Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury awarded more than $20 million for the death of three persons in a 2002 collision between a car and a tractor-trailer. Original defendants included the truck driver, his employer, the owner of the load being carried, the owner of the tractor (Adler), and the owner of the semi-trailer. The driver and his employer obtained a substitution of judge, but a second motion to substitute the judge was denied on the ground that it had been requested by the same entity (employer) operating under a different name. A motion for substitution brought by the Adler was denied on the ground that the determination concerning the employer was a substantial ruling. Section 2-1001(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives all defendants the right to one substitution of judge, provided no substantial ruling has yet been made in the case. The appellate court ordered a new trial. The parties agreed to dismiss Adler, releasing it from liability. The Supreme Court vacated the new trial order, but remanded on other issues. Once Adler, whose request to substitute had been denied, was no longer in the case, no other defendant had standing to challenge that denial. View "Powell v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired as a public school basketball coach in 1999, and made athletic director in 2003, was fired as coach in 2008, following a campaign based on his allegedly abusive and bullying style of coaching. He filed suit for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy to intentionally interfere with prospective business advantage, and slander per se. The trial court dismissed as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under the Citizen Participation Act, 735 ILCS 110/15. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The purpose of the Act is to protect citizens who are attempting to speak freely or petition government from retaliatory meritless lawsuits, intended to chill exercise of constitutional rights and impose burdensome expenses. The special summary dismissal under the Act, without discovery, allows attorney fees. For SLAPP protections to apply, plaintiff's claim must be solely based on the movant's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government. The Act is not intended to apply to tortious acts and does not create a new privilege concerning defamation. It is possible that defendants could spread lies about plaintiff while at the same time genuinely petitioning government for redress, but such a situation cannot support dismissal as a SLAPP.View "Sandholm v. Kuecker" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped for driving on a suspended license, got out of his car, and was searched. An officer testified that he found a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance in defendant's pocket. Another officer testified that the sergeant pulled the bag out of defendant's pocket and never retrieved anything from the ground. The substance tested positive for cocaine. The defendant testified that the drug was planted. The prosecutor argued to the jury that the testimony of a police officer should be believed because he would not risk "his credibility, his job, and his freedom" by lying, but no evidence was presented that such consequences would occur. Defendant was sentenced to five years in prison for possession of 0.8 grams of cocaine. The appellate court reversed, finding the prosecutorial statements improper. The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The comments were improper because no evidence was presented that officers risked their careers by testifying falsely, but it was not plain error because the defendant's version of events was highly improbable and the jury was instructed that arguments are not evidence. The error was not so serious as to affect the fairness of the trial and challenge the integrity of the judicial process. View "People v. Adams" on Justia Law

The attorney, admitted to practice in Illinois in 1969, was the subject of a 2004 Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission complaint following convictions relating to driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while his license was revoked. The state Supreme Court issued an order suspending him from the practice of law for a period of 18 months, and ordering him to reimburse the Disciplinary Fund for any client protection payments arising from his conduct. In 2007 the ARDC charged him with misrepresentation to a tribunal and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. The Hearing Board found proven misconduct and recommended suspension for two years, but the Review Board recommended dismissal of the charges. The Supreme Court suspended him for one year. While the violations primarily involved representation of the attorney's own bankrupt company and occurred within days of the suspension, the attorney attempted to conceal the misconduct and refused to admit wrongdoing. View "In re: Thomas" on Justia Law

Forfeiture proceedings were instituted concerning three vehicles; each had multiple owners, and, in each case, one of the owners was charged with aggravated DUI. The trial court declared the vehicle-forfeiture provisions of the Criminal Code facially unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process for lack of a provision requiring a prompt probable cause hearing after seizure of a vehicle but before trial of the forfeiture action. A new statute, effective January 1, 2012, provides for such hearings. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court looked to U.S. Supreme Court decisions and reversed. The statutory scheme does not mandate the return of a vehicle just because one of the owners demonstrates innocence. Only one of the owners need give consent to use of a vehicle in the commission of an offense for the vehicle to be subject to forfeiture, and there is no constitutional requirement for an innocent-owner defense in a forfeiture proceeding. In most cases such as this, a prompt determination of probable cause is made in connection with the underlying criminal prosecution. In the Criminal Code, the forfeiture provisions themselves comport with due process, and there is no constitutional requirement for additional procedures. View "People v. One 1998 GMC" on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)). She requested that the state produce the video recording of the stop made by the camera located in the arresting officer's vehicle. The recording had been destroyed as part of a regular purge. The circuit court granted defendant's motion for sanctions and barred the state from introducing testimony concerning what was contained on the videotape. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The state was placed on notice by defendant to produce the recording of her stop and arrest in the civil statutory summary suspension proceedings and took no action to preserve it; the sanction was reasonable. View "People v. Kladis" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a), and failing to report an accident involving death or injury (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) after a collision resulting in one death and injuries to three people, filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel other than the county public defender and other motions, based on ineffective assistance. The trial court declined to consider the untimely motions. The appellate court reduced the failing to report conviction, held that the trial court erred in ordering defendant to serve 85% of his reckless homicide sentence, and remanded the pro se motions. The Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court erred in failing to conduct a preliminary examination into the factual basis of motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. While a motion for a new trial must be filed within 30 days of the entry of a finding or return of a verdict, an exception exists if a defendant is seeking a new trial based on claims of ineffective assistance and the claim is raised before a notice of appeal is filed. View "People v. Patrick" on Justia Law

An undercover agent made a controlled purchase of heroin from the defendant. Evidence showed that the transaction took place 443 feet from the "High Mountain Church and Preschool." Defendant was convicted of delivering a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class 1 felony. The appellate court reduced the conviction to simple delivery (a Class 2 felony) after finding that a preschool is not a "school" within the meaning of section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The supreme court affirmed. The 1991 amendment that added the "school" provision also amended or created numerous other acts to increase the penalty for various offenses taking place on or around school grounds; it defined "school" as "any public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college or university." Precedent has interpreted the Act accordingly, not encompassing a preschool.View "People v. Young" on Justia Law

The State of Illinois maintains a state park on land that was once a college founded in the nineteenth century. The township sought quiet title to two parcels comprising the park. The state has a sign on the land and mows the grass, but no legal instruments have been recorded against the parcels since the original survey and plat in 1860 by the college. When the plat was certified, the parcels complied with requirements for a statutory dedication. The dedication was impliedly accepted by the township and fee simple vested in the public. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the township quieting title, finding no lack of jurisdiction. It also affirmed on the merits, declining to reach, as premature, a claim that the township wanted to sell land that must be preserved for public purposes. The supreme court affirmed. In the initial filing by the township, the state could not have been sued in circuit court, but the state went beyond defending itself when it subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the circuit court to assert its own claim that it was entitled to have title quieted in its favor.View "Township of Jubilee v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

The manufacturer notified franchise dealers that it was discontinuing the Sterling (a subsidiary of Daimler) line of trucks. The letter offered dealers the opportunity to continue as a service dealership under a new agreement. Plaintiff, a dealer, was warned that, following the termination of the existing agreement, if it did not sign the general release and agree to terminate its Sterling franchise, Daimler Trucks would not renew its Detroit Diesel Direct Dealer Agreement. Daimler later terminated that agreement, which plaintiff alleges prevented it from obtaining parts at wholesale and performing warranty work on Detroit Diesel engines. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, 815 ILCS 710/1 and claims of breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and fraud. The circuit court dismissed all but two counts. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear several counts under the Act, because those counts should have been brought before the Motor Vehicle Review Board. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp." on Justia Law