Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered an open plea of guilty to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) and unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1) (count II). The circuit court merged the counts, entered a conviction on count II, and sentenced defendant to 12 years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, alleging it was “excessive” and a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d). At the hearing, defendant asked that his sentence be reduced to seven years so he would be immediately eligible for a drug treatment program. The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court noted that while the 604(d) certificate stated that counsel consulted with defendant about defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence, it did not state that counsel consulted with defendant about defendant’s contentions of error in the guilty plea. The court remanded for a new post-plea motion and hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 604(d) requires counsel to certify that he consulted with the defendant regarding defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the guilty plea, not only regarding contentions of error relevant to the defendant’s post-plea motion. View "People v. Tousignant" on Justia Law

A 17-year-old defendant pled guilty to criminal sexual abuse involving his 16-year-old girlfriend. He was sentenced to pay a $100 fine and serve 300 days in the county jail, with credit for time served. Asked whether there was “any sentence regarding [sex offender] registration?” the trial judge responded, “No.” More than three years later, the defendant moved to vacate the plea and sentence, arguing they were void because the court was required to order him to register. The trial judge denied the motion on the merits. The appellate court majority dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the prosecution opposed alteration of the prior judgment, precluding the trial court from reacquiring jurisdiction over defendant’s case under the doctrine of revestment. The court should have dismissed defendant's post-judgment motion to vacate his plea and sentence for lack of jurisdiction. View "People v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 2009 plaintiffs challenged, under the Illinois Constitution, the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995, which prevents a minor from obtaining an abortion unless a parent or guardian is first given notice of the minor’s intention or the minor obtains judicial waiver of the requirement. The Act has never been enforced. Months earlier, the Seventh Circuit had held the Act facially valid under the U.S. Constitution. The trial court dismissed the challenge. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, noting the heavy burden in asserting facial invalidity. In Illinois, the right to an abortion derives from substantive due process principles, not from the constitutional privacy provision. State due process protections should be interpreted the same way as the federal due process clause, absent a reason for doing otherwise. The U.S. Supreme Court has found parental notification statutes constitutional under federal substantive due process and equal protection law. Although the state constitution includes a privacy provision not found in the U.S. Constitution, “reasonableness is the touchstone” of that clause,” and the Act is reasonable, having been narrowly crafted to promote minors’ best interests. The Illinois Constitution also contains a clause stating that “equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex,” but the Act does not create a sex-based classification.View "Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 1998 the Gillespie School District hired Wight under for services preliminary to the actual designing and construction of a new elementary school building. Wight agreed to perform a “site mine investigation.” Wight hired Hanson Engineers to assess the potential for coal mine subsidence. A physical engineer at Hanson sent a letter to Wight, noting recorded subsidence events, including five to six events since 1979, affecting more than 40 structures in the area. The letter stated: “No one can predict when or if the land above the roof-and-pillar mine will subside… The owner should consider the fact that there is no economically feasible corrective action… to guarantee against future subsidence… it can be intuitively concluded that there is a relatively high risk of subsidence in the Benld/Gillespie area. The letter was not attached to the report, which noted some of its highlights. The school was built and occupied, but in 2009 was severely damaged as the result of subsidence and was condemned. The District sued Wight, alleging professional negligence, breach of implied warranty, and fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment of material fact. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Wight, based on statutes of limitations applicable to the claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that it was expressing no opinion concerning the merits of various claims. View "Gillespie Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 7 v. Wight & Co." on Justia Law

S.L., the daughter of Julia, born in 2002, was adjudicated abused or neglected in 2007, and was made a ward of the court in January 2008, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b). The conditions that gave rise to her removal were insect bites, apparent dog bites, substantial bruising to her shoulder and groin, and unclean living conditions. At each of five subsequent permanency hearings, the goal was for S.L. to return to Julia within 12 months, while custody remained with the Department of Children and Family Service. In July 2010, the goal was changed to substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Julia was continuously represented by counsel. In November 2011, the state sought termination of parental rights, alleging that Julia failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal and was unable to discharge parental responsibilities de to mental impairment. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding of unfitness because the state did not file a separate notice under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii), identifying which nine-month periods were the subject of the termination proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the finding, noting that Julia did not allege any harm as a result of the defect in notice. Failure to file the separate notice pleading was a pleading defect, not a failure to state a cause of action, and was forfeited by Julia because she failed to raise the issue in the trial court.View "In re S.L." on Justia Law

