Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1997, at age 15 and without a drivers’ license, Jackson was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. The Secretary of State created a driving record, issued a license number, then suspended the license under 625 ILCS 5/11- 501.1(h). In 1998 he was charged with driving on a suspended license. He was convicted. In 2006 Jackson obtained a new license, answering no to a question as to whether his license had ever been suspended. He was later cited for speeding and driving without insurance. In 2011 he was charged with a Class 4 felony of driving on a suspended license. Jackson argued that the statute denied him due process by preventing him from presenting evidence that he thought he had a valid license. The circuit court declared the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, holding that the case can be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds and was not subject to direct appeal. The issue concerns proof of the elements of the offense, not constitutionality. The defendant is entitled to present evidence that he did possess a valid license, while the state may offer rebuttal that he misled authorities into reinstating his driving privilege by providing erroneous information. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the 2004 shooting death of a man whose body was found in a garbage can. He gave a statement, but would not sign it and did not testify at trial. There was testimony that defendant had stated that he had a homosexual relationship with the victim, that they had argued, and that defendant had shot the victim before dragging the body outside. Police searched defendant’s residence with his consent. It had been cleaned; no inculpatory evidence or usable fingerprints were found. The defense offered testimony as to defendant’s mild retardation. There was testimony that the condition of the body was consistent with having been dropped on the sidewalk and dragged. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, based on purportedly inadequate jury questioning, but, following a supervisory order, affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court then affirmed. The trial court erred in failing to ask prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted the principle that failure to testify should not be held against defendant, and in failing to ask whether they understood three other principles, but the objections were defaulted for failure to raise them during voir dire or by post-trial motion. The evidence was not close. View "People v. Wilmington" on Justia Law

Lake Holiday, a private community, is governed by the Association, which enacted restrictive covenants, rules, and regulations, including rules that concern speed limits, impose fines, provide for enforcement of rules by private security officers, and require residents to provide security officers with identification when requested to do so. Plaintiff owns property in the development and was driving within the development, when a private security officer measured plaintiff’s speed, pulled plaintiff over, took plaintiff’s license, detained plaintiff for a few minutes, and issued a citation. In his third amended complaint plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the practices of the security department were unlawful and that the rules and regulations were void and alleged breach of fiduciary duty and willful and wanton conduct and false imprisonment. The trial court granted defendants summary judgments. The appellate court held that the practice of recording drivers was not a violation of the eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), nor was the security department prohibited from using radar, but that the Association was not authorized by the Vehicle Code to use amber lights on its vehicles and that stopping and detaining drivers for Association rule violations was unlawful. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, in favor of the Association. View "Poris v. Lake Holiday Prop. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

English, was charged with knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)), felony murder predicated on aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3)), and aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a)), based on the death of his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter. Convicted of felony murder and aggravated battery of a child, he was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. The appellate court held that the court did not err by not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter, but that the sentencing statute violated Illinois’ single-subject rule. On remand, he was sentenced to 50 years. While direct appeal was pending, English filed a post-conviction petition, which he voluntarily dismissed in 2003. In 2004, he filed another post-conviction petition, which the court treated as successive and dismissed. The appellate court held that it had no jurisdiction to consider dismissal of the 2004 petition, but that the court erred in declining to reinstate the 1999 petition. On remand, English argued that his felony-murder conviction was improper because the acts constituting the aggravated battery of a child arose from, and were inherent in, the killing. The circuit court denied the petition as barred by res judicata because it was related to the claim raised on direct appeal regarding jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. View "People v. English" on Justia Law

Bjork was a nurse for Dama’s late wife. O’Meara was Dama’s dentist. Dama, then 90 years old, told Bjork that O’Meara had been asking for money and that “he did not want O’Meara to get everything.” Dama’s banker, Williams, informed Bjork that Dama wanted to name Bjork as death-beneficiary on a bank account and sent Bjork a “Power of Attorney,” signed by Dama. Bjork signed and returned it to Williams. Later, Dama signed a power of attorney, appointing O’Meara as agent, and revoking powers previously granted to Bjork, then executed a will, leaving his entire estate to O’Meara. Bjork and Dama remained in contact by mail, telephone, and visits until shortly before Dama’s death. O’Meara filed the will and was appointed independent representative of Dama’s estate. Bjork filed citation petitions (Probate Act, 755 ILCS 5/16-2). After the estate closed, Bjork sued for intentional interference with testamentary expectancy. The circuit court dismissed, citing the six-month limitation period of the Probate Act. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Bjork’s tort claim does not implicate concerns regarding certainty in property rights or efficient estate administration. The probate proceeding did not provide meaningful relief and the claim does not seek to invalidate Dama’s will. View "Bjork v. O'Meara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (ex-wife) and her parents sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant is a psychiatrist who was court-appointed to make recommendations in connection with plaintiff’s custody dispute with her ex-husband, following the 1998 entry of a marriage dissolution judgment. Plaintiff initially requested the evaluation, but was unhappy with the results. Defendant reported that plaintiff and her parents were delusional and that the children should be removed from their mother’s custody and have no further contact with her. A change of custody was granted. The Department of Children and Family Services later made a finding of abuse and neglect against the plaintiff. Plaintiff accused defendant of making false statements and a false evaluation. The trial court dismissed on the basis of res judicata; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on a separate civil rights class action that plaintiff had filed earlier in federal court against defendant and others for their role in custody proceedings. That action was dismissed for the immunity of such evaluators, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.View "Cooney v. Rossiter" on Justia Law

