Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Donald died in 2007 at age 84. His will, dated December, 2006, was admitted to probate. The woman he had married one year before execution of that will, Blanca, was named as executor. James, who had been held out by Donald as Donald’s biological son throughout his life, sued Blanca in her individual capacity and as executor, contesting the will. In 2000 James had learned from Donald that James’s mother, who died in 2001, married Donald, after James’ biological father abandoned them. Donald stated that a “secret” adoption had taken place. There is no legal documentation of an adoption. The disputed will states, “I am married to Blanca DeHart. I have no children.” James cited this as evidence of unsound mind and alleged that, during the brief marriage, Blanca became joint tenant on real estate, bank accounts and brokerage accounts worth millions of dollars, and obtained a power of attorney to act on her then-husband’s behalf, exercising control over his real estate dealings and sale of the family farm. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action as to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, contract for adoption and equitable adoption. The court erroneously denied a motion to compel deposition of the attorney who drafted the disputed will.View "DeHart v. DeHart" on Justia Law

In 2006, an 80-year-old man was found strangled to death in his apartment; his garage was empty, but his car was later recovered several blocks away. The keys to the car were in the possession of Bailey when he was arrested in connection with an unrelated incident. Bailey also had the victim’s checkbook and apartment keys. Fingerprints matching Bailey’s were found at the apartment, which was in disarray. Bailey was charged with the homicide and with home invasion and robbery of a senior citizen. He had given incriminating statements to police, but he denied them at trial, although he admitted that he had known the victim and had done odd jobs for him. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder and Bailey received a natural life sentence for the homicide, with concurrent terms for the other offenses. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for resentencing on the homicide under the statute applicable at the time of trial, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a), which provided for a term of not less than 20 nor more than 60 years. The trial court’s refusal to submit separate verdict forms for felony murder brought about the sentence of natural life. View "People v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Blair was convicted of armed robbery for taking $965 from Kelly in 2009 by threatening the use of force while armed with a firearm. The circuit court imposed a 23-year term, which included a 15-year firearm enhancement. In another case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the firearm enhancement was unconstitutional as in violation of the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, based on a comparison to the armed violence statute. Months later, the legislature amended the armed violence statute to provide that robbery cannot serve as a predicate offense for armed violence so that the two offenses no longer have identical elements which could support a proportionate penalties challenge. The appellate court agreed with Blair that the sentence was void ab initio and remanded for resentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and upheld the sentence. The firearm enhancement had merely been declared unenforceable. By amending the armed violence statute, to which the armed robbery provision had been compared, the legislature revived the firearm enhancement for armed robbery with a firearm because there was no longer any issue as to identical offense elements.View "People v. Blair" on Justia Law

Cardona was charged with indecent solicitation of a child and unlawful restraint based on a 2007 incident concerning a girl who was walking home from school. Cardona has never been tried; he was ruled unfit for trial and was transferred to a mental health center. At a statutory “innocence only” or “discharge” hearing, Cardona was acquitted of indecent solicitation, but not of unlawful restraint, on which a finding of “not not guilty” was entered. Before the supreme court, he did not contest the sufficiency of evidence that the offense was sexually motivated, providing a statutory ground for requiring registration as a sex offender. As Cardona’s term of extended treatments was ending and Cardona was still unfit for trial, the state sought to have him certified as a sex offender. The circuit court ordered him to register. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court affirmed, rejecting a due process argument that, if he was unfit for trial, he was also unfit to defend himself against the attempt to force him to register as a sex offender. Although due process bars the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent, registration proceedings are not criminal, and requiring registration is not punishment. The registration is a regulatory scheme. Cardona was represented by appointed counsel and also had an interpreter in the proceeding.View "People v. Cardona" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual misconduct against his stepdaughter in 2007, when she was nine years old. The appellate court reversed his conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault, finding the evidence insufficient. The Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court to consider whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for the uncharged crime of aggravated criminal sexual abuse as a lesser-included offense. The appellate court did so find and remanded for sentencing. The supreme court affirmed, rejecting an argument of forfeiture by the prosecution, noting the authority of reviewing courts to reduce offenses on appeal. The absence of a statutory element from a charging instrument will not prevent a finding that it contains an outline of the lesser offense if any missing element can be inferred. The court noted that the assault charge involves sexual penetration, while the abuse charge involves sexual gratification or arousal. The former was alleged in the indictment; the latter was not. However, the indictment specifically alleged sexual penetration and, from this, the court held that it could be inferred that the misconduct was done for sexual gratification or arousal. The defendant had reasonable notice of the potential for a conviction of the lesser-included offense and had the opportunity to defend against it.View "People v. Kennebrew" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Illinois Department of State Police denied Coram a firearm owners’ identification (FOID) card. The trial judge ordered issuance of the card. The State Police moved to vacate on the basis of Coram’s 1992 domestic battery conviction for slapping his girlfriend. He had pled guilty, but had not served any jail time. The Illinois statute provides for denial of a FOID card to anyone prohibited by federal law from possessing a firearm. In 1996, after Coram’s conviction, the federal Gun Control Act was amended to impose a firearm disability on those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. A different judge confirmed the previous order and, further, held unconstitutional, as applied, language of the federal Gun Control Act which was incorporated into the Illinois statute. Although that federal statutory language provided relief in cases of pardon, expungement of conviction, or restoration of rights after conviction, Coram, who had never served jail time, claimed that these grounds were not available to him under Illinois law. The Illinois Supreme Court resolved the matter without reaching constitutional questions concerning the right to bear arms. It vacated the holding that federal statutory law was unconstitutional as applied, but affirmed the original order directing issuance of a FOID card. Coram had a remedy under the Illinois statutory scheme, which provides a process to review whether an applicant for a FOID card should be perpetually barred from obtaining one or can have his second amendment firearm rights restored because he is determined to currently be a law-abiding, responsible citizen. That is what happened here. View "Coram v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers testified that teenagers were screaming, making gestures, and throwing bottles at passing vehicles in the vicinity of 4217 West 25th Place and then retired to the backyard of that address, which was not the defendant’s residence. Defendant was heard yelling an expletive and was seen with a gun i before he dropped it to the ground. The loaded gun had its serial number scratched off. The defendant testified that police searched the yard, showed him a gun and accused him of dropping it. He denied having a gun that evening. Defendant’s friend corroborated his version of events. Convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), defendant was sentenced to 24 months of probation. He was also found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, but no sentence was imposed for that offense. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon must be reversed, but that the court should impose sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit has held that the “use” statute, which refers to “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible” is effectively “a flat-ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home” and violates the second amendment, which protects both the right to keep and the right to “bear” arms. The other statute, however, prohibits possession of a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person by one who is under 18 years of age. The defendant was 17. Possession of handguns by minors falls outside the scope of the second amendment’s protection. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

