Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Illinois Department of Labor sent Jack’s Roofing a notice of investigation of possible violation of the Employee Classification Act, 820 ILCS 185/3.25 by misclassifying employees as independent contractors. Jack’s provided the Department with requested information. Preliminary determination found misclassification of 10 individuals for eight to 160 days and calculated a potential penalty of $1,683,000. The Department requested a response within 30 days for consideration before final determination. Less than a month later, the Department sent notice of a second investigation Jack's sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional as violating: the special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution because it subjects the construction industry to more stringent employment standards than other industries; the due process clauses of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions because it does not provide an opportunity to be heard and is impermissibly vague; the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against bills of attainder because it is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial; and the equal protection clauses of both constitutions because no other industry is subjected to the same standards when seeking to hire independent contractors. On remand, the court denied relief, finding the Act valid and enforceable. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part, rejecting facial constitutional challenges. A procedural due process challenge to enforcement provisions has been rendered moot by the recent amendments to the Act, which must be applied to plaintiffs in the future. The court also affirmed that section 10 of the Act is not unconstitutionally vague. Remaining constitutional challenges to the Act were forfeited. View "Bartlow v. Costigan" on Justia Law

In the underlying litigation, the attorney represented a contractor being sued for job-site injuries and was later sued by the contractor’s insurance company for signing settlement agreements without authority. Section 13-214.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3, sets forth a six-year statute of repose for “action[s] for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise … against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services.” The trial court held that the provision barred claims for breach of implied warranty of authority, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation against the attorney. The appellate court reversed, finding that the statute of repose did not apply to an action brought by a non-client of the defendant-lawyer for a cause of action other than legal malpractice. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the dismissal, stating that under the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, the claims “arose out of” the attorney’s actions “in the performance of professional services.” View "Evanston Ins. Co. v. Riseborough" on Justia Law

James, a 60-year old with a lengthy criminal record and a history of psychiatric hospitalizations, has been held involuntarily at the Chester Mental Health Center since 2003, under successive involuntary commitment orders entered after he had reached the mandatory parole date on his criminal sentences. As the most recent order was about to expire, the Chester facility filed a petition under the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-813) alleging that James continued to be subject to involuntary admission, with certificates from a psychiatrist and a psychologist, stating that James was “[a] person with mental illness who, because of his illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future … is unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm.” The petition was filed on April 29, 2010. The court set the matter for May 5, 2010. James’s attorney appeared on that date and obtained an order for independent evaluation. The independent doctor was prepared to testify that James should remain at Chester; on May 19 James’s attorney advised the court that his client had elected to have a jury. James agreed to wait unit the first available jury date in August. At trial on August 23, James expressed surprise that he had a court date and stated that he was not feeling any better. The jury returned a unanimous verdict that James was subject to involuntary admission. The appellate court held that under these particular circumstances, the delay between the jury request and the actual hearing was significant enough to be prejudicial to the patient and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that, given all of his circumstances, the delay following James’s request for a jury trial did not cause him any prejudice.View "In re James W." on Justia Law

Police officers testified that they received a tip that Cregan would arrive by train on November 3, 2009, and that he had an active warrant for his arrest. They learned that he was a member of the Satan Disciples gang and that a civil warrant sought his arrest for failure to pay child support. Officers waited at the train station, approached Cregan, placed him under arrest, and searched his bags. An officer testified that he intended to bring the bags into custody, as Cregan was alone, and that he intended to conduct an inventory search of the bags, pursuant to department policy. Cregan asked if his bags could be turned over to his friend Collins, but the officer told him the bags had to be searched first. Another officer testified that gang members are “known to carry weapons,” so the officers had safety concerns. Cregan testified that when he exited the train Collins was waiting to give him a ride and that he greeted Collins before the officers approached. Officers found a jar of hair gel in the bags. Its appearance was not noteworthy. Opening it, they found a bag containing powder cocaine. Cregan was charged with unlawful possession of less than 15 grams of cocaine, a controlled substance. The court denied his motion to suppress; Cregan was convicted. The appellate court held that the search was valid incident to the arrest, because the bags were immediately associated with his person and was not limited to a brief search for weapons. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding the search lawful incident to the arrest. View "People v. Cregan" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an open plea of guilty to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) and unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1) (count II). The circuit court merged the counts, entered a conviction on count II, and sentenced defendant to 12 years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, alleging it was “excessive” and a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d). At the hearing, defendant asked that his sentence be reduced to seven years so he would be immediately eligible for a drug treatment program. The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court noted that while the 604(d) certificate stated that counsel consulted with defendant about defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence, it did not state that counsel consulted with defendant about defendant’s contentions of error in the guilty plea. The court remanded for a new post-plea motion and hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 604(d) requires counsel to certify that he consulted with the defendant regarding defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the guilty plea, not only regarding contentions of error relevant to the defendant’s post-plea motion. View "People v. Tousignant" on Justia Law

