new trial based on the trial court’s failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 431(b) during jury selection when it did not ask the potential jurors whether they understood and accepted the four principles contained in that rule: that the defendant is presumed innocent; that the state must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and that the defendant’s failure to testify cannot be held against him. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that plain error review was not warranted and that the evidence was sufficient to convict. View "People v. Belknap" on Justia Law