Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Freeport Journal published an online article concerning Hadley’s decision to again seek election to the Stephenson County Board. Online readers could post comments after completing a basic registration. “Fuboy” posted: “Hadley is a Sandusky waiting to be exposed. Check out the view he has [an elementary school] from his front door” and “Anybody know the tale of Hadley’s suicide attempt? ….” Hadley filed a defamation lawsuit against the Journal and its parent company. The company provided Hadley the IP address acquired from Fuboy’s internet service provider, Comcast. The federal court dismissed the suit against as barred by federal statute. Hadley returned to state court with a defamation action against Subscriber Doe a/k/a “Fuboy” and issued a subpoena to Comcast. The circuit court directed Comcast to comply and to notify the subscriber. An attorney moved to quash. The court stated that the better procedure to discover Fuboy’s identity would be Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224, under which Hadley would have the burden of setting forth allegations that would be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure 2-615, even if such a motion was not filed. The court allowed Hadley to add a count, directed at Comcast, seeking relief under Rule 224. The court concluded that count I could withstand a motion to dismiss, so Hadley was entitled to Rule 224 relief. The court found that the comment imputed the commission of a crime to Hadley; was not capable of innocent construction; and could not be considered an opinion. The court directed Comcast to provide identification. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hadley’s complaint states facts to establish a defamation cause of action sufficient to withstand a section 2-615 motion, so the court properly concluded that necessity was established under Rule 224. View "Hadley v. Subscriber Doe" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree murder. After the presentation of the evidence, the circuit court instructed the jurors. The term “reasonable doubt” appeared in three instructions: “The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him. This presumption remains with him throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on the verdict. It is not overcome unless from all the evidence in this case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.” “The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden remains on the State throughout the case. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence.” The third instruction sets forth specific propositions that the state must prove to sustain the charge of first degree murder: “If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.” During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for a definition of “reasonable doubt.” The court’s written reply stated: “We cannot give you a definition it is your duty to define.” The jury found defendant guilty. Following post-trial proceedings, the court sentenced defendant to 70 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court vacated defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated defendant’s conviction. Defendant failed to show that a clear or obvious error occurred, so his procedural default of the reasonable doubt claim must be honored. View "People v. Downs" on Justia Law

Shelley and Christopher married in 1992. Shelley works in the private sector and has Social Security tax withheld from her pay; she expects to receive full benefits in 2033 at age 67. Christopher works for the police department and does not have Social Security tax withheld. He contributes to the Police Pension Fund and can retire with full benefits in 2017 at age 50. In their 2012 divorce, Christopher computed the estimated present value of his pension benefits, using a “Windfall Elimination Provision” to determine what part of those benefits were in lieu of Social Security, which is exempt from equitable distribution. Using Christopher’s wages, as if covered by Social Security, predicted that his Social Security benefit at age 67 would be $1,778 per month; using his wages for those years in which he contributed to Social Security, predicted that his benefit at age 67 would be $230 per month. The difference of $1,548 was posited as “in lieu of Social Security.” The difference between that amount and the pension amount was $2,479 per month, with an estimated present value of $639,720.74. The court determined that the proposed valuation would violate federal law as interpreted by Illinois Supreme Court precedent. Christopher recalculated the present value of his pension, without the offset, as $991,830. The court adopted that figure, and awarded Shelley about 35%. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that Social Security benefits cannot be calculated until the participant collects them. Decreasing Shelley’s share of Christopher’s pension based on the present value of hypothetical Social Security benefits that, even if he had participated in that program, he might never receive is illogical and inequitable. Failing to consider Social Security may paint an unrealistic picture of their future finances, but Congress intended to keep those benefits out of divorce cases. View "In re Marriage of Mueller" on Justia Law

In 2005, the then-17-year-old defendant entered an open guilty plea to attempted first degree murder and home invasion. In 2007, he moved to withdraw that plea, alleging deficient advice and representation. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of 17½ years in prison. In 2009, defendant filed a pro se petition, alleging that he was denied his right to effective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel by failure to investigate defendant’s history of mental illness and telling defendant, defendant’s mother, and defendant’s aunt “lies” in order to “force” a guilty plea. The alleged lies included telling defendant that he would receive a sentence of between 12 and 20 years if he pleaded guilty; stating that defendant’s family had not paid enough to go to trial; and hiding exculpatory police and medical reports. Defendant alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal. The trial court held that the petition “is not frivolous or patently without merit,” docketed second-stage proceedings, and appointed counsel. Three years later, appointed counsel moved to withdraw, stating that the issues raised wre without merit and unsupportable as a matter of law. The trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed: If a pro se postconviction petition advances to the second stage on the basis of an affirmative judicial determination that it is neither frivolous nor patently without merit, appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw must contain at least some explanation as to why all of the claims in that petition are so lacking in legal and factual support as to compel withdrawal. The motion filed in this case failed to meet this standard. View "People v. Kuehner" on Justia Law