The employee alleged that, while at work in 2004, he was involved in an accident that resulted in a condition for which he sought compensation. A Workers’ Compensation Commission arbitrator denied benefits, citing lack of causation, and, in 2009, the Commission adopted the decision. The trial court confirmed the denial. The appellate court vacated, finding that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The employee had calculated the 20-day time period for filing, Workers’ Compensation Act, section 19(f)(1), using the date on which required documents were mailed to the court, rather than the date on which the documents were received and file-stamped. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the so-called “mailbox rule,” which has applied to notices of appeal from the trial to the appellate court and to petitions for the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s review of arbitrators’ decisions, also applies to commencement of an action for judicial review of a Commission decision, which is an exercise of special statutory jurisdiction. Notice to the other party and the statute of limitations were not factors in this case and, absent a clear directive from the legislature, allowing the mailbox rule in such a case is most consistent with Illinois law. View "Gruszeczka v. IL Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with murder and home invasion, remained in custody after his February 8, 2009 arrest. After he was granted several continuances, trial was set for February 1, 2010. The prosecution then requested a continuance because the sole eyewitness could not travel for medical reasons. A second continuance was requested because the technician who had collected evidence was on deployment in Afghanistan. Granting this request brought the trial date to July 19, 2010. Defendant requested dismissal for expiration of his statutory speedy trial period, which he claimed ran out on June 26. The judge dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for trial, rejecting both defendant’s argument that the state may receive no more than a total of 60 days of continuance and the state’s claim that there is no limit to the number of continuances. Under the speedy-trial statute, “if a court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days.” The statute means that the 60-day period is tied to the specific evidence for which the continuance is sought. The prosecution may seek separate continuances to obtain different items of material evidence, but may obtain only one 60-day continuance for each. Awareness that two witnesses are unavailable means that the state should seek a continuance as to both simultaneously, rather than exhausting a continuance as to one and then seeking a continuance as to the other, unnecessarily prolonging proceedings. This defendant did not challenge the state’s due diligence, the materiality of the testimony, or reasonable grounds to believe that the testimony would be obtained at a later date. View "People v. Lacy" on Justia Law

The Chicago Inspector General initiated an investigation of possible improprieties in how a former city employee was awarded a city contract without the normal competitive process. Documents were sought from the city’s law department. Some furnished documents contained redactions, based on attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. The Inspector General issued a subpoena, under the Municipal Code, but when the law department refused to comply, private lawyers were retained. The trial court dismissed, with prejudice, an action seeking an order to produce unredacted documents. The appellate court reversed and remanded for in camera inspection of the unredacted documents to resolve the claims of privilege. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Although the municipal code allows the Inspector General to conduct investigations and issue subpoenas, it does not confer the power to unilaterally retain private counsel to initiate enforcement proceedings or prosecutions in the Inspector General’s own name. The office of the Inspector General is a creature of municipal ordinance, not state statute, and has no legal status apart from the city. The Illinois Municipal Code gives that authority to Corporation Counsel. There are no statutory provisions for appointment of special counsel, even though Corporation Counsel, the one subpoenaed, has a conflict of interest in resisting production by claiming privilege. The Inspector General should look to the mayor for recourse. View "Ferguson v. Patton" on Justia Law