Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Stevens was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court had granted a motion in limine to admit other-crimes evidence, finding that the evidence was relevant to show propensity, motive and identity. On appeal he argued that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when he was compelled to testify on cross-examination about a pending sexual assault charge. He had testified that his sexual activity with a prior victim was consensual and the cross-examination involved a different prior victim. The trial court noted the similarities between the assaults and characterized his testimony as “disturbing in the extreme.” The court stated that even if the other-crimes evidence had not been admitted, the evidence against Stevens was so strong that it was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, holding that the examination was proper because it discredited Stevens’s testimony, was probative of his intent and motive, and impeached his claim of consent. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the examination was proper to discredit a consent defense and test credibility. View "People v. Stevens" on Justia Law

In 2012, the North Mac School District adopted a resolution of intent to issue working cash bonds in the amount of $2,000,000. Bettis filed a petition, seeking to submit the proposition to the voters at the April, 2013 election. Marsaglia and O’Neal filed objections to the petition on seven bases, including that the petition sheets were neither numbered nor securely bound, as required by the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/28-3. The electoral board sustained the objections. Bettis sought judicial review. The caption of the petition identified only Marsaglia and O’Neal as opposing parties, but Bettis also served, by certified mail, all members of the electoral board, counsel for the board, counsel for the objectors, and the District Secretary. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the appeal was moot because the election had passed, but holding that failure to serve the electoral board as a separate legal entity required dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that courts may not add to or subtract from the requirements listed in the statute, which does not require the naming of parties and does not require that a copy of the electoral board’s decision be attached. View "Bettis v. Marsaglia" on Justia Law

Illinois law requires that every bag labeled as containing a certain weight of seeds actually weigh that amount. Precision discovered that an outgoing load of seed was underweight and began randomly checking bags. Latr, Dudley was terminated after admitting he had tampered with a forklift. After Dudley’s unemployment compensation application was denied, Hohman, Kluemke, and Michael began weighing bags without Precision’s instruction or knowledge. They found light bags and provided information to Dudley, who reported to the Department of Agriculture. Inspectors found underweight bags and issued stop sale orders. The company stopped production for 10 days while all employees, working around the clock, weighed all bags and brought them up to the proper weight. According to Hohman, management stated “If we find out that anybody in this company had anything to do with us being turned in … it will result in termination.” The Department ended its investigation without penalties or fines. Hohman was subsequently terminated for engaging in horseplay with a forklift. Subsequently, Precision eliminated 22 positions across eight holding companies because of a business slowdown. Kluemke and Michael were two of four Nashville, Illinois employees terminated. Precision asserted that management chose Michael because he spent too much socializing, needed a more diverse skill set, and did not want to perform certain tasks; Kluemke had poor attitude. In a retaliatory discharge case, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s judgment in favor of the company. Retaliatory discharge claims are a narrow exception to the general rule that employees are at-will. If an employer comes forward with a valid, nonpretextual reason for an employee’s discharge and the trier of fact believes it, there can be no causation in a retaliatory discharge claim. View "Michael v. Precision Alliance Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

Jolly was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Prosecution evidence consisted largely of the testimony of Gunn, a confidential informant and drug addict, with three felony convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. Gunn had implemented a controlled buy from Jolly, but did not wear a surveillance wire and used his own cell phone to call Jolly. Gunn admitted that working as a confidential informant was his only source of income. Jolly was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment as a Class X offender. He later filed a pro se motion, arguing that counsel failed to: move to reduce bond; obtain consent before waiving Jolly’s right to a speedy trial; appear in court during pretrial hearings; provide Jolly access to discovery materials; discuss trial strategy or visit Jolly; and prepare for trial while preparing for another criminal case. In a second pro se motion, he added failure to: object to testimony about recovered currency; challenge Gunn’s credibility; challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; object to police testimony that Jolly’s voice was recorded; object to the lack of testimony from experts on the state’s exhibits, including the admission of cocaine; move to dismiss for lack of evidence; and move to suppress the recovered cocaine and currency. Following a hearing with new counsel, the circuit court denied the motion. On remand, the trial court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry, but allowed the new public defender to be excused. Jolly proceeded pro se. The court permitted the state to participate in an adversarial manner and relied on matters outside the record. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the finding that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and remanded for a new preliminary Krankel inquiry. View "People v. Jolly" on Justia Law

