Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued Dr. Murphy and his employer, ECHO, alleging that Murphy was negligent in treating Anderson, who suffered a severe and permanent brain injury following emergency room treatment. ECHO billed Anderson for services physicians provided him during a previous emergency room visit, but did not bill for Murphy’s services during the Code Blue that resulted in his injury. The hospital billed Anderson for supplies used during the Code Blue. The circuit court concluded that Murphy was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, 745 ILCS 49/25. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Act was meant to apply to volunteers, not to those who treat patients within the scope of their employment and are compensated for doing so. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Act provides “Any person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United States who, in good faith, provides emergency care without fee to a person, shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the person, in providing the care, be liable for civil damages.” Murphy was fully compensated for his time that day. He responded to the emergency not because he was volunteering to help but because it was his job to do so. The agreement that ECHO had with the hospital and the agreement that ECHO had with Murphy require that ECHO physicians to comply with hospital policies, and the hospital’s written policy was that emergency room physicians were to respond to Code Blues. The legislature never intended that Good Samaritan immunity would be available in this situation.View "Home Star Bank & Fin. Servs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., Ltd." on Justia Law

Mitchell executed a promissory note, secured by a mortgage on her Chicago home. Four years later, the lender filed a complaint to foreclose the mortgage. The special process server’s affidavit described substituted service: process was left at Mitchell’s residence with her daughter, Foreman, who lived at the residence. Mitchell did not answer. The lender mailed notice of intent to move for judgment of foreclosure and sale on June 9, 2010. On June 3, the lender moved for an order of default. On June 9, the court granted the motions. A notice of sale was mailed to Mitchell’s address and a judicial sale was held on September 13. On August 2, 2011, the lender sought an order of confirmation. Notice of the motion was mailed to Mitchell. The circuit court confirmed the sale on September 14. On October 12, Mitchell filed an appearance and a motion to vacate the order, asserting that “to the best of her knowledge” she was never served, had not received notice of the motion for default judgment, had been informed that a loan modification was approved, and did not receive notice of the September 14 order. She later withdrew her motion and moved to quash the order or, in the alternative, for relief from judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, and the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 735 ILCS 5/15-15083. Mitchell asserted her only child is a son and she does not know anyone named Foreman. The circuit court denied the motion. The lender subsequently argued that Mitchell waived objections to jurisdiction by filing a post-judgment motion to vacate. The appellate court noted that failure to comply with statutory requirements results in waiver of “all objections to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person” and that Mitchell’s waiver “worked prospectively and retroactively.” The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that waiver of personal jurisdiction is prospective only and does not serve to validate retroactively orders entered without personal jurisdiction. View "BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Clark was indicted under 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) for having used an eavesdropping device to record a conversation between himself and attorney Thomas without her consent and having used a device to record a conversation between himself, Judge Janes, and Thomas while Janes was acting in the performance of official duties, without the consent of either. Defendant stated that he was in court and attorney Thomas was representing the opposing party; there was no court reporter nor was there any recording device, so he made recordings to preserve the record. He claimed he had a first amendment right to gather information by recording officials performing their public duties. The circuit court dismissed, holding that the statute is unconstitutional on substantive due process and first amendment grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that if another person overhears what we say, that person may write it down and publish it, but if that same person records our words with a recording device, even if it is not published in any way, a criminal act has been committed. The statute goes too far in its effort to protect individuals’ interest in the privacy of their communications and burdens substantially more speech than necessary to serve interests it may legitimately serve. It does not meet the requirements necessary to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

The circuit court dissolved the Tiballi marriage in 2005, awarding joint legal custody of daughter Francesca, but placing residential custody with Sheila. In 2010, Robert sought to modify custody. The court appointed a psychologist to advise it pursuant to the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/604(b), dismissed the petition, and ordered Robert to pay the fees of that psychologist. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting Robert’s argument that the psychologist’s fees were not “costs” under the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1009(a). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Requiring a party who has his custody petition dismissed without prejudice, for non-abusive reasons, to automatically bear the full cost of a section 604(b) evaluator is beyond the scope of the Code and the Marriage Act. The Marriage Act is the specific statute that controls the matter and evaluator fees are not “court costs” within the meaning of the Code or Civil Procedure. When the circuit court appointed the section 604(b) evaluator, it ordered the parties to share equally in his fees without prejudice to ultimate allocation. The court never made that ultimate allocation because of its mistaken belief that section 2-1009 mandated the fees be taxed entirely to Robert as costs.View "In re Marriage of Tiballi" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving a van owned by Chattic when a marked police squad car pulled alongside at a stop sign. The police officer followed defendant for several minutes before activating the squad car’s lights. The defendant had not violated any traffic laws. The citations he received were unrelated to the movement or condition of the van. The officer testified that “It appeared that the registration on the vehicle had expired.” He checked its registration and learned that the registration was valid, but that the owner, Chattic, was wanted on a warrant. He was unable to determine whether the driver was a woman. After he determined that the driver was a man, the officer asked the defendant for a driver’s license and proof of insurance and explained why he stopped the van. The defendant had no license and received a citation for driving while license suspended, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d), a Class 4 felony. According to the officer, asking for a license and proof of insurance is “standard operating procedure. The trial court granted a motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed, stating “Except where there is articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or the vehicle is unregistered, or that either the motorist or vehicle is in violation of the law, stopping and detaining a motorist in order to check his credentials is unreasonable under the fourth amendment.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Unless a request for identification is related to the reason for the stop, it impermissibly extends the stop and violates the Constitution.View "People v. Cummings" on Justia Law