McVey sued for injuries she sustained after a waitress dropped a tray on her foot. Memorial Hospital of Carbondale treated her. McVey settled the lawsuit for $7,500, then filed a petition to adjudicate liens. The hospital’s lien was $2,891.64. In addition to attorney fees, McVey allegedly incurred litigation costs of $846.66 in securing the settlement. The trial court entered an order recognizing that under the Health Care Services Lien Act (Act) (770 ILCS 23/10), no individual licensed category of health care professional or health care providers may receive more than one-third of the award or settlement, so that the hospital could recover no more than $2,500. The court acknowledged precedent holding, that in order to ensure that a plaintiff receives 30% of the judgment, the computation of the amount available to health care providers should not begin until costs associated with bringing the case and securing payment have been deducted, but refused to deduct attorney fees and costs before calculating the amount available to the hospital. The appellate court reversed and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that hospitals are not required to contribute to the costs of litigation. View "McVey v. M.L.K. Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Walters, an Illinois timber buyer, executed a 2005 contract with Biederbeck to log trees from her Warren County property for $16,000. Biederbeck was a resident of the State of Washington. O’Dell, an Iowa resident, hauled the trees to a sawmill. After the harvest, the Warren County Soil and Water Conservation District asserted that it owned the property and filed suit, alleging violation of the Wrongful Tree Cutting Act, trespass, conversion, and negligence. Biederbeck denied knowledge of whether she was paid for trees that were improperly harvested. Walters and O’Dell did not file answers. Following a default judgment, the trial court denied a petition under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 to vacate. The defendants alleged, among other things, that they had been engaged in good faith settlement negotiations and that their attorney had experienced a death in the family. Despite expressing that equity favored vacating the judgment, the court believed it was constrained by 2007 Illinois Supreme Court precedent to eliminate equitable considerations in the proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, stating that when a 2-1401 petition presents a fact-dependent challenge to a final judgment or order, other standards govern the proceeding. The petition must set forth specific factual allegations supporting: the existence of a meritorious defense; due diligence in presenting this defense; and due diligence in filing the section 2-1401 petition. The court may also consider equitable considerations to relax the applicable due diligence standards under appropriate limited circumstances. View "Warren Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Walters" on Justia Law

Husband and wife (who did not speak English) entered into a written one-year lease, took possession of the apartment, and tendered the security deposit and first month’s rent. Ten days into the lease, they received “an official 30 days notice” of eviction, stating that “[c]onstruction begins June 10,” and that they did not qualify for an unspecified “new program.” Several additional efforts to force the family to move followed; their tender of rent was refused. They purportedly sought legal advice and were told that the landlord could not unilaterally terminate the lease. They reported feeling discriminated against and harassed; they were confused, depressed, and anxious. Demolition began while the family was occupying the apartment. Husband allegedly told wife that he could not tolerate the situation any longer. The following day, he committed suicide in the apartment. Wife sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful eviction, breach of contract; under the Wrongful Death Act; and under the survival statute. The trial court dismissed the wrongful death and related survival actions, finding that “wrongful death via suicide” is not cognizable in Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Despite an ostensible connection between severe emotional distress and suicide, suicide may result from a complex combination of factors. It is “rare” that suicide would not break the chain of causation and bar a wrongful death action, even where the plaintiff alleges the defendant inflicted severe emotional distress. Husband’s suicide was not a reasonably foreseeable result of defendant’s alleged conduct in breaking the lease and pressuring the family to vacate. View "Turcios v. DeBruler Co." on Justia Law

The state filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that D. had committed first degree murder. D. was nine years old; the victim was 14 months old. The circuit court found D. unfit to stand trial and subsequently found him “not not guilty” of murder. Thecourt remanded D. to the Department of Human Services for fitness restoration education, so that D. may become fit and be tried for murder. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court erred in denying a suppression motion. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for “harmless error analysis,” noting that in interviewing D., a detective seized on D’s fear that his father or others in the household would go to jail, or that he, himself, would be taken away. The detective promised D that no matter what he said, no one was going to jail, no one would be in trouble, he would not be taken from his father and, at the end of the day, he could go to his grandmother’s house and “hang out” with his dad. The detective reinforced that no consequences would follow an admission that D hit the victim and rejected repeated denials, making plain that anything less than an admission was unacceptable. The detective stated that whatever happened was a mistake, and everybody makes mistakes, and was explicit about the admission that would suffice—an admission that D. hit the baby once .D eventually admitted to hitting the infant once. D., functioning at the level of a seven- or eight-year-old, was especially vulnerable and susceptible to police coercion. View "In re D.L.H." on Justia Law

Police received a hotline tip that LeFlore was committing burglaries in Aurora; learned that he was on mandatory supervised release from prison and that he had been recently arrested for fleeing in a car registered to his address; and placed a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on the car. The GPS showed the car parked near a gas station when it was held up. The robbery was caught on a surveillance camera. LeFlore was charged. He confessed before learning of the use of the GPS and was identified by the cashier. He unsuccessfully moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence. LeFlore was convicted. While appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones, that attachment of a GPS device and its use to monitor vehicle movements on public streets was a search under the fourth amendment The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for a new trial for failure to properly admonish defendant (Supreme Court Rule 401(a)), but, with respect to use of the GPS, held that the good-faith exception applies and that the evidence should not be excluded. There was “binding appellate precedent” that police could have reasonably relied upon in using the GPS in 2009 and it would have been objectively reasonable for police to rely upon the legal landscape and constitutional norm that had been established at that time, allowing warrantless attachment and use of GPS technology. The court found no police culpability and that there would be little deterrent value to suppressing the evidence. View "People v. LeFlore" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a $10 Rental Housing Support Program surcharge collected by the recorder of deeds for the recordation of any real estate-related document in a county, 55 ILCS 5/3-5018. Originally $1 was retained by the county in which it was collected. During the litigation, the section was amended to impose a $9 surcharge to fund the Rental Housing Support Program and a separate $1 recordation fee to be paid to the county. The trial court held both versions of the statute to be unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The General Assembly has no evidentiary burden and is not required to produce facts to justify the statute. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the section violated the uniformity clause. The court found a rational basis for the fee: By helping provide affordable housing to low-income families throughout the state, the statute provides needed housing security and financial stability to vulnerable residents and a more stable income stream to landlords. It decreases the number of vacant and abandoned buildings and increases the opportunities for building owners to maintain their property. View "Marks v. Vanderventer" on Justia Law