Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Parents of adopted sons, Austin, 16, and Ricky, 15, retained counsel to represent both. Each was charged with misdemeanor criminal sexual abuse of other boys under foster care in the household. After a joint bench proceeding, the petition against Ricky was denied. The circuit court found that an admission Austin purportedly made to police was sufficient to prove the charges. He was adjudicated a delinquent minor and sentenced to probation. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed. A minor accused of delinquency has a non-waivable right to a defense attorney. In addition to representing accuseds jointly, counsel allowed presentation of videotaped statements of the alleged victims in lieu of live testimony, which could have been cross-examined. Counsel never argued that Austin’s purported statement was involuntary or sought to suppress it, despite evidence that Austin was questioned aggressively and had diminished mental capabilities. The representation was not the type of counsel guaranteed by due process and the Juvenile Court Act. The court and counsel indicated that they viewed the attorney as functioning as a guardian ad litem. There is a per se conflict where counsel attempts to perform as guardian ad litem and defense counsel in a delinquency proceeding. The evidence was sufficient that there was no double jeopardy bar to a new trial. View "In re Austin M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured at work, filed a product liability complaint, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz,” the name he used at work. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, naming additional defendants, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz.” Plaintiff identified himself as “Juan Ortiz” in discovery documents. In a deposition, plaintiff stated that his birth name was “Rogasciano Santiago,” but that he had also used the name “Juan Ortiz.” The trial court allowed a second amended complaint to identify plaintiff as “Rogasciano Santiago, f/k/a Juan Ortiz.” The appellate court held that, when a plaintiff intentionally files a complaint using a fictitious name, without leave of court pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-401, the court may dismiss with prejudice and that amendment, after expiration of the limitations period, to correct plaintiff’s name, requires dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A court has discretion to dismiss with prejudice a complaint filed using a fictitious name without leave of court. Dismissal is justified only when there is a clear record of willful conduct showing deliberate and continuing disregard for judicial authority and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate to remedy harm to the judiciary and prejudice to the opposing party. The original complaint is not a nullity, per se, and an amended complaint correcting the name may relate back to initial filing. View "Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were sexually abused by their teacher, White, at an Urbana school. Before working in Urbana, White was a teacher in the McLean County school district. Plaintiffs filed suit against White, Urbana, individual administrators, the McLean County district, and individual McLean administrators. Plaintiffs alleged that between 2002 and 2005, McLean administrators acquired actual knowledge of White’s teacher-on-student sexual harassment, sexual abuse, or sexual “grooming” of minor female students, but never recorded these incidents in White’s personnel file or employment record, failed to make timely mandated reports of abuse by White, and failed to investigate parental complaints. According to the complaint McLean disciplined White for “sexual harassment, sexual grooming, and/or sexual abuse” of minor female students, then entered into a severance agreement with White which concealed his sexual abuse of students and created a falsely positive letter of reference for White. The trial court dismissed with respect to the McLean defendants, finding they owed no duty. The appellate and supreme courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The state sovereign immunity law does not extend to conduct that is willful or wanton, 745 ILCS 10/2-202; the alleged fact are sufficient to establish that, having undertaken the affirmative act of filling out White’s employment verification form,defendants had a duty to use reasonable care in ensuring that the information was accurate. View "Jane Doe-3 v. McLean Cnty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs." on Justia Law

Hackett was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A), and aggravated driving while license revoked, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3). He moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle so that evidence gathered after the improper stop constituted fruit of an unlawful search. The stated basis for the stop was improper lane usage. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, finding that momentary crossings of a highway lane line did not give the officer reasonable grounds to make the stop. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To establish probable cause that a violation of the lane usage statute has occurred, the officer must point to facts which support a reasonable belief that defendant has deviated from his established lane of travel and that it was “practicable” for him to have remained constant in his proper lane. A traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause. Here, a police officer observes multiple lane deviations, for no obvious reason; an investigatory stop was proper. View "People v. Hackett" on Justia Law

