Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with attempted murder, armed robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated battery with a firearm. A public defender was appointed, but defendant later successfully requested a different attorney. Defendant subsequently requested to proceed pro se. In granting this request, the trial court admonished him, and defendant waived his right to counsel. He then made motions, causing the matter to be continued. On the morning of trial, defendant stated that he no longer wanted to represent himself and requested a third appointment of counsel. The trial court, noting that defendant had refused to cooperate with two public defenders, viewed the request as a delaying tactic and denied it. The trial commenced with jury selection. Defendant refused to participate without counsel and remained in his holding cell. He later participated without counsel. He did not testify or call witnesses, but made an opening statement and closing argument and cross-examined prosecution witnesses, including four victims. Following conviction, the court imposed a 95-year term. The appellate court found plain error and ordered a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(a)) ambiguous, but concluding that “trial in absentia” provisions were not relevant. The trial court in this case was not statutorily required to appoint a third public defender simply because defendant decided to waive his right to be present during voir dire. View "People v. Eppinger" on Justia Law

In 2005, defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced to 12 years. The appellate court affirmed. In 2008, he filed, pro se, a post-conviction petition. It was dismissed; the appellate court affirmed. In 2009, again pro se, he sought leave to file a successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)), alleging that he had just discovered that, after serving his sentence, he will be subject to an additional three-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). MSR was not mentioned when he was sentenced, which, he claimed, denied him due process. The trial and appellate court rejected his argument. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Criminal Code states that for this offense, the three-year MSR term shall be included in the sentence “as though written therein.” The Post-Conviction Hearing Act states that a petitioner must show “cause” for failure to raise his claim earlier. This claimed defect can never be “cause” because the petitioner is presumptively charged with knowledge of mandatory supervised release as a matter of law. The court recommended that the legislature address more specifically how one seeking leave to file a successive post-conviction petition meets the statutory requirements of showing cause and prejudice. View "People v. Evans" on Justia Law

Between 2002 and 2004, the defendant assaulted his 11-year-old stepdaughter and her 13-year-old friend. While in pretrial custody, before he was charged, defendant said he wanted to talk about what happened but that he wanted guarantees of probation. The officers doing the interrogating told him that they could not give him any guarantees. The state argued at closing that these conversations were inculpatory as admissions of guilt. Defendant was convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, three counts of criminal sexual assault, five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and one count of possession of child pornography; he was sentenced to 75 years. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, finding plain error in the improper admittance of plea-related statements at trial, even though defendant had not previously raised this objection. The Illinois Supreme Court held that there was no plain error. For statements to be inadmissible as plea negotiations, it must be clear that an accused actually intended to plead guilty in exchange for a concession and that such an intention is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. This defendant’s intent to engage in plea negotiations was not shown. View "People v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with five counts of burglary, pled guilty in 2009 and received a sentence of 2 years’ probation and 180 days in jail. He was ordered to pay a public defender fee of $200 after the judge questioned him about his employment. In 2010, he was sentenced to six years in prison after having been found to have violated his probation. In his appeal, defendant contended that the hearing on his ability to pay the defender fee had been inadequate, that it was too late for a remand because the statute calls for a hearing within 90 days of judgment, and that no hearing could be held at all and that the fee should be vacated. The appellate court remanded for a new hearing. The supreme court affirmed. The perfunctory hearing was inadequate and the defendant was entitled to a new hearing of the quality set forth by statute. There is no reason why the trial court’s error should be uncorrectable on appeal. View "People v. Somers" on Justia Law

Consolidated Grain maintains a grain elevator in La Salle County, sold Rogowski’s crops, and gave him the proceeds by checks paid directly to him. The bank had lent money to Rogowski for which he signed a note and granted the bank a security interest in his crops and any proceeds of their sale. The bank notified Consolidated of its lien by two written notices, one covering crop years 2004 and 2005 and the other covering years 2005 and 2006. The notices listed as covered agricultural commodities “all grain on hand, all growing crops,” without listing their amount or location. The bank obtained a deficiency judgment against Rogowski in 2008, which remains unsatisfied, then sought payment from Consolidated. The trial court ruled in favor of the bank. The appellate court reversed and the supreme court affirmed. The Federal Food Security Act of 1985 provides how notices of security interests are to be worded and provides that there must be a statement of “each county or parish in which the farm products are produced or located,” The court rejected a “substantial compliance” argument and held that the notices were insufficient for failing to strictly comply with the Act. View "State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Chicago police in an unmarked car saw the defendant yelling “dro, dro” to a passing vehicle, in front of a Chicago Housing Authority building, in an area known for marijuana sales. The arresting officer testified said that “dro, dro” is slang for the sale of cannabis, and case law has recognized that this refers to a higher quality, or hydroponic, marijuana. The defendant was arrested for violation of a municipal ordinance forbidding the solicitation of unlawful business on a public way. At the scene, plastic bags containing what appeared to be cannabis were found on his person, and, at the police station, plastic bags of what later tested positive for cocaine were also found in his clothing. All took place without a warrant. The circuit court denied a motion to suppress; the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court, reversed finding that there was probable cause to arrest. The court noted that the police testimony was unrebutted; facts known to police at the time of the arrest provided reasonable grounds to believe defendant was committing a criminal offense.View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law

In 1997, at age 15 and without a drivers’ license, Jackson was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. The Secretary of State created a driving record, issued a license number, then suspended the license under 625 ILCS 5/11- 501.1(h). In 1998 he was charged with driving on a suspended license. He was convicted. In 2006 Jackson obtained a new license, answering no to a question as to whether his license had ever been suspended. He was later cited for speeding and driving without insurance. In 2011 he was charged with a Class 4 felony of driving on a suspended license. Jackson argued that the statute denied him due process by preventing him from presenting evidence that he thought he had a valid license. The circuit court declared the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, holding that the case can be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds and was not subject to direct appeal. The issue concerns proof of the elements of the offense, not constitutionality. The defendant is entitled to present evidence that he did possess a valid license, while the state may offer rebuttal that he misled authorities into reinstating his driving privilege by providing erroneous information. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the 2004 shooting death of a man whose body was found in a garbage can. He gave a statement, but would not sign it and did not testify at trial. There was testimony that defendant had stated that he had a homosexual relationship with the victim, that they had argued, and that defendant had shot the victim before dragging the body outside. Police searched defendant’s residence with his consent. It had been cleaned; no inculpatory evidence or usable fingerprints were found. The defense offered testimony as to defendant’s mild retardation. There was testimony that the condition of the body was consistent with having been dropped on the sidewalk and dragged. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, based on purportedly inadequate jury questioning, but, following a supervisory order, affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court then affirmed. The trial court erred in failing to ask prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted the principle that failure to testify should not be held against defendant, and in failing to ask whether they understood three other principles, but the objections were defaulted for failure to raise them during voir dire or by post-trial motion. The evidence was not close. View "People v. Wilmington" on Justia Law

Lake Holiday, a private community, is governed by the Association, which enacted restrictive covenants, rules, and regulations, including rules that concern speed limits, impose fines, provide for enforcement of rules by private security officers, and require residents to provide security officers with identification when requested to do so. Plaintiff owns property in the development and was driving within the development, when a private security officer measured plaintiff’s speed, pulled plaintiff over, took plaintiff’s license, detained plaintiff for a few minutes, and issued a citation. In his third amended complaint plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the practices of the security department were unlawful and that the rules and regulations were void and alleged breach of fiduciary duty and willful and wanton conduct and false imprisonment. The trial court granted defendants summary judgments. The appellate court held that the practice of recording drivers was not a violation of the eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), nor was the security department prohibited from using radar, but that the Association was not authorized by the Vehicle Code to use amber lights on its vehicles and that stopping and detaining drivers for Association rule violations was unlawful. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, in favor of the Association. View "Poris v. Lake Holiday Prop. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

English, was charged with knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)), felony murder predicated on aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3)), and aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a)), based on the death of his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter. Convicted of felony murder and aggravated battery of a child, he was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. The appellate court held that the court did not err by not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter, but that the sentencing statute violated Illinois’ single-subject rule. On remand, he was sentenced to 50 years. While direct appeal was pending, English filed a post-conviction petition, which he voluntarily dismissed in 2003. In 2004, he filed another post-conviction petition, which the court treated as successive and dismissed. The appellate court held that it had no jurisdiction to consider dismissal of the 2004 petition, but that the court erred in declining to reinstate the 1999 petition. On remand, English argued that his felony-murder conviction was improper because the acts constituting the aggravated battery of a child arose from, and were inherent in, the killing. The circuit court denied the petition as barred by res judicata because it was related to the claim raised on direct appeal regarding jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. View "People v. English" on Justia Law