Elliott was arrested for driving under the influence, 625 ILCS 5/11-501 and given notice of the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license. On September 1, 2009, he filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension. On October 11, the statutory summary suspension commenced. Two days later, on October 13, 2009, defendant was pulled over in another county and cited for driving on a suspended license, 625 ILCS 5/6-303. On October 19 the circuit court granted petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. Four days later, the Secretary of State entered an order of rescission, removing the statutory summary suspension from Elliott’s driving record. Elliott sought dismissal of the pending citation for driving on a suspended license. The trial court rejected his arguments and he was found guilty of driving on a suspended license. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that rescinding the suspension is not simply terminating the suspension, but undoes the action so that it never existed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction, holding that rescission of a statutory summary suspension is of prospective effect only. View "People v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Hommerson was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to a term of natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petition did not contain a verification affidavit pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b). The circuit court dismissed the petition solely on that basis. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that a petition lacking a verification affidavit was frivolous and patently without merit. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the dismissal elevated form over substance. The legislative intent was that compliance with technical requirements was a matter for second stage review, after review of the merits of the claim. View "People v. Hommerson" on Justia Law

McChriston was convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony that carried a mandatory Class X sentence. The trial judge sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment. The order did not indicate that he would also be required to serve a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) under the Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d), nor did the judge mention MSR at the sentencing hearing. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentencing on direct appeal. McChriston filed a pro se post-conviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, raising issues not related to the MSR term. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. He filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that the Department of Corrections (DOC) impermissibly added a three-year MSR term to his sentence. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting arguments that imposition of the MSR term violated constitutional rights to due process and the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The MSR term attached by operation of law and was not unconstitutionally imposed by the DOC. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the trial court had no discretion with respect to MSR. View "People v. McChriston" on Justia Law

Boyd, a female bartender filed a complaint with the Cook County Commission on Human Rights alleging that she was sexually harassed by her employer, Crittenden. The Commission entered awarded her $41,670 in lost wages, $5,000 in compensatory damages, $5,000 in punitive damages, and attorney fees and costs. The circuit court affirmed. The appellate court upheld the order and grant of compensatory damages, but reversed the award of punitive damages. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Although Cook County is a home rule unit, and although home rule units may authorize their local units and boards to award punitive damages, the ordinance at issue does not expressly authorize punitive damages. The Commission is an administrative agency, with no common law powers. Its authority is limited to what is granted in the ordinance. Punitive damages are not favored in the law and more protections are afforded in litigation than are available in administrative proceedings. View "Crittenden v. Cook Cnty. Comm'n on Human Rights" on Justia Law

The Illinois Tax Delinquency Amnesty Act established a period, October 1, 2003 until November 17, 2003, during which "all taxes due" from 1983 through the first half of 2002 could be paid without interest or penalties. Tax liabilities not paid within the amnesty period would incur interest at 200%. Illinois Department of Revenue regulations provided that a taxpayer participating in the program must pay its entire tax liability regardless of whether that liability was known to the Department or the taxpayer. Those who were unsure of their tax liability were to pay a good-faith estimate during the amnesty period. An audit of the plaintiffs’ federal tax returns for 1998 and 1999 began in 2000 and ended in 2004, after the amnesty period expired and caused changes in their Illinois tax liability. The plaintiffs paid the taxes, along with single interest, but the Department assessed an interest penalty of 200%, (more than $2 million), which they paid under protest before filing suit. The circuit and appellate courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in favor of the Department. The phrase “all taxes due” means taxes due when initial returns are required to be filed, rather than taxes known to be due during the amnesty period. Taxpayers who were under IRS audit and were, therefore, uncertain about their ultimate Illinois tax liability could participate in the amnesty program by making a good-faith estimate pursuant to the regulations and making payment based on it. There was no constitutional violation because those in the plaintiffs’ position had an opportunity to avoid 200% interest by making a good-faith estimate of tax liability and paying it during the amnesty period, with the possibility of a refund. View "Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamer" on Justia Law