Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Unit owner Palm had a dispute with his condominium association, and sought access to records and financial information. Chicago, a home rule unit, has an ordinance that requires production within three business days. Production was resisted on the theory that the ordinance was beyond the city’s home rule authority because state statutes allow 30 days to respond to such requests, and, unlike the ordinance, limit the age of the requested documents to 10 years, and require that a proper purpose be stated. The trial court ordered production; the appellate and supreme courts affirmed, finding the ordinance a valid exercise of home rule power. If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home rule powers by statute, the statute must contain an express statement to that effect. The home rule provisions of the Illinois Constitution are intended to eliminate, or reduce to a bare minimum, circumstances under which local home rule powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intent. Comprehensive legislation which conflicts with an ordinance is insufficient to limit or restrict home rule authority. If the legislature wishes to deny or restrict the city’s authority, it may enact a statute so providing.View "Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Dr. Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

While patrolling a motel parking area, police approached defendant’s car and saw, in plain view in the center console, a large bullet. They ordered defendant and his passengers out of the car, handcuffed hem, found several more bullets in the car and on defendant’s person, then found a .454 revolver under a floor mat on the front passenger side. The circuit court suppressed all of the evidence, concluding that the challenged police conduct subjected defendant to an unlawful search without probable cause because the bullet did not establish evidence of a crime. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The parties agree that the officers’ initial approach and their questioning of defendant was lawful. The officers were in a vulnerable situation when they observed the bullet. It was dusk and the officers were on foot in a parking lot away from their vehicle; they were outnumbered by defendant and his two passengers, who were in a running car. The officers were forced to make a quick decision based on limited information after seeing the bullet. A reasonably cautious individual in a similar situation could reasonably suspect the presence of a gun, implicating officer safety.View "People v. Colyar" on Justia Law

In 2003, Domagala, a live-in caretaker, was seen repeatedly striking and pressing the throat of his 84-year-old charge, Stanley. Approximately a week after being taken to the emergency room, Stanley was discharged to a nursing home with a feeding tube in place. While in the nursing home, Stanley pulled out the tube several times causing peritonitis, a systemic infection, which ultimately led to his death. Domagala was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 40 years. He filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to conduct a diligent investigation to discover that a superseding, intervening cause, i.e., gross negligence of treating medical staff, and not petitioner’s conduct, caused the death of the victim. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that Domagala is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.View "People v. Domagala" on Justia Law

In 2006, defendant was indicted for aggravated battery and mob action. Multiple continuance motions were filed by defendant and the state. When the case was called for jury trial in May 2010, the victim-witnesses had not arrived. The judge began jury selection, over defense counsel’s objection, although the defendant had not arrived. When the witnesses had not arrived, more than 90 minutes later, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and entered a written order stating that the “matter is dismissed.” The appellate court held that that the order was an appealable dismissal of charges rather than a nonappealable acquittal, then reversed and remanded for trial. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Normally jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn, but under these unique facts, the defendant was never at risk of conviction. The state indicated it would not participate prior to the jury being sworn. The court stated that it understood the court’s frustration regarding delays and its desire to control its docket, but “cannot countenance proceedings which the court labels as a ‘trial” but which simply prove to be ‘a sham [or] artifice employed by the trial judge to achieve the result of a dismissal with prejudice for want of prosecution.’”View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Lloyd was convicted of seven counts of criminal sexual assault under 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(2). The victim was 13 years old and had known Lloyd all of her life. The appellate court affirmed six of his convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court held that all seven convictions must be reversed. The state was required to prove that Lloyd committed an act of sexual penetration with the victim and that he knew either that she was unable to understand the nature of the act or that she was unable to give knowing consent. Lloyd’s knowledge of the victim’s age, alone, was insufficient to prove that he knew the victim was unable to understand the nature of the sex acts or give knowing consent. The court criticized the state’s decision not to charge aggravated criminal sexual abuse, for which the evidence was sufficient, stating that it is “more than unfortunate that the State chose to prosecute this case in a manner that required the minor victim … to answer questions as to her motivation or willingness to engage in sexual activity … and about her sexual education.” View "People v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

In 2003, Russell, the sole occupant and pilot of an Agusta 109C helicopter, died after his helicopter crashed in Illinois. Russell, a resident of Georgia, was living in Illinois and working for an Illinois air ambulance service operating in the Chicago area. The helicopter was manufactured in Italy in 1989. The trial court dismissed claims against SNFA, a French company that manufactured a custom tail-rotor bearing for the helicopter, for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Agusta and its American subsidiary, AAC, effectively operated as an American distributor for the tail-rotor bearings in the U.S. market and that SNFA custom manufactured the bearings at issue specifically for Agusta. By engaging a business entity located in Illinois, SNFA undoubtedly benefitted from Illinois’ system of laws, infrastructure, and business climate and has the requisite minimum contacts with Illinois for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable; Illinois has an indisputable interest in resolving litigation stemming from a fatal Illinois helicopter accident.View "Russell v. SNFA" on Justia Law