A 17-year-old defendant pled guilty to criminal sexual abuse involving his 16-year-old girlfriend. He was sentenced to pay a $100 fine and serve 300 days in the county jail, with credit for time served. Asked whether there was “any sentence regarding [sex offender] registration?” the trial judge responded, “No.” More than three years later, the defendant moved to vacate the plea and sentence, arguing they were void because the court was required to order him to register. The trial judge denied the motion on the merits. The appellate court majority dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the prosecution opposed alteration of the prior judgment, precluding the trial court from reacquiring jurisdiction over defendant’s case under the doctrine of revestment. The court should have dismissed defendant's post-judgment motion to vacate his plea and sentence for lack of jurisdiction. View "People v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 2009 plaintiffs challenged, under the Illinois Constitution, the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995, which prevents a minor from obtaining an abortion unless a parent or guardian is first given notice of the minor’s intention or the minor obtains judicial waiver of the requirement. The Act has never been enforced. Months earlier, the Seventh Circuit had held the Act facially valid under the U.S. Constitution. The trial court dismissed the challenge. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, noting the heavy burden in asserting facial invalidity. In Illinois, the right to an abortion derives from substantive due process principles, not from the constitutional privacy provision. State due process protections should be interpreted the same way as the federal due process clause, absent a reason for doing otherwise. The U.S. Supreme Court has found parental notification statutes constitutional under federal substantive due process and equal protection law. Although the state constitution includes a privacy provision not found in the U.S. Constitution, “reasonableness is the touchstone” of that clause,” and the Act is reasonable, having been narrowly crafted to promote minors’ best interests. The Illinois Constitution also contains a clause stating that “equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex,” but the Act does not create a sex-based classification.View "Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 1998 the Gillespie School District hired Wight under for services preliminary to the actual designing and construction of a new elementary school building. Wight agreed to perform a “site mine investigation.” Wight hired Hanson Engineers to assess the potential for coal mine subsidence. A physical engineer at Hanson sent a letter to Wight, noting recorded subsidence events, including five to six events since 1979, affecting more than 40 structures in the area. The letter stated: “No one can predict when or if the land above the roof-and-pillar mine will subside… The owner should consider the fact that there is no economically feasible corrective action… to guarantee against future subsidence… it can be intuitively concluded that there is a relatively high risk of subsidence in the Benld/Gillespie area. The letter was not attached to the report, which noted some of its highlights. The school was built and occupied, but in 2009 was severely damaged as the result of subsidence and was condemned. The District sued Wight, alleging professional negligence, breach of implied warranty, and fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment of material fact. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Wight, based on statutes of limitations applicable to the claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that it was expressing no opinion concerning the merits of various claims. View "Gillespie Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 7 v. Wight & Co." on Justia Law

S.L., the daughter of Julia, born in 2002, was adjudicated abused or neglected in 2007, and was made a ward of the court in January 2008, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b). The conditions that gave rise to her removal were insect bites, apparent dog bites, substantial bruising to her shoulder and groin, and unclean living conditions. At each of five subsequent permanency hearings, the goal was for S.L. to return to Julia within 12 months, while custody remained with the Department of Children and Family Service. In July 2010, the goal was changed to substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Julia was continuously represented by counsel. In November 2011, the state sought termination of parental rights, alleging that Julia failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal and was unable to discharge parental responsibilities de to mental impairment. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding of unfitness because the state did not file a separate notice under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii), identifying which nine-month periods were the subject of the termination proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the finding, noting that Julia did not allege any harm as a result of the defect in notice. Failure to file the separate notice pleading was a pleading defect, not a failure to state a cause of action, and was forfeited by Julia because she failed to raise the issue in the trial court.View "In re S.L." on Justia Law

Elliott was arrested for driving under the influence, 625 ILCS 5/11-501 and given notice of the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license. On September 1, 2009, he filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension. On October 11, the statutory summary suspension commenced. Two days later, on October 13, 2009, defendant was pulled over in another county and cited for driving on a suspended license, 625 ILCS 5/6-303. On October 19 the circuit court granted petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. Four days later, the Secretary of State entered an order of rescission, removing the statutory summary suspension from Elliott’s driving record. Elliott sought dismissal of the pending citation for driving on a suspended license. The trial court rejected his arguments and he was found guilty of driving on a suspended license. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that rescinding the suspension is not simply terminating the suspension, but undoes the action so that it never existed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction, holding that rescission of a statutory summary suspension is of prospective effect only. View "People v. Elliott" on Justia Law