Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Peoria School District employs 26 full-time and part-time individuals who work as security agents and guards. No other Illinois school district has this type of employee. These employees were represented by a union certified by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board since 1989. The last collective-bargaining agreement expired in June, 2010. In July, 2010, a statutory amendment, Public Act 96-1257, purported to remove these employees from the oversight of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board and redefine them as “public employees” subject to the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act and the jurisdiction of the Illinois Labor Relations Board. The School District sought a declaration that its labor disputes with these employees were governed by the statute concerning educational employees, rather than by the one concerning public employees, challenging the enactment as invalid “special legislation,” forbidden by the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed without remand, holding that the challenged statute is invalid as forbidden special legislation because its language does not apply prospectively to school districts which may, after its effective date, employ peace officers. Although a general law could have been passed which would have affected a generic class of individuals, here, the affected class was closed on the effective date of the enactment. View "Bd. of Educ. of Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150 v. Peoria Fed'n of Support Staff" on Justia Law

The underlying divorce proceedings were initiated by the husband in 2010 through his attorney, James, and were complicated because the couple had a three-year-old son. Both parties had debts and neither was able to pay attorney fees, but husband’s family contributed more than $8,000 on his behalf, which was paid to James. When James received the money, husband signed an agreement, designating the sum as an “advance retainer” and the attorney’s property, not placed in a client trust account. Citing the “leveling of the playing field” provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the trial court entered a “disgorgement” order for James to turn over to wife’s attorney half of the fees paid to him ($4,000). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Marriage Act reflects a policy of giving trial courts discretion to do equity in dissolution proceeding by making interim fee awards where parties lack resources. Case law and ethics rules concerning attorney fees come from a different context and are not pertinent to marriage dissolution. The advance payment retainer argued by James might be appropriate in some circumstances, such as bankruptcy or a forfeiture proceeding. View "In re Marriage of Earlywine" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted for participation in a 1994 Peoria home invasion and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 30 years for armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The appellate court affirmed; Coleman was unsuccessful in initial post-conviction claims. He claimed actual innocence in a 2009 successive post-conviction petition. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Coleman called eight witnesses and the state called an investigating detective. The trial court denied relief, finding that Coleman’s evidence was insufficient to probably change the result on retrial. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered a new trial. To succeed on a post-conviction claim of actual innocence, a claimant must present new, material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial. Although the state’s evidence at the original trial was sufficient to convict, there was no forensic evidence linking Coleman to the attack, and the prosecution’s identifications were significantly impeached. At the post-conviction hearing, Coleman presented the testimony of five men who admitted that they were present at the crime scene and that he was not. Although their credibility could be challenged based on their voluntary intoxication and criminal records, their testimony was consistent on key details. The evidence was new, material and noncumulative. On retrial, the fact finder can determine the credibility of those witnesses and balance the conflicting accounts. View "People v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2001, a vehicle was fired at eight times by another expressway motorist on the expressway. The driver positively identified the defendant as the shooter several times, and the passenger, seriously injured, also, identified the defendant from a photo array. Convicted, the defendant was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of the passenger and to a consecutive 10-year term for shooting at the driver. He later claimed that he would have accepted a plea bargain rather than go to trial if he had known he could receive consecutive sentences, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed, but the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced. The record showed that the defendant had hoped to prove he was actually innocent and wanted to go to trial. The trial court reasonably found the defendant’s statements to the contrary incredible. The defendant had called a witness to testify that her boyfriend was the shooter, contrary to a signed statement she had given after the incident. The victim testified that he had been offered money to recant. View "People v. Hale" on Justia Law

Boyar died in 2010, suffering from dementia. His will, under which his son Robert was administrator, distributed all property to a trust for the benefit of Boyar’s children and grandchildren. Under the trust, Robert and a bank were named co-trustees, with a provision that a trustee could be removed by beneficiaries. Less than a month before his death, Boyar had executed an amendment naming a lawyer who was his neighbor as trustee, not be subject to removal by beneficiaries. The trust provided that personal property should be divided among the children by their own agreement, which they began to do about a week after the demise. A few weeks later the lawyer informed Robert of the amendment and demanded a personal property itemization. Robert believed that the amendment, not changing substantive dispositions, was orchestrated to permit the lawyer to maintain control of the trust and collect fees. The circuit court rejected a claim of undue influence and dismissed the petition challenging the amendment. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that there was no need to address whether the “doctrine of election” (applicable to will contests) should be extended to living trusts that serve the same purpose as a will, since that doctrine could not be invoked under the circumstances. Allowing Robert to challenge the amendment had no impact on substantive distribution. By accepting the items of personal property, he cannot be said to have made a “choice” that precludes the challenge.View "In re Estate of Boyar" on Justia Law