In 2005, a mortgage was entered into as to property in Naperville. The loan was eventually sold to EMC, which obtained a judgment of foreclosure in 2009. The debtor’s request to have the 2009 foreclosure judgment vacated was denied, as was her subsequent motion to reconsider that denial. To both of these adverse orders, Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language (that there was no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal) was added, and the debtor appealed. The appellate court, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. Although a foreclosure judgment is final as to what it adjudicates, it is not appealable until entry of an order approving the sale and directing distribution. The orders to which the circuit court added Rule 304(a) language were not themselves final for purposes of appeal. There is no court rule permitting appeal of the nonfinal orders at issue here, and Rule 304(a) cannot confer appellate jurisdiction where none exists. View "EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Kemp" on Justia Law

The railroad was originally sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in 2002 in Mississippi, where Fennell lived and worked and was allegedly exposed to asbestos. He had also worked for the railroad in Louisiana. In 2006, after discovery, the Mississippi court dismissed without prejudice. In 2009, Fennell refiled in the circuit court of St. Clair County, Illinois. The railroad sought dismissal under the interstate doctrine of forum non conveniens. The circuit court denied the motion; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the circuit court did not consider all of the relevant factors. The citizens of St. Clair County should not be asked to bear the burden of this lawsuit. The majority of the witnesses, including treating physicians, are in Mississippi and not subject to Illinois subpoenas. Although the St. Clair County circuit court cited “almost 80 years of relevant evidence as to the defendant’s knowledge of the exposure to asbestos” that were held by the defendant’s Belleville law firm located in the county, the supreme court ruled that such documents can be copied and that this is not sufficient to tip the balance as to the proper forum. View "Fennell v. IL Cent. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

The parties married in 1977, had three children, and started marriage dissolution proceedings in 2000. In 2001, the circuit court entered judgment of dissolution, reserving ancillary issues. In 2004 the court again entered a dissolution order, still reserving ancillary issues. In 2005, husband sought to establish a property valuation date, contending that it should be the date of dissolution. The trial court held that current values should be used and, initially, set a date of January 1, 2006. Matters were continued until the court held hearings in 2010 and set a new valuation date of December 31, 2010. The circuit court certified a question for interlocutory review: In a bifurcated dissolution proceeding, when a grounds judgment has been entered and there is a lengthy delay before the hearing on ancillary issues, is the appropriate date for valuation of marital property the date of dissolution or a date as close as practicable to the date of trial on ancillary issues? The appellate court held that the date of trial on ancillary matters is the time for evaluation. The supreme court disagreed, holding that the valuation date is the date of dissolution. Once dissolution has been entered, the property in question is no longer marital property.View "In re Marriage of Mathis" on Justia Law

Hernandez developed Parkinson’s disease, allegedly as the result of his exposure to chemicals at Central Steel, where he worked from 1968 to 1995. From 1995 to 1996, Hernandez was represented by a firm that filed a social security disability claim. From 1999 to 2002, he was represented by Bernstein, Grazian and Volpe, who filed a 1999 workers’ compensation claim, alleging chemical exposure at work. A third law firm was retained in 2004 and filed suit for civil damage recovery, strict product liability and negligence lawsuit against various companies involved in the manufacture and sale of those chemicals; that suit dismissed as time-barred. Hernandez alleged that the Bernstein firm should have advised him that he had other ways to recover beyond seeking workers’ compensation benefits and should have advised that he file a legal malpractice action against the first law firm for its failure to file a product liability suit. In 2009 the circuit court dismissed on grounds of res judicata. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the elements of res judicata had not been proven.View "Hernandez v. Pritikin" on Justia Law