Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted in 2013 for criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse, based on acts he allegedly committed in 2012, when he was 17 years old. At the time of the alleged offenses, the Juvenile Court Act only applied to those minors under 17 years of age, with limited exceptions. Effective January 1, 2014, the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Juvenile Court Act was amended to apply to minors who were under 18 years of age, 705 ILCS 405/5-120, with a saving clause: “[t]he changes …apply to violations or attempted violations committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act.” Defendant filed, in 2014, a “Motion to Declare Adult Prosecution Unconstitutional,” alleging that the saving clause violated his equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions. Defendant argued that he was similarly situated to 17-year-olds who allegedly committed offenses on or after the amendment’s effective date and there was no rational basis to treat him differently. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion, finding no rational basis for the different treatment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; it was reasonable for the legislature to distinguish between the two groups since applying the amendment to offenses committed before the effective date would require those cases to be transferred to the juvenile division and to begin anew. View "People v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Gaytan was a passenger in a car that had a rear-mounted, ball-type trailer hitch. Police officers stopped the car, believing that the trailer hitch obstructed the vehicle’s license plate in violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b)). When the driver of rolled down her window, the officers detected an odor of cannabis. A subsequent search of the car revealed a diaper bag containing cannabis, which the driver indicated belonged to Gaytan, who nodded in agreement that it was his. The officers then arrested Gaytan for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d). The circuit court of McLean County denied a motion to suppress evidence in which Gaytan argued that the trailer hitch was not prohibited and, therefore, the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion that an offense was being committed when they stopped the car. The appellate court reversed Gaytan’s conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the convictions. Although precedent indicated that section 3-413(b) prohibits only those materials which are attached to a license plate the statute is ambiguous. Under the circumstances of this case, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to have believed that the trailer hitch violated the statute. View "People v. Gaytan" on Justia Law

Allen was convicted of murder and armed robbery for the 1984 shooting death of Ciralski. In 2009, Allen filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging actual innocence and raising constitutional issues related to his claim of innocence, chiefly that the state suborned perjury and coerced confessions. He attached to his petition an unnotarized statement, styled as an affidavit. The statement indicated its writer was Langford, and the author took responsibility for Ciralski’s murder, stating that Allen had no involvement. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the petition, finding it frivolous and patently without merit. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Langford statement contained elements consistent with the testimony at trial and the overall defense theory of the case. The statement, while subject to challenge at the second stage for lack of notarization, qualifies as other evidence for first-stage post-conviction review, where dismissal is appropriate only if “the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” The circuit court’s alternative reasons to dismiss the post-conviction petition constituted greater scrutiny than the first stage involves. The court remanded for second-stage proceedings. View "People v. Allen" on Justia Law

Illinois has five state-funded retirement systems for public employees: the General Assembly Retirement System (GRS); the State Employees’ Retirement System of Illinois (SERS); the State Universities Retirement System (SURS); the Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois (TRS); and the Judges Retirement System of Illinois (JRS). All provide traditional defined benefit plans and are subject to the pension protection clause of the state constitution. Public Act 98-599 (eff. June 1, 2014), amended the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/1-101), reducing retirement annuity benefits for individuals who first became members of four of the systems before January 1, 2011. Members of those systems brought separate actions challenging the amendment under the Illinois Constitution’s pension protection clause. The actions were consolidated. The circuit court of Sangamon County found plaintiffs’ challenge meritorious, declared Public Act 98-599 unconstitutional in its entirety, and permanently enjoined its enforcement, rejecting a contention that the Act could be upheld, notwithstanding its violation of the pension protection clause, based on the state’s reserved sovereign powers. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that although the financial challenges facing Illinois government are well known, “Obliging the government to control itself is what we are called upon to do today.” View "In re Pension Reform Litig." on Justia Law

Barner was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1)) and sentenced to natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of People v. Williams (2010). The appellate court again affirmed. That decision was vacated by a new supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider in light of People v. Leach (2012). The appellate court again affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Barner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated when three state witnesses were allowed to testify concerning the DNA laboratory work and conclusions of nontestifying scientists. None of the documents at issue took the form of an affidavit, attestation, certification, sworn statement, or formal declaration; they lacked the “formality and solemnity” necessary for a statement to be testimonial. The court noted that Barner presented no evidence and did not impeach the state’s witnesses in any significant way, so that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The main focus at trial did not concern the identification of the attacker, but was the victim’s credibility and her account of the assault. View "People v. Barner" on Justia Law

Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider for Meuse, an elderly blind man. He required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes inside the house and to change into street shoes when answering the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard a deliveryman on May 10, she hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell. She fell down the stairs, breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands. She sought compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1). Because Meuse lacked workers’ compensation insurance, Zakarzecka named the custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, the Illinois State Treasurer. An arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of her hands to Zakarzecka, against the Fund. The Commission affirmed. As custodian , the Treasurer sought judicial review. The circuit court confirmed the ruling. The appellate court initially reversed. On rehearing, Zakarzecka argued, for the first time, that judicial review was barred because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory prerequisite for invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction, 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2). Agreeing that a bond was required, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Leetaru, a graduate student at and former employee of the University of Illinois, sought to enjoin the University from taking further action in an investigation of him, as a student, regarding allegations that he violated the University’s “Policy and Procedures on Academic Integrity in Research and Publication.” Leetaru alleged that the defendants failed to comply with the University’s rules and regulations governing student discipline and that their actions exceeded their lawful authority, were arbitrary, resulted in a gross injustice, and deprived him of due process. The circuit court dismissed, finding that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing the right to seek injunctive relief in circuit court to prevent unauthorized or unconstitutional conduct by the state, its agencies, boards, departments, commissions and agents, or to compel their compliance with legal or constitutional requirements, which includes actions to require compliance with administrative rules and regulations. Leetaru’s claims may proceed in circuit court without offending principles of sovereign immunity. Leetaru does not question the right of defendants to investigate research misconduct, but only claims that in investigating misconduct, defendants are obligated to adhere to policies and procedures promulgated by the University and that they have failed to do so. View "Leetaru v. Bd of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill." on Justia Law

Country Casualty's agent Lessaris, issued an automobile insurance policy to Skaperdas. Skaperdas’s fiancée, Day, was subsequently involved in an accident while driving his vehicle. Country Casualty covered the loss but required Skaperdas to change his policy to include Day. Lessaris prepared the policy, but identified only Skaperdas, not Day, as a named insured. The policy's declarations page identified the driver as a “female, 30-64.” Following issuance of the policy, Day’s minor son, Jackson, was struck by a vehicle while riding his bicycle and seriously injured. The driver’s insurance was insufficient to cover Jackson’s medical expenses. Plaintiffs made a demand for underinsured motorist coverage under the Country Casualty policy. Country Casualty denied the claim on the ground that neither Day nor Jackson was listed as a named insured. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Lessaris breached his duty to exercise ordinary care and skill in renewing, procuring, binding, and placing insurance coverage as required by 735 ILCS 5/2-2201, and that Country Casualty was responsible for the acts of its agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. They also sought reformation of contract to include Day as an additional named insured and a declaration of coverage. The trial court dismissed the negligence and respondeat superior counts. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Code does impose a duty of ordinary care. View "Skaperdas v. Country Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In July 2000, the Illinois Attorney General, on his own motion and at the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), filed a complaint against JTE and Tri-State, alleging operation of a solid waste disposal site on 40 acres in Lynwood that had operated as a sand pit, without a permit, in violation of the Environmental Protection Act, 415 ILCS 5/1. The underlying individual owners were later added to the suit. The site was operational from 1995 until 2003. After several years of litigation, the circuit court ruled in the state’s favor, holding that defendants had violated the Act by engaging in open dumping and by permitting the deposit of construction and demolition debris waste above grade without a permit. Monetary penalties were imposed on each defendant. The court also ordered defendants to remove any and all material deposited above grade at the site. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed as to liability, but vacated the injunction, finding that section 42(e) of the Act may not be applied retroactively in this case. At the time the site was operational, the only injunctive relief available was prohibitory, that is, the restraint of future violations. View "Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc." on Justia Law

One Hope contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services to provide services with the objective of keeping troubled families together. Seven-month-old Marshana died while her family participated in One Hope’s program. The Cook County public guardian, as administrator of Marshana’s estate, filed a wrongful death case to recover damages against One Hope and Marshana’s mother,alleging that One Hope failed to protect Marshana from abuse or neglect and should not have allowed Marshana to be returned to her mother because of her unfavorable history and failure to complete parenting classes. Attorneys for the Public Guardian deposed the executive director of One Hope, who revealed the existence of a “Priority Review” report regarding Marshana’s case. The priority review process considers whether One Hope’s services were professionally sound, identifies “gaps in service delivery” and evaluates “whether certain outcomes have been successful or unsuccessful.” The Public Guardian moved to compel production of the report. One Hope argued that the report was protected from disclosure by the self-critical analysis privilege. The circuit court determined that the privilege did not apply. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Relevant legislative acts and omissions evince a public policy determination by the General Assembly that the type of information sought in discovery here is not subject to a “self-critical analysis privilege.” View "Harris v. One Hope United, Inc." on Justia Law