In 2004 an ambulance, answering an emergency call, drove through a stop sign and was hit by a passenger vehicle that had the stop sign in its favor. The injured driver of the passenger car sued the ambulance driver and Massac County Hospital, for which he worked, and recovered $667,216.30 for negligence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the situation was governed by the Vehicle Code, not by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, which protects local public entities and their employees from liability for injuries "caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle or firefighting or rescue equipment, when responding to an emergency call." The Vehicle Code imposes duties on drivers of both public and private emergency vehicles to refrain from negligence. The supreme court reversed. The evidence was insufficient to establish the willful and wanton conduct that might preclude municipal immunity. The statutes at issue are not in conflict; each governs in its own sphere. Under the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act, the legislature has chosen to grant immunity from negligence liability to public employees and employers, such as the driver and hospital, and this result is not abrogated by the Vehicle Code. View "Harris v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant, a man in his early thirties, had consensual sexual relations with a girl he knew was 17 years old. He took pictures of the activity with his cell phone. The pictures were found by the girl's mother, who complained to police, but who was initially told that the girl was too old to be considered a victim under the statutes concerning sexual abuse or sexual assault. Defendant was ultimately convicted under the child pornography statute, which set a higher age limit for the age (18) at which a teenager may legally consent to be photographed while engaged in sexual activity. The age of consent for sexual activity remains at 17. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that it was unfair to criminalize the photographing of a lawful activity and that this discrepancy was an as-applied denial of due process, equal protection, and the Illinois constitutional right to privacy. The court applied the rational basis test and found there to be a reasonable basis for the legislative decision. View "People v. Hollins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant, both women, met in 2005 through a chatroom connected with a television series. Defendant, in Illinois, used her own name and aliases to communicate with plaintiff, in Los Angeles. One alias was that of a man, and a romantic relationship developed through the Internet, telephone, and mail. Defendant disguised her female identity using a voice-altering device. Plaintiff purchased airline tickets for a meeting in Denver, but her new “boyfriend” cancelled the plans. Plaintiff was informed that he had attempted suicide. In 2006 the two planned to live together in Colorado, but defendant subsequently informed plaintiff, using another alias, that the man had died of cancer. The deception continued for seven more months until plaintiff’s real friends confronted defendant and obtained a videotaped admission as to what had occurred. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and seeking damages for the cost of a therapist, lost earnings, and emotional distress, was dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that claims made in the previous complaint, but not incorporated into the third amended complaint, had been abandoned. The supreme court affirmed, holding that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation does not apply to a personal relationship with no commercial component. View "Bonhomme v. St. James" on Justia Law

The driver pled guilty to DUI in 2009. Although the Illinois Vehicle Code and the Unified Code of Corrections provide that a fourth DUI conviction is a nonprobational Class 2 felony, the driver, who had three prior DUIs, was sentenced to only probation, in the amount of 48 months. Relying on appellate court precedent, the court accepted his argument that his 2000 conviction should not be considered for sentence-enhancement because he had pled guilty without legal counsel. The State’s Attorney objected and sought mandamus. The supreme court entered an order directing sentencing in accordance with the statute, overruling the 1991 appellate decision in light of a 1994 Supreme Court decision, Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, which indicates that a valid uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is also valid when used to enhance punishment as to a subsequent conviction. View "People v. Kinney" on Justia Law

The parties, who had twin children, divorced in 2007, while husband was unemployed. The issue of child support was reserved. The husband lived off assets that had been awarded to him as part of the marital estate, withdrawing about $8,500 from his savings account each month. The wife, who had custody, subsequently petitioned for child support, and, in 2010, was awarded $2,000 a month, even though the husband was still unemployed. For two children, the statutory guideline refers to 28 percent of net income, defined as “the total of all income from all sources,” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3). The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court set aside the support order, remanding for specific findings and recalculation. The amount withdrawn from savings should not be considered “income” because the money already belonged to husband. However, if use of the statutory guidelines then generates a support amount that the trial court finds inappropriate, it should make a specific finding to that effect and then adjust the support amount accordingly. One factor it can consider is “the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.” View "In re Marriage of McGrath" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of armed robbery while armed with a firearm and home invasion while armed with a firearm, Class X offenses, received concurrent terms of 25 years’ imprisonment. Both crimes had initial sentencing ranges of six to 30 years, plus a 15-year enhancement for use of a firearm, which made each range, 21 to 45 years. Defendant challenged his sentence for armed robbery with a firearm by comparison to the range for armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I or II weapon. The crimes had identical elements, but the other crime had a sentencing range of only 15 to 30 years; he argued and that this discrepancy violated the proportionality clause of the Illinois Constitution. In 2007, the legislature eliminated the overlap between armed robbery and armed violence. The appellate court applied the identical-elements test and remanded for resentencing under the armed robbery statute as it existed before the 2000 effective date of the firearm enhancements. The supreme court affirmed, declining to overrule the identical-elements test, which it characterized as an objective, straightforward and bright-line test. Remanding for resentencing under the armed violence statute would be improper because defendant had never been charged with that offense.View "People v. Clemons" on Justia Law