In 1990, defendant, then 14 years old, was arrested for two fatal shootings. Following a discretionary hearing under the Juvenile Court Act, the court allowed defendant to be prosecuted under the criminal laws. He was convicted of two first degree murders, attempted first degree murders of two others, and home invasion. Because defendant was convicted of murdering more than one victim, the Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c), required a term of natural life imprisonment, with parole not available. He was also sentenced to 30 years for each attempted murder and home invasion, all to run concurrently. The appellate court affirmed. In 1996-1998 defendant filed three post-conviction petitions. All were dismissed; the appellate court affirmed the dismissals. In 2002, defendant filed another petition, arguing that the natural life sentence was unconstitutional because defendant did not actually participate in the act of killing; that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment; and that the statute requiring a mandatory life sentence violated the Illinois Constitution as applied to a 14-year-old. The circuit court dismissed, noting that defendant carried a weapon and actually entered the abode where the murders occurred. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant another petition in 2011, arguing violation of the Eighth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Graham v. Florida, and ineffective assistance because counsel failed to interview an eyewitness before the juvenile hearing. The court denied the petition. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama (2012), that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” The appellate court concluded that Miller applies retroactively on post-conviction review and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, but upheld denial of the ineffective assistance claim. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

Chicago Officers testified that: Officer Watson was working undercover narcotics surveillance, seated in a covert vehicle, and saw defendant exit a Nissan and walk in front of his car. Watson observed defendant pull a weapon from his coat pocket, start to shoot, running toward a pedestrian. The individual turned and ran, grabbing his side. Defendant fired six shots, then returned to the Nissan. Watson radioed his team with a description of defendant and the vehicle and followed the vehicle. Officer Humpich also followed the Nissan for five blocks. The Nissan stopped. Jackson exited and began to run. Officer Utreras also pursued the vehicle and saw defendant exit the Nissan and start to run. Utreras exited his vehicle and identified himself. Defendant stopped running and said, “I didn’t shoot nobody. I just picked up the gun.” Utreras had not asked about the shooting. Utreras recovered a handgun from defendant’s coat pocket and six spent shell casings. Defendant had a prior conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Defendant testified that he was a passenger in the Nissan, driven by Williams, and that Williams fired the shots. Defendant stated that he did not have a gun, that he never touched the gun, and that “[he] did not have nothing to say to the police.” Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and sentenced to nine years in prison. The appellate court agreed with defendant’s argument, raised for the first time, that the state charged him with the offense of unlawful use of a weapon as a felon without providing notice that it intended to charge him with an “enhanced” Class 2 offense, so that his sentence violated section 111-3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed that holding, but affirmed the appellate court’s holding that defendant’s sentence did not constitute improper double enhancement.View "People v. Easley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with computer tampering in an unrelated case. The docket sheet, the judge’s half sheet, and the court call sheet for the arraignment date indicate that defendant was not in court and that the arraignment did not take place. Defendant’s efforts to have a court reporter change the transcript were unsuccessful. The court reporter referred defendant to her supervisor, Taylor. In a telephone conversation, Taylor explained that any dispute over the accuracy of a transcript should be presented to the judge. Defendant surreptitiously recorded three telephone conversations with Taylor and posted recordings and transcripts of the conversations on her website. Defendant eventually obtained a fraudulent court transcript. Defendant was charged with eavesdropping, (720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), and using or divulging information obtained through the use of an eavesdropping device, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3). Defendant claimed am exception for “reasonable suspicion that another party to the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense against the person … and there is reason to believe that evidence of the criminal offense may be obtained.” The state argued that the exception did not apply because the reporter accused of creating a forged transcript was not a party to the recorded conversations. After a mistrial, the court found the statute facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding the statutes overbroad as criminalizing a range of innocent conduct. The eavesdropping statute does not distinguish between open and surreptitious recording and burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to serve a legitimate state interest in protecting conversational privacy. The language of the recording statute criminalizes the publication of any recording made on a cellphone or other such device, regardless of consent. View "People v. Melongo" on Justia Law

Officer Salgado attempted to stop a man (Gonzalez) he saw breaking into a car. Gonzalez fired several shots at Salgado, who returned fire. Gonzalez jumped into the car driven by Fernandez. The two escaped the scene. Salgado later identified Fernandez and Gonzalez from a photo lineup. Fernandez returned home, bleeding from a gunshot to his hand. The vehicle he was driving, which belonged to his sister, was found and had bullet holes in several places. Gonzalez also had a gunshot wound. Fernandez was found guilty by accountability of one count of burglary, 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a), and two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of a peace officer, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(3)). The trial court merged the convictions into a single count of aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of a peace officer and sentenced him to 12 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the aggravated discharge of a firearm conviction.View "People v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

Spanish Court Condominium Association filed a complaint under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, 735 ILCS 5/9-101, against Carlson, a unit owners, who allegedly had failed to pay monthly assessments for six months. Carlson admitted that she had not paid her assessments, but denied that she owed those assessments, alleging that she incurred water damage to her unit because Spanish Court failed to properly maintain the roof directly above her unit. She asserted “Breach of Covenants” and “Set-Off” for failure to maintain the roof and that Spanish Court failed to repair or replace her toilet, which was rendered inoperable during the investigation of a water leak in an adjoining unit. The trial court granted Spanish Court’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses and entered an agreed order awarding possession of Carlson’s unit to Spanish Court, and a money judgment for unpaid assessments. The appellate court vacated and remanded for reinstatement of Carlson’s affirmative defenses relating to the roof. The appellate court analogized to a landlord/tenant situation, viewing the obligation to pay assessments, and the obligation to repair and maintain the common elements, as mutually exchanged promises. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the failure to repair is not germane to the forcible proceeding.View "Spanish Court Two Condo. Ass'n v. Carlson" on Justia Law