Fitzpatrick was stopped by a Zion police officer for walking down the middle of a street, a petty offense which violates the Illinois Vehicle Code and was also contrary to municipal ordinance. After a brief pat-down search, Fitzpatrick was placed under arrest and, at the police station, was searched for contraband. Cocaine was found in his sock. Fitzpatrick was charged with possessing fewer than 15 grams of cocaine. He moved to suppress the evidence on a theory that a full custodial arrest for a petty offense violates the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution. The motion was denied and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the issue has been settled under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Fitzpatrick failed to meet his burden of establishing his claim that there is any long-standing Illinois tradition prohibiting arrests for petty offenses. The same meaning should be given to article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution as has been given to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.View "People v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law

Hunter was arrested in 2008 when Chicago police observed him standing in the doorway of a building. A codefendant, on the sidewalk, twice accepted money from a passerby and then nodded to Hunter, who retrieved an item from the vestibule and handed it to the passerby. Police recovered cannabis and handguns from the vestibule. Hunter was charged with possession of cannabis. Bail was set, he was released, and he filed a written demand for trial. Continuances were granted; 175 days after the speedy-trial demand, Hunter was indicted as an armed habitual criminal and on four counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Hunter claimed that the gun-related offenses were known when he was originally charged, were subject to the compulsory joinder statute, and should have been combined with the cannabis charge. He claimed that the speedy-trial statute was violated since he had not been brought to trial on the new charges within 160 days of his original trial demand. The trial court dismissed the new charges. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, holding that the compulsory joinder statute requires that offenses based on the same act and known of by the prosecution must be prosecuted together and are subject to the speedy-trial period of the original charge. The original drug charge remains undisturbed.View "People v. Hunter" on Justia Law

In 2003, a stampede at a Chicago nightclub killed 21 people and injured 50 others. Security guards had released pepper spray to break up a fight on the dance floor, and a rush to the exit crushed these victims. The operators of a restaurant and bar in the building were acquitted on charges of involuntary manslaughter. They were held in indirect criminal contempt for willful violation of court orders concerning building code violations, and received two-year prison sentences. Those orders prohibited occupancy of a suspended mezzanine and occupancy of the second floor of the building. The appellate court ruled that the original orders were not clear and reversed the finding of indirect criminal contempt in 2011. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for consideration of other issues, holding that the jury could have found the defendants guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubtView "People v. Le Mirage, Inc." on Justia Law

A 14-year-old was the subject of a petition to have her adjudicated delinquent based on unlawful consumption of alcohol and other offenses. She pled guilty to the misdemeanor of unlawful consumption of alcohol in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and was sentenced to 18 months of probation. Later that year, the state filed a petition to revoke her probation, claiming that drug testing revealed that she had consumed marijuana and cocaine. She was conveyed to a Department of Juvenile Justices facility. Her sentence has been served. Addressing the issue under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute does not permit a minor to be committed to the Department after being adjudicated delinquent for unlawful consumption of alcohol, being placed on probation with conditions, and then having that probation revoked for violation of those probation conditions. Sentencing for underage drinking is limited by a Juvenile Court Act provision stating that a minor may be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice “only if a term of incarceration is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the offense for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent.” Underage drinking is not an offense of which an adult may be guilty. The court rejected a claim that this juvenile could be incarcerated for having “violated a court order” by noncompliance with probation terms. View "In re Shelby R." on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping and concealment of a homicidal death. He was sentenced to terms of natural life plus 70 years. The appellate court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences and dismissal of his subsequent post-conviction petition,(725 ILCS 5/122-1. Johnson filed a section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment in 2008, which the circuit court erroneously dismissed. The appellate court remanded. The state filed a motion to dismiss his amended petition and requested that Johnson be assessed filing fees and court costs as an inmate filing a frivolous petition, 735 ILCS 5/22-105(a). The trial court dismissed and assessed numerous fees and costs against Johnson, including a $50 fee under the Counties Code, which provides that a State’s Attorney may collect a $50 fee for each day actually employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus. The prosecution argued that the habeas corpus fee applies to all collateral proceedings. The appellate court held that the reference to habeas corpus was generic and applied to all collateral proceedings, in order to deter frivolous filings. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the fee, stating that, although there are several different types of habeas corpus proceedings, the Counties Code provision applies only to those and is not generic. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law