Smith and others were indicted for first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm in a 1998 shooting death. The jury found Smith guilty based on a theory of accountability. The appellate court affirmed. Smith filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate his claim that he suffered from a mental disability. Smith claimed he did not understand his Miranda rights and that, although he responded affirmatively to understanding those rights, his mental deficiency is such that he often gives responses that he thought others wanted to hear. Smith attached Social Security Administration documents indicating Smith was found disabled due to mental retardation, with an IQ of 74. Post-conviction counsel was appointed and indicated that an amended petition was not necessary. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The trial court denied Smith’s subsequent petition for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. The appellate court affirmed, stating that a defendant must make a “more exacting” showing of cause and prejudice to merit leave to file a successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; a defendant must show that the claim not raised in an initial post-conviction petition “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process.” The trial court twice instructed the jury that an opening statement is not evidence and, following closing argument, stated that “[n]either opening statement nor closing arguments are evidence, any statement… not based on the evidence should be disregarded.” During closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that Smith did not have a gun. Defense counsel pointed out in closing argument the inconsistency between the state’s opening and closing arguments. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2009, IAWC petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission under the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101) for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. The state was granted leave to intervene. In 2012, the Commission approved the reconciliation with modifications and denied the state’s request for rehearing. Under the Public Utilities Act, the state had 35 days to appeal, placing the deadline for filing the notice of appeal at October 16. Notice of appeal was filed on that date. The record and briefs were filed. The appellate court entered a summary order, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the notice had not been timely filed, reasoning that under Supreme Court Rule 335(i)(1), the notice should have been filed within the 30-day deadline specified in Rule 303(a). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; the appellate court erred in concluding that separation of powers principles required the timeliness of the notice to be judged by Supreme Court Rule 303(a) rather than the period specified by the legislature in the Public Utilities Act. View "Madigan v. IL Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Pusateri, a former employee of Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company (PG) filed a complaint under the False Claims Act, 740 ILCS 175/1, alleging that PG used falsified gas leak response records to justify a fraudulently inflated natural gas rate before the Illinois Commerce Commission. As a customer, the State of Illinois would have paid such fraudulently inflated rates,. The Cook County circuit court dismissed with prejudice, finding that as a matter of law, there was no causal connection between the allegedly false reports and the Commission-approved rates. The appellate court reversed, construing the complaint’s allegations liberally to find PG could have submitted the safety reports in support of a request for a rate increase, despite not being required to do so under the Administrative Code. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, reasoning that the court lacked jurisdiction to order relief. The legislature did not intend the False Claims Act to apply to a Commission-set rate. The Commission has the duty to ensure regulated utilities obey the Public Utilities Act and other statutes, except where enforcement duties are “specifically vested in some other officer or tribunal.” View "Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co." on Justia Law

Holt threw eggs on the Katheiser driveway to frighten Kartheiser and his 6 year old daughter. Represented by counsel, she entered a negotiated guilty plea to resisting a peace officer. The other charge was nol-prossed. She was sentenced to 12 months of probation and was ordered to provide documentation of treatment. The court admonished Holt that the agreement involved a “conviction.” Days later, she filed a pro se motion to vacate, stating that she “was told there would be no conviction” and “never had the chance to testify.” Her counsel was allowed to withdraw. The circuit court granted the motion to withdraw the plea and appointed the public defender. The next day, Holt filed a pro se “Petition to Quash … the police report,” claiming tampering with the record, police brutality, and that her children were missing. After several more incidents, Holt was placed in a mental health center. She filed notice of appeal and a “Demand Letter for Formal Correction,” seeking to “hold Tim Brown accountable for ‘Bearing FALSE Witness’ the 8th Great Commandment and for Defamation.” The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Holt had been found fit to stand trial during the pendency of the appeal so that whether she received effective assistance of counsel during proceedings below was moot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that public interest exception applies to warrant review. Where the evidence clearly indicates that defendant is unfit to stand trial, but a defendant contends that he is fit, counsel is not obligated to argue for a finding of fitness. In doing so, counsel would be violating his duty to the client and suborning a violation of due process. View "People v. Holt" on Justia Law

In 1993, Cordrey was sentenced to 36 years in prison for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping, with a three-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). In 2012, the Prisoner Review Board imposed MSR conditions. Cordrey was required to attend counseling, was prohibited from having contact with his victim, was required to have biweekly parole meetings, was required to register as a sex offender, with victim notification, and was subject to electronic monitoring. Cordrey was scheduled to begin MSR on April 12, 2013. That day, the Department of Corrections reported that Cordrey violated his parole because he had no suitable host site to serve his MSR. Cordrey was returned to prison to serve his MSR. Cordrey filed a grievance, followed by a pro se petition for habeas corpus. Counsel was appointed. The petition challenged the practice called “violating at the door” and alleged that more affluent offenders, who can afford suitable housing, can walk out of prison, while indigent offenders are returned to prison, in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the writ, reasoning that the Department of Corrections was unable to find placement for Cordrey due to his status as a sex offender, rather than his status as an indigent. The court noted the lack of evidence concerning housing options available for MSR, concerning whether both sex offender and non-sex offender indigent inmates are violated at the door, or whether there were alternates adequate to meet the state’s interests when there is no housing or funding available to inmates on MSR. View "Cordrey v. IL Prisoner Review Bd" on Justia Law

In 2011, Huber, sought judicial dissolution of American Accounting Association. In January 2013, AAA moved to dismiss Huber’s then second-amended petition. On March 6, 2013, the court held a telephone conference with the parties and dismissed the petition. Huber appealed. AAA argued that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because notice of appeal was due no later than April 5, 2013, but the clerk did not receive the notice until April 9; it claimed that where notice is received after the 30-day deadline, it is deemed timely filed only if timely mailed, which may only be proven by a certificate of the attorney or affidavit of a nonattorney, neither of which Huber provided. Huber countered that the postmark on the envelope in which he mailed his notice disclosed a timely mailing date of April 3. The appellate court dismissed, holding that a postmarked envelope does not substitute for the affidavit or certificate that Supreme Court Rules 373 and 12(b)(3) require. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that what Huber identified as a “postmark” was actually a postage label from a self-service kiosk that allows customers to mail letters and packages, buy postage, and access other postal services. View "Huber v. Am. Accounting Ass'n" on Justia Law