The ability of consumers to make purchases on the internet from out-of-state merchants without paying Illinois sales or use taxes caused Illinois retailers to ask the legislature to “level the playing field.” The result was a taxing statute, Public Act 96-1544, effective in 2011, called the “click-through” nexus law. The law was challenged by a group of internet publishers that display website texts or images, such as a retailer’s logo, containing a link to a retailer’s website; they are compensated by the retailer when a consumer clicks on the link and makes a purchase from the retailer. Out-of-state retailers who use such arrangements to generate sales of over $10,000 per year become subject to taxation under the statute. Their challenge was based on the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, which prohibits discriminatory taxes on electronic transactions, and the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute is invalid. The court noted that such marketing, when conducted through print media or on-the-air broadcasting, does not give rise to tax obligations under the Illinois statute. The enactment is a discriminatory tax on electronic commerce within the meaning of federal law, which preempts it. The court did not reach the commerce clause issue. View "Performance Mktg. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamer" on Justia Law

A February 2008 automobile accident resulted in the death of the driver who was purportedly at fault. His son was issued letters of office to serve as independent administrator of the driver’s estate. The limitations period for plaintiff’s claim of personal injuries was two years. Just before that limitations period was to expire, plaintiff filed suit, apparently unaware of the driver’s death. Her action against a dead person was invalid. Attempts to serve process were unsuccessful, but a special process server eventually notified the plaintiff that the defendant was dead. The Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/13-209, allows a two-year extension of the limitations period under certain conditions, including when a plaintiff moves to substitute the decedent’s personal representative as defendant. The plaintiff did not do so, but obtained the circuit court’s permission to have an employee of plaintiff’s attorney appointed as “special administrator” to defend the estate, a procedure that has no statutory authorization. The circuit court dismissed the action on limitations grounds, but the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Upon learning of the defendant’s demise, the plaintiff should have sought leave to amend the complaint to substitute as defendant the decedent’s son, as decedent’s personal representative, and should have then served process on that representative. The plaintiff failed to use reasonable diligence. View "Relf v. Shatayeva" on Justia Law

In 1998 Prazen retired as superintendent of the City of Peru electrical department. He had more than 27 years of service and purchased five years of age-enhancement credit. Prazen had an unincorporated electrical business, which was incorporated just before he retired. Before he retired, the City entered into an agreement with his corporation for operation of the City’s electrical department, including management and supervision. First year compensation under the contract was about $7,000 higher than Prazen’s prior annual salary. The relationship lasted until 2009, when the corporation was dissolved. In 2010, the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund notified Prazen that, after participating in the early retirement incentive plan, he had violated the statutory prohibitions (40 ILCS 5/7-141.1(g)) against returning to work. The Fund recalculated his years of service as 27 and claimed he should repay $307,100 as a statutory forfeiture. The circuit court agreed. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The work done between 1999 and 2009 was done by a separate corporate entity and was not precluded by statute. If the legislature had wanted to specifically prohibit this, it could have said so. The statute does not show intent to prohibit outsourcing to a retired employee’s corporation and the legislature did not grant the Trustees of the Fund authority to find that a corporation was a “guise.” The court noted that, earlier in the period under consideration, the Board had expressed the view that what the arrangement was p View "Prazen v. Shoop" on Justia Law

When an insurance company authorized to transact business in Illinois becomes insolvent and unable to pay claims, the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund pays those claims after an order is entered liquidating the company, 215 ILCS 5/532. A cap on individual claims is inapplicable to workers compensation claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1. The plaintiff is the successor to Wells, a manufacturer. A Wells employee was seriously injured on the job in 1985, and, in 1993, the Industrial Commission ordered weekly lifetime benefits for total, permanent disability. Wells began to make the payments directly to the employee. Wells was self-insured, but had excess insurance from Home Insurance. After Wells’ payments to the injured employee reached $200,000, Home paid benefits until Home became insolvent in 2003 and was liquidated. The Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund took over Home’s obligations, but stopped paying the employee in 2005, arguing that payments to an excess, rather than a primary, insurer were not payments of “workers’ compensation claims” exempted from the cap. Wells continued paying the employee and sought a declaration that the Fund’s payments should continue. The circuit court agreed with Wells, awarding summary judgment, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the distinctions made by the Fund between excess and primary coverage and between payments made directly or indirectly to employees. View "Skokie Castings, Inc. v. IL Ins. Guar. Fund" on Justia Law