Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the younger child, a boy aged 2½ years, was brought to the emergency room by his mother. He had second-degree burns on his face. His mother had found him, injured, at the home of her boyfriend, who had been babysitting her two children. She did not live with the boyfriend. The children were determined to be neglected based on a finding of “environment injurious to their welfare.” The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, noting that the evidence did not show that the mother had any prior indication that the boyfriend would not provide a safe environment and also noting that she immediately took the child to the hospital. The finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

Stanbridge served time for aggravated criminal sex abuse concerning a 1999 Adams County; Lieberman was convicted of multiple Cook County counts of rape in 1980. Both were committed to the Department of Human Services under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1), which establishes a framework under which persons who have been convicted of certain sex offenses may be subjected to further civil detention after service of their criminal sentences. Their petitions for release were dismissed by the circuit courts. In Stanbridge’s case, the appellate court reversed, but as to Lieberman, dismissal was affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed (reinstated) dismissal of the petitions, clarifying the evidence required at post-commitment hearings for discharge or release. There must be a plausible account on each of the required elements of the petition, demonstrating a change in the circumstances that led to the initial commitment. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to bring forward sufficient evidence. In both of the proceedings at issue, the evidence did not, essentially, present anything new; there was no “plausible account” showing that the individual should no longer be civilly committed as sexually violent. View "In re the Detention of Stanbridge" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of committing multiple sex offenses concerning his 14-year-old daughter in 2007 and 2008. The convictions were for two counts of criminal sexual assault, one count of criminal transmission of HIV, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant had HIV, knew it, and took medication for it. He did not always wear a condom, but the victim did not contract the disease. The appellate court reduced the conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault to criminal sexual assault; the supreme court affirmed. Section 12-14(a)(3) of the Criminal Code provides for aggravation of a criminal sexual assault if the offender “during the commission of the offense … acted in such a manner as to threaten or endanger the life of the victim.” Mere exposure of the victim to HIV during the commission of the offense did not threaten or endanger her life. The court noted that the sentence for criminal transmission of HIV should be consecutive to the others. View "People v. Giraud" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty in 2006 to aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a minor and received a 14-year term. He had originally been indicted for offenses involving several minor victims between 1995 and 1998. Some charges were nol-prossed in 1999 and the state attempted to have defendant involuntarily committed as sexually dangerous (725 ILCS 205/0.01). After a 2004 remand, the state did not seek commitment a second time, but proceeded with criminal prosecution and agreed to dismiss remaining counts except one. Considering time already spent in custody, it was anticipated that defendant would soon be sent home. However, two weeks after the plea, the Attorney General (not the State’s Attorney) sought commitment under a different statute, the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1). A motion to withdraw the guilty plea was denied; the appellate and supreme courts affirmed. Where an accused pleads guilty to an offense which could trigger the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, defense counsel has a minimal duty to advise him that, after completing his prison term, he will be evaluated and may risk involuntary commitment, but defendant failed to showing that he was denied effective assistance or prejudiced: that he could establish actual innocence or a plausible defense. View "People v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a police station and reported that he had strangled his wife to death. Although there had been an argument and a struggle, he claimed that the death was an accident. At trial, defense counsel argued that the evidence showed, at most, recklessness and involuntary manslaughter. Leach was convicted of first degree murder, based on knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The court properly admitted testimony of a qualified expert that it would take three to six minutes for a person to die from strangulation. Leach raised constitutional confrontation issues because the autopsy report, concluding that the death was a homicide, was made by a pathologist who had retired before trial and could not be cross-examined. A different expert testified, based on the report. The routine autopsy report is not testimonial and not subject to the “Crawford” rule even if the examiner is aware that police suspect homicide and a specific individual. It was not prepared for the primary purpose of criminal prosecution. Any error was harmless given that Leach did not dispute the manner and cause of death or that he was guilty of some form of homicide. View "People v. Leach" on Justia Law

A sex offender pled guilty to criminal sexual assault, to failing to register as a sex offender, and to subsequently failing to register a change of address. A 12-year sentence was imposed for the assault; different judges later imposed concurrent sentences of two and three years for his registration convictions. The State’s Attorney sought a writ of mandamus, claiming that consecutive sentences were required by law. The supreme court agreed with the State’s Attorney, construing the section 5-8-4(d)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(2)) and finding that criminal sexual assault is a “triggering” event for purposes of consecutive sentencing. Although the two registration offenses may themselves be the subject of concurrent sentences, the term for criminal sexual assault must be served first. View "People v. Meersman" on Justia Law

Tate was convicted for a 2001 fatal shooting. Four eyewitnesses identified him. The appellate court affirmed. Tate retained counsel and filed a post-conviction petition, attaching affidavits of alibi witnesses and of occurrence witnesses. Tate alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to call these witnesses. Although this issue had not been raised by post-trial motion, the supreme court found that there was no forfeiture. The circuit court nonetheless summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed. Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, a petition may be dismissed, initially, if it is “frivolous or patently without merit.” If this does not occur, the court determines whether there is a substantial showing of a constitutional violation meriting an evidentiary hearing. Most petitions are filed pro se. The state argued that Tate should be held to the higher standard of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, because he had counsel. The court rejected the argument. Tate’s petition could survive the first stage if it was arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and if it was arguable that he was prejudiced.View "People v. Tate" on Justia Law

In 2003, the doctor was charged by the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation with violating the Illinois Medical Practice Act in connection with electro-convulsive shock treatment of a patient. Administrative proceedings were stayed while the doctor pursued, among other things, a claim that a provision of the Department’s rules concerning evidentiary hearsay was invalid. The circuit court invalidated the rule in 2005, but later vacated its judgment. The appellate court reinstated the invalidation ruling in 2007, and the Department closed the case without prejudice in 2008. The doctor then filed a petition for a statutory award of his litigation expenses. The circuit court refused to award the fees, but the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the denial, stating that the statutory fees that are available for invalidating an administrative rule must be sought while there is still jurisdiction over the matter. The doctor waited 33 months after the original circuit court order invalidating the rule and more than one year after the appellate court reinstated that order. The courts no longer maintained jurisdiction to hear his fee petition.View "Rodriquez v. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation" on Justia Law

The Rosenwinkels purchased 160 acres in Kendall County in 1991 and began cattle operations in 1992. Across the road was a farm house, at least 100 years old; in 1991, the tenant moved out and the house was vacant. In 1998, the Toftoys demolished the house. They built a new home, completed in 2004. In 2007, they filed a nuisance action complaining about flies. The Rosenwinkels sought protection under the Farm Nuisance Suit Act (740 ILCS 70/1). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the Toftoys and ordered remedial measures, including removal of moist bedding and manure. The appellate court affirmed, except as to the remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that plaintiffs did not acquire property rights until six years after the farm began operating, beyond the Act’s one-year limitation. By “coming to the nuisance,” plaintiffs were barred from suit. The Act is a “right-to-farm” law to limit nuisance actions and preserve use of farmland. It provides that no farm “shall be or become a private or public nuisance because of any changed conditions in the surrounding area” when the farm has been in existence for one year and was not a nuisance when it began operations. View "Toftoy et al., etc., v. Rosenwinkel et al." on Justia Law

Chicago issued plaintiff, Downtown Disposal, notices for violating ordinances pertaining to dumpsters and requiring Downtown Disposal to appear at administrative hearings on various dates. When Downtown Disposal failed to appear, the department of administrative hearings entered default judgments for costs and penalties. Van Tholen, president of Downtown Disposal, moved to set aside the judgments, alleging the company did not receive notice. At a consolidated hearing, Van Tholen advised the hearing officer that for five years, Downtown Disposal had made several attempts to change its address on file with the city, but the city had not changed its records. The hearing officer rejected the argument. Van Tholen filled out and signed pro se complaints for administrative review, using preprinted forms supplied by the clerk’s office. Attorney Boonstra later filed appearances on behalf of Downtown Disposal. The trial court dismissed, holding that actions filed by nonattorneys on behalf of a corporation are null and void. The appellate court reversed and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. An attorney’s signature was not jurisdictional and its absence did not render the proceedings null and void. Application of the nullity rule would be harsh since no purpose underlying the rule was implicated and an alternative remedy was available. View "Downtown Disposal Servs